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VO/C/t/ 
Copyright means the sole right to produce or reproduce 
whole the work or any substantial part thereof in any material 
whatsoever and the copyright in a work shall be deemed infringed 
by any person who, does anything, the sole right to do which is 
conferred on the owner of the copyright. 
Legal protection of author's rights is relatively young. It got 
its Phillip In the aftermath of Industrial Revolution. The first 
Copyright Statute, thus, dates back only to less than three hun-
dred years. 
Copyright has a special role to play in today's world, particu-
larly in the context of development. In the course of development 
programmes and in the attempts towards a new International 
Economic Order, due emphasis is being laid on the development 
of science and education as a means to economic development. 
There has, thus, been a marked realisation in a number of 
developing countries including India of the need to protect literary 
and artistic works as a source of social progress and cultural 
development. Copyright protection involves ensuring not only 
payment of attractive and reasonable royalties to the authors, but 
also suitable protection for publishers, for the opportunity avail-
able to an author to have his works disseminated depends equally 
on the laws protecting publishers. It is increasingly apparent that 
the spread of education and improvement of educational stan-
dards is the very basis of the development process, so is the need 
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for an effective copyright system to encourage national intellec-
tual creativity in order to sustain the development process itself. 
Any country wishing to stimulate or inspire its ov\/n authors, 
composers or artists, and thus, augment its national cultural 
heritage, must provide effective copyright protection. This calls 
for an updated national copyright legislation, v\/hich has to be 
framed with due regard to the national needs and in a manner that 
best serves the national interests. Such a legislation should 
provide for the protection not only of the creators of Intellectual 
Work but also of those (the Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Broadcasting Organisations) who help in the dissemination 
of such works, in respect of their own rights. 
Today, we are surrounded by technological marvels - radio 
and television broadcasting (terrestrial and by satellite), cable 
distribution systems, audio and video recording, reprography in 
all its forms, and computers - and skills to link these technologies 
into vast multifacility networks. Reprography, tape - recording and 
computer storage have made reproduction of works easy as well 
as comparatively inexpensive and within a reach of such a large 
number of users that control of reproduction by the copyright 
owners is often impossible. Cable television and satellite broad-
casts could ignore national boundries making effective control 
very difficult indeed. Then the latest and probably the greatest 
development in the whole history of Information Technology has 
come by as a result of fast developing Internet. The Internet, with 
nearly 90 million persons connected, is the biggest single phe-
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nomenon showing that the global village is within our reach. There 
are 100,000 Web Sites already and the number doubles every 
two-and-a-half months. This new development of Internet has 
given rise among others, to intricate issues relating to copyright 
law. The Internet and the World Wide Pages are full of Copyright 
material being used or published by people other than the cre-
ators. The Copyright laws do not specifically include materials 
sent zooming around the Internet in email, binary files or as World 
Wide Pages and, thus, there is an urgent need to extend copyright 
laws to them. It is the jurisdictional wrangles that make Internet 
copyright violators think that they are above the law. 
It is in this background thatthe present study wishes to make 
an indepth analysis of aforesaid issues which have a bearing on 
our national life. 
To keep pace with the new technological developments, the 
Indian Copyright Act, 1957 was amended in 1983 & 1984. The 
wave of liberalisation of Indian economy was, indeed, a positive 
and major step in the direction of free-market and competition. But 
out-dated copyright law was a major hurdle in integrating India 
with the international business community. The United States, 
infact, did keep India as a black listed trade partner under the 
notoriously called Super 301 and asked India to make its Patent, 
Copyright and Trademark laws more effective and at par with 
International Standards. It was at this stage that Copyright (Sec-
ond Amendment) Bill, 1992 was introduced in the Parliament. The 
present study was designed around this time. It is, indeed. 
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heartening to note that the said Bill was finally passed and 
assented to in 1994. The present work proposed to undertake a 
comparative study of Indian copyright law with that of copyright 
laws of United Kingdom and United States. It was thought proper 
to study English Copyright law not only because Indian law on the 
subject has heavily borrowed from the former but also due to 
India's historical links with Great Britain. The choice of United 
States was again made for two reasons, first, the United States 
Copyright law has also for historical reasons been influenced by 
the British Common law and secondly, as in the early years of 
Independence from Britian, United States opted for national 
needs rather than the copyright protection, how far India can 
benefit from the United States's experiences when in the changed 
global scenario, it is the United States itself which threatened 
India to update its copyright regime. The study, thus, wishes to 
test the hypothesis that Indian Copyright law is highly inadequate 
as compared to Copyright laws of United Kingdom and United 
States even after the latest amendment. 
Using the research techniques both doctrinaire as well as 
comparative methods of research, the study has been divided into 
twelve chapters : 
Chapter one or introduction discusses the ideology of copy-
right, justification of copyright, major systems of copyright in the 
world, the research problem, the scope of the study, the survey of 
existing literature etc. 
Chapter two makes an attempt to give historical account of 
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copyright law. It discusses the copyright in antiquity, middle ages 
and the effect of invention of printing on the copyright law. An effort 
has been made to examine various International Conventions on 
the question of copyright. The historical background of copyright 
law in U.K., U.S.A. and India has also been surveyed. 
Chapter three investigates the question of subject - matter 
of copyright and the rights which the copyright law confers on the 
authors. It discusses the varied treatment in different countries as 
to the question what should be copyrightable. The issue of moral 
rights of authors and their significance is also examined. 
Chapter four examines the question of copyright protection 
under Internatinal law. It discusses the issues of treatment of 
foreigners in copyright law, principles of International Copyright 
Conventions, national treatment, limitations of the principle of 
national treatment and the system of applying International Copy-
right Conventions to the national law. 
Chapters five to eight, examine the vital aspects of subjects 
of copyright in the three countries. Only such subjects have been 
taken which have been affected by the new technological devel-
opments and about which the law has been recently amended in 
the countries selected by the present study. 
Chapter five, thus, deals with the question of copyright in 
literary, dramatic and musical works. The issue of "originality" 
and various types of works protected as literary, dramatic & 
musical works form the subject matter of this chapter. 
Chapter six examines the question of copyright in computer 
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programs and computer generated works. The copyright in screen 
display, databases, problems relating to ownership of copyright 
when the computer program has been developed by freelance 
staff etc. have also been discussed. 
Chapter seven discusses an important area of copyright i.e. 
copyright in architectural designs. The question of ownership of 
copyright of an architects' work during the course of employment 
or where his services were only partially hired are discussed. The 
question of publication as to architectural designs and recent 
legislative changes in this regard are also examined. 
Chapter eight discusses the crusial issue of performers 
rights under copyright laws. It examines the status of a performer 
in the three countries under study and the recent amendments in 
this regard. The judicial response in this regard is also put to 
critical evaluation. 
Chapter nine discusses the most vital area of neighbouring 
rights with emphasis on International Conventions. The Rome 
Convention, Stockholm Convention and Phonogram Convention 
are discussed in at length. The challenges posed by satellite and 
cable transmission are also taken care of. 
Chapter ten discusses the question of infringement of copy-
right in U.K., U.S.A. and India. The various types of infringements 
and issues relating to them arc examined. The defences available 
in a case of infringement of copyright and controversies relating 
to them have also been discussed. The "fair-use" defence is also 
studied in all its manifestations. 
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Chapter eleven examines the civil and criminal remedies 
available under the three copyright systems in case of an infringe-
ment of copyright. It makes an indepth study of judicially created 
remedies such as Anton Pillor Order. The recent legislative 
activity as to criminal remadies is also taken care of. 
Chapter twelve sums up the whole study and discusses the 
various conclusions which can be derived from other wise inde-
pendent and self explanatory chapters of this study. The future 
challenges to the copyright law are discussed in great details. The 
suggestions for further reforming and making Indian law more 
effective are also discussed & further areas of researches indi-
cated. 
Holding the entire study in retrospect, following broad con-
clusions can easily be drawn. 
It emerges from the study that the idea of copyright protec-
tion only began to emerge with the invention of printing, which 
made it possible for literary works to be duplicated by mechanical 
processes. The study brings out the conceptual differences be-
tween the Anglo - United States systems on the one hand and Civil 
Law systems on the other. While the Common Law countries 
(U.K., U.S.A. & India) treat copyright, ineffect, as a form of 
property and lay emphasis on the economic rights of authors, the 
Civil law countries (notably France) in addition to economic rights, 
also emphasise moral rights of the authors and treat the work o' 
an author as an expression of his personality. But with the recent 
changes in the United Kingdom and Indian Copyright laws, moral 
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rights of authors have found a prominent place in the common law 
countries as well. 
As to the 'subject-matter of copyright', the study reveals that 
there is substantial similarity in the laws of the three countries 
studied here. In these three countries, there is a general agree-
ment that the quality or merit of a work are matters of taste and do 
not enter into the question of what is a work. Nor is there a 
prescribed degree of originality, ability or amount of skill and 
knowledge necessary to create the work, or a measure of re-
sources used to produce it. Unlike for a patent, where novelty is 
essential, there is no such requirement for copyright. It means no 
more than the creator can truthfully say - 'This is all my own work'. 
As to the categories of the works which are given copyright 
protection, the study has revealed that some national legislations 
(U.K., U.S.A. & India) contain a definition of the works protected, 
others do not (e.g. Italy). Broadly speaking, there are two catego-
ries of works. The first is the one which mentions works named in 
the Berne Convention 1886 : 'literary and artistic works' which 
include 'dramatic, musical and dramatico-musical works'. The 
second is a category of recent types of works, cinematograph 
films, sound recordings, broadcasts. The first category works are 
protected as copyright in the Common Law countries while term 
used for the second category in the Civil Law jurisdictions is 
neighbouring rights. 
As to the 'rights of authors', the study has revealed that 
economic rights of authors under the International Copyright 
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Conventions and in tlie national legislations are not uniform 
though there is substantial similarity in them as far as U.K., U.S.A. 
and India are concerned. These rights differ in the terminology. 
Several rights do overlap and the precise scope of each right 
varies from one country to another. One significant aspect of the 
1994 Indian Amendment in this regard is narrowing down of 
author's moral rights. Now, an author may restrain or claim 
damages in respect of any distortion, mutilation or modification of 
the work if it is done before the expiration of the term of copyright 
and if such acts would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation. 
However, an exception has been carved out in the law for adap-
tation of computer programs for the purposes of debugging. Moral 
rights have been narrowed down because the prior provisions 
whereby even distortion, mutilation and modification of the work 
which are not pre-judicial to the author's honour or reputation 
would violate tfie author's moral rights and were in excess of the 
requirements of the Berne Convention. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the provision of moral rights under Indian law goes well 
beyond the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement which exempts 
countries from any rights or obligation arising from the provisions 
of the Berne Convention on moral rights. Infact the exclusion of 
moral rights from the purview of the TRIPS Agreement reflects the 
lack of moral rights under American Copyright jurisprudence . 
Similarly on the issue of 'treatment of foreigners', the study 
has revealed apart from conventional protection, the copyright 
protection to foreign authors varies considerably. In the U.K., 
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works are protected if the maker at the time of publication is a 
qualified person (qualified persons are British and Irish nationals 
or person domiciled or resident in the U.K.) or if they are first 
published in the U.K. or an associated territory. The U.S. having 
won independence from Britian and wanting to create its own 
culture became protectionist. Copyright protection, thus, was 
granted only to American citizens and the residents in the U.S. 
Even a century later when copyright was gradually granted to 
some foreign authors (country by country), copies of foreign works 
had to be printed in the U.S. But the Indian law protects foreign 
authors in the same manner as its own nationals subject to the 
condition of reciprocity. 
As to the copyright in 'literary, dramatic and musical works', 
the study has found substantial similarity in the laws of the three 
countries studied here. A large variety of works such as compila-
tions, selections, abridgments, headnotes of law reports, adver-
tisements, examination papers etc. are protected as 'literary 
works'. The ambit of dramatic works has also been enlarged 
though actors gags are not covered. On the issue of musical 
works, the study found that U.S. law is far less ambiguous as 
compared to U.K. and India as it extends copyright protection to 
'accompanying words' as well. The protection to musical works in 
films is still not adequate and the response of Indian judiciary in 
this regard is, indeed, unfortunate. 
On the issue of 'copyright in software', the study has found 
that the legislative activity on copyrightability of software has 
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been quite recent one and the countries studied liere are bringing 
quick amendments in quest of l<:eeping pace with the fast changing 
computer technology. The 1994 Indian Amendment brings Indian 
law in conformity with the Uruguary Round Agreement on Trade -
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) which requires coun-
tries to provide authors and their successors in title the right to 
authorise or to prohibit the commercial rental of originals or 
copies of their copyright works. However, it is to be noted that the 
TRIPs Agreement is less stringent than the amended Indian law 
in that it allows a purchaser of a copyrighted work to sell his copy 
and adds the caveat that, in respect of computer programs, this 
obligation does not apply to rentals where the program itself is not 
the essential object of the rental. 
At present, few computers in which copyright material is 
stored are interconnected (at least in a developing country like 
ours), and access to networked computers is limited for the most 
part to business users. However, with the dramatic growth in the 
use of personal computers in the home, accompanied by the rapid 
spread of computer networks not only between businesses but 
also among indviduals, the copyright problems posed by com-
puter use are likely to increase exceptionally. Infact, the latest use 
of Internet has already posed greatest ever challenge to copyright 
law. The globe-girdling Internet links 3.2 million computers in over 
150 countries.^^ This network is virtual That is it doesn't exist in 
physical form. Highly sophisticated computer software makes 
computer-to-computer connectivity possible. Apparently seam-
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less, and silently creating a global library is the World Wide Web. 
In this library are located many many Web sites (or bookshelves 
of the electronic type on computer). And these bookshelves are 
crammed with books. Internet jargon calls them Home Pages. 
Each page combines texts, graphics and pictures. Basically, 
information in the multimedia format. An Internet user who visits 
a Web site has freedom for random access. Web users are, thus, 
able to see, select, read and copy what may be a copyrighted 
material. Thus the problem of the nature of 'home-taping' has 
emerged in a highly dangerous manner and the law as it exists 
today is unable to cope with it. The U.S. Government has consti-
tuted a Committee in March 1996 to examine the issue and 
recommended amendments in the copyright law to meet the worst 
challenge posed by technology to it. The Internet's development 
has indeed totally changed the dissemination of information even 
to the extent of replacing printed works completely. The day has 
come when a large number of houses and offices throughout the 
globe are linked to a computer centre via viwer/printer consoles'. 
The result is that the supply of one copy of a new work to a central 
point would make it or selections from it, available to all offices 
and houses which are linked to the central point. Bearing in mind 
as discussed in this study that the whole concept of copyright in 
modern times arose from the invention of the printing press, even 
its partial replacement by computers amounts to a revolutionary 
change. It is suggested that in this changed scenario the copyright 
owners have to exercise their copyright at the input stage and look 
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to the computer disseminator for the royalties in the same way that 
they have looked towards their publishers in the past. As copyright 
owner has always been recognised both under International law 
and under most national laws (including U.K., U.S.A. and India) 
entitled to his reproduction right, there seems no good reason why 
he should not be entitled to control copyright through Internet and 
payment of royalties before his work is put on Internet Web. 
As to the question of copyright protection to 'architectural 
designs', the study has found that the protection granted to 
architects under the United States law prior to 1976 was highly 
insufficient as compared to the protection enjoyed by their coun-
terparts in U.K. and India. The protection to architects in India has 
been further widened by the 1994 Amendment which replaced the 
term architectural work of art by work of architecture. 
As to the vital question of 'performers rights', the study has 
revealed that despite recent legislative activity in U.K. and India 
and despite specific inclusion of performers rights in the latest 
amendments, the plight of cine actors performing in films still 
continues due to conferment of copyright only on the film produc-
ers. But these amendments do otherwise give sufficient protection 
to other neighbouring right owners such as Producers of Phongrams 
and Broadcasting Organisations. 
As to the infringement of copyright and types of infringement 
such as primary and secondary, the study found remarkable 
similarity in the copyright laws of the countries studied. As to the 
infringement in respect of computer programs, the study has 
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revealed that Indian copyright law is infect better than its counter 
part in the United States. 
Finally, the study reveals substantial similarity as far as 
remedies for copyright violations are concerned. The British 
remedy of Anton Pillor Order is quite effective and should be 
expressly recognised in Indian Copyright Act. On the question of 
Criminal remedies, certainly the American law is much more 
stringent as compared to U.K. and India. 
On the whole, thus, it can be safely said that Indian law as 
on the Statute book does not sound all that immature and is almost 
at par with that of U.K., U.S.A. and International standards yet it 
has so far not been put to any real use. The Indian Judges should 
also develop greater sensitiveness towards copyright violations. 
What, therefore, is urgently required is the generation of copyright 
conciousness as an aspect of India's social, economic and cul-
tural development. 
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^rv veatitt^, ait lAanAs'ave/due/ io/ s4ttaJi/, fAe^'^a^id a^ 
tAc/ ui'(pvids/, luko/ auA/ op ki/S/ inji/ni/te/ ioAf^ ^ov kls/ U4iuxaitkif. 
^ands-matv nvad^ lA/ jzo/S/sUy^ie' lo/ camjzieA^ tkls^ wo/tfv. "l^ ^ cs-.v-
Lfu^ii-ati<i c)alu.l<iUo4i/^an'th<i'na&lo^rt(Pf2AeliyQ4 <r^ttaA/an.<ian/ 
tAe/ t(is.t o^' tAc/m/ '^^(xi/z/toA/ IfLuAafrvinad/ (9.'}i.Hl.^X.) 
s4s/ y taAe/ U/f2/ tke/ p^eii/ t<X/ a-x^fz/ios^s/ nuj/ s^n-.ui/ of/ o/& tv^ t(<m/ 
tAe/n<itn0a^'i^tO/^. ^iJto'kd'. e<<iai!,ivM' SiAdicii/, ^C/arv, J-acultif 
0^' '^aw. fA. "^Jfl. bt., sAtv(j/avk/ S/ViiAe/S/ nnj/ rnvnA/ bn/<Minta-
ifUKi.ws^tij,. noA/ s/iAwpid^ ^eoau/^e/ O/p kls/ ieAnq/ nvif sM/jiKi/Vv-i&O/t and' 
tne/nlai ^HAA/ ^z/vvma'Vitij/ / o ^ tkn/ ^acV tkoA/ i/V i/S/ ke/ w-ho/, ieimj/ 
p/e/v\i'(^liialtij/ o/n/ t/ke/ too^k/ O/iot l<i/V wtvu/y^p/to/ve^' ^vaun/d, 
ize/is/uaded, lun^ U^^i/^aMi^p'te/iMi'l<ulHifz<xii/nui'to/d^u<i/le/npi^ U 
ami' e/yie/i(^i^ to/ s/Viuiij/bnx^ Vfi/is/ ii^in/i/ii/^ p/io/O/te/m/. uhdv^, 
^tO/^. SidJi^i/ ko'S/ &-ii/e/n/ tAe/ mo/U-in^/ S/fzii/U/ &A>Airui att im^ 
e^p)/tt/S/ as/ux ett as/ eA^e/V {pix^ta ni/ ^udde' in e/x^iCM/U/n^ tAe/ pA^e/^cfU/ 
sAdidA^. ^~%IAA/^O/V ki/S/enli(^k4/e4^e<lan<l'iAep3li^<l^le/(jM4Aanoe/, v 
UXOAAAA' ha ite/ ka^odtt^ oam/e/ txp (^U/JT/S/ LUVIA' Vke/ atjzAo/ and- o/nuixj^i 
of nuj/ ue4vUi/i/e/. ^f) n/S/pi/te/ op n/in/ (UAc'twi/S-o 0U'S4^ s/h/edu/te/ 
Inc/tud/i/n^' ki/s/ daui^AlcA/ S/ vaeddin<}' ke/ aiwai^s/ ^<xund/ tiyme/ ^<PV 
g/ain^ tAuPu^k and/ iiotwU/ni/.u/m^ rm^ iv<pvk, di'ti^'enM/i^ rnam/n^ 
co/vteoU^ns/ andp/voAjvdin^^uldeli/ne/s/. ^ d<i/ not kaipe^ ade^uaie/ 
vao/td/SJ to/ e/XfZ'te/S/s/ nvt^ izAO/fcumd/ ^taUUule/ to/ kom/. 
l) luaiotd' tike/ Ui/ exfZAAi/S/S/ nu^jT/tO/^aiind s^etis^of (j/taHlwd^ 
lo/^ta^. S. Sk<iftvini/iA/t^}ta:i4uii ^znviy'^^haivrnarv, ^e^ia^vl/-
me/ni ai la to pvv ^e^/no/ o/ cAW/yAxml ^mvtcA^^ ap ins^iaHan/ ^o/lA 
nKileiiat as/ luoU/a.K/ s^ii/t/OuaI. 
I Acit'*t9'to4cd^mCHt4> \ ( i i ) 
Lamp aidAxai^^ e/nVkw^Aid rwe/ &ij/ n^aA'tn^ soko4^'vlt^ su^^yes^dofv in 
IwvtnAi'ixinod'of nvi^ mo^xA/. u ex'lend'nu^ ha^'tl^vot tAanks' iO' hAnv. 
con>s^Uint/ i/nsyiz^iatlan^ and luovd^sy of encou/ta^fnont/. 
y ^c^linfl^^ teiyati/ke/ieynvt^ ton/^and' to'\i'in^'as>&<uyixilio/n 
wllJv tal<>/^yyiv. ^}7l. Sh^heAidaddin, ^~^Ze<ide/v, ^ &f2avtmAi4iA/aj 
'^aiO' wJup uxas/ a^ ij/eoman &e/iAdce/ to me/ vn pA<PS/ec/uAA/n(y tJv'u^ 
LuovK/. i) am/ e/xA/ve/meh^ t^valejui' UP kvnv and fZ/tO't^ l(vai> nun^ 
s4ttaA' tc/S^ h/i/s/ &o/U/t bn fze^ioe/. 
l) nau^no wotd^sy UP^Xyp/te^s/^i^nu^(^/taU/Utde^UPnuf t/eaone^v 
Iflv. '^}fl. ^IfUps^klv S'ilanv ^ov ki/S/ ^^ene^iUyUonsy and/ i/nsA/slanc^ 
Upflni'S/^mi^Luopk/a'S/(f/ulcJ!/asyf2osyS4/Mii/. ^n^aot/, im^tnesd/s/rut's/ 
alwai^s/ i^iAi/n u/iifze/vm/O/sA/ in ki/S/ nwnd/. 9 am/ ind'eed/ q/taiefu/t Ui/ 
kim/ 04V t/ke/ c/0/m/pI<di<pn (pf tA/vs/ uxovk/. 
^' i) am/ (t^iAotden' UP nvij/ teamed/ Uiaoke^vs/ £^to^. Sa'le^i^n 
S<k/Ua^v, ^v. ""Yl/.^X/. Kikan, l%v. "ds/kaf 'Cqu/zai^ki/ and^ 
OAAC/V eMe^i4wed/ Uuiok<i/vs/ op lAn/ "da'CU/tUj/ wkosAi/ .uynolavti^ 
lie/vs^pniduie/s/ and enoouA/a^An^^ aiHUcd'e/ he/tpA>A/ me/ in ike/ 
pM/VMU/V of' Vki/S/ siud'i^. 
^ am/ats<p(>/nd(iAledUpm^teaohA>/v,^v. S^ifl. T^^tvLuko/ 
noA/04^tij/(j4U/mA^m^vvia^tix^iitM/kas/a'ts<pk'e^ fie<Lm^intnA/S/ 
luoitzi in nuive/ Lkcin one/ coa4fs/. 
y e/X'/iAAiS/S/ m4^ dxui/fz/ .ui^vs^e/ aJ/ o/uitiiude/ Ut/ m^ UuxoneA/ 
\Pvof: ^km^d/ Siddi^ue/, fovniotli^ ^eun and/ ^^Jui'ivm^n, 
^nUiio Vdiimia. ^Vle/ou/^elkd/, 
-c/ am/ at&O/ f'vale^at to/ ^ t o ^ . '^api/vu/l SMa^ s^ ?^  ^ e<^ 6c 
c^tof. ^Zo/sAe^edu/S/^ajo/v, ^o^t/tAei/p c<xns4^ni/enooyU/tafem^nl 
l) sAatt ^€/ tacklnx^ ifv nuf daUj' and io^o^ i/f v do/ n<il 
menliixh/ nu^ A^^iMid fzate^U'Sy uiAoy kd^ndled Vke/ plam^s^ a^ 
tea vniru^ in/ nve/ and to/ t/ke4/V enooM^ia^f-e/m/e/nA/, a^<u>tio4v, s-aovi-
f-iclal deAMiMo/yv and' fZ'Kn^e/VS/, 9 d^/sovi&e^ aM' nvt^ sucoe/S/s/. 
l) am/ tAank/^-U/t to/nu^ e/id'<>/t/s/LS'te/i/, ^YH/VS/. da'Z/l/tai/ yakntv 
Luno/ LUC'S/ le/^po^ps^/ile/ Ic/v nvt^ lo/i/rvvruy s4tU^'vA '^)fh</S/UfH/ 
LLniuii'Vsi'U^ i<m/tte0n' i^eci'V^ a^o/. uias/ s^'e/ uxko/ enco/U'ta^ed' 
and ifvs-fiA/ved' me/ to ivmie/i/tatie/ kl^An/v s4AAAii/e/s/ and to de/v-oAA!/ 
m4j,&e/l^ to/ inte/tteotu/al/ izAA/Vsui/t. 9 owe/ to ke/v d^e^/jz^isd/ mos^i/ 
a^eoti'Onale/ ^laii/tude/ ^ov h/e/p oont/ii/^uAion/ in^ mak/bnx^ w-ha^-
QAPQ/v 9 anv iad<nj/. 
9 a^fn(yuil<i/^uJbtx)/nuj/^atJve/V-l/tv-taup^io^. Sij^iA/ \KkaliAi 
ilZaiS'ive^A/, 'd^ac/idAAj/a^'^^aup, ^nle/inailona't ysMmAAy ttni/-
wi/vs/iiij,', '^YYlalau/S/la- ^ ov ki/S/ s^c/kolo/vti^ ad/ypvcc/ and' oon^Uani/ ke/tp/ 
du/U/nx^ t/ke/ la'Sd/ s4<2^'e/s/ op tAi/S/ tAXovk/. 
9 f24A4/ on vec^oid mu/ ^tatOUode/ to rmj/ Uud<>4vt, ^YYbv. 
yia^e/e/S/ s4ktnad iuko kas/ tiM/ttt^ ou^tAeA' ka^' in doimy tke/ 
fZAxxof vexidm^. ^ am tkiovkJAi/t to ''Vyiv. ^VJaa^iUi^n s4kma<i, 
te/^eU'tcA sokoidP, Qy efza ptment of '^OUP ^on/ kis/ kutp/ In ^i/toof 
le^adin^. Cikank'S/aiC/a du<i/lo^yyiv. s4z^4>4fj/Skii/Pivani/amJ/ 
^yyiv. Su'taiiiw lov tkai'V kotj}/. 
t^ Ki<ut/id' im^- a6ii<}oii'(i4^ and/ lAank^ to tk<.'/ ^Wovid 
y n/tc'tieotu/d t I'nc'Mi' 
^ ^ 'vts/ Le/tp/ in/ pA^iAddma/ nu>/ Lui/tA/ t/ko tveoe^&O/U^ nvateA/oa I an 
tAey sut'&feot'. 
U atso/W-lsAtoyiAanAke/ie^, '^ndiatv^ede/iaUo/H' fA<^aifv<.t 
SacleU^y '^04n/li<u^'; J-e^iulianal i)nclm'tv^u4'i4/Syke/PS/, ^Jleiu 
^€^n<i^n<il<i^t^pAe^i'Sy sA<iA<xciatian'. 'if^(wv^Hi^and Ji/tm/'^Viit-
e/v^ S^s/so^kiUon, 'ydcwv^ai^; lavtA^i/e/keA/p/intAeycomp^leAAan 
of t/ki/S/ LVO'TA/. 
l) am/ tkank^U't to/ Vke/ ti^ tavuins/ and/ sia^ o/f' tAe/ tlni -
iAe/1/S/Uie/s^ op '^€,am/&AA4iqo, ^yX^<Ptd '^'}Cwtt and S^^Wwa id '^^£,aw 
Sc/k<Mi/l. ^kanks/ 0^10 atsKP due/ UP tA^ 'Indian/ ^^Ai/j^iv^kV 
'~^aatd, 'DndMfi/^aw/'^nsU'UUe/, ^ uAisk/'^^Eounc/it, S^mn/tv-
oan '^^Ai.ntte/, IfLaula'na' £Az<xd ti/^'ta'tij/ and' ikaV o^- ^^xLaw 
ti/^e/ui't4f (i^ S^U^'t'k ''YKu/siA/m tlnbu^vsdli^. 
^ am alu)/ tAanAiu/t dp tm^ fZ/tC/oUpws/ pi/iAifid'S/, "^iltv. 
^yyiakd'. .94m/i/t, 'Mv. ^n/me^v^iLf, 'YYbv. S^slmySLddUf-i/, '}fU. 
So/ii/m/ ^^uAMid', Ifiv. ^}fla'mo.<)4v '^XJw.n, Iflp. s4pla/S/ <s4laiv/ Sc 
^yyiv. '^a-ieed s4ns/a^i/ ^v tAclv &o/-ofze/taiwn' and kelp/. 
^k<inA/S/a'iA>/a'ts<pd^i/e/t/0/^}fli'S/ SclTlv. ITlxjukd/. %ayi4'^ ^.o/vt/ked/v 
io/iMi/, a'f^e<yU4xn and' keJip/. 
y ai4/t/iAule/ to/ ^Wlv. S. '^WaAeed' S^Mo/S/ wko/ tipped tAi/s/ 
wo/iA' O' co/n.udc'iaite/ amAMA/nO (pf ins/pi/taii<x*v and MA/fZjKi'ii/ 
lAjA/lok kas/ c^iuvi/ a' lamy waij/ itv lAe/ success^ui' comfztdian' of' lAis/ UXPIK/ 
and/ ^ M' lAdl/ y anv lAftnAful UP him/. ^Xlkank^' in t/us/ leqatd ate/ aisip 
duci/Up'yKt. ^ Vkjot, '}}lt< '((^al.ui'p and/ 'ITlv. TLaklv '^}twuiin. 
^^asi/, llmA/nxi4/th/s/liM'sA/, tA<wA4/n^uto^uZ(itne^W/a'S/nvatt 
lo^ipe/, a^e^iiix^n' and' oo^-a^fze/t/ati'a'n/ funn^ ^een' ^{uonxlatlan' (xf 
sAAxealed' an^ Lhi/S' fz^z/Ofeot/ tuvnvin<l(iAl' a<f do'tne/Syllo itttoie^L, ske 
ruvuisA/i/fi/S/ i4v (PKLC'V to fze^i^fi' me/ on/ (Ae/ vi/^Jvt/ put me/ of nvitui' t o 
fiH/ts^ue/ mij/ wa-itz/ to/ the/ ^Im/S-k-. c) a-c^no/iuledfC/ Lullh/ to/V4>/ the/ 
leceifii/ o/f. kn/V Ivet^. 
^Ive/ c/vtO/VS/ and/ o/mA/S/^lann/ Vkab te/main wt/C/ mine/. 
ALIGARH [FAUAN MUSTAFA/ 
"i^y 
CHAPTER - 1 : 1 : 
INTRODUCTION 
Legal protection of author's rights is relatively young. It got its 
phillip in the aftermath of Industrial Revolution. Copyright' 'thus is not 
an ancient concept. The first copyright statute dates back only to less 
than three hundred years. 
What is copyright ? A policy maker in the United States will reply 
that copyright is an instrument of consumer welfare, stimulating the 
production of the widest possible array of literary and artistic works at 
the lowest possible price. A practitioner on the European continent will 
say that copyright is at best watered down version of author's right - that 
grand civil law tradition that places the author, not the consumer, at the 
centre of protection. Those who argue against copyright protection will 
tell that copyright is a monopoly that undesirably derives up the price 
of goods in the marketplace. A high protectionist of copyright may 
respond that copyright is a property right no more, no less - and one 
without which we would have very few creative works in the market-
place. A. United States tiade official will tell that copyright is one of the 
strongest net contributors to the nation's balance of hade. A school teacher in 
a developing country will reply that copyright is what stands in the way of 
getting textbooks into the hands of his students. An anthropologist may say that 
copyright is the symbol of a nation's culture aspirations. 
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Confronting this welter of competiting perspectives, Professor 
Lyman Patterson observed that the basic and continuing weakness of 
copyright law is the "absence of fundamental principles for copy-
right". It seems that the pessimism of the learned scholar is wrong since 
there does exist a cohering view of copyright, a view that reconciles 
most if not all of the competiting antiphonies, and one that offers a 
sound prescription for the public policy as well. Under this view, it is 
proposed that copyright is not about protecting authors or publishers, 
nor is copyright singularly about securing authors' welfare or consumer's 
welfare. Copyright is not about bolstering international trade balances, 
nor is it about protecting art, high or low. Copyright is about none of 
these things, and copyright is about all of them. 
Copyright, in a word is about authorship. Copyright is about 
sustaining the conditions of creativity that enable an individual to craft 
out of thin air, and intense, devouring labour. Copyright is as much 
about the pages of deleted text, the scenes that lie on the cutting room 
floor, as it is about the refined work, the final, cut, that ultimately 
reaches the author's public. But copyright and authorship - are only in 
part about the act of creation. If creation is all there was to authorship, 
copyright could comfortably leave the author scribbling alone in his far-
off garret. Authorship in its contemporary sense implies not just an 
author, but an audience; not just words spoken, but individuals spoken to.' 
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By authorship, is meant authors communicating as directly as 
circumstances allow with their intended audiences. Copyright sustains 
the very heart and essence of authorship by enabling this communica-
tion, this connection. It is copyright that makes it possible for audiences 
- markets - to form for an author's work, and it is copyright that makes 
it possible for publishers to bring these works to market. 
To be sure, copyright law and policy in different places may 
emphasize one or another particular object over another. An emphasis 
on consumer welfare is the hallmark of copyright jurisprudence in 
common law countries such as U.K., U.S.A. and India, just as an 
emphasis on author's rights is the hallmark of the continental regimes. 
But viewed globally, and in the round, it is authorship that provides the 
cohering theme. 
Copyright infact means the sole right to produce or reproduce 
whole the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form 
whatsoever and "the copyright in a work" shall be deemed to be 
infringed by any person who, without the consent of the owner of the 
copyright, does anything, the sole right to do which is confered on the 
owner of the copyright. 
Copyright law is, in essence, concerned with the negative right of 
preventing the copying of physical material existing in the field of 
literature and the arts. Its object is to protect the writer and artist from 
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the unlawful reproduction of his material.' It is concerned only with the 
copying of physical material and not with reproduction of ideas." and it 
doesn't give a monopoly to any particular form of words or design. It is, 
thus, to be distinguished from the rights conferred by patent, trade mark 
and design legislations, which give to the registered proprietor an 
exclusive right to the registered material, even as against a person who 
has reproduced such material innocently and from an independent 
source. Ifitcouldbeshownthattwoprecisely similar works were in fact 
produced wholly independently of one another, the author of the work 
that was published first would have no right to restrain the publication 
by the other author of that author's independent and original work.^ A 
patentee, on the other hand, has the right to prevent another from using 
his invention if it, infact, infringes the former's patent, notwithstanding 
that the latter's invention was the subject of independent investigation 
on his part. As was observed by Lord Diplock, "the copyright work 
must be the source from which the infringing work was derived".^ The 
claim is not to ideas, but to the order of words, and this order has a 
marked identity and a permanent endurance. The order of each man's 
words is a singular, and although, if two authors composed originally 
with the same order of words, each would have a property therein, still 
the probability of such an occurance is less than that there should be 
two countenances that could not be discriminated. The permanent 
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endurance of words is obvious by comparing the works of ancient 
authors with other works of their day; the vigour of their words is 
unabated; the other works have mostly perished. It is true that property 
in the order of words is a mental abstraction, but so also are many other 
kinds of property; for instance, the property in a stream of water, which 
is not in any of the atoms of the water, but only in the flow of the stream. 
The right to the stream is nonetheless a right of property, either because 
it generally belongs to the riparian proprietor, or because the remedy for 
a violation of the right is by action on the case, instead of detinue or 
trover.' 
Nothing can with greater propriety be called a man's property 
than the fruits of his brain. The property in any article or substance 
accruing to him by reason of his own mechanical labour is never denied 
him, the labour of his mind is no less ardous and consequently no less 
worthy of the protection of the law. But since copyright in the modern 
form is a comparatively recent legal concept and long and fruitful 
periods of Western civilisation have existed without it. The question 
which, therefore, arises is; what is the justification for a copyright 
system ? 
(A) JUSTIFICATION OF COPYRIGHT : 
Four major arguments can be advanced in favour of a copyright 
law. First, the author is the creator or maker of the work which is the 
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expression of his personality. He should be able to decide whether and 
how his work is to be published and to prevent any injury or mutilation 
of his intellectual offspring. The author, like any other worker, is 
entitled to the fruits of his efforts. The royalties he is paid are the wages 
for his intellectual work. Secondly, in the modern world considerable 
investment is needed to make the creation of some works, such as works 
of architecture or films, possible. As the purpose of the creation of 
practically all works is to make them available to the public, that 
process too, such as publication and distribution of books or records is 
expensive. These investments will not be made unless there is a 
reasonable expectation of recouping them and making reasonable 
profits. Furthermore, the doctrine of unjust enrichment may come into 
play if those who make creative contributions on the road of the work 
from its creator to its user, were not compensated. Thirdly, the works 
produced by creators form a considerable national asset. Therefore, the 
encouragement and the rewarding of creativity are in the public interest 
as a contribution to the development of the national culture. Finally, the 
dissemination of works to large numbers of people forges links between 
classes, racial groups and age groups and, therefore, makes for social 
cohesion and creators thus render a social service. If the ideas and 
experiences of creator can be shared by a wide public within a short 
space of time they contribute to the development of society. 
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(B) NATURE OF COPYRIGHT : 
Copyright is a property right but the subject matter of the 
property is incorporeal. The property in the work is justified by the fact 
that the right owner has created or made it. As he is the owner he can 
dispose off it by outright sale (assignment of his right) or by licensing. 
The subject of the property is incorporeal, it gives a dominium over the 
work, a right in the work erga omnes. The property is an intellectual 
property in that it originates in the mind of a person or persons before 
it is reduced to material form. 
Copyright is a right oi limited duration Unlike physical property, 
which lasts as long as the object in which it is vested (a chair, a camera, 
a house), copyright is limited in time. After the expiration of the time 
fixed by statute the work passes into the public domain, that is it 
becomes public property and can be freely used by anyone. 
Copyright is an exclusive right. This means that the right owner 
can prevent all others from copying the work. This is often referred to 
as a monopoly but that is rather misleading. It is recognised that the 
produce of a person's skill and labour is his property. If someone makes 
a movable object such as a chair, it belongs to him. He can use it in any 
way he likes. If anyone steals the chair he commits an offence and can 
be prosecuted. But anyone else can also make chairs and compete with 
him. He has no monopoly in making chairs. 
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If someone writes an article about that chair he will be the owner 
of the work; that is, the thoughts that come to his mind when contem-
plating the chair and its uses, the way he expresses them, the choice of 
words he uses in describing its appearance and its uses. When he writes 
it down he will own the manuscript. But anyone can write an article 
about chairs in general or about this particular chair and compete with 
him. He has no monopoly in writing articles on chairs or even on this 
chair. If anyone else writes an article about chairs or about this 
particular chair which is similar in kind to the original one he will 
probably acquire himself a copyright in his own article about the chair. 
The only thing he is prevented from doing is attempting to avoid the 
intellectual effort of writing the article and instead copying the author's 
article or substantial parts of it and then publishing it in his own name. 
That would be the equivalent of stealing the chair. 
It is, therefore, misleading to say that a copyright creates a 
monopoly or is a monopolistic right. On the other hand, holding all or 
most of the copyrights in a particular field on behalf of all or most 
copyright owners as collecting societies do may in practice constitute 
a monopoly. 
Copyright is a multiple right, a bundle of rights in the work. They 
can be assigned or licensed either together or separately. Both the 
categories of works protected by copyright and the number of specific 
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rights which form the bundle known as the scope of copyright have been 
gradually extended over the years as technology has advanced. 
(C) GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF COPYRIGHT : 
The copyright law has to strike a balance between two public 
interests, the right accorded to the copyright owner and the reasonable 
demands of organised society. This dichotomy can very well be 
explained with reference to Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.* The rights of organised society in paragraph (1) & the 
rights of the copyright owner in paragrpah (2) are mentioned : 
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of 
the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic produc-
tion of which he is the author. 
The basic limitations which are peculiar to copyright flow 
directly from this balance between the interests of the copyright owner 
and the interests of the copyright users and the public as a whole. These 
limitations which, as copyright is a creature of Statute, are Statutory 
limitations & are of three types; 
(i) Copyright is of limited duration. After the stated term, the work 
falls into the 'public domain'. 
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(ii) Some uses of protected works are free. These are usually referred 
to in general terms as 'fair use' or 'fair-dealing' in the common 
law jurisdictions. Other jurisdictions state the exceptions where 
the use of copyright works is free, specifically in the statute. 
(ii) In some cases the right owner is not given an absolute right 
subjecting all uses of the protected work to his prior authorisation, 
but only the right to equitable remuneration for each use. This is 
known as a 'compulsory licence'. 
(D) MAJOR SYSTEMS OF COPYRIGHT : 
Although copyright is a comparatively young right it has both 
grown into a system of rights which affect a large variety of matter from 
books, photographs, films, records, broadcasts to pictures, sculptures, 
buildings and has gained worldwide general acceptance. This means 
that it has been accepted in countries whose economic, social and 
political philosophies differ widely. The four major arguments dis-
cussed above in favour of copyright have been generally accepted, but 
different legal systems given priority to one and put greater emphasis 
on some than on others. Of the three main systems the droit d' auteur 
system puts an emphasis on the first argument advanced above i.e. 
principle of natural justice, the common law system relied on the second 
argument i.e. the economic argument and the erstwhile Socialist sys-
tems relied on the fourth argument i.e. the social argument. There are. 
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however, considerable variations between different countries within 
the same system. 
(i) The Droit d' Auteur of Civil Law Systems : 
These are essentially individualistic. The right in the work 
springs from the act of personal creation, the work is part of the 
personality of the author and remains linked to him throughout its life. 
It is a human right with distinctly religious overtures. In the terms of the 
droit d' auteur at the centrestage is the work. It is the creation of the 
author's mind and is intellectual and incorporeal until it is fixed in 
writing or any other tangible form. The fixation is the physical 
embodiment of that work such as a book or a street of music which its 
owner can use, lend or sell as he pleases like any other property. 
The property in the work is described as intellectual property. In 
the case of literary works the fixation can be a manuscript or a book; in 
the case of musical works, sheet music, a musical score or a record; in 
the case of artistic works, a picture, a drawing, or a statute. All these 
physical objects have one thing in common, that they can be reproduced 
in small or large quantities and by various processes. The technological 
processes by which reproduction can be achieved vary and new ones are 
constantly being added, but they are all reproductions of the works. The 
work which by the process of its creation becomes the property of the 
author gives him the right to exploit it economically (economic rights) 
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but the work also has an intellectual and moral link with its author as his 
brainchild which gives him the right to publish it or not as he .wishes, 
when he wishes and in such form as he wishes and to defend it against 
any distortions or abuses (moral rights). Several important results flow 
from this concept : 
(i) Copyright is a natural right and, thus in theory, absolute and 
should not be restricted. Although in practice restrictions are 
imposed, they must be kept to a minimum. As, in theory at least, 
the right should be perpetual and the extension of the right 
beyond the life of the author is justified. France pioneered the 
duration of 50 years after the death of the author which is today 
very widely accepted. The moral rights are in theory also 
perpetual as these are attached to the work which lives on after 
the economic rights come to an end and continue to bear the 
expression of the personality of the author and his fame. How-
ever, internationally the duration of the droit moral for the whole 
term of the economic rights was accepted by the Berne Conven-
tion of 1886 only as recently as 1967. 
(ii) The droit moral occupies a place of major importance. It is inalien-
able in order to protect the author against commercial pressures which 
he may fmdirresistable, particularly at the early stages of his career. 
To renounce his moral rights would be moral suicide.^ 
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(iii) Contracts between the author and those he has to deal with such 
as publishers are put into a special category with safeguards for 
the author as the financially weaker party. 
(iv) Drasatic restrictions on the rights of the author such as compulsory 
licences are acceptable only in very exceptional circumstances. 
(v) Perhaps the most far reaching consequence in 20th century terms 
is that because the droit d' auteur is a natural and, therefore, 
individual right, it can only originate in an individual and not in 
a company or corporation. This means that making a film, or 
record, or broadcast, which is in almost all cases done by a 
company can't give rise to a droit d' auteur as such film producers 
or record producers can't be authors. As a result, under the 
French system, film companies have to acquire a large number of 
rights from individuals who are classed as authors, ranging from 
the stars to cameramen and cutters, and producers of phonograms 
have to seek protection under the law of unfair competition and 
broadcasting companies under public law provisions, whilst in 
other continental European systems they are given neighbouring 
rights. Historically the concept of the droit d' auteur is a child of 
the French Revolution and has been applied more rigorously in 
French law but other countries such as Italy, the Liberian coun-
tries (Spain and Portugal) and the Latin American countries have 
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also adopted the droit d' auteur system in more or less pure form. 
The Germanic jurisdictions (Germany, Austria, Switzerland) 
whilst based on the concept of the droit d' auteur show signifi-
cant variation. For instance the droit moral is not a perpetual 
right as in French law but terminates with the copyright term 50 
years after the death of the author, based on the experience that 
at that time there may be no heirs left who are morally entitled 
or able to safeguard the purity of the work. The Nordic jurisdictions al so 
stem from the droit d' auteur concept but are closer to German than 
French law and have developed special traits particularly in recent 
decades under the influence of their own social philosophy. 
(ii) The Common Law or Copyrisht Systems : 
The philosophical foundation of copyright as opposed to the 
droit d' auteur is more humble. It is simply the right to prevent the 
copying of physical material and its object is to protect the owner of the 
copyright against any reproduction or use of that material which he has 
not authorised. Copyright, in its essence is a negative concept. It is the 
right to prevent people from dealing with something that is yours and 
has been improperly taken by someone. Copyright, as the word 
suggests, was in its origin a right to prevent copying, that is reproduction. 
The modern concept of copyright stems directly from the Statute 
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of Queen Anne in 1709. Then the main objective was to protect the 
investment of the book-sellers who fulfilled the function of a modern 
publisher. As the economic argument has always been in the fore-
ground, this system found no difficulty in extending an 18th century 
notion to 20th century technology. When the film, the phonogram and 
the broadcasting programmes joined writing as a means of communi-
cating the work, the proponents of the copyright concept had no 
difficulty incorporating the film producer, the phonogram producer and 
in some cases broadcasting organisations into the copyright system. On 
the other hand, as discussed above, the proponents of the pure droit d' 
auteur concept could not bring themselves to give these entities, whom 
they see more as users than as creators, a droit d' auteur. Thus, the 
notion of neighbouring rights which signifies rights neighbouring on 
author's rights and is mainly applied to the rights of performers, 
producers of phonograms and broadcasting organisations have to be 
invented, whereas most copyright systems granted copyright albeit with 
lesser scope and of shorter duration. Furthermore, as the economic 
argument had always been in the foreground, copyright countries such 
as U.K., U.S.A. India were not shocked by the notion that the first 
copyright owner in the case of films or phonograms or broadcasting 
programmes is a company or a corporation. 
The general philosophy of copyright is that whoever takes the 
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initiative in creating the material and makes the investment to produce 
it and market it, taking the financial risks that such activities involve, 
should be allowed to reap the benefit. He can only do that if he is 
protected, by a right because if he is not protected, the copyist will 
produce the same product at a lower cost because he does not have to 
take the initiative and risks or make the investment. He will, therefore, 
undersell the originator of the material in the market place. This will 
have two consequences. The first is that the copyist will reap an unjust 
(and sometimes very large) enrichment, the second is that the originator 
will be deprived of the incentive to create similar materials and the 
public will be deprived of the widest base for competitive creativity. 
The test of the economic value of copyright must, therefore, be 
what measure of protection is needed to bring about the creation and 
production of new works and other material within the copyright 
sphere?'" In answering the question, "what is a work"? the basic idea 
of the copyright system is to protect products of intellectual endeavour 
from the sublime to the most humble, demanding sometimes only 
modest efforts and little originality. To qualify as a protected work, the 
subject matter has to be the direct result of some one's skill and labour 
and capable of being reproduced. In the United Kingdom for instance 
the list of protected works includes a trade catalogue or a football 
coupon'- among 'literary works', as well as engineering drawings among 
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the 'artistic works'. The standard reply to the defendant's challenge, 
'you say that what the plaintiff did is so easy you could do it yourself 
with very little effort' is : 'very well then do it and you will have a 
copyright; but if you copy it from the plaintiff instead you must pay for it'. 
When rights like the right of public performance, the recording 
right and the broadcasting right became as important or more important 
than the original reproduction right (the right against copying) the term 
'copyright' was already too deeply embedded in the legal language to 
change it to something like 'the right in the work'. 
Many copyright systems, unlike continental European droit d' 
auteur systems, do not specifically recognise moral rights as such, but 
some of the remedies which the moral right gives to authors are 
available not under copyright but under other headings, such as 
defamation if the authors' reputation has suffered, breach of an implied 
term of the contract or breach of trust if the author's droit de divulgation 
is violated or the tort of "passing off if the defendant tries to mislead 
the public into thinking that he is the author of the plaintiff's work. 
The copyright system stemming from the 1709 Statute of Queen 
Anne has spread to all the English speaking countries such as U.S.A. 
and Australia just to name two and to many countries which are or were 
part of the British Commonwealth including our own country. 
Philosophically the difference between the personal, individual-
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istic and idealistic droU d' auteur system and the more commercially 
oriented copyright system may be fundamental, but in practice the 
differences should not be over estimated. Historically both systems 
were created when the system of privileges, which has been in operation 
both in England and on the European main land from the fifteenth to the 
eighteenth century, was abondoned. the continental European coun-
tries under the influence of the French Revolution as discussed in 
foregone pages followed the French Act of 1783 whereas the countrieji 
of the common law legal tradition followed the main lines of the 1709 
Statute of Queen Anne. But when international copyright became a 
commercial necessity in the 19th century the protagonists of each 
system, England and France, became founder members of the Berne 
Union in 1886. The Convention achieved a set of compromises between 
the two systems that have served both the world and the copyright 
owners well. Most states adhering to the droit d' auteur system have 
ratified it and most states adhering to the copyright system have also 
done so, the United States being the recent one.'"* The development of 
the Berne Union has decisively influenced the copyright systems. The 
acceptance by the United States of the term of 50 years after the death 
of the author in the copyright Act of 1976 and the acceptance of 
recommendation by the Whitford Committee in the United Kingdom in 
the Copyright Act of 1988 to 'make proper provision for moral rights 
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under copyright law''" are the most important recent examples of that 
influence. The acceptance of neighbouring rights into the copyright 
statutes of most continental European and Latin American Countries of 
the droit d' auteur tradition and their ratification of the neighbouring 
rights convention like the Rome Convention and Phonogram Conven-
tion are example of the influence of the copyright on basically droit d' 
auteur countries. 
With the increased recognition of neighbouring rights in the 
droit d' auteur courvtvies and the development of the moral rights in the 
copyright countries under the influence of Berne Convention a synthe-
sis of the two philosophies will gradually be achieved which will 
greatly strengthen the position of copyright as a legal discipline both 
nationally and internationally. 
Both systems presuppose a free market economy and grant a high 
level of protection. The copyright system seems to adopt more easily to 
the demands of new technology. On the other hand in coping with the 
difficulties posed by the fact that more and more works are produced in 
employment and by team-work, the droit d' auteur doctrine has an 
important contribution to make. 
(iii) The Socialist System : 
The law of the erstwhile U.S.S.R. was based on the socialist 
doctrine which emphasised the social importance of the author but 
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claimed that he can only truely function if he represented and depicted 
the ideas and the life of a socialist society. Copyright was regarded as 
an instrument for the management of cultural process'." As the interest 
of society as a whole were paramount and, therefore, prevailed in the 
situations where that interest came into conflict with that of the author, 
the economic rights of the individual authors were considered less 
valuable, but some of the moral rights of the authors like the right of 
paternity and the right of the integrity of the work were safeguarded. 
The publication and dissemination of the work was in the hands 
of state publishing houses, firm companies, phonogram companies or 
theatres and the selection of what works are disseminated was made by 
them under state control. This shows some similarities with the system 
of privileges in eighteenth century Europe and shares with it the close 
affinity between the concept of copyright and state censorship. 
In the former US.S.R, public performance of copyright works by 
the mass media, mainly broadcasting and film, was free from the 
payment of copyright, as was the press. Other performances in public 
were subject to a compulsory licence granting the author a right to 
equitable remuneration and the same applied to the author's recording 
right. On the other hand the term of copyright was lengthened in order 
to comply with the Universal Copyright Convention.'^ 
Most of the other formerly Socialist Countries are members of 
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the Berne Union and have modern laws which occupy a middle ground 
between the former Soviet Union and Western Europe. 
(Iv) Islamic Law & Copyrieht : 
No literature is available on the issue of copyright under Islam. 
Infact there is neither an express verse on the question of copyright in 
the Holy Quran nor in the Sunna of the Prophet (P.B.U.H.). Thus 
whether or not Islam gives any protection to the authors is to be decided 
on the basis of juristic opinion which like any other matter is divided. 
But before we take up the opinion of scholars of Islamic law, it is in the 
fitness of things to keep one basic rule of Islamic law in mind i.e. 
whatever is neither prohibited expressly nor permitted expressly is 
permitted. Since, neither the texts of Holy Quran nor Hadith of the 
Prophet lay down either specific prohibition or permission as to copy-
right, it is to be held that Islam has nothing against the guarantee of 
copyright protection to the authors. 
The juristic opinion in this regard can easily be divided into what 
may be termed as the Classical School and the Modern School. 
The classical school does not consider copyright as a 'prop-
erty' '^ It's scholars treat copyright as an abstract'^ right and not as a 
material right. Hence copyright can not be a subject of sale. Not only 
this but any restraint on the commercial exploitation of a work by others 
is not correct and hence one must abstain from such things. ' ' In the 
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opinion of this school, there can be only two reasons for preventing 
others from publishing or commercialising the original work, namely, 
first, such use is without authority or consent of the person who is the 
owner of the property, secondly, such a use will harm any individual or 
organisation. 
Since both the above mentioned reasons are not present in the 
case of commercial exploitation of intellectual works, no right of their 
creators is violated. Thus Mufti Mohammad Shafi of Pakistan quotes 
Kitabus Sayer Wal Jihad in his article on the subject and observes : 
if one's work is affecting some other person's 
profit then it is allowed, but if the work causes 
harm to any one it may not be allowed. 
As by violating copyright, the violator merely reduces the profits 
of author and original publisher, it is permitted in Shariah. Another 
argument which is being advanced by this school against copyright is 
that knowledge (Urn) is a form of prayer (ihadat) which can not be 
subject matter of sale. Moreover, knowledge comes under the public 
domain and thus every individual must have right over it and to use it. 
It seems that this school attaches more importance to dissemination of 
knowledge and, therefore, denies copyright. 
As opposed to the above school, the writers of Modern School 
find nothing against copyright as far as Shariah is concerned.The 
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school refers to taking of one dinar by Yagus for narrating one Hadith 
of Abu Hurairah (R.T.A.).^" Well known Hanafi jurist (most widespread 
Sunni School) Allama Ibn Abid Bin Shami says that compensation for 
rights is not prevalent, and I have seen the writings of some jurists who 
have quoted Mufti Abu Saud who has validated the compensation for 
right of easement and residence.^' Thus taking of royalty by the author 
for the work published is valid. The school also argues that in part, state 
used to take care of authors and thus copyright was not a major issue but 
in today's context recognising copyright is necessary for the survival of 
authors. Moreover, since the publisher who publishes the work of an 
author, does so for making profits, it would be highly unjust that though 
he makes major monetary gains, he has no responsibility towards the 
author. This in the opinion of this shcool is unjust enrichment and 
therefore on this ground it argues in favour of copyright. 
It is not difficult to conclude that the modern school sounds much 
more logical and reasonable as compared to the classical school. Thus 
it emerges out of above discussion that Islam is not against copyright 
protection. At the same time, there is an urgent need to make an indepth 
study of Islamic view of copyright which has become the need of the 
hour. The acute paucity of literature in this field should be filled soon 
by the Islamic jurists. 
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(v) The System of the Developing Countries : 
The developing countries are sometimes put into a separate 
category in respect of copyright mainly because they are all able to 
benefit from the compulsory licence system created for them in 1971 
both by the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention. 
However, the laws of the former British and French Colonies in Africa 
and Asia are shaped by the copyright system and droit d' auteur system 
respectively. This is particularly the case in India where the copyright 
system follows the United Kingdom Copyright Statutes very closely. 
Equally the Latin American republics although classed as developing 
countries have sophesticated, droit d' auteur oriented copyright laws. 
Of the 81 states that have so far adhered to the Berne Convention, 
45 or more than half are developing countries. Copyright legislation has 
been fairly active in developing countries during past two decades. 
Laws have been enacted in Algeria, Brazil and Senegal in 1973; in 
Sudan in 1974. in Cyprus and Ecuador in 1976 : in Cuba and Mali in 
1977; in Burundi, Ivory Coast, Thailand and Yugoslavia in 1978; in Sri 
Lanka in 1979, in Guinea in 1980, in Costa Rica in 1981; in Barbados, 
Cameroon, Colombia, Congo, Indonesia and Madagascas in 1982, in 
the Central African Republic and Ghana in 1985, and in some other 
countries the copyright laws have been significantly modified, like in 
Mexico in 1981 and in India in 1983, 1984 & 1994. 
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As to the basic characteristics or trends in recent copyright 
legislations, all developing countries which have recently legislated, 
have provided for a fairly adequate and comprehensive protection of author's 
economic and moral rights in keeping with the Berne Convention. 
(E) SOCIAL & POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF COPYRIGHT : 
All the conditions for the birth of a copyright system were present 
in 18th century Europe. A long tradition of individual creation and 
competition for public recognition had laid the foundation for a 
positive philosphical and cultural attitude towards intellectual prop-
erty. The invention of the printing press has created a trade which 
expected to reap the economic benefits of its investment in the works 
of authors and had achieved it by the system of privileges. The doctrine 
of natural law and the political changes brought about by the French 
Revolution swept away that system as it was connected with repression 
and censorship. It may be significant that of the four major original 
copyright laws three were passed in the wake of revolution and the 
fourth (the Statute of Queen Anne) in a situation of rapid change 
following the Revolution of 1688. 
In England the Stuarts were finally removed by the 'glorious 
revolution' which, in 1688, put William of Orange on the English 
throne and Parliament into power. In 1702, the House of Commons 
refused to continue the Licensing Acts because the whole apparatus of 
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licensing had broken down and the censorship which was based on it, 
with it freedom of speech and freedom of expression in print by the 
press and in pamphlets and books were being recognised as common law 
rights. Barbara Ringer rightly remarked : 
The Statute of Anne marked the end of autocracy 
in English Copyright and established a set of 
democratic principles, recognition of the author 
as the ultimate beneficiary and fountain head of 
protection and a guarantee of legal protection 
against unauthorised use for limited times, with-
out any elements of prior restraint of censorship 
by government or its agents.^^ 
The fundamental French copyright statute was passed in 1793 in 
the wake of revolution, four years after the storming of the Bastille. 
In the United States after the declaration of Independence in 
1776, 12 of the 13 original states of confederation enacted copyright 
Statutes based on the Statute of Anne and the Constitution contains in 
first article the establishment of the copyright (and the patent) system. 
The first federal Statute followed in 1790. 
The first Copyright Act of the USSR was passed in 1917, barely 
two years after the Russian Revolution. 
Thus since the 19th century, if not before, the question that has 
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most often occupied the centre of the political stage has been the proper 
balance between the rights of the individual and the rightful demands of 
an organised society. Because this is also the central question of 
copyright with the creators of works of all kinds representing the 
individual and Parliament representing the public interest, the copy-
right system must always have a political dimension. In the highly 
industrialised and sophesticated societies of today a highly developed 
copyright system is one of the characteristics of a free society. Barbara 
Ringer says that 'it is harder to determine that the interelationship 
between strong copyright protection and individual freedom of expres-
sion is one of cause and effect, but I believe that, on the basis of the 
historical evidence, a casual relationship can be shown'.^^ The adverse 
is even plainer to see. If authorship of all kinds is remunerated by a 
proper copyright system, new ideas or new expressions of creative 
personality will reach the public quickly unless they are artificially 
suppressed. Within copyright, creators may have to resort to patronage 
to survive. That patronage came in European history from the Church, 
from the great aristrocratic houses or from the Monarch. In modern 
times it comes largely from the State. If creators were to be dependent 
on the State, a subtle censorship of taste or a crude consorship of 
reasons of state could be exercised in literature and the arts. The 
absence of such censorship is an essential ingredient of a free society. 
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An up-to-date and virile copyright law in a free society will greatly 
assist its preservation. A bad copyright law may help to destroy it. A 
free society does not seem possible without an effective copyright law 
as no other system has so far been devised which ensures creators the 
necessary freedom of thought and action whilst ensuring the general 
public as consumers the widest access to their works. 
(F) STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM & OBJECTS 
OF THE STUDY : 
As is revealed from the aforesaid discussion, copyright has a 
special role to play in today's world, particularly in the context of 
development. During the last four decades when the political map of the 
world changed considerably, and several states progressively became 
independent and other states were newly created, these developing 
countries have had to cope with the enormous problem of education of 
the vast masses of their people. Some developing countries, racing 
against time in order to provide for mass education by methods both 
formal and non-formal, and telescoping, as it were, their process of 
catching up with the present, are facing challenges in respect of 
encouraging and fostering intellectual creativity, while satisfying the 
urgent needs for promotion of knowledge, in particular knowledge in 
the field of science and technology. 
In the course of development programmes and in the attempts 
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towards a new international economic order, due emphasis is being laid 
on the development of science and education as a means to economic 
development. In the priorities of the process of development, the 
protection afforded by the Berne Convention helps to encourage the 
creation of intellectual works at the national level for such works 
constitute an important element of the intellectual inputs that are 
necessary for the training and building up of a sound base of qualified 
manpower required for various economic and social developmental 
projects. There has been a marked realisation in a number of developing 
countries including India of the need to protect literary and artistic 
works as a source of social progress and cultural development. Most of 
the newly independent developing countries faced a difficult situation 
with regard to access to works of the mind, since priority has to be given 
to the training of the people and to education, in order to compensate for 
the shortage of staff and management personnel who are essential to the 
design and implementation of development policies or plans. In this, the 
Berne Convention played a significant role in facilitating the urgent 
need of the newly developing countries to have access in a less 
expensive way, to works of the mind of countries that had these, while 
at the same time assisting in the need for protection of author's rights 
in their relevant national legislations. In the early stages, this priority 
involved resorting abundantly to foreign works and consequently to 
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foreign methods and precedents. In order to remedy that situation, 
emphasis had to be placed on the need to give an essentially national 
character to the training of people. 
National and international protection provided by national laws 
and the International Convention have encouraged teaching material 
including literary, artistic and scientific works, to be created by authors 
originating in the community to which the works are addressed, of 
course, until this takes place, and it can really take place gradually, in 
steps with the advancement of the development process, recourse to 
foreign works remains essential. Even in the long run, a reasonable level 
of such recourse will continue to remain desirable, in order to avoid 
barriers to cultural interchange^''. 
In many of the developing countries, there is still a shortage of 
specialists in certain areas of knowledge. Incentives and subsidies are 
often required for the purpose of encouraging local national authorship 
both in language in general use^nd in local language. Also required is 
education of the public in laws of copyright. Development of national 
authorship and creativity can not be set in motion without guarantees to 
the author of adequate remuneration for his efforts, to enable him to 
devote his time and attention fully to the needs of producing educational 
material, text-books and books required for the immense task of the 
expansion of education in these countries. 
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Copyright protection involves ensuring not only payment of 
attractive and reasonable royalties to the authors, but also suitable 
protection for publishers, for the opportunity available to an author to 
have his works disseminated depends equally on the laws protecting 
publishers. It is incresingly apparent that the spread of education and 
improvement of educational standards is the very basis of the develop-
ment process, so is the need for an effective copyright system to 
encourage national intellectual creativity in order to sustain the 
development process itself. Any country wishing to stimulate or inspire 
its own authors, composers or artists, and thus augment its national 
cultural heritage, must provide effective copyright protection. This 
calls for an updated national copyright legislation, which has to be 
framed with due regard to the national needs and in a manner that best 
serves the national interest. Such legislation should provide for the 
protection not only of the creators of intellectual works but also of those 
(the Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organisations) who help in the dissemination of such works, in respect 
of their own rights. 
The very process of development in developing countries has 
thrown up the urgent need of a general enrichment of knowledge 
(particularly in the fields of science and technology); improvement of 
School and University teaching; mass education; raising the standards 
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of higher level schooling ; increase in the number of universities, 
higher education establishments, libraries; increase in professional 
training facilities; development of the national cultural heritage; access 
under reasonable conditions to protected material whose owners are 
abroad; and cultural, economic and social promotion. The place of 
intellectual creation as a stimulus for development requires production 
of educational and cultural material; dissemination of works of enter-
tainment; increased use of the national languages; translation of 
foreign works; and as a factor of cultural promotion, needs reproduction 
and communication of ideas and works, reflecting national culture; 
popularisation of traditional events (folk lore), expressions of national 
identity; stimulations of cultural activities.^' 
The role of copyright in development at the national level, is to 
encourage creativeness; achieve progress in the arts and sciences; 
promote tertiary industry (books, entertainment, records, films, etc.); 
promote the activities of the media (radio, television, cinema, press); 
and enlarge the content of the national heritage, while at the interna-
tional level, it is to facilitate cultural exchanges; achieve integration in 
international relations; and increase the role of developing countries 
within the international community. The adverse effects of inadequate 
protection on national intellectual creativity can be quite easily demon-
strated. The national cultural environment suffers if the creations of 
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authors, composers and artists are not protected or protected only for a 
short period. It necessarily reduces their creativity, stunts the growth of 
national culture, and adversely affects the publishing as well as the 
entertainment industries. It is important to ensure that copyright is not 
only acknowledged, but also respected in practice. 
Life in this century has been transformed by technology, and 
perhaps nowhere has the change been more spectacular than in the field 
of communications. The principal concern of copyright is with commu-
nication. The copyright system has been devised and developed over the 
last century or more to encourage intellectual creativity - literature, 
drama, music, art and the dissemination of information, ideas and 
culture, thereby enriching people's lives by opening their eyes and 
minds to wider and more diversified views of the world and by giving 
them a greater understanding of themselves and each other. The copy-
right law pursues this purpose by giving those who create cultural 
works, rights of control over the use to which the people may put those 
works - in effect over the communication of such works to the public by 
one means or another, and the ambit of this control has evolved to meet 
new forms of use as they have appeared. Today we are surrounded by 
technological marvels - radio and television broadcasting (terrestrial 
and by satellite), cable distribution systems, audio and video recording, 
reprography in all its forms, and computers - and skills to link these 
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technologies into vast multifacility networks. Reprography, tape re-
cording and computer storage have made the reproduction of works 
easy as well as comparatively inexpensive and within a reach of such 
a large nimiber of users that control of reproduction by the copyright owner 
is often impossible. Cable television and satellite broadcasts could ignore 
national boundaries making effective control very difficult indeed. 
The impact of these galloping technological developments (re-
prography, cable television, satellite broadcasting, computer storage of 
protected works) has led to certain new developments. Important 
amongst these concerns piracy, that is, the illegal reproduction and 
distribution of protected works and other flagrant infringements of 
copyright. Piracy has become much easier to perpetuate, and it has 
become more widespread with the new means of reproductions. The 
losses caused by piracy to publishers, producers of audio - visual works, 
and phonograms and, consequently and inevitably, to authors are 
getting increasingly larger. This development is particularly detrimen-
tal to the cultural life of developing countries like India. National 
production of books, audio - visual works and phonograms can be 
suffocated at birth, and without such production, there is no outlet for 
the development of national creativity. The increase in piracy could 
lead to a far - reaching cultural dependence and to the fading away of 
national cultural identity. Collective administration of copyright and 
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provisions of suitable infrastructure for this purpose are particularly 
important in today's context. 
The most recent and probably the greatest development in the 
whole history of information technology has come as a result of fast 
developing Internet and cyberspace. Marshall Macluhon in his book 
"The Medium in the message" rightly observed : "ours is brand new 
world of allatonceness. 'Time' has ceased, 'space' has vanished. We 
now live in a global village - a simultaneous happening... The new electronic 
interdependence recreates the world in the image of a global village. 
The Internet, with nearly 90 million^^ persons connected, is the 
biggest single phenomenon showing that the global village is within our 
reach. It is just a matter of years for the Net to reach every nook and 
corner of the world. As such to say that the concept of a global village 
is a hype does not seem to be true. The Internet is a global computer 
network made up of hundreds of smaller networks linked together by the 
international telephone system." These networks are run by govern-
ments, academic institutions and corporations, individual users or 
smaller companies link into this matrix of networks by connecting to the 
nearest mode, again via a phone line^*. 
The World Wide Web is a hypermedia information storage system 
linking resources around the world. Browsers (a program that allows 
users to access the Web with the click of a mouse) allow highlighted 
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words or icons, called hyperlinks, to display text, video, graphics and 
sound on a local computer screen, no matter where the resource is 
actually located. "Web Pages" can be seen by millions of users on the 
Net, an expanding universe of networks that has doubled in size 
annually for a decade and now spans 150 nations. There are more 
than 100,000 Web sites already, and the number doubles every two - and 
- a - half months. 
The development of Internet on the one hand has posed a major 
threat for the criminal justice system because Internet can easily be used 
to trade in pornography, obtain.information about drugs or distribute 
offensive literature. The U.K. Government has already introduced 
legislation pertaining to Internet in the 1994 Criminal Justice Act. 
Pornography laws have been extended to include computer - generated 
pornography and the definition of publication in the Obscene Publica-
tions Act has been extended to include computer transmission. Similar 
changes are to be considered in India as well. But it must also be 
recognised that due to the nature of Internet, the only solution is self 
regulation by the Internet users. This view is supported by recent 
evidence of people controlling the use of Internet by rebuttal, email 
bombs (thousands of dummy email messages), cancelling and computer 
viruses. On the other hand use of Internet has given rise to intricate 
issues relating to copyright law. The Internet and the World Wide Web 
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are full of copyright material being used or published by people other 
than the originators. The copyright laws do not specifically include 
materials sent zooming around the Internet in email, binary files or as 
World Wide Web Pages and there is urgent need to extend copyright 
laws to them. But then even if a book is protected by copyright, the 
authorities might not be so diligent in prosecuting unauthorised on line 
use of its content. 
It is the jarisdictional wrangles that make Internet copyright 
violators think that they are above the law. If a picture is taken from a 
copyrighted American source, placed on Usenet in England, down-
loaded to a newsserver in France and then retrived in India, who is going 
to chase whom? It is indeed a crucial issue as to how to protect an author 
in these circumstances and needs serious consideration as is aimed in 
this study. 
(G) SCOPE OF THE STUDY : 
It is, indeed, unfortunate that such an important area of law i.e. 
copyright law which deals with the aforesaid issues did not receive 
much attention from the jurists and researchers of our country. 
The Indian Copyright Act of 1957 which replealed the Indian 
Copyright Act of 1914 has been on statute book for about four decades 
and in a quest to keep pace with the technological developments, major 
amendments were undertaken in the 1957 Act in 1983 and 1984. But 
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inspite of these amendments and the positive changes brought by them 
in the copyright law, the Indian law was still not able to cope with the 
changing times and, therefore, another major exercise to amend the 
Copyright Act was initiated by the Copyright Amendment Bill in 1992 
which has now been passed in 1994. 
It was at this point of time that the present study was designed to 
examine the state of copyright law in India with adequate emphasis on 
the challenges posed to it by the technological.developments. As India 
is one of the former colonies of Britain and is one of the prominent 
members of British Commonwealth, the Indian Copyright Law as many 
other laws have heavily borrowed from the English system and there-
fore, any discussion on India Copyright law must necessarily resolve 
around the British Copyright law. Similarly as American Copyright law 
has also been influenced by the British Common law traditions prior to 
comprehensive statutory developments and as America has also devel-
oped from a relatively backward country to the mightiest power of the 
world, it is in the fitness of things that while examining Indian Copy-
right law, recourse be had to the American experiences in this regard. 
As a result this study has been planned to make a comparative assess-
ment of Indian Copyright law with that of U.K. and U.S. Copyright 
laws. 
The wave of liberalisation of Indian economy was indeed a 
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positive and major step in the direction of market economy. It marked 
the end of licence raj which was the hallmark of joint economy with 
greater emphasis on public sector. This major change resulted in if not 
withering away of state, at least in the withdrawal of state from major 
economic activities of the nation and, thus, paving away for free market 
and competition. But out-dated copyright law was a major hurdle in 
integrating India with the international business community. The United 
States infact did keep India as a black listed trade partners under the 
notoriously called. Super 301 and asked India to make its Patent 
Copyright and Trade-mark laws more effective and at par with the 
International Standards. Thus, undertaking present study became a 
major national need and one is indeed happy to note that while the new 
patent law could not get through, the Copyright Amendment Bill, 1992 
with adequate safeguards to authors, architects, performers, phonogram 
producers or those dealing with computer programs got the approval of 
Indian parliament. 
(H) SURVEY OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE : 
Compared with the many sided initiatives taken by India in the 
reformulation of the international legal regime of copyright, and with 
the phenomenal growth since Indepedence in the number and quality of 
literary, dramatic and artistic works, the law of copyright has received 
scant juristic attention. This fact becomes even more puzzling when we 
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further recall that independent India accorded high priority to formula-
tion of her own law on copyright. The Indian Copyright Act, 1957 
repealed the 1914 Act. Thus the revision of the 1914 Act occurred 
within ten years of independence, alongside with the great codification 
of the Hindu law. Even this last development did not unfortunately 
focus attention of jurists to this vital area of the law, in its manifold 
bearings on the social and cultural development of India. Similarly 
judicial decisions of great significance adversely affecting the rights of 
creative artistis in last four decades or so did not disturb the legal 
researchers. 
The net result of this juristic apathy is lack of any substantial 
work on copyright law in India. The only material which exists is few 
small books and a small number of articles & write-ups in magazines 
which can in no why be termed as research journals. There is no 
scholarly commentation on copyright law.There are only handful of 
professional treatises on the subject written by practitioners. 
The commentary of Indian Copyright Act of 1957, by T.R. 
lyenger and Lai does no more than simply referring to case law under 
various sections without an adequate or even an analysis of the relevant 
judicial pronouncements. These two commentaries are basically writ-
ten keeping in view the needs of copyright attorneys who are keen only 
in having a ready - made manual of Copyright Act, for the preparation 
CHAPTER - 1 :41 : 
of the cases in their hand. Similarly Kal Thairani has come up with a 
small venture entitled "copyright - Indian Experience" in 1987. This 
small book is no more than a digest of Indian Copyright Act of 1957. 
M.L. Chopra who has worked in the Copyright & Book Depart-
ment of Union Government has come up with an extremely small 
pamphlet like book, "Copyright and International Coventions" in the 
year 1998. An effort is made in this useful attempt to give a bird's eye 
view of International Conventions relating to copyright. 
Recently, P.M. Bakshi tried to fill this vital gap in the legal 
writing of this country but unfortunately ended up by contributing a 
very - very brief book on the wide ocean of Intellectual property 
entitled, "Intellectual Property - Indian trends", dealing with all the 
three branches i.e. copyright, patents & trade - marks. 
In addition to aforesaid books, a small number of articles have 
also been written on different aspects of Indian Copyright law in our 
country. With the exception of two - three articles, all of them are more 
or less meant for laymen and merely describe the Indian law without 
having much recourse to analysis and criticism. 
At least three of these write ups are in the form of editorials of 
Calcutta Weekly Notes on various aspects of copyright law such as 
"Copyright and music", "meaning of original", and "literary work". 
The relevance of protecting copyright in computer programs has 
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been recognised by many writers, probably because, the advent of 
computers & problems relating to them were all too visible. As a result, 
at least three articles have been written on the question of copyrightability 
of computer programs. P.M. Dhar has contributed two articles in this 
vital area i.e. "computer software & copyright protection - Indian 
dilema" in the journal section of A.I.R. in 1985 and "Intellectual 
property in computer programs: Weakness of the Indian copyright Act 
1957", in the Journal of Indian Law Institute in 1986. The learned 
author has argued that copyright protection can be guaranteed to 
creators of software within the 1957 Act if some amendments are 
carried out in various sections of the Act. In 1986 itself, an editorial 
again appeared in Calcutta Weekly Notes entitled "Computer - Soft-
ware Dreams" which did discuss in addition to others, the issue of 
copyright protection of software. 
At the time of 1983 and 1984 amendments of copyright Act, 
Samuel Israel wrote a write up in popular magazine i.e. Economic & 
Political Weekly, entitled "Copyright in India : National and Interna-
tional. The 1983 Amendment" in which the need, scope and objectives 
of the amendment are discussed. 
It was around this time that the Annual Survey of Indian Law 
published every year by Indian Law Institute decided to attach some 
importance to copyright law and thus since 1985 it now includes a 
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survey on the developments in the field of Intellectual Property Law. 
Regrettably, the quarterly Journal of Indian Law Institute, the 
authentic organ of professional legal criticism till 1986 did not touch 
upon copyright law. But in 1986 when the Berne Convention of 1886 
completed its hundred years, the journal brought a special issue which 
contained six detailed research articles, three of these dealt with 
copyright law in India. Prof. Upendra Baxi in "Copyright Law and 
Justice in India" discusses the Indian Copyright law in historical 
retrospect, the amendments of 1983 and 1985 and the need to make 
provision for protecting copyright of Indian traditional folklores. Prof. 
K. PunnusM'amJ in his article entitled "performing Right of the Intellec-
tual \Vorks : Judicial Annihilation" discusses various issues relating to 
rights of performers in film & music industry. Prof. K. Punnuswami has 
published another article on the same subject in the Indian Bar Review. 
Prof. D.C Pandey has contributed an article in 1988, published in the 
Journal of Indian law Institute, entitled, "Copyright Board - A futile 
forum" in which the learned author has invited the attention of legal 
community towards the working of Copyright Board and has presented 
a gloomy but realistic picture in this regard mainly due to the non-
exercise of its powers while adjudicating vital copyright issues. 
In 1993, Virendra Kumar Ahuja contributed one small article on 
"Performers Rights: A critical view" in the Supreme Court Journal in 
CHAPTER - 1 : 4 4 : 
which he tries to answer the question as to why performer's protection 
rights are necessary? He also discusses the effect of Indian Copyright 
Amendment Bill of 1992 on this issue. 
It is, therefore, abundantly clear that there is almost nothing 
which has been done in India as far as copyright law is concerned. It is, 
therefore, of utmost importance to make a comprehensive study of vital 
aspects of Indian Copyright law in view of the technological challenges 
of our times. The pre sent study is a modest attempt to fill this vital gap. 
But the study has taken up only few issues relating to copyright and thus 
has a limited scope. 
While there is no substantial work even on the general aspects of 
copyright law in India, in United Kingdom and United States of 
America even on very minute copyright issues, hundreds of books and 
articles have been written. It will be indeed an extremely difficult task 
to present an authentic survey of everything written on copyright law in 
these two countries. Such an exercise is certainly out of the scope of 
present study. Suffice, it is to say that a huge body of literature exists 
in both England and America on this vital area of law. Similarly in a 
large number of articles written in both countries and elsewhere, a 
comparasion of British law has been made with that of American law 
and vice - versa. But there is not a single work in which a comparative 
assessment ofBritish, American & Indian laws has been made and thus 
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the relevance of present study. 
(1) RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ; 
If our numerous laws were perfect, if social control were auto-
matic, legal scholarship, like the state of the Marxists, could be left to 
wither away. But our laws are not perfect and final, and can not be so 
in a dynamic society; they are not always even intelligble, and if 
intelligible, not always intelligently made. The legal scholars write and 
write, the law journals publish and publish, and what do we have? 
Precious little. This is true in respect of no other field as in the field of 
copyright law in India. 
As a first step in this direction, the present study proposes to 
undertake a comparative study of Indian Copyright Law with that of 
Copyright laws of United Kingdom and United States of America. As 
law is a normative science, that is, a science which lays down norms and 
standards for human behaviour in a specified situation or situations 
enforceable through the sanction of the state. What distinguishes law 
from other social sciences (and law is a social science on account of the 
simple fact that it regulates human conduct and relationship) is its 
normative character. This fact along with the fact that stability and 
certainty of law are desirable goals and social values to be pursued, 
make doctrinaire research to be of primary concern to a legal researcher. 
It is common knowledge that the doctrinal research involves analysis of 
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Statutory law and case law, arranging, ordering and systematising legal 
proposition. For the purposes of present study it is this method of 
research which has been adopted. 
A particularly useful source of ideas is the comparative approach 
to legal problems. This is not to say that every topic lends itself to such 
treatment or indeed, that eveiy piece of comparative research is likely 
to produce good results. But such a methodology can be of immense use 
where local law needs to be integrated with the international community 
and has to come at par with internationally recognised standards. In 
recent times, in law report projects, study of comparative laws (in the 
sense of a study of the comparable position in other countries on 
particular topics forming the subject - matter of legal reforms) has 
increased and received a great impetus. Countries, infact, do imitate 
each other and law reform bodies, it may be said, try to learn from each 
other's experience. Sometimes ago, the comparative method found no 
more than verbal acceptance among the majority of jurists who 
continued to pay lip - service to it as a fine jurisprudential method, but 
themselves rarely adopted it. 
This does appear to be no longer true of jurists, nor is it true of 
other persons belonging to the discipline of law. Infact, the comparative 
method may not be new as we think it to be. Aristotle's Constitutions 
can, with substantial accuracy, be called comparative jurisprudence. 
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Moreover, the comparative research does serve at least three 
useful functions. First, comparative research can throw doubts on the 
usefulness of strongly entrenched views. Secondly, it may suggest a 
suitable solution to legal problems. Thirdly, comparative study tends to 
aid in assembling which principles applicable in the field concerned, 
are fundamental and which are secondary. The present study makes an 
effort to achieve all the three functions of comparative research. 
The practical problem that a researcher faces when he pursues 
this method is, what countries to choose for comparative study, what 
books and other materials to consult and how much of the material 
collected to be used for the purpose of the study. For the purposes of this 
study, it was thought proper to study English copyright law as Indian 
law has heavily borrowed from the former and India has historical links 
with Great Britain. The choice of United States of America, was again 
made for two reasons, first, U.S. Copyright law has also for historical 
reasons been influenced by British Common law and secondly, as in the 
early years of independence from British Imperialism, U.S. opted for 
National needs rather than copyright protection, how far India can 
benefit from the U.S. experiences when in the changed global scenerio, 
it is United States itself which threatens India to update its copyright 
regime. It is due to the U.S. pressures that the copyright law has started 
receiving serious attention in India. 
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(J) PLAN OF STUDY : 
Using the aforesaid research techniques, the study has been 
divided into twelve chapters. 
Chapter one or introduction discusses the ideology of copyright, 
justification of copyright, major systems of copyright in the world, the 
research problem, the scope of the study, the survey of existing litera-
ture etc. 
Chapter two makes on attempt to give historical account of 
copyright law. It discusses the copyright in antiquity, middle ages and 
the effect of invention of printing on the copyright law. An effort has 
been made to examine various International Conventions on the ques-
tion of copyright. The historical background of copyright law in U.K., 
U.S.A. and India has also been surveyed. 
Chapter three investigates the question of subject - matter of 
copyright and the rights which the copyright law confers on the authors. 
It discusses the varied treatment in different countries as to the question 
what should be copyrightable. The issue of moral rights of authors and 
their significance is also examined. 
Chapter four examines the question of copyright protection 
under Internatinal law. It discusses the issues of treatment of foreigners 
in copyright law, principles of international copyright conventions, 
national treatment, limitations of the principle of national treatment and 
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the system of applying international copyright conventions to the 
national law. 
Chapters five to eight, examine the vital aspects of subjects of 
copyright in the three countries. Only such subjects have been taken 
which have been affected by the new technological developments and 
about which the law has been recently amended in the countries selected 
by the present study. 
Chapter five, thus deals with the question of copyright in literary, 
dramatic and musical works. The issue of "originality" and various 
types of works protected as literary, dramatic & musical works form the 
subject matter of this chapter. 
Chapter six examines the question of copyright in computer 
programs and computer generated works. The copyright in screen 
display, databases, problems relating to ownership of copyright when 
the computer program has been developed by freelance staff etc. have 
also been discussed. 
Chapter seven discusses an important area of copyright i.e. 
copyright in architectural designs. The question of ownership of copy-
right of an architects' work during the course of employment or where 
his services were only partially hired are discussed. The question of 
publication as to architectural designs and recent legislative changes in 
this regard are also examined. 
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Chapter eight discusses the crusial issue of performers rights 
under copyright laws. It examines the status of a performer in the three 
countries under study and the recent amendments in this regard. The 
judicial response in this regard is also put to critical evaluation. 
Chapter nine discusses the most vital area of neighbouring rights 
with emphasis on International Conventions. The Rome Convention, 
Stockalm Convention and Phonogram Convention are discussed in 
great detail. The challenges posed by satellite and cable transmission 
are also taken care of. 
Chapter ten discusses the question of infringement of copyright 
in U.K., U.S.A. and India. The various types of infringements and 
issues relating to them are examined. The defences available in a case 
of infringement of copyright and controversies relating to them have 
also been discussed. The "fair-use" defence is also studied in detail. 
Chapter eleven examines the civil and criminal remedies avail-
able under the three copyright systems in case of an infringement of 
copyright. It makes an indepth study of judicially created remedies such 
as Anton Pillor Order. 
Chapter twelve sums up the whole study and discusses the 
various conclusions which can be derived from other wise independent 
and self explanatory chapters of this study. The future chalanges to the 
copyright law are discussed in great details. The suggestions for further 
reforming and making Indian law more effective are also discussed & 
further areas of researches indicated. 
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COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL 
RETROSPECT 
The notion that an author should have an exclusive "copyright" 
in his creation took firm shape at the beginning of the 18th century. But 
it is derived from a confusion of earlier strains and there was still a 
major evolutionary conflict to come before its modern form was finally 
fixed. 
The history of copyright law may properly be divided in three 
major periods : The period which terminated in England with the Statute 
of Anne in 1709 and in much of Europe with the end of the 18th century, 
during which privileges were granted to individual publishers or au-
thors; the period represented by the Statute of Anne of 1709 and the 
French Law of July 19, 1773, when authors' rights were protected by 
general legislation and the period which may be said to begin with the 
French Decree of March 28, 1852, which extended the protection of the 
law to foreigners as well as nationals, and marked the beginning of 
Conventions and treaties between various countries. This chapter ex-
amines the historical development of copyright law with reference to 
above stages of its evolution. The question of how copyright came to be 
recognised as an author's economic and moral rights have been dis-
cussed at length. The coming into being of International Union of 
Copyright and merits and shortcomings of such a Union are the other 
issues which are investigated here. 
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(A) PERIOD OF PRIVILEGES : 
This period started with the introduction of printing in the 15th 
century'. It is believed that no recognition of legal rights of authors 
existed before that time. Speculation over the existence of such recog-
nition in ancient Greece and Rome seems idle. There is no trace of any 
legal provision against copying a literary or artistic work, although 
plagiarism was undoubtedly condemned by public opinion.^ This rather 
than law was the agency of social control for the interests of authors at 
that time. The conditions of literary and artistic creation, with the long 
and costly work necessary for the production of each copy, and the lack 
of economic value in the work in itself did not bring about that pressure 
of interests for recognition and protection which is the prerequisite of 
the creation of a legal right. Authors were more conscious of the honour 
accruing to them by the circulation of their writings than of the 
possibility of profit through their sale. Their only solicitude was about 
the accuracy of the copies made by transcribers. 
This does not mean, however, that large number of copies were 
not produced. The Roman booksellers did a flourishing business, and 
slave labour was employed to furnish copies promptly, cheaply, and on 
a large scale.^ It seems strange then that the idea of property in literary 
work, as distinguished from that in the manuscript, had not been 
developed at that time."* With the discovery of printing in 1451, the work 
of reproduction of literary works became easy. An economic value was 
attached to a book now, since it may be reproduced in great numbers and 
distributed by the ordinary channels of trade. Authors have an economic 
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interest to be secured in the exclusive right of making or causing to be 
made copies of their work. They found themselves confronted with a 
situation in which they lost the actual physical control of the vehicle of 
their work, which in the old days they had maintained by the possession 
of the original manuscript. Now, the power to make copies was in the 
hands of any possessor of one of the printed copies. Yet the pressure of 
the interests of authors is not strong enough to obtain general recogni-
tion and protection. Personal privilages were alone granted. Original 
authors were rare in this time. Most of the books published were 
printings of the works of ancient authors and of the Fathers of Church. 
They required much expense and work of scholarship in comparing 
manuscripts and revising the texts. Printers employed the services of 
learned men. Theirs was a pioneer work. No wonder then that they were 
the first to obtain privileges or patents giving them a limited period of 
time. Even when the work published was one of a new writer, the stake 
of the publisher appeared greater than that of the author, and thus the 
protection was granted in the name of the former.^ An additional reason 
for this was that printers and publishers from an early time had formed 
guilds and corporations, and these, by their regulations, provided for 
the protection of the interests of their members. 
The discovery of printing coincided with the Reformation and 
facilitated the later by expanding its doctrines. The intellectual and 
religious movement of the times caused anxities to the established 
monarchs. The control of the press seemed a necessity to them. Thus 
they came to organize censorslip, and prohibit the printing and publica-
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tion of any work without royal authorization. The declared object of the 
crown in organising the stationers company was to prevent the propa-
gation of the reformed religion, and it seems to have been thought that 
this could most effectively be brought about by imposing the severest 
restrictions on the press.^ In this period there were several decrees and 
ordinances of the Star Chamber regulating the manner of printing, the 
number of presses throughout the kingdom, and prohibiting all printing 
against the force and meaning of any of the statutes or laws of the realm. 
It was for these reasons and for the encouragement of the printing of 
unobjectionable, privileges were granted individually in the name of 
the king. They were revokable at will and their term differed in each 
case.^ 
In England, the royal grants of privilege to print certain books 
were not copyrights. They were not granted to encourage learning or for 
the benefit of authors; they were commercial monopolies, licenses to 
tradesmen to follow their calling. As gradually monopolies became 
unpopular, the printers sought to base their claims on other grounds, and 
called the "right of copy" not a monopoly, but a property right. The 
stationers company had a register in which its members entered the 
titles of the works they were privileged to print. A custom developed by 
which members refrained from printing the books with stood on the 
register in the name of another. Thus, members respected each others 
"copy" , as it was called, and there grew up a trade recognition of "the 
right of copy" or copyright. This right was subsequently embodied in 
a by-law of the stationers company'. The entry in the register was 
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regarded as a record of the rights of the individual named, and it was 
assumed that possession of a manuscript carried with it the right to print 
copies. 
The assumption of control of all printing by the Star Chamber in 
1637, and the Licensing Acts of 1641, 1642 and 1643 were all for the 
benefit of the booksellers and in the direction of strengthening the 
commercial monopoly in the art of printing which the company had so 
long enjoyed.* 
In this period of individual, personal privileges, there can be no 
question of international protection of the author's rights. Cases are 
referred to where privileges were granted to foreigners whose work was 
published within the country. Thus, Grotius, a Dutchman, published his 
famous treatise at Paris in 1625 and obtained a privilege for 15 years. 
As a general rule, during this period, books printed for the first time in 
one country could be freely reprinted in other countries, the foreign 
privileges not being recognised. 
In Germany, where, with the discovery of printing, the book 
industry was most prosperous, the privileges were granted either by the 
Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire or by the Sovereigns of the various 
states. German cities, such as Leipzig and Frankfurt were great centres 
of book publishing and book selling, and many foreigners visited their 
famous fairs. They recognised the author's or editor's property right in 
a book, regardless of the existence of a privilege. A Decree of the 
Electors of Saxony dated Feburary 28, 1686 appears to be the first 
enactment protecting foreign publications to the same extent as na-
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tional. It even reduced the formalities to be complied with by the 
foreigners.^ 
The fact that the works of certain eminent authors, such as 
Voltaire, could not be published in the author's country on account of 
the censorship, and were published in foreign countries gave a certain 
dignity to piracy. Thus liberty of thought was encouraged by the 
reprinting in Holland and Switzerland of works suppressed by the Royal 
censors in France. 
(B) PERIOD OF GENERAL LEGISLATION : 
The period of personal privileges granted by Sovereigns to 
individual authors and publishers came to an end with the restoration of 
the freedom of the press, the stronger pressure of the interests of authors 
and publishers, and the growth of a public sentiment that the rights of 
authors should be fully and adequately protected. In England all these 
causes operated earlier than in any other country. The Licensing Act of 
1662 expired in 1694. Repeated attempts were made to renew it, as 
proprietors of copyright felt that they had no adequate protection under 
the common law, without the summary measures provided in the Act. 
Numerous petitions were presented to Parliament in 1703, 1706 and 
1709. In the last year, there was passed the Act of 8 Anne, C.19 ("An 
Act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting of the copies, during 
the times therein mentioned) which is the first general legislative 
enactment in any country designed to protect the rights of authors. 
This Act gave authors of books the sole right and liberty of 
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printing them for a term of 21 years from April 10, 1710, and of books 
not then printed the sole right of printing for 14 years, with a proviso 
that after the expiration of the said term of 14 years the sole right of 
printing or disposing of copies should return to the authors thereof, if 
they were then living for another term of 14 years. The titles to books 
had to be registered in the register book of the stationers company and 
9 copies had to be delivered to certain libraries.'" 
This Statute, passed with a view to giving a greater protection to 
copyright, had the unexpected result of curtailing it; for, in the case of 
Donaldson V. Beckett, the House of Lords finally decided that the effect 
of the statute was to extinguish the common law copyright in published 
works, though leaving the common law copyright in unpublished works 
unaffected. 
The Universities, alarmed at the consequence of this decision, 
applied for and obtained an Act of Parliament establishing in perpetuity 
their right to all the copies given or bequeathed to them or which might 
thereafter be given to or acquired by them theretofore.'-
After their independence, the United States of America were not 
long in adopting copyright legislation. In the meantime, Connecticut 
and Massachusetts had passed Acts in 1783, and Congress in the same 
year had recommended to the various states to grant copyright protec-
tion to authors and publishers who were citizen of the United States. 
Only the States of Virginia, New York and New Jersey followed this 
recommendation. In 1789 the constitution of the United States of 
America provided (Article I, Section 8, clause 8) that Congress was 
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authorised" to promote the progress of science and useful arts by 
securing for the limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries." The Federal Copy-
right Act of May 31,1790 was passed in accordance with this constitu-
tional provision.'^ 
The next country to legislate generally on the rights of authors 
was France, with the law of July 19, 1793,''' which followed the 
abolition of the privileges by the French Revolution. The French law of 
1793 was extended to different European countries (Belgium, Holland, 
Italy and Switzerland), as they came gradually under Napolean's sway. 
It forms the point of departure of copyright legislation in the civil-law 
countries." 
With regard to the rights of foreigners, the British Act of 1709 did 
not make any distinction between citizens and foreigners provided the 
work was published within the country. In Gurichard V. Mori^^, it was 
held that anyone had the right to publish in England a work which had 
been first published in a foreign country. This situation was remedied 
in England by the passing of the International Copyright Act in 1837. 
This Act granted protection in England to the authors of books first 
published in foreign countries, on condition of reciprocity, namely, on 
condition that in such foreign countries authors of books first published 
in England were protected. 
The United States Federal Act of 1790 protected citizens of the 
United States and foreigners resident therein. An amending Act of 
1831' ' made it clear, in section 8, that "there was no prohibition to the 
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printing, publication, importation or sale of books, charts, dramatic and 
musical compositions, engraving, photographs, written, composed or 
made by anyone who is not a citizen or resident of the United States". 
No protection under the common law could be availed of by foreigners, 
in view of the construction given to the Act by the United States 
Supreme Court in Wheaton V. Peters,^^ which declared that by the 
statute of 1790 congress did't affirm an existing right but created a right. 
The French law of 1793 referred generally to "authors" , and it 
might seems that foreigners as well as nationals were covered by its 
provisions. This seemed to be confirmed by a Decree of February 5, 
1810, Article 40 of which dealt with the right of "authors" , either 
nationals or foreigners" to assign their rights to a publisher or any other 
person. But the dominant opinion in France as well as judicial decisions 
upheld the view that works of foreigners were protected only if first 
published in French territory. 
(C) PERIOD OF INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION ; 
The ninteenth century brought profound changes in the condi-
tions upon which the rights of authors were based. In the political field, 
the liberty of the press, the destruction of the division of social classes, 
the dissemination of education, the reinforcement of national unity by 
the use of national languages instead of separate dialects, in the social 
and economic field, new processes of reproduction of literary and 
artistic works, the expansion of the press, the creation of new univer-
sities, the development of bookselling and the wider circulation of 
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books, the learning of foreign languages and the more general travelling 
of people from one country to another - all these facts created new 
conditions for the works of authors and artists. As a result authors began 
to demand a fuller protection of their rights, and to raise much outcry 
against the injustice done to them by the pirating of their works in 
foreign countries. The treatment afforded by law to a bale of cotton 
shipped to St. Petersburg was compared with the fate of an author's 
creation, of which he was robbed as soon as crossed the boundry of his 
home state. But at the same time conflicting interests appeared. Some 
peoples, who had no literature of their own, lived at the expense of those 
with a rich and prosperous literature. National industries had developed 
supplying the domestic market, and they were reluctant to yield their 
interests to those of foreign authors and foreign publishers. On the other 
hand, foreign works were badly adapted or mutilated for the domestic 
market, and another group of persons interested in art & literature 
organised and demanded that the social interest in the production and 
publication of the genuine works of foreign authors be secured and 
protected. Furthermore, national writers and artists found that their 
interests were prejudiced by the abundant publication and sale of 
unauthorised foreign works at cheap prices. It is from the conflict of 
these various interests and the attempt to harmonize them that the 
international protection of foreigners slowly evolved. 
It has been noted above that in the previous period many coun-
tries provided in their law for the protection of foreign author's rights 
on condition of reciprocity, or attempted to negotiate treaties for the 
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reciprocal protection of their citizens in this field. However, very few 
treaties were entered into upto 1852. Certain countries remained out-
side this effort. Belgium and the U.S. constituted outstanding illustra-
tion of this exception by refusing protection to foreign authors. 
In the United States, the Copyright Act of 1790, as further 
amended by the Act of Feburary 3, 1831, protected only citizens and 
residents of the United States, and explicitly allowed the piracy of 
works written, exposed or made by persons who were neither citizens 
nor residents of the United States of America. In view of this state of the 
law, systematic piracy was committed in the U.S.A. of works published 
in all foreign countries, especially in England. Since immigrants came 
to the U.S. from all countries, piratical reprints of books in all languages 
were made. English books were most commonly pirated. Any work that 
was considered likely to sell, and of which the cost of reproduction was 
moderate, was reprinted in U.S. without any hesitation whatsoever.'^ 
Committees of writers were set up in England and in the United States 
put to an end to this situation, without result, however, for a consider-
able time, because gradually there grew up vested interests in the 
reprinting of books, which could not be easily destroyed. The so called 
"courtesy copyright" among American publishers, protecting the first 
American reprinter, did not last long. Competition which ensued, 
resulted in the publication of English novels on bad paper, with bad 
print, at a cheap price, ten, fifteen or twenty five percents. For this 
reason, the most important publishers in U.S. took their place at the 
head of the movement to secure protection to foreign authors.^" They 
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were joined by those American authors who could not find a publisher 
or a market for their books due to the disastrous prices of cheap reprints. 
This movement which started with Henry Clay's Report of February 6, 
18372'- (jjjj „Q| achieve success until 189F^ when after a tremendous 
amount of educational work and strong pressure by publishers of 
American books and of American authors, the Chase Act was passed. 
This was only partially successful. It did away with the requirement that 
the author be a citizen or resident of the United States, but it qualified 
the protection of foreign authors by the stipulation that all books must 
be set up in the United States in order to acquire copyright^', and by the 
requirement for reciprocity on the part of the state to which the author 
belonged. 
The greatest impulse to general international recognition of 
author's-rights was given by the French Decree of March 28, 1852, 
which constituted a landmark in this field. From 1840 to 1852 France 
attempted to secure copyright protection for French works by the 
conclusion of treaties granting reciprocal treatment. This effort had 
failed to a large extent. Treaties were secured with Sardinia in 1843 and 
with Portugal, Honover and Great Britain in 1851. It had not been 
possible to conclude treaties with Belgium or Holland, the two principal 
"hotbeds" of French piracies. Even the above four treaties were 
inadequate, especially with regard to the right of translation of an 
author's works^'*. 
In the meantime, the thought was being crystallized in France 
that bargaining was not the best, method of securing international 
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protection of authors rights, and that if France should begin declaring 
that piracy of a foreign work in France was a crime punishable by the 
law, the other governments would be more willing to take the same step. 
This was done by the French Decree of March 28, 1852, promulgated 
by Louis Napolean, President of the Second French Republic. Thus, the 
counterfeiting in French territory of works published in foreign coun-
tries was prohibited and so was the sale, exportation and transportation 
of countfeited works. 
During the decade from 1852 to 1862 France was able to con-
clude twenty-three treaties for the reciprocal protection of author's 
rights, using to the best advantage the initiative taken by her in 
promulgating the law of 1852. 
In the meantime, in 1858, the first Congress of Authors and 
Artists was held at Brussels.^^ By its resolutions proclaiming the 
principle of international recognition of author's rights without 
the condition of reciprocity, and by calling for uniform legislation 
on literary and artistic property by all countries, this Congress 
started the movement which brought about the International Copyright 
Union of 1886. 
(D) PROTECTION OF FOREIGN AUTHORS PRIOR TO 1886 : 
Before considering the Copyright Union and the protection of 
copyright after its enactment in 1886, it is of interest to look at the 
situation existing at that time under the municipal law of the various 
countries and the treaties concluded among them. 
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(i) National Law : 
At the time the International Copyright Union was organised in 
1886, 24 countries including U.K. & U.S.A. possessed general legisla-
tion for the protection of copyright." 
These different legislative enactments were far from being uni-
form, nor did they offer a uniform solution to the various questions of 
copyright. A certain similarity existed only between the laws of coun-
tries, the legal traditions of which sprang from the same soil, or when 
one country consciously copied the law of another. Thus, the Belgion 
law of 1886 followed the principles of the French law. The Austrian law 
of 1886 had adopted the resolutions of the Diet of the German Confed-
eration and was similar to the laws in force in the German States prior 
to the adoption of the Imperial Act of 1870. The Hungarian law of 1884 
was modelled extensively on the German law. There was great similar-
ity between the laws of Denmark, Sweden and Norway. 
(ii) By Conventions, Treaties etc. : 
The first treaties for the reciprocal protection of authors rights 
were concluded between Prussia and other states of the German Con-
federation. These treaties, 32 in number, were entered into between 
1827 and 1829. 
England in the meantime passed the International Copyright Act 
of 1837, and on the basis thereof a Copyright Convention was entered 
into in 1846 with Prussia, to which ten German States acceded in 1847. This 
is the second example of a sort of multipartite agreement in this field. 
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It appears that in 1886 there were in force 43 bipartite agreements 
between 15 countries for the protection of copyright^*. 
(E) ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT UNION : 
(i) Brussels Congress of 1858 : 
The Origin of the movement for the creation of International 
Copyright Union may be traced to the Congress of Authors and Artists 
which met in Brussels in 1858, under the impetus given by the French 
Decree of 1852. It was a remarable Congress for its time. The committee 
of organisation had listed the questions to be discussed, including the 
international protection of author's rights, with or without reciprocity, 
and with or without the necessity of complying with any formalities. 
The Congress adopted five resolutions on International Copy-
right Law and other resolutions on rights in literary and artistic works 
in general, and in dramatic and musical works and designs in particular, 
as well as on economic questions such as tariffs on literary and artistic works. 
The resolutions on international copyright law were as follows^" 
(I) That the principle of international recognition of copyright in 
favour of authors must be made part of the legislation of all 
civilized countries 
(II) This principle must be admitted regardless of reciprocity. 
(III) The assimilation of foreign to national authors must be absolute 
and complete. 
(IV) Foreign authors should not be required to comply with any 
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particular formalities for the recognition and protection of their 
rights, provided they have complied with the formalities required 
in the country where publication first took place. 
(V) It is desirable that all countries adopt uniform legislation for the 
protection of literary and artistic works. 
(ii) Artistic And Literary Congresses of 1878 : 
At the Universal Exposition of 1878 at Paris, among upwards of 
30 International Congresses, there were assembled an International 
Literary Congress and an International Artistic Congress. 
The Artistic Congress met from September 18 to 21, 1878. It 
voted 21 resolutions, the most important of which were the following. 
The artists right in his work, is a property right. Its duration should be 
limited. It was desirable that the period should be fixed at one hundred 
years from the date of the publication of the work. No formality should 
be required for the protection of the copyright. Foreign artists should be 
dealt with as nationals, without the condition of reciprocity. The 
international treaties for the protection of copyright should be indepen-
dent of treaties of commerce. It was desirable that a "general Union" 
be constituted among the various countries, which should adopt uni-
form legislation. The Congress appointed a committee to present the 
resolutions to the French Minister of Education and Fine Arts and 
request that he take the initiative of calling together an "official 
international commission" for the creation of the desired Union. This 
initiative was not taken by the French Government, which thus missed 
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the opportunity seized by the Swiss Government a little latter, of 
patronizing efforts towards the creation of the International Copyright 
Union. 
The Literary Congress met from June 17 to June 29. It was 
presided over by Victor Hugo. After long discussions on the nature of 
author's rights and the proper legislation to ensure their protection in all 
countries, it voted the following five resolutions : 
(I) The right of an author in his work does not constitute a grant of 
law, but one of the forms of property which the legislation must 
guarantee. 
(II) The right of the author and of his heirs and legal representatives 
is perpetual. 
(III) After the expiration of the period fixed for the duration of the 
author's right by the laws in force in the various countries, any 
person may freely reproduce a literary work, subject to payment 
of a royalty to the author or his legal representatives. The rights 
recognised in favour of heirs cannot prevent the publication of a 
new edition provided this is accurate, this new edition must be 
preceeded by real offers of payment of an indemnity and two 
summonses repeated at intervals of six months. Nevertheless, the 
heir will be deemed bound by the wishes of the author whenever 
he may justify this 
(IV) Every literary, scientific or artistic work shall be treated in the 
countries other than the country of origin in the same way as 
works of national origin. This shall also apply to the execution of 
CHAPTER - 2 : 7 0 : 
dramatic and musical works. 
(V) In order that this protection be secured, it will be sufficient for 
the author to have complied with the ordinary formalities in the 
country where the work was first published. 
(iii) International Literary and Artistic Association : 
At its meeting of June 28th 1879 the Literary Congress decided 
to create an International Association of which literary societies and 
authors of all countries could be members. This Association was 
organised at once and announced as its objectives "the propagation and 
defence of the principles of intellectural property in all countries, the 
study of international Conventions, and working towards their im-
provements." It held important meetings from 1879 on. At its Brussels 
meeting in 1884 the Association became L'Association Litteraire el 
Artistique Internationale, thus incorporating artists as well as authors, 
and extending its task to the protection of artistic as well as of literary 
property. It still exists today under this name.-' 
At the Rome meeting of Association in 18 82"*', Dr. Paul Schmidt, 
representing the German publishers, caused a resolution to be adopted 
stating that the need for the protection of intellectual property was the 
same in all countries, and that complete satisfaction of this need could 
only be obtained by the Constitution of " a Union for literary property'' 
similar to the Postal Union, and called upon the Executive Council of 
the Association to initiate a discussion of this matter by the Press of all 
countries and to cause "Conference to be convened in which there should 
CHAPTER - 2 : 71 : 
be represented all interested, with the view to preparing such a Union. 
(iv) Berne Conference of 1883 : 
The International Association unanimously approved this pro-
posal, and decided to call a Conference at Berne. It was convened on 
September 10, 1883. 
The Conference appointed a Committee of seven members to 
prepare a project for the Union. The Committee prepared a draft often 
Articles'? which, notwithstanding its many defects, was remarkable for 
the time. In particular, it contained the principle of national treatment 
and provided that no other formalities were to be required so long as 
those prescribed in the country of origin were complied with. It 
recognised translation rights during the entire term of the copyright in 
the original work, and provided for the establishment of an Interna-
tiona] Bureu of the Union. 
(v) Official Conference of 1884 : 
As the proposal met with general approval on June 28, 1884, the 
Swiss Government adressed to the various Governments an official 
invitation to a Conference. This met at Berne on September 8. 1884. 14 
countries were represented: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Costa Rica, 
Praraguay, Salvador, Sweden and Norway and Switzerland. Numa Droz 
was elected as president. 
At the first meeting of the Conference, the German delegation 
submitted the following important question for discussion : 
Instead of concluding a Convention based on the 
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principle of national treatment, would it not be 
preferable to consider at this time a codification 
regulating in a uniform manner for the entire Union, 
and within the framework of a Convention, the 
whole of the provision relating to the protection of 
copyright. 
The delegates generally expressed their sympathy with this 
ideal,'"* but refused to admit its practicability. But the Conference 
before finishing its work adopted a resolution in the spirit of general 
proposal. It stated its conviction that the international codification of 
copyright law was bound to come in the future. 
The Draft Convention adopted by this first Diplomatic Confer-
ence of delegates of the various states consisted of twenty-one articles. 
It was accompanied by a draft additional article maintaining existing 
Conventions which were not contrary to the general Convention, and by 
a draft Final Protocol. 
An exception to the principle of full national treatment of foreign 
authors was admitted by the Conference with regard to the duration of 
copyright. It was provided that this could not exceed the term granted 
in the country of origin. Another limitation was made by the Conference 
with regard to the persons protected by the Convention. It protected 
only authors nationals of the Union and publishers of works published 
in the Union. Thus, it tended to compel authors of countries not 
belonging to the Union to contract with publishers in the Union for the 
publication of their works. 
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(vi) Official Conference of 1885 : 
On September 7, 1885, the new Conference met at Berne with 
delegates from twenty countries in attendence. The draft adopted in 
1884 contained several provisions constituting a beginning of interna-
tional codification in copyright law. This part of the work of previous 
Conference was now partly undone. Indeed, it appeared that an insis-
tence on these provisions of the draft would alienate a number of 
countries, and the Union would have to be restricted to a smaller 
number. It was thought more practical to refer to the desire of certain 
countries not to derogate much from their national law, or to leave 
certain matters to the exclusive province of such law, in order to obtain 
their adherence, in the hope that future Conferences of Revision might 
be able to do more in the matter of codification. 
(vii) Final Conference of 1886 : 
The Swiss Government communicated the Draft Convention to 
55 countries, and invited them to sign the Convention at a new Confer-
ence. This Conference convened at Berne on September 6, 1886. All the 
countries that signed the Draft Convention in 1885 were represented at 
this new Conference, except. Honduras, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Norway. In addition, Belgium, Liberia, Japan and the U.S. sent 
delegates, the last two ad audiendum. The Conference was bound by the 
understanding reached at the previous Conference that it would not in 
any way change the draft Convention, and so had practically nothing to 
do except to sign the Convention, an Additional Article, and a Final 
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Protocol. 
France and Spain declared that their accession included that of all 
their colonies. Great Britain's accession meant the inclusion of all its 
colonies and possessions, subject to an understanding that the British 
Government could denounce the Convention subsequently for any or all 
of its the possessions including India. The Conference also received 
declarations from the signatory countries with regard to the class in 
which they desired to be placed from the point of view of contributions 
towards the expenses of the International Bureau established by the 
Convention. France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy were placed in 
the first class; Spain in the second; Belgium, Switzerland in the third, 
Haiti in the fourth, and Tunis in the fifth. 
One year later, on September 5, 1887 delegates of the signatory 
countries met at Berne and exchanged ratifications of the Convention. 
Only Liberia was absent and failed to deposit its ratification^^ Accord-
ing to its Article 20, the Convention entered into effect three months 
later, viz, on December 5, 1887. 
(viii) Outline of Berne Convention of 1886 : 
The purpose of the Berne Convention as indicated in its preamble 
was to protect, in as effective and uniform manner as far as possible, the 
rights of authors in their literary and artistic works". Article 1 laid 
down that the countries to which the Convention applied constitue a 
Union for protection of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic 
works. 
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The fundamental principle of the Convention was "national 
treatment", i.e., persons entitled enjoy in each country of the Union the 
advantages accorded by the law of such country to its own nationals. 
This was subject, however, to the limitation that the duration of 
copyright could not exceed in any country of the Union the term 
provided for in the country of origin. 
Another important feature of this Convention was the principle 
of automatic protection, according to which such national treatment 
was not dependent on any formality; in other words protection was 
granted automatically and was not subject to any formality of registra-
tion, notice or deposit'^ 
The Convention also contained a beginning of codification on 
copyright by provisions forming common legislation for the Union. 
Thus, translation rights formed the subject of the compromise solution 
by the fixation of the term often years from publication of the original 
work" other provisions of the Draft Convention dealt with the repro-
duction of articles of newspapers and periodicals^^ and the reproduc-
tion of copyrighted works in publications intended for instruction, in 
works of a scientific character.^^ It was provided that articles of 
newspapers or periodicals might be reproduced, provided the authors or 
editors had not explicitly forbidden reproduction. The reproduction of 
articles of political discussion, of daily news was unrestricted. 
Article 9 dealt with the right of public presentation of dramatic 
or dramatical musical works, whether published or not. The national 
treatment principle of Article 2 was made applicable in this matter. No 
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compliance with any formalities was required except those prescribed 
in the country of origin. Authors were also protected against the 
presentation of a translation of such works during the term of protection 
of other translation rights accorded by the Convention. Article 2, also, 
applied to the public execution of unpublished musical works as well as 
of published musical works the author of which had explicitly forbid-
den public execution. 
Further provisions of the Convention dealt with indirect appro-
priations of literary or artistic works, such as adaptations, musical 
arrangements, etc.; the presumption of authorship of works protected 
by the Convention; the seizure of piratal reproductions upon attempted 
importation; the measures which might be taken by the various coun-
tries to control the circulation, representation or exhibition of works; 
and the application of the Convention to works already created"^ The 
contracting countries were permitted to enter into special agreements 
among themselves, provided these conferred to authors larger advan-
tages than those granted by the Convention. 
An International Bureau was established for the Union at Berne, 
and provisions were made for periodical revisions of the Convention, 
for accession of new countries and of colonies to the Union, and for the 
indefinite duration of the Convention, subject to denunciation. 
In addition to the Convention, an additional Article and a Final 
Protocol were signed and ratified. The former retained in effect the 
existing bipartite treaties which granted to authors broader rights than 
those secured by the Convention. The latter contained explanations of 
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various provisions in the Convention. 
The Convention was an achievement when compared with the 
text now in force after the latest revision at Paris in 1971, the original 
Convention will, of course, appear inadequate. But when the state of the 
municipal law in the various countries in 1885 is taken into consider-
ation, and the discussions at the Conferences of 1884 and 1885 are 
studied it must be admitted that the Berne Convention was a great step 
ahead in securing to authors and artists a more complete protection than 
they ever enjoyed up to that time in the international field. 
(ix) Paris Conference of Revision 1896 : 
Paragraph 6 of the Final Protocal adopted in 1886 provided that 
the first Conference of revision was to meet within a period of frx)m four 
to six years the coming into effect of the Convention on December 5, 
1897. The French Government was to fix the date within these limits, 
after taking the advice of the International Bureau. It was subsequently 
felt that the time was short to attempt a revision of the Convention, and 
the French Government convened the Conference of Revision on April 
15, 1896. A programme was prepared with the cooperation of the 
Bureau on the basis of resolutions adopted in the intervening years by 
the literary and artistic associations in various countries. 
In the meantime, four new countries had acceded to the Union, 
Luxembourg'", Monaco"^, Montenegro''^ andNorway"*"*. Thus, the mem-
bers of the Union at the time of the Paris Conference of Revision of 1896 
were 13. All were represejit^ alf the Conference. In addition, delegates 
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of 14 non-member countries including United States also attended. 
The substance of the provisions adopted at the Conference of 
Paris is as follows : the fundamental principle of Article 2 was made 
clearer by redrafting its first paragraph and adding a new paragraph to 
the effect that posthumous works were included among the works 
protected. The Declaration interpreted the second paragraph of Article 
2 by declaring its meaning to be that protection was secured under the 
Convention, subject exclusively to compliance with the conditions and 
formalities prescribed by the law of the country of origin. 
The two most important amendments concerned Articles 3 and 5 
of the Convention. The original Article 3 extended the protection of the 
Convention to publishers of works published in a country of the Union, 
the authors of which did not belong to a member country. The German, 
Belgian, and Swiss delegations proposed that this article be rewritten so 
that protection be extended to authors belonging to non-member coun-
tries who published their works for the first time in a country of the 
Union. Thus under the amended Article 3, these authors were protected 
under the Convention for their published works when first publication 
took place in a country of the Union. "Publication" was defined in the 
Declaration to mean "issue of copies", so that presentation of a 
dramatic or dramatico-musical work, the execution of a musical work, 
or the exhibition of a work of art is not to be deemed to constitute 
publication. 
Article 5 of the original Convention granted translation rights 
only for a period of ten years. The revised Article 5 provided that 
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authors and their legal representatives were to enjoy exclusive transla-
tion rights for the whole term of copyright in the original work, 
provided that when the author failed to make use of his right for ten 
years from publication of the original work in the country where 
protection was claimed, his exclusive right of translation ceased. 
(x) Berlin Conference of Revision 1908 : 
It was the view of the delegates of Paris that a new Conference of 
revision should meet after a period of between 6 to 10 years. Berlin was 
chosen as the place for that Conference. Four new countries were added 
to the Union"^ prior to the convening of the new Conference of revision: 
Denmark'''', Japan'*^ Liberia''^ and Swiden.^" 
The New Conference, postponed by common agreement, was 
called together on October 14, 1908. It was a long Conference, lasting 
until November 14, 1908. 
All the members of the Union were represented at the Conference 
with exception of Haiti. In addition, delegates of the many countries 
attended the Conference including U.S. 
It was proposed at the Conference that protection of the rights of 
authors be extended and simplified. 
With these objectives in view, it was proposed to extend the 
protection of the Convention to works of art applied to industry, to 
extend to photographs, architectural works and choreographic works 
the same protection as to other artistic and literary works, to assimilate 
translation to other forms of reproductions and to grant translation 
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rights for the whole term of copyright; to deal with newspaper articles 
involving political discussion as with other literary articles; to recognise 
the exclusive right of execution of musical works as residing in their 
composers without the formality of their reserving their rights upon 
publication, lastly, to provide for the composer's right to authorize the 
adaptation and execution of his works by mechanical instruments. 
The objective of simplification was sought by abolishing the 
reference in Article 2 of the conditions of the law in the country of 
origin. 
The new Convention was signed on November 13, 1908. The 
most important amendments adopted at Berlin were the following : The 
Convention defined more fully the literary and artistic works to be 
protected, and made it clear that the contracting countries were bound 
to afford protection by their law for all of these works. Photographic 
works were explicitly included. Protection was made subject to no 
formality whatsoever and independent of the existence of protection in 
the country of origin. The Convention provided that protection under it 
endured for the life of the author and 50 years after his death, subject, 
however, to different regulation by the law of each country. Translation 
rights were now recognised for the entire term of copyright without any 
restriction. Recognition was given to the right of authors of musical 
works to authorize the adaptation of their works to mechanical instru-
ments, and the public execution of such works by such instruments. 
This principle was subject to the provision that the legislation of the 
contracting countries might determine the reservations and conditions 
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relative to its application. Likewise, the Convention recognised the 
exclusive right of authors to authorize the reproduction and public 
presentation of their works by cinematograph. 
(xi) Additional Protocol of 1914 : 
On March 20, 1914, delegates of the 18 member countries of the 
Union signed at Berne an Additional Protocol to the revised Convention 
of 1908. The circumstances under which it came about are as follows : 
The revised Convention of 1908 granted to authors belonging to 
nonmember country where their work was first published, and unionist 
treatment in the other member countries. Thus, every member country 
was bound under the Convention to treat works of such authors pub-
lished in its territory precisely as if they were works of national authors, 
without any regard to the existence of reciprocity in the country to 
which the author belonged. Specifically, Great Britain and the British 
dominions were bound to protect works of American authors published 
in their territory, as works of national authors published in their 
territory, as works of national authors, and they were further bound to 
extend to them Unionist protection if they were published in another 
country of the Union. 
Under the Chase Act of 1891, which for the first time extended 
copyright protection in the United States to foreign authors not resident 
in the U.S. the onerous condition of manufacturing in the United States 
was imposed. In the case of a book, photograph, chrome or lithograph, 
it was necessary, as a condition to protection, that copies to be deposited 
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and the copies to be offered for sale in the U.S. "be printed from type 
set within the limits of the U.S. or from plates made thereunder or from 
negatives or drawings on stone made within the limits of the United 
States, from transfers made thereunder." thus a foreign author was 
prevented from following the natural and convenient course of having 
his work set up in his own country. The effect of this clause was to 
prohibit the foreign author from offering for sale in America a work 
printed outside U.S. 
The Act of March 4, 1909 relieved foreign authors in general 
from the effects of this clause, but they were preserved as to works 
written in the English language. This amounted to a discrimination 
against Great Britain and its dominions and colonies. 
On May 18, 1910 an Imperial Copyright Conference met at 
London to discuss the question of ratification of the revised Convention 
of 1908, and to consider the elaboration of an Empire Law on copyright. 
It terminated its work on July 10 with the adoption of a memorandum 
containing various resolutions.'' 
Subsequently, Great Britain passed the new Copyright Act, of 
1911, in conformity with the revised Convention of 1908. This Act 
protected American authors without regard to any formality whatso-
ever, provided their works were first published in Great Britain or any 
other Union country." In 1912 Great Britain ratified the Convention of 
1908 without any reservation. However, it proposed to the member 
countries of the Union the adoption of an Additional Protocol granting 
to each member country the right to restrict, within its territory, the 
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benefits of the Convention with regard to authors of a non-member 
country. 
As a result all the member countries of the Union accepted the 
text of an Additional Protocol proposed by Great Britain and signed at 
Berne on March 20, 1914. 
The Protocol constitutes a restriction of the regime of the Union 
by granting power to a member country to limit the protection of the 
works of authors, nationals of a non-member country ,who at the time 
of publication were not domiciled in a country of the Union. This power 
could be exercised when the non-member country did not sufficiently 
protect works of authors belonging to the member country. The latter is 
free to determine the absence of "sufficient" protection for works of its 
authors in a non-member country. It may then retaliate but such a 
member country is bound to notify the Government of the Swiss 
Confederation by a written declaration of the restrictive measures taken 
by the country concerned. This government will then communicate the 
declaration to the member countries. 
(xii) Rome Conference of Revision 1928 : 
At the Berlin Conference of 1908 it was agreed that the next 
Conferenceof Revision could be held at Rome between 1914and 1918. 
The World War necessitated a postponement. In 1927 it was arranged to 
convene the Conference on May 7, 1928. The International Bureau 
Communicated to the member countries, as well as to non-members. 
At the time the Conference convened on May 7, 1928, the Union 
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comprised 36 countries, 19 more than in 1914. 
All the 36 members of the Union were represented at the Rome 
Conference with the exception of Haiti and Liberia 21 non-member 
countries including United States also attended. 
The programme of the Conference, as prepared by the Interna-
tional Bureau and the Italian government, proposed amendments in 
form and in substance of the Convention of 1908. The most important 
were the following. It was first proposed to abolish the liberty given by 
Articles 25 and 27 of the 1908 Convention to member countries and new 
acceding countries of making reservation with regard to the application 
of certain provisions of the Convention. It was pointed out that the 
situation created thereby was very confusing, and contravened the 
object of the Convention. 
It was further proposed to make the period of copyright of 50 
years post mortem auctoris compulsorily uniform for all countries of 
the Union, to extend the protection of the Convention to works of art 
applied to industry, to secure to authors and artists the exclusive right 
of authorizing the communication or execution of their works by radio 
and analogous means; and to perfect the provisions on mechanical 
musical instruments and movies. The Italian government submitted 
proposition for the recognition of the moral right of authors. 
The Conference created a Plenary Committee, an editing com-
mittee, and sub-committees on the moral right of authors, radio, 
cinematographs and photographs, and mechanical reproduction of mu-
sical works. 
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The Rome Conference did not rewrite the Convention as its 
predecessor had done. The amendments were drafted on the existing 
text, or inserted in additional articles under his or ter without disturbing 
the existing numeration of the Convention. The most important amend-
ments adopted were the following : 
Oral literary works, such as lectures, addresses, sermons, were 
included among the works to be protected under Article 2 of the 
Convention. An additional Article 2 bis reserved the liberty of each 
country to exclude totally or partially from protection, political dis-
courses and discourses made in judicial debates, and to determine the 
condition under which lectures, addresses and sermons might be repro-
duced by the Press. The valiant efforts of France to have works of art 
applied to industry protected as artistic works, in general, failed again. 
Upon the proposal of Great Britain, the text of the Additional Act of 
Berne (1914) was inserted in Article 6 of the Convention. The Italian 
proposal for recognition of the moral rights of authors formed Article 
6 bis of the New Convention. This provided that independently of the 
proprietary rights, and even after the assignment of these rights, authors 
possess the right to claim authoriship of their works and to object to any 
deformation, mutilation or modification thereof prejudicial to their 
honour or reputation. The legislation of each country was left free to 
determine the conditions for the conditions for the exercise of these 
rights of authors. 
The proposition that the duration of copyright be made compul-
sorily uniform in all countries of the Union for 50 years post mortem 
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auctoris or that atleast dependency upon duration in the country of 
origin be abolished, was not approved by the Conference. A new Article 
7 bis was adopted regulating the period of protection of works of joint 
authoriship. Minor amendments were made to Articles 13 and 14 
dealing with articles of journals and periodicals, the retroactive appli-
cation of the Convention, and cinematographic works. 
Aside from the recognition of the moral rights of authors, the 
only important amendment to the Convention consisted in the insertion 
of a new Article II, bis, recognising the exclusive right of authors to 
authorize the communication of their works to the public by the radio. 
On the whole, the results of the Rome Conference were rather 
mediocre. Many of the objectives of the programme were not accom-
plished. Discussions were lengthy and laborious, and the amendments 
adopted, aside from the recognition of the moral rights of the authors 
and of the exclusive right to authorize public communication of works 
by the radio, were of limited significance. 
(xiii) Brussles Convention 1948 : 
During the world war most of the countries party to the Interna-
tional Copyright Union were at war. There has been no contention either 
in this war or that of first world war on any side that the Convention was 
to be deemed abrogated by the war. In view of the fact that the 
Convention is of a juristic rather than a political nature, that it intended 
to establish a more or less permanent condition of things which need not 
pressure a state of peace, and that it concerns the interests of private 
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persons and not of states directly. 
After the war was over, it was thought proper to take the long due 
revision of the Convention. Thus the Brussels Conference of 1948. 
Some of the main features of the Brussels Convention are as 
follows : Article 4 provided that first publication in a Non-Union 
country would mean loss of protection. Further protection is to be 
afforded to nationals of Non-Union countries habitually resident in a 
Union country. It was also open to any country of the Union to restrict 
protection of works whose authors are nationals of a non-Union country 
which does not give reciprocal rights and are not habitually resident in 
a country of the Union. 
The Brussels Convention omitted the provisions of Article 7 (2) 
of the Rome Convention which entitled countries of the Union to 
provide a shorter period of protection than those laid down in Article 7. 
This was a big achievement. The Rome Convention added, for the first 
time, provisions with regard to the minimum term of copyright in works 
of joint authorship, namely one expiring with the death of the author 
who dies last. However, the Brussels Convention dropped this provi-
sion, and. instead, provided that, in the case of a work of joint 
authorship, the term of protection was to be calculated from the date of 
the death of the last surviving author." Then the Convention provided 
that the protection of the Convention was not to apply to news of the day 
nor to miscellaneous information having the character of mere items of 
news. '^* Thus, no copyright protection is afforded by the Convention to 
news or facts constituting press information. 
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The Rome Convention, for the first time, introducted provisions 
intended to extend an author's rights beyond those generally compre-
hended in the term copyright. These provisions comprehended what is 
known as the author's droit moral. These provisions were extended by 
the Brussels Convention which provided first that, even after the 
assignment of his copyright, the author should have the right during his 
life-time to claim authorship of the work, and to object to any "distor-
tion, mutilation or other alteration thereof or any other action in relation 
to the said work which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputa-
tion". Secondly, it was provided that the rights granted to the author as 
aforesaid should, after his death, be maintained atleast until the expiry 
of the copyright. Thirdly, the means of redress was left to the national law." 
A further new right, which was introduced for the first time by the 
Brussels Convention, deals with what is known, on the continent, as the 
droit de suite. It provided that the author or, after his death, the persons 
or institutions authorized by national legislation are, with respect to 
original works of art and original manuscripts, to enjoy the inalienable 
right to an interest in any sale of the work subsequent to the first transfer 
thereof by the author thereof. This matter, however, is left to the 
legislation of individual members and can not be claimed in any country 
which does not have such legislation.'^ 
(xiv) Stockholm Convention of 1967 : 
The Berne Convention was further revised at a Conference held 
in Stockholm on 11th July 1967" which closed on the 14th July 1967. 
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The Convention introduced a protocol regarding developing countries 
to satisfy the wishes and needs of some developing countries who 
considered the protection provided by the Berne Convention beyond 
their scope of interests'*. 
The Protocol provided that any country regarded as a developing 
country in conformity with the established practice of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations which ratified and acceded to the 
Convention might make reservations in respect of certain matters which 
would have the effect of giving less protection in that country than what 
was afforded in other countries of the Berne Union. 
The adoption of the Protocol, despite opposition, led to a serious 
situation in the international copyright field. Thus, although Article 21 
made the Protocol an integral part of the Berne Convention, Article 28 
provided that any country ratifying or acceding to the Convention may 
declare that its ratification or accession is not to apply to the substantive 
provisions of the Convention and the Protocol. Thus none of the major 
developed countries ratified or acceded to the substantive provisions of 
Convention as also the Protocol with the result that Stockholm Revi-
sion became a dead letter. 
(xv) Paris Revision of 1971 : 
The disagreement to the Stockholm Conference led to its revision 
at the Revision Conference held in Paris during the period from July 5 to July 
24, 1971. India also participated in this Conference and signed the 
Convention. The Convention entered into force on 10th October 1974. 
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The situation created by Stockholm Conference was particularly 
unfortunate since it had been hoped that one of the results of the 
Stockholm Revision would be that U.S.A. would join the Berne Con-
vention after undertaking revision of its national law''. Thus, the Paris 
Convention assumed added importance. 
In view of this situation, the very first change which Paris 
Revision brought in was the dropping of Article 21 of the Stockholm 
Convention relating to the Protocol Regarding Developing Countries 
and the Protocol itself and, instead provided for acceptable special 
provisons in favour of developing countries in Article 21. As a result 
many countries, including some of the major countries including U.S.A. 
(US as late as 1989),^" have now adhered to the Paris Convention. As to 
U.S. there is still difficulty, not withstanding the United States Copy-
right Act, of 1976, in the sense that there are possible areas of conflict 
between the Convention and the Act. Similarly United Kingdom's 
Copyright Act, 1956 is to be amemended before U.K. can adhere to 
Paris Revision. The Copyright Committee of 1977 in England recom-
mended that England should ratify the Paris Convention^'. 
Two systems are possible for an International Copyright Conven-
tion. Theoretically the most satisfactory system would be a complete 
copyright code to be applied in each countiy of the Union both for 
nationals and subjects of other countries. A less satisfactory system is 
one which merely requires each member state to give to the nationals of 
other member states the same protection as it gives to its own nationals 
with the result that the measure of protection will vary from state to 
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State. The system in fact adopted in the Berne Convention represented 
a compromise of the two systems and the revisions of the Convention 
alluded to above have tended to extend the principle of the common 
code. Infact the Paris Act embodies a reasonably complete code but, as 
will be seen, specifically reserves to members the right to deal with 
certain matters by their own legislation." 
Thus Article 3 which contains the general criteria for eligibility 
for protection provides : 
(I) The protection of this Convention shall apply to : 
(a) Authors who are nationals of one of the countries of the Union, 
for their works, whether published or not; 
(b) Authors who are not nationals of one of the countries of the 
Union, for their works first published in one of those countries, 
or simultaneously in a country outside the Union and in a country 
of the Union. 
(II) Authors who are not nationals of one of the countries of 
the Union but who have their habitual residence in one of them shall, for 
the purposes of this Convention, be assimilated to nationals of 
that country." 
This article is certainly wider in scope than the Brussels Conven-
tion, since works of nationals of Union countries are to be protected, 
even if first publication takes place in a non-Union country. But even 
the Paris Act provides, in a similar way to the Brussels Convention, that 
it is open to any country of the Union to restrict protection of works 
whose authors are nationals of a non-Union country which does not give 
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reciprocal rights and are not habitually resident in a country of the 
Union**'. 
The Paris Revision contains special criteria of eligibility for 
protection in respect of cinematographic works and works of architec-
ture. It provides^"*. 
"The protection of this Convention shall apply, even if the 
conditions of Article 3 are not fulfilled, to : 
(a) Authors of cinematographic work the maker of which has his 
headquarters or habitual residence in one of the countries of the 
Union; 
(b) Author of works of architecture erected in a country of the Union 
or of other structure located in a country of the Union or of other 
structure located in a country- of the Union. 
Article 3 (3) provides that the expression "published works" is 
to mean works published with the consent of their authors, whatever 
may be the means of manufacture of the copies, provided that the 
availability of such copies had been such as to satisfy the reasonable 
requirement of the public, having regard to the nature of the work. But 
the performance of dramatic or musical work, the exhibition of a work 
of art and the construction of a work of architecture do not constitute 
publication. How then can such works be published ? In the case of a 
dramatic work and a musical work, by printing and publishing the text 
or score. In the case of a work of art, such as a picture, presumably by 
publishing sketches, photographs and so on of the work.*' 
Article 5 of the Convention deals with the extent of protection. It 
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provides : 
" Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are 
protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than 
the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or 
may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially 
granted by this Convention. 
(Ill) Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic law. 
However, when the author is not a national of the country of origin of 
the work for which he is protected under this Convention, he shall enjoy 
in that country the same rights as national authors". 
It is interesting to note that there is disparity in the extent of 
protection in the country of origin and in other countries of the Union, 
since protection in the country of origin is governed by the domestic 
law, but in countries other than the country of origin, the author is given, 
not only the rights which are given under their domestic laws, but also 
the rights granted by the Convention. Thus, an author can be worse off 
in the country of origin than in other countries of the Union. 
As to the term of protection, the basic term of protection is still 
to be the life of the author and 50 years after his death." However, 
unlike the Brussels Convention, minimum terms of protection have now 
been laid down for cinematographic works, photographic works and 
works of applied art. Thus, in the case of cinematographic works the 
countries of the Union may provide that the term of protection is to 
expire 50 years after the work has been available to the public with the 
consent of the author, or failing such as event within 50 years from the 
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making of such a work, 50 years after the making.^^ In the case of 
photographic works and works of applied art in so far as they are 
protected as artistic works, it is to be a matter for legislation in the 
countries of the Union to determine the term of protection thereof; 
however, this term is to last atleast until the end of a period of 25 years 
from the making of such a work/* In the case of anonymous or 
pseudonymous works where the identity of the author remains undis-
closed, the period is 50 years after the work has been lawfully made 
available to the public.^' But the Convention also provides that the 
countries of the Union are not required to protect anonymous or 
pseudonymous works in respect of which it is reasonable to presume 
that their author has been dead for 50 years.™ 
The Paris Act further provides that the countries of the Union 
may grant a term of protection in excess of those provided by article.^' 
As far as the works protected by the Paris Convention are 
concerned Article 1 states that the countries to which the Convention 
applies are constituted into a Union for the protection of rights of 
authors in their "literary and artistic works''. Article 2( 1) then provides 
that the expression "literary and artistic works" shall include every 
production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may 
be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphalets. and 
other writings lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same 
nature, dramatic or dramatico-musical works, choreographic works and 
entertainments in dumbs show, musical compositions with or without 
words; cinematographic works to which are assimilated works ex-
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pressed by the process analogous to cinematography; works of drawing, 
painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and assimilated works ex-
pressed by a process analogous to photography; works of applied art, 
illustrations; maps, plans, sketches, and three-dimensional works rela-
tive to geography, topography, architecture or science. 
The Paris Revision, however, expressly provides, that the protec-
tion is not to apply to news of the day, nor to miscellaneous facts having 
the character of mere items of press information. 
As to translation, adaptation etc. the Paris Act provides.'^ 
Translations, adaptations' arrangements of music 
and other alterations of literary or artistic work 
shall be protected as original works without preju-
dice to the copyright in the original work. 
But the protection to be granted to official texts of a legislative, 
administrative and legal nature, and to official translations of such is to 
be determined by the countries of the Union." 
The provisions of Article 2 as to adaptations must be read in 
conjunction with Article 12, which lays down that authors of literary or 
artistic works are to enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing adapta-
tions, arrangements and other alterations of their work. It is a matter of 
domestic legislation as to how far works of applied art and industrial 
designs and models are protected'^, subject to, of course, Article 7(4) 
which provides for a minimum term of protection of 25 years from the 
making of a work of applied art. 
With regard to broadcasting rights, the Paris Revision has con-
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ferred upon authors following distinct rights: 
(a) The right to restrict the original broadcasting. 
(b) The right to restrict any diffusion of the broadcasting by an 
indepedent receiving authority. 
(xvi) The Universal Copyright Convention of 1952 : 
The desire to bring the United States within a general network of 
international copyright relations and to create a bridge between the 
Berne Union on the one hand and that of Pan-American countries on the 
other was truely strong. So was also the wish to maintain the basic 
tenents of the Berne Convention, indeed its Brussels revision was 
directed towards this aim only. After the Brussels Revision, UNESCO 
took the initiative by promoting the Universal Copyright Convention 
which was signed at Geneva on September 6, 1952. India also partici-
pated in this Conference. 
Recommendations were made for the holding of a Revision 
Conference in 1971 for the purpose of revising this Convention and 
infact the Universal Copyright Convention, like the Berne Convention, 
was revised in Paris in 1971. 
The effect of the revised Convention is that each contracting state 
undertakes to give to the unpublished works of the nationals of all other 
contracting states the same protection as it gives to the unpublished 
works of its own nationals as well as the protection specially granted by 
the Convention" and further provides with the right to restrict the 
public performance of the broadcast at the receiving end. 
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It is further provided, that a permission to broadcast is not to 
imply permission to record the broadcast'*, but then there is a confusing 
and ambiguous kind of the paragraph. 
It shall, however, be a matter for legislation in the countries of the 
Union to determine the regulations for ephemeral recordings made by 
a broadcasting organisation by means of its own facilities and used for 
its own broadcast. The preservation of these recordings in official 
archives may, on the ground of their exceptional documentary charac-
ter, be authorised by such legislation. 
Then the notion of droit moral and that of droit de suite have 
been repeated with amendments. 
India participated in this Convention and signed the Final Act. on 
November 10, 1973, it made a Declaration under Article 38 of the Paris 
Act that it would exercise the rights provided under Articles 22 to 26 of 
the Stockholm Act, (which related to administrative matters). By a note 
dated October 7, 1974, India has deposited its instrument of ratification 
with the declaration that the said ratification doesn't apply to Articles 
1 to 21 and the Appendix thereto with a further declaration that India 
doesn't consider itself bound by Article 33 (i) of the Paris Revision. It 
shall be entitled to calculate the term of protection from the date of the 
"first publication" of the work or from its registration prior to publi-
cation, provided the term of protection is not to be less than 25 years 
from the date of its first publication or registration". "Publication" as 
used in this Convention, means the reproduction in tangible from and 
the general distribution to the public of copies of a work from which it 
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can be read or otherwise visually perceived.'* But the Convention shall 
not apply to works or rights in works which, at the effective date of this 
Convention in contracting state where protection is claimed, are 
permanantly in the public domain in the said contracting state. 
As to the nature of the protection to be afforded, the Convention 
provides that each contracting state shall give adequate and effective 
protection to the rights of authors and other copyright proprietors in 
literary, scientific and artistic works, including writings, musical, 
dramatic, and cinematographic works, and paintings, engraving and 
sculpture". It is further provided that these rights are to include the 
basic rights enduring the author's economic interests, to give to the 
published works of nationals of the other contracting states wherever 
first published, and to published works of the nationals of any country 
if first published in one of the contracting states rights it gives to works 
first published in its own territory as well as the protection specially 
granted by Convention*''. Authors are to enjoy such protection without 
any formality of registration or deposit of copies etc, subject to the 
condition that from the time of first publication, all copies published 
bear the symbol (c) accompanied by the name of the copyright propri-
etor and the year of first publication, placed in such manner as to give 
reasonable notice of claim of copyright.*' 
The Convention provides for copyright to endure the life time of 
the author and 25 years after his death. It is to be noted that the duration 
of the term is binding and obligatory upon all the contracting states*'. 
In case of any contracting state which, upon the effective date of the 
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Convention in that state, does not compute that date of protection on the 
basis including the exclusive right to authorize reproductions by any 
means, public performance and broadcasting, and are to extend to the 
work either in original^' form or in any form recognisably derived from 
the original. But any contracting state may make exceptions that do not 
conflict with the spirit and provisions of the Convention, to such rights 
but shall nevertheless accord a reasonable degree of effective protec-
tion to each of rights to which exception has been made. 
It is clear from the above provisions that while promising general 
copyright protection, the Convention does not describe the details of 
protection which are to be afforded by the contracting states and 
substantially leaves the mode and extent of protection to the separate 
legislation of each state. It only extended further than the Berne 
Convention in requiring protection to be given to published works, not 
only if first published in a contracting state, but if first published 
anywhere, if the author is a national of a contracting state.*^ 
The 1971 Convention came into force on July 10, 1974 three 
months after the deposit of 12 Instruments of Ratisfication. 
(xvii) Pan American Conventions : 
There are certain American Conventions - the Montevido Con-
vention and the various Pan-American Conventions, to none of whch 
neither United Kingdom nor India is a party. 
The Pan- American Conventions are those of Mexico City (1902), 
Rio de Janerio (1906), Bouenos Aires (1910) and Havana (1928)*^ The 
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later of these Conventions are both modifications of the original 
Convention of 1902, and all adopt the Berne Convention & principle of 
according national protection to works published in any of the countries 
of the Union. 
But the Montevideo Convention (January 11, 1889) adopted a 
wholly different priciple to that of the Berne Convention, conferring 
upon an author belonging to one country of the Union in other countries 
of the Union the rights which he enjoys in the country where he first 
publishes, not the rights which authors enjoy in the country where the 
infringement takes place, so that under this Convention the law of the 
country of origin follows the work into the other countries of the Union. 
The Convention of 1910 has been ratified by U.S., Gautemala, 
Casta Rica, Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua, Ecrodor, Dominica, Brazil, 
Peru, Paraguay, Haiti, Colombia, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Mexico. 
And the Convention of 1928 has been ratified by Costa Rica, Gautemala, 
Nicaragua and Panama. 
Another Pan-American Convention was concluded at Washing-
ton in 1946 under the terms of which rights of copyright set out in some 
detail are to be conferred as between the signatory countries without 
any formality. This Convention has been ratified by Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Paraguay. 
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(F) COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN INDIA : 
(i) Pre-lndependence : 
The question whether or not India, as a civilised nation had prior 
to the colonisation any notions or institutions for legal protection of 
creative artists has not even been asked for; this makes even tentative 
approaches to answers quite ambitious at this stage. Legal and social 
historians of ancient and medieval India have yet to attend to this 
aspect.*^ 
After the East India Company established in sway in the Territo-
ries of India, an Act of the Parliament*' entitled "An Act for effecting 
an arrangement with the East India company for the better Government 
of His Majesty" was passed in 1698. In the middle of the 18th century, 
English common law was introduced into those pj»rts of Indian Terrotories 
subject to the Government of the East India Company, where, by a 
charter from the Crown, courts of judicature were established which, 
inter alia, administrated the copyright law of England with regard to 
matters relating to copyright. In other parts of the Indian territories 
principles of equity and good conscience seem to have prevailed. 
In 1842, the Literary Copyright Act, 1842*^ was passed to amend 
and consolidate the law of copyright in the United Kingdom. It extended 
throughout the British Dominions. It was extended to British India as well. 
From the middle of the 18th century upto the time of the enact-
ment of the Literary Copyright Act, 1842, copyright protection in India, 
if at all afforded, was by the common law of England or by virtue of the 
principles of equity and good conscience. After the enactment of 
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Literary Copyright Act, 1842, copyright in published books could be 
enforced under the said Act in British India. "Books", under the said 
Act, included every volume, pamphlet, letter and presssheet music-
sheet, map, chart, and plan, it directed registration of every book at the 
stationer's hall in London. Musical and dramatic compositions were 
held to be books and protected by Copyright Acts, relating to literary 
works the English Act of 1842 also afforded protection by its Section 20 
to performing rights in both dramatic and musical works. 
The Governor-General of India got passed 6n 18 December, 
1847*^ an Act, for the encouragement of learning in the territories 
subject to the government of the East India Company by defining and 
providing for the enforcement of copyright therein. Its preamble speaks 
of doubts which exist or which may exist concerning recognition and 
enforcement of copyright as a part of the common law or administration 
of justice on the basis of "justice, equity and good conscience" or as 
regards the application of British Statutes to territories then adminis-
tered by the East India Company.^" 
The term of copyright under the 1847 Act was for the lifetime of 
the author plus seven years after the death of author. But in no case the 
total term of Copyright was to exceed 42 years. The government was 
given the power to issue licence for the purposes of publication of the 
book if the owner of copyright upon the death of the author refused to 
allow its publication. The Act further laid down that under a contract of 
service copyright in "any encyclopaedic review, magazine, periodical 
work or work published in a series of books or parts shall vest in the 
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proprietor, projector, publisher or conductor" Unauthorised printing of 
copyright work for "sale, hire or exportation" or "for selling, publish-
ing or exposing to sale or hire" constituted infringement. Infringing 
copies were deemed to be copies of the proprietor of copyrighted work.. 
Suit or action for infringement was to be instituted in the ' 'highest local 
court exercising original civil jurisdiction." The formality of registra-
tion with the home office was the condition precedent for the enforce-
ment of copyright under the Act, but the proviso to section 14 specifi-
cally reserved the subsistence of copyright in the author, and his right 
to sue for its infringement to the extent available in law other than the 
1847 Act. 
The question of amending the Act of 1847 was considered on 
several occasions since 1864 on the ground that the said Act was 
incomplete as it did not provide, among other matters, for the protection 
of copyright in photographs, translations, newspaper, telegrams, etc. 
But legislation had been deferred in view of the possibility of amend-
ment of the English Act on the subject of copyright. 
In order to consider the question of ratification by England of the 
Berlin Revision of Berne Convention (1908), a departmental committee 
was appointed by the Board of Trade in 1901. The Committee came to 
the conclusion that Berlin Convention should be accepted by Britain 
with as few reservations as possibly. 
Subsequently, in 1910, an Imperial Copyright Conference was 
convened in London to consider the recommendations of the said Board 
of Trade Committee. Representatives of self-governing Dominions, the 
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India office and the colonial office took part in the said Imperial 
Conference. The Conference endorsed the recommendations of the 
Board of Trade Committee and recommended: 
(a) That an Act dealing with the essentials of the Imperial Copyright 
Law should be passed by the Imperial Parliament. 
(b) That this Act should be expressed to extend to all British 
Possessions subject to rights of self-governing dominions and 
possessions to modify or add to its provisions by legislation 
certain cases affecting only procedure and remedies. 
A Bill, giving effect to these recommendations, was prepared and 
introduced in both the houses of Parliament and after several modifica-
tions, was eventually passed into laws which came to be known as the 
Copyright Act, 1911 .^ ' It came into operation in the United Kingdom on 
1st July, 1912. 
The Government of India considered that the early introduction 
of the Imperial Copyright Act, 1911 into India was desirable and 
consulted various local Governments regarding modifications and al-
terations that might be necessary to make it suitable for the local 
conditions of India. 
In view of difficulties that were experienced in Great Britain 
because of non-application of the Copyright Act of 1911 to India and 
having regard to serious hardship and loss which might be inflicted on 
English authors thereby, the said Copyright Act of 1911 was brought 
into force in India by a proclaimation in the Gazette of India on 31st 
October, 1912. 
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In the meantime, the question of modification or additions to the 
said Act was postponed for subsequent consideration on receipt of 
views of various local Governments. Later, the Government of India, 
after the receipt of the views of local governments, concurred with them 
and by virtue of powers conferred by Section 27 of the Copyright Act 
of 1911, prepared a Draft Bill embodying modifications in and addition 
to the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911 which were considered desirable 
together with certain formal and necessary alterations due to difference 
between English and Indian administration and procedure. This Bill 
was eventually passed into law which came to be known as Indian 
Copyright Act, 1914.^^ 
The 1914 Act was a short Act in the sense that it had only 14 
Sections which annexed the whole of the Imperial Copyright Act of 
1911 as its first schedule. 
According to professor Upendra baxi. the 1914 Act introduced 
two major changes: 
First, it introduced criminal sanctions for copyright infringe-
ment.'^ 
Secondly, it modified the scope of the term copyright under 
Section 4 the "sole right" of the author to "produce, reproduce, 
perform or publish a translation of the work shall subsist only for a 
period often years from the date of publication of the work."'" The 
author, however, retained her "sole right" if within the period often 
years she published or authorised publication of her work a translation 
in any language in respect of that language. 
CHAPTER - 2 : 106 : 
The modification of term of copyright for translation rights can't 
be explained by any reference to dominant characteristics of colonial 
policy. The language of the Act might suggest a laudable policy of 
promoting wider diffusion of Indian works from one language to other 
Indian languages, a consideration which might have appeared distinc-
tive to India as compared with U.K. There might also have been the 
desire to promote the growth ofpublication industry in numerous Indian 
languages.^' 
But even if the intention of the Britishers in enacting 1914 Act 
was laudable, the Act proved to be of disastrous consequences and 
disadvantageous to the authors and a real boon to the publishers. This 
is proved by the following assessment of the said Act in a note of dissent 
when the joint select committee of the Parliament in 1956 was consid-
ering the recommendation for the continuation of the 1914 Act.'^ R.D. 
Sinha "Dinker" strongly argued that the Act has "worked to the utter 
detriment of the authors". In a hard-hitting argument, he observed : 
Most of the novels by Sarat Chandra Chatterjee... 
were translated in Hindi, while the author was yet 
alive. The author's novels, in translation sold thou-
sand of copies, but the author did not get a pie out 
of the sale - proceeds... something like this hap-
pened in the case of Gurudeva. Publishers in Hindi 
and other languages were making good money out 
of the translations of his works, but the poet, sev-
ered by the nation, was in his extremely old age 
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touring the country for money to support the Shanti-
Niketan." 
It seems that publishers of Hindi language were the major benefi-
ciaries from the modification of the term of copyright regarding trans-
lations. But then this fact is of great political importance as Hindi was 
now emerging as a dominant language in North. Infact, ultimately it 
became the national language as well. 
The Act continued with minor modifications till 24 January, 1958 when 
the copyright Act, 1957 came into force. 
(ii) Post Independence : 
(a) Copyright Act of 1957 : 
The 1914 Act had become outdated and thus a bill to revise the 
copyright law in India was introduced in the Council of States on 
October 1, 1955. The bill was passed in about 18 months time which 
also included its processing by the Joint Select Committee of the 
Parliament on June 4, 1957. 
It was a remarkable achievement of Indepedent India's legisla-
ture that it attached so much of importance to intellectual property 
rights in general and that of copyright in particular. Infact, there 
were number of factors which necessitated the early revision of the 
copyright law : 
First, it was clear that continued existence of the 1911 Act 
through the 1914 was unbecoming to the changed constitutional status 
of India. 
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Secondly, the 1914 Act did not accord with 1948 Brussels Act of 
the Berne Convention and the 1952 Universal Copyright Convention. 
Thirdly, the new and advanced methods of communication ren-
dered modernization of the law necessary. The need for an 'indepedent 
self- contained law" was also felt in the light of the experience of the 
"working" of the 1911 Act, and more important, of "the growing 
public consciousness of the rights and obligations of the authors".'* 
Reports of many committees and deliberations of International 
Copyright Conventions were taken into account while considering the 
Draft of 1957 Bill. The Joint Select Committee was also benefitted by 
the evidence of many Indian and foreign organisations such as Indian 
Institute of Education and Cultural Freedom, All India Centre of PEN, 
The Indian Council for Cultural Freedom, The All India Hindi Publish-
ers Association, Indian Phonographic Industry, All India Radio, British 
Copyright Council, International Confederation of Societies of Authors 
and Composers (Paris), Performing Right Society (London) and Colum-
bia Gramophone Company Ltd. Interestingly, the satsangis of 
Radhaswami Faith, a purely religious organisation also came with its 
suggestions and gave evidence before the Select Committee. But de-
spite such a lengthy deliberations, the report of the Select Committee 
was brief report of just ten pages of majority report and seven pages of 
dissent by six members. 
All the major recommendations of the select committee were 
ultimately accepted such as its definitions of'authors', 'artistic works', 
'dramatic works'. Its recommendations as to enhanced prison sen-
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tences, Indepedence of Copyright Board, were also accepted. It also 
defined civil jurisdiction for the infringement proceedings and the same 
was approved by the Parliament while enacting Act. The original 
proposal to reduce the term of copyright for life of the author and twenty 
five years post - mortem was not accepted by the Select Committee on 
the ground that India must fall in line with International Conventions. 
The committee also negatived the Bill's proposal on similar grounds 
making the formality oF^ registration a pre-condition for infringement. 
Perhaps the only significant matter on which committee's proposals 
were not accepted in view of powerful dissents, pertained to a ten year 
term of copyright for translations. 
The Act, as it was finally passed, was not in any sense a 
replication of the English legislation proposals. In this sense, the Act 
was the first truely Indian legislation after more than 200 years of the 
subjection to the Imperial law. 
The Act is divided into 15 chapters and contains 79 sections. In 
addition to this, the government has been empowered to enact copyright 
rules by virtue of Section 78 of the Act. The Government has thus 
enacted Copyright Rules which deal with matters of procedure for 
application of licences for translations, performing rights societies, 
relinquishment and registration of copyright and related matters. 
Chapter I, III, IV and V deal with copyright and its ownership; 
chapter XI with infringement; chapter IX with International Copyright; 
chapter X with registration of Copyright & remedies and chapter II, VI, 
VII and X with powers and functions of the Registrar of Copyrights and 
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Copyright Board. Chapter VIII deals with the rights of Broadcasting 
authorities. 
Despite all this, the Act was not sufficiently far-sighted. For 
instance, it does not protect the right of the performers adequately. But 
the fact remains that the country had its own law of copyright for the 
first time in contemporary history; and, for weal or woe, it represented 
the law-policy choices made by its indepedent legislature'"" 
(ii) The 1983 and 1984 Amendments : 
Despite the leading role which India played in the revision of the 
Berne Convention and Universal Copyright Convention leading to the 
Paris Act of 1971, it was not until 1983 that the Indian legislature could 
take up the revision of the 1957 Act. The new Sections 32 A and 32 B 
which were inserted by these amendements provided for 'compulsory 
licences' for publication of copyrighted foreign works in any Indian 
language for the purposes of systematic instructural activities at a low 
price with the permission of the copyright Board on certain conditions. 
Another significant change which the amendment brought in was the 
insertion of Section 19 A, which empowered the Copyright Board, upon 
a complaint, to order revocation of the assigned copyright where either 
the terms are 'harsh' or where the publication of the work is unduly 
delayed. The Board has been given the power to publish unpublished 
Indian works and for the protection of 'oral works'. The 1984 amend-
ment also provides for the stringent punishments for piracy and effec-
tive procedures to inhibit it. 
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(iii) Amendment Act of 1994 : 
To cope with new challenges of technology, the revision of 
Copyright Act 1957 was necessary. With this object, a Bill to amend the 
Act was introduced in 1992 in the Loksabha along with Copyright Cess 
Bill. The Bill had become necessary because it has become much easier 
for anyone to copy sound recordings, films and printed works through 
photocopy than in the past. The Bill was refered to Joint Select 
Committee & was finally passed & assented to in 1994. 
The important features of the amendment are, for instance, under 
the present law a "musical work" has to be written in a notation (as 
used in western music") This requirement is being done away with as 
in practice it denied any protection to most of the Indian composers. 
The amendment provides protection against making films, video 
tapes or audio tapes of a performance without the performer's permis-
sion with few exceptions where the recording is for private use or for 
news reporting. These rights will be enjoyed not only by singers and 
actors but also jugglers and snake charmers. 
The law will also regulate hire or resale of any copies of films 
including videotapes or sound recording or computer programs. Under 
this law a video shop will have to take permission before hiring out any 
tape to consumers from owners of the same. It is proposed that copy-
right society will be responsible for collective administration of copy-
rights in line of performing rights society. 
The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 1994 has also enlarged the 
scope of protection of computer programs. Prior to the amendment, the 
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copyright holder enjoyed the exclusive right to reproduce the work, 
issue copies, perforin the work in public, to make any cinematograph 
film or sound recording in respect of the work, to make any translation 
of the work or to make any adaptation of the work. The Amendment Act 
confers the copyright holder with the additional exclusive right to sell, 
give on hire any copy of the computer program regardless of whether 
such copy has been sold or given on hire on earlier occasions. In other 
words, even the legitimate owner (e.g. a purchaser) of a copyrighted 
work can not sell or rent his copy of the work. The Amendment 
effectively elminates the "first sale" doctrine, developed in American 
jurisprudence under which a legitimate owner of a copyrighted work 
could further sell, transfer, lease or rent the work to another. Taking 
advantage of the "First Sale" doctrine, many rental companies used to 
purchase software programs and offer them for short-term rentals - a practice 
which resulted in wide spread reproduction of copyrighted works.'*" 
The 1994 Amendment brings Indian law in conformity with the 
Uruguary Round Agreement on Trade - related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) which requires countries to provide authors and their 
successors in title the right to authorise or to prohibit the commercial 
rental of originals or copies of their copyright works. However, it is to 
be noted that the TRIPs agreement is less stringent than the amended 
Indian law in that it allows a purchaser of a copyrighted work to sell his 
copy and adds the coveat that, in respect of computer programs, this 
obligation does not apply to rentals where the program itself is not the 
essential object of the rental. 
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A traditional exclusion from infringement allows use of a copy-
righted work for research criticism or private use, known as "fair 
dealing". The 1994 Amendment eliminated the "fair dealing" exclu-
sion with respect to computer programs. This is an unusual step as "fair 
dealing'' has been a long standing exclusion which is part of well settled 
copyright law. 
At the same time, a new exclusion from copyright infringement 
of computer programs has been added. A lawful possessor of a copy of 
a computer program may make back up copies purely as a temporary 
protection against loss, destruction or damage in order to use the 
computer program for the purposes for which it was suplied. Such acts 
will not constitute either copyright infringement or violation of moral 
rights of author. 
Another significant aspect of the 1994 Amendment is narrowing 
down of author's moral right. Now, an author may restrain or claim 
damages in respect of any distortion, mutilation or modification of the 
work if it is done before the expiration of the term of copyright and if 
such acts would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation. However, an 
exception has been carved out in the law for adaptation of computer 
programs for the purposes of debugging. 
According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 
Amendment Act, moral rights have been narrowed down because the 
prior provisions whereby even distortion, mutilation and modification 
of the work which are not the pre-judicial to the author's honour or 
reputation would violate the author's moral rights were in excess of the 
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requirements of the Berne Convention. It should be noted, however, that 
the provision of moral rights under Indian law goes well beyond the 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement which exempts countries from 
any rights or obligation arising from the provisions of the Berne 
Convention on moral rights. Infact the exclusion of moral rights from 
the purview of the TRIPS Agreement reflects the lack of moral rights 
under American Copyright jurisprudence . 
In addition to the moral rights mentioned above, a new droit de 
suite (resale share right) has been created by the 1994 Amendment. This 
gives authors of original copies of paintings, sculptures or drawings or 
the original manuscripts of literary, dramatic or musical works the right 
to share in the resale proceed of such original copies where the proceeds 
exceed Rs. 10,000. The share of proceeds shall be as the Copyright 
Board may fix but it may not exceed 10 percent of the resale price. The 
droit de suite ceases to exist on the expiration of the term of copyright. 
Infringement of the droit de suite does not, however, give rise to any 
criminal liability because of the bonafide difficulties which may exist 
in locating the author at the time of the subsequent sale. 
Provisions of the droit de suite is optional for member countries 
under the Berne Convention. The TRIPS Agreement, in turn, incorpo-
rates the Berne Convention by reference and does not impose any 
additional requirements with respect to droit de suite. 
The penality for copyright infringment is imprisonment for a 
minimum of six months and a maxmium of three years and a fine ranging 
from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 2 lakh. The 1994 amendment creates a new de 
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minimus punishment of imprisonment for less than six months or a fine 
of less than Rs. 50,000 where the infringement has not been made for 
gain in the course of trade or business. The Amendment also creates a 
de minimus punishment for second and subsequent convictions of 
imprisonment for less than one year or a fine of less than one lakh rupees 
where infringement has actually not been made for gain in the course of 
trade on business. 
A radical new penality has been devised which punishes even the 
users of an infringing computer program. Any person who knowingly 
makes use on a computer of an infringing copy of a computer program 
shall be punishable with imprisonment of atleast seven days which may 
extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than Rs. 
50,000 but which may extend to 2 lakh rupees. 
It can, therefore, be said by way of conclusion that the copyright 
law is of relatively recent origin. The need for protection of authors' 
right came to be firmly realised only after the advent of printing press. 
Since then the copyright has seen many ups and down. Yet it is 
heartening to note that with every passing decade, more and more 
countries are realising the danger of not giving adequate protection to 
creators of intellectual property and are thus joining the Copyright 
Union and bringing changes in their National laws. The Indian law after 
the 1994 amendment is an excellent piece of example in this context 
though it is also true that in certain aspects under the U.S. influence and 
in order to comply with the TRIPS agreement, the amendment has an 
effect of narrowing down the copyright protection as well. 
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1. The evolution of copyright has attracted scholars of formidable 
polish. See generally SCRUTTON, LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1883) 
Chap. IV; BIRREL, SEVEN LECTURES ON COPYRIGHT Lon-
don (1898); HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 
Vol. VI, pp. 360-379, KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF 
COPYRIGHT (1967), pp. 1-25. 
2. Plagiarism has existed from the earliest times. It apears that 
Martial was the first to apply the term to intellectual property in 
speaking of his verses as his children and of him who stone them 
as plagiarius, a term which in Roman Law was derived from 
plagium the crime of stealing a human being. See RENOUARD, 
TRAITE DES DROIT D'AUTEUR, p. 16, quoted in LADAS, R 
STEPHEN , THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LIT-
ERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, VOL I (1938), New York, 
R 13. 
3. FRIEDLANDER, ROMAN LIFE AND MANNERS UNDER THE 
EMPIRE, in, 36. 
4. The Roman law secured to the owner of the material used the 
property in the writing; "And therefore, if Titius has written a 
poem, a history or an oration, on your paper or parchment, you, 
and not Titius are the owner of the written paper." The Institutes, 
Book H, Title I, Section 33. 
5. In England for instance in 1556, Mary & Philip granted the 
stationer's company a charter. This gave a power in addition to 
the usual supervisory authority over the craft, to search out and 
destroy books printed in contravention of statute or proclaimation. 
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SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT & 
AUTHORS^ RIGHT 
After undertaking a survey of historical background of copyright 
law at the International level including a discussion on various 
Conventions and examining the copyright law in United Kingdom, 
United States of America and India in its historical retrospect in the 
previous chapter, it is in the fitness of things to discuss the subject 
matter of copyright both under the International Copyright Conventions 
as well as in the three countries which are under study. In addition to 
this, the chapter also examines the question of author's rights. The term 
authors' rights is the term used to distinguish copyright from neighbouring 
rights^, the principal distinction being that the former subsists in 
original works of authorship while the latter subsists in derivative 
works. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the principle features 
of legal protection for author's rights, as embodied in the International 
« 
Conventions, and as reflected in copyright systems of U.K., U.S.A. and 
India. 
SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT 
(A) CREATION OF THE WORK : 
(1) Quality : 
There is a general agreement that the quality or merit of a work 
are matters of taste and do not enter into the question of what is a work? 
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Nor is there a prescribed degree of ability or amount of skill and 
knowledge necessary to create the work, or a measure of resources 
which form subject matter of this study, it will in each case be a question 
of degree whether the labour or skill or ingenuity or expense involved 
is sufficient to warrant a claim of copyright. For instance in United 
Kingdom, even simple compilations like a football coupon consisting of 
a list of forthcoming matches with spaces for punter to put a sign for 
win, lose or draw, were held to have a copyright.^ The argument that 
anyone can do it was met by the House of Lords saying 'if you can do 
it yourself then do it yourself, but if you copy someone else's work you 
must pay for it. For the same reason examination papers have been held 
to be 'literary works'\ as have trade lists^, street directories', and 
time - tables^. 
(ii) Originality : 
Unlike for a patent, where novelty is essential, there is no such 
requirement for copyright. However, it is generally the case that to be 
copyright - protected, a work must be original. The new U.K. copyright 
Act i.e. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 makes reference to 
'original literary dramatic, musical or artistic works'^. The United 
States Copyright Act 1976 also uses the expression' original works of 
anthorship'*. Borrowing from Great Britan, the Indian Copyright Act 
1957 refers to 'original literary dramatic, musical or artistic works'^. 
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But this emphasis on originality has to be understood in a very wide 
sense and does not mean novelty. It means no more than that the creator 
can truthfully say - 'This is all my own work'"'. It is possible for two 
different persons quite independent from one another to make the same 
invention. In such cases the invention first registered at the Patent 
Office will have the prior claim and other will not be protected. Not so 
in copyright. Infringement of copyright predicates the use of someone 
else's work. If the similarity or even identity is accidental there is no 
infringement. Thus, taking the examples cited above, if two people set 
out indepedently from one another to make a map or street directoiy 
using identical or very similar information and producing very similar 
results, each will have a copyright in his work. The net result of this is 
that the writer, the composer, the painter, the sculptor or anyone 
creating copyright material need not fear the existence of pre-existing 
rights which would threaten his copyright. This is the reason why the 
requirement of registration or deposit is not necessary in a copyright 
systems including U.K. and India although some countries ( notably the 
United States) have voluntary systems, for varying reasons. 
(iii) Derivative Works : 
So far we have dealt with primary works, in the sense that the 
author starts from nothing and creates a work, however humble or 
pedestrian may be the creation. There are, however also works where 
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the author starts with a pre-existing work and by an additional intellectual 
input of his own, creates a new work. The earliest examples were 
translations of a literary work into another language. The translator 
needs the permission of the author of the pre-existing work to make the 
translation, but he has himself a copyright in his translation. 
There is a copyright in the adaptation of a literary work such as 
play adapted from a novel or a film script adapted from a play. In the 
realm of musical works, adaptations are usually called arrangements, 
e.g. an orchestral work arranged for piano, or conversaly a song written 
with piano accompaniment orchestrated for voice orchestra. In popular 
music there are many arrangements of original songs made to suit a 
particular performer or a particular language version of the text. Each 
such adaptation or arrangement is a work provided there is a sufficient 
element of intellectual creation. The intellectual input of the adapter or 
arranger may be quite modest to be sufficient. 
In an anthology, e.g. a collection of poetry or extracts from other 
literary works by different authors, the originality or the intellectual 
input lies in the selection and the arrangement of the pre - existing 
works. The creator of the collection has a copyright in the collection, 
though not in the pre - existing works of which it consists. 
A collective work, in which copyright subsists in the individual 
items of the collection as well as in the collection itself, is to be 
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distinguished from a compilation, in which copyright subsists in a 
compilation of facts which are not in themselves eligible for copyright 
protection. For example, while an individual name and telephone 
number may not be copyrightable, most jurisdictions recognise that a 
compilation of names and telephone numbers in a telephone directorary 
is copyrightable. However, the requirement of originality in relation to 
such compilations remains unsettled, particularly when they take the 
form of computerised databases. Some courts in the United States, for 
example, have held that a minimal expenditure of time, money and 
labour (the so - called 'sweat of the brow' theory) in compiling the data 
is sufficient to make the resulting compilation eligible for copyright 
protection; other courts have held that the compiler must show originality 
of selection or arrangement of data in order to be entitled to copyright 
protection, a requirement that may be particularly difficult to meet in 
the case of a comprehensive, randomly arranged, electronic database.'' 
If the translation or the arrangement of a pre-existing work is 
recorded or the screen play filmed, the producer of the phonogram or the 
film will have a copyright in the common law countries (e.g. the U.K., 
U.S.A. and India) or a neighbouring right in many other countries. Thus 
there will exist, superimposed one upon the other, several copyrights or 
neighbouring rights : 'the copyright of the author of the primary work, 
the copyright of the translator or adapter or arranger and the copyright 
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of the producer of the phonogram or the film. In a song written by A, 
orchestrated by B, recorded by C, or a novel written by A, dramatised 
by B and filmed by C, A, B, and C will have copyrights or neighbouring 
rights in most countries. 
(B) FIXATION OF THE WORK ; 
In all common law countries including the three under discussion, 
fixation is crucial. The work has to be fixed in writing or in some other 
material form to qualify for a copyright. This is not to say that a work 
cannot be complete while merely in the mind of the author, e.g. a 
composer may play his composition or a poet recite his poetry without 
having written anything down beforehand. The work is an intellectual 
creation not a material thing. However, in common law jurisdictions it 
does not acquire protection until it is reduced to material form. In other 
words, fixation is a condition precedent to the existence of copyright. 
The work can exist in a complete state in the mind of the author, but he 
has to take a further step before acquiring a copyright, he has to fix it 
in material form. This is not so in most Civil law jurisdictions, 
partricularly in France and Germany. In these jurisdictions, a lecture 
given without a script or a musical performance of a work without a 
score is protected. In view of this position the Berne Convention does 
not take sides and provides'^ that it is 'a matter for legislation in the 
countries of the Union' to require fixation 'in some material form'. 
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This gives each country the possibility to demand fixation either 
generally or for one or more categories of works'"*. 
'Writing' is not required in International law. The Berne 
Convention defines a literary work as: "every production in the literary 
— domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such 
as books, pamphlets and other writings ".'^ It seems to follow that 
in all Berne Convention countries, any form of fixation other than 
writing will suffice to acquire a copyright. Apart from the obligation to 
honour the Convention, the opposite interpretation would lead to very 
odd results in the light of modern technology, e.g. a musical work not 
written down on paper but played and recorded would not be protected 
as a work and anyone who copied it from the recording would not be an 
infringer. As this situation arises regularly in recording studios with 
jazz and popular music, musical copyright would be seriously 
undermined. 
In countries, not members of the Berne Convention writing could 
be required by the national law. The classic case was the United States, 
where the word 'writings" occur in the Constitution itself'^ This was 
perfectly logical in the 18th century but when other forms of fixation 
emerged such as films and records, the courts had to wrestle with the 
problem and eventually gave the term 'writings' of 'authors' a wide 
meaning in the light of modem technology declaring a recording a form 
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of writings which Congress could protect in pursuant to the Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution. Therefore, under national laws the answer 
which the law gives to the question: what constitutes fixation? is not of 
crucial importance to what is and what is not copyright material and 
who is the copyright owner? 
The next stage in the life of the work after creation and fixation 
is publication. 
(C) PUBLICATION OF THE WORK : 
The definition of publication is relevant in International copyright 
in several respects : 
(i) In the Copyright Conventions the country of publication is one of 
the connecting factors (e.g. in the Berne Convention'"' and 
Universal Copyright Convention'*) if the author of the work is 
not a national of a contracting state.'In the Rome Convention'^ it 
is one of three connecting factors which can be eliminated by 
reservation. 
(ii) If formalities are required, these may be satisfied in Universal 
Copyright Convention member countries by use of the UCC -
prescribed notice, which must include the year of publication. 
(iii) It is relevant for the computation of the term of copyright for 
those classes of work where the term is X years from the date of 
first publication. 
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(iv) It is relevant for the system of compulsory licenses in developing 
countries under the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions 
1971 in as much as the date when the issuing of a compulsory licence 
becomes possible is computed fiom the publication of the work. 
Whereas in the law of libel publication as a term of art has a very 
narrow meaning, i.e. showing or communicating the writing containing 
the libel to any person other than the person defamed, in copyright the 
meaning is wider and closer to the general meaning of the word, i.e. 
making public. The definition of publication has varied considerably 
both from country to country and from time to time. In the history of 
copyright, publication meant originally the making public of copies 
(i.e. reproductions) of works. When films and phonograms were invented 
the old definitions began to present new difficulties, which were dealt 
with in separate ways in different countries. 
There are five basic questions which are to be answered here : 
(a) Does public ation imply publication with the consent of the author? 
(b) Does publication require a fixation in a tangible form {corpus 
mechanicum) and the making of copies or duplicates which are 
tangible objects, or does, for instance, public performance of a 
literary or musical work constitute publication? 
(c) Are phonograms or films copies for the purpose of publication? 
(d) How many copies have to be made available to the public to 
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amount to publication.? 
(e) Do these, copies have to be sold, or does hiring out copies for 
public performance also amount to publication? 
The first question is nearly always answered in the affirmative. 
Unauthorised publication is not 'publication'. The only exception, albeit an 
important one, is publication under a compulsory license system.^ " 
The answer to the second question varies from country to country. 
In some countries broad definitions like 'making a work public by any 
means' (Netherlands'*) or 'the first exercise of the right to use the work 
shall be considered its first publication (Italy^-) or 'a work has been 
published if it has been made accessible to the public with the consent 
of the copyright owner, (Germany") are obviously wide enough to 
include publication by public performance or recitation of a literary or 
musical or dramatic work, or exhibition of a picture or statue, and are 
intended to include such means of publication. 
On the other hand, the common law jurisdictions adopt a narrower 
definition of publication, which requires copies (reproductions) of the 
work to be issued to the public.^ ^ This clearly excludes publications merely 
by public performance or recitation of literary or musical works or the 
exhibition of any artistic work or the construction of a work of architecture. 
The major disadvantage of recognising public performance is the 
difficulty of ascertaining the date and place of a first performance of a 
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work, and these two factors govern not only the term of protection but 
often decide when a work is protected internationally." This is the main 
reason why the Berne Convention excludes performance from 
constituting publication. 
In France, where publication is nowhere defined in the law, the 
courts have developed the concept of publication, starting from the 
publishing of printed copies and gradually including phonograms and 
films, thus assimilating modern media to the original printed copies. So 
that making copies available to the public by any means^^ seems to 
constitute publication and so does public performance, recitation and 
any form of communicating works to the public directly.^' 
In sheer logic, it is difficult to see why making available to the 
public phonograms containing the recording of a work should not be 
publication of that work, as particularly in the field of music the work 
reaches the public more quickly and in much longer numbers than by 
printed copies'^ and the same consideration applies to films. However, 
under the 1956 U.K. legislation^^ and the national laws derived from it 
publication of a recording of a work did not amount to publication in 
law. This attitude was based on the essential difference between a copy 
of a book and copy of a phonogram. Whereas a printed copy is a 
'neutral' reproduction of the work, a phonogram is a reproduction of the 
recorded performance of the work. Thus, the performance comes 
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between the work and the copy whereas there is no such intervention in 
the printed copy of a book. Thus, recognising this difference the 
publication of a phonogram is regarded as publication of the recording 
which is a derivative work, but not of the work recorded. On the other 
hand, the making of a recording or a film provides the certainty of place 
and time which mere (unrecorded) performance lacks. However, the 
latest amendments in both United Kingdom as well as in India have 
taken care of this problem and now making a work available to the 
public byissue of copies or by communicating the work to the public is 
regarded as publication.^' This was in line with the United States 
Copyright Act 1976 which provides that 'publication is the distribution 
of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public' thus preserving the 
traditional and as we have seen above not unwarranted distinction 
between 'copies' and 'phonograms' but widening ^the concept of 
publication by including publication of'phonorecords' (i.e. the recorded 
version) of a work. 
The Berne Convention also adopts a wide definition of 
publication.'- A work is published if, with the consent of the author, it 
is made available to the public 'whatever may be the means of 
manufacture of the copies'. However, performance, recitation, 
broadcasting of literary, musical, cinematographic works, exhibition of 
works of art and construction of works of architecture, are specifically 
CHAPTER - 3 : 133 
excluded as not constituting publication. 
The Universal Copyright Convention contains a definition of 
publication which requires 'reproduction in a tangible form' and the 
copies must be 'copies from which it can be read or otherwise visually 
perceived'.'^ This clearly excludes phonograms and computer software 
distributed only in machine - readable code, but includes films, although in the 
latter case it poses a problem with regard to the soundtrack of a film. 
The Rome Convention defines publication of a phonogram as 
'the offering of copies....'/". As to the question of what number of 
copies , the normal rule is that it must in the last resort be a matter for 
the courts to decide in each case. However, the general rule must be that 
the copies must be sufficient in number to satisfy the reasonable 
demands of the public. Three points arise at this junctiure : 
First, the quantity necessary to constitute publication will vary 
according to the nature of the work. If a book or a record has been a 
success in the country where it was first published, putting a few copies 
in a shop for sale in another country will probably not constitute 
publication there, as it would not satisfy the reasonable demand of the 
public. On the other hand, it was held in the United Kingdom-'^ that 
putting six copies of the sheet music of a song which was unknown on 
sale was sufficient to constitute publication. 
The place of publication is where the offering of the work to the 
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public takes place. If a book is printed in country A and copies are 
shipped to country B where they are stored and then sent to country C 
where they are offered for sale, publication takes place in country C 
because that is where the public is for the first time invited to buy them. 
Secondly, making available means offering them to the public. 
There is no need for the offer to be accepted. Thus, it makes no 
difference if the copies remain unsold.^^ On the other hand, making 
available must mean that the copies be displayed or advertised in some 
form so that the public is aware of their availability, keeping copies in 
a basement without anyone being aware of their existence would 
probably not be sufficient. Some examples from national laws will 
illustrate the point, publication must be more than just minimal,^^ there 
must be 'serious attempt to satisfy public demand, the distribution must 
be made in a scheduled, deliberate and comprehensive manner. 
Thirdly, what is, in this context, the definition of 'the public'? It 
is submitted that it must mean availability to the general public and that 
availability to a 'closed group', however, large in numbers, is probably 
not publication, particularly if, as in the Universal Copyright Convention, 
the language used is 'general distribution to the public'. The problem is 
of great practical importance in countries where the state exercises 
censorship of literary works, so that some of them have to be circulated 
in a clandestine way. 
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The answer to the fifth question - have the copies available to be 
for sale or is availability for hire sufficient? - is of particular importance 
in the case of films where copies are not offered to the public for sale 
but are made available to distributors for public performance in the 
cinemas. The answer must be that the availability for hire is sufficient 
for publication, as the opposite would lead to absurd position that a film 
which has been seen by millions is an unpublished because the film 
producing company only releases a small number of copies for hire to 
a small number of distributions in any given country. Although this view 
has been expressly adopted in the official guide to the Berne Convention^^ 
it has been admitted that it requires a wide interpretation of the wording 
of the Universal Copyright Convention ('general distribution to the 
public of copies of a work'). The public is never in possession of any 
copies of a film as it is in the case of book or a record. It means that 
general distribution has to be understood as a general communication of 
the work to the public. The Indian Amendment of 1994 has indeed taken 
care of this problem.'^ 
(D) CATEGORIES OF WORKS & SUBJECT MATTERS OF COPYRIGHT: 
Some national legislations contain a definition of the works 
protected (United Kingdom, United States, India), others do not (Italy). 
Broadly speaking, there are two categories of works. The first is the one 
which includes the works named in the Berne Convention: 'literary and 
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artistic works' which includes dramatic, musical and dramatico -
musical works. The second is a category of recent types of works : 
cinematography films, sound recordings, broadcasts. These categories 
are ranked as works or subject matter of copyright in the common law 
jurisdictions (U.K. U.S.A., Australia, India etc.) In other jurisdictions, 
the second category ranks as subject matters which enjoys neighbouring 
rights. Even more recent subjects matters such as videograms and 
computer software. Videograms come within the definition of 
cinematograph films in nearly all countries and are, therefore, works in 
countries where films are works. The most significant difference between 
videograms and films is that the latter are mainly shown in public 
cinemas while the former are shown in private homes. Computer 
software, means programs devised to control the working of computers 
& is generally regarded as coming within the definition of'literary works'. 
Thus, the historical process of extending the categories of works 
continue as the British Copyright Council put it : 
Over the years the types of works protected by 
copyright have been extended, as has the scope of 
protection afforded. Today copyright subsists in 
almost all works representing the product of labour 
and/or skill, if fixed so that they can be 
reproduced.''" 
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The United States Copyright Act 1976 which lists seven categories 
of 'works of authorship does make it clear that these categories are 
illustrative and not limitative"", and thereby reinforces the point that, 
like the categories of tort, the categories of copyrightable works are 
never closed. 
(E) AUTHORS RIGHTS : 
After discussing subject matter of copyright, now we should 
examine rights of authors. The major rights under copyright law include 
both economic rights and moral rights. While copyright is an idealistic 
concept, starry-eyed idealism should be discouraged. Copyright is 90% 
about money but that is not to say that the remaining 10% can not be as 
important as the 90%. The importance of the 90% was well put by 
Beaumarchais : 
People say that it is not noble on the part of ' 
authors to plead sordid interest while claiming to 
aspire to glory. They are right, glory is attractive, 
but they forget that, to enjoy it for just one year, 
nature condemns us to dine three hundred and 
sixty five times.''^ 
The importance of the other 10% is contained in the definition of 
the droit moral in French law ; The author shall enjoy the right to 
respect for his name, his authorship, and his work. The right shall be 
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attached to his person. It shall be perpetual, inalienable and 
imprescriptible.'*^ Its main objective is to safeguard the author's 
reputation, what Shakespeare called that immortal part of myself. 
0) Economic Rights : 
The enumeration of the author's economic rights under the 
Conventions and in national legislations is not uniform: the terminology 
differs; several rights overlap; and the precise scope of each right varies 
from one country to another. Nevertheless, as detailed below, the 
following basic rights - or their equivalents - are found in one or both 
of the Copyright Conventions and in nearly every national copyright 
law including U.K., U.S.A. and India : 
(a) the reproduction rights; 
(b) the adaptation rights; 
(c) the distribution rights; 
(d) the public performance right; 
(e) the broadcasting right; and 
(f) the cablecasting right. 
The economic rights of the author are in a large majority of cases 
assigned to an entrepreneur such as a publisher of books or music, a film 
producer or a record producer. The latter uses his judgement, both 
artistic and commercial and, in the case of the film producer or record 
producer, adds his entrepreneur who carries the risk of failure and reaps 
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the profit of success. He also pays for the marketing and advertising of 
the works in its fixed form. It is the rationale of copyright that if he is 
to recoup his investment and make a profit he has to be protected 
against unauthorised reproduction."* If he were not so protected the 
'pirate' could almost invariably produce copies at a much lower price. 
In book publishing the pirate's price would be lower, but he still has 
substantial costs. In record production the pirated product is sold at a 
much lower price because the pirate only bears the cost of manufacture 
and distribution and saves both copyright royalties and recording costs. 
In film production the pirate's costs are only a small fraction because of 
the very high cost of making the original film. 
About the absolute necessity of copyright protection there can, 
therefore, be no doubt, even when contemplating only the economic 
rights of the author. However, controversy is possible on two issues : 
First, how long should the protection be, and secondly, should it be 
absolute i.e. including a right to forbid any use of the work, or should, 
in certain cases, use be permitted without the authorisation of the 
author, against the payment of a fair and equitable remuneration, i.e. by 
a compulsory licence? The argument for the term of protection, i.e. the 
duration of the copyright, has, throughout the history of copyright, been 
carried by the moral right of the author. This point is well illustrated by 
the first Copyright Act in history : the Statute of Queen Anne (1709) in 
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the United Kingdom. The copyright term of 14 years was taken from 
patent law and clearly intended to allow the printer/publisher to recoup 
his costs. It also gave the author a further term of 14 years, making 28 
years in all but only if at the end of the first 14 years the author was still 
alive. Thus, the Act clearly distinguished between what it deemed 
necessary for the publisher to recover his investment and what it 
deemed necessary for the benefit of the author. However, in later 
Statutes the two terms were amalgamated into one, which was assignable 
as a whole to the publisher'*^ It was gradually lengthened beyond the 
life of the author until it reached 50 years/705/ mortem auctoris^'' (pma) 
in the Berne Convention in 1908. The motivation for this gradual 
lengthening of the term was clearly the moral right of the author which 
links his personality to the work and thus leads to the concept that 
copyright is a property right in the work which can and should be passed 
to the creator's heirs and successors. 
(a) The Reproduction Right : 
The reproduction right - the right to authorise the reproduction of 
a work in copies - is of course the most fundamental of all the author's 
economic rights and it is recognised in the Berne Convention, in the 
Universal Copyright Convention, and in virtually every National 
Copyright Law including U.K., U.S.A. & India"*. 
It is, generally, accepted that every means by which a work of 
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authorship may be reproduced is embraced by the reproduction right, 
including traditional methods of design, engraving lithography, offset 
and all other process of printing, as well as more modern techniques of 
photocopying, mechanical and magnetic recording, and the like. What 
is less settled is whether certain uses of a work - such as storage and 
retrieval in a computer system - fall within the scope of the reproduction 
right.'•^ Also in doubt is the effectiveness of the reproduction right in 
relation to 'home taping' of sound recordings, films and computer 
programs, and 'reprography' of literary works'^. 
The reproduction right, generally, includes the initial fixation of 
a work in any material form, e.g. the recording of a musical or dramatic 
performance, as well as any subsequent duplication of the initial 
fixation, e.g. the making of copies of a sound recording or film. 
The application of the reproduction right to works of architecture 
presents special problems. Four potential acts of reproduction may be 
identified here : 
(1) Copying one architectural drawing in the form of another building; 
(2) Copying one building in the form of another building; 
(3) Copying a drawing or model in the form of a building : and 
(4) Copying a building in the form of a drawing or model. 
While the first activity obviously infringes the reproduction right 
unless authorised by the author, it is less clear whether the other three 
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activities infringe. However, the recent UNESCO/WIPO statement of 
principles recommends that all four activities described above should 
be counted among the author's rights to authorise reproduction". 
(b) The Adaptation Right : 
The adaptation right is the right to authorise the adaptation, 
arrangement or other alteration of a work. Examples of adaptations 
include: translations from one language to another; musical arrangements 
of the spoken or written word; dramatisations of non-dramatic works 
and vice-versa; fictionalisations of non-fictional works and vice versa; 
motion picture versions of plays or novels and vice versa. 
The adaptation right is expressly recognised in the Berne 
Convention" and somewhat indirectly adumbrated in the Universal 
Copyright Convention'\ In addition, a translation right is separately 
enumerated in both Conventions'''. 
Computer technology has raised a number of questions concerning 
the scope of the adaptation right. Principal among these is the question 
of whether the conversion of a computer programs from one programming 
language to another falls within the adaptation right? As detailed 
elsewhere in this study", those courts that have had occasion to 
consider this question have generally held, by analogy with foreign 
language translation, that unauthorised program conversion does infringe 
the adaptation right. 
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Adaptation is usually understood to involve a pre-existing work 
from one medium to another, e.g. from book to films or from two 
dimensions into three or vice versa. But it may also involve alterations 
to a work in the same medium, such as revising the first edition of a book 
to create a second edition. The exercise of this right to alteration creates 
special problems in relation to works of architecture in as much as the 
owner of a building may need to change it from time to time, the 
question arises as to whether such changes conflict with the exclusive 
right of the author (generally the architect) to authorise any alteration? 
The recent UNESCO/WIPO statement of principles recognises this 
problem, and suggests the following approach to reconcile the conflicting 
interests of owner and architect. 
The author of a work of architecture should enjoy 
the exclusive right of authorising alterations of that 
work, except where the alteration is of a kind that 
is of great importance to the owner of the building 
or other similar construction and it does not amount 
to a distortion, mutilation or other modification 
which would be prejudicial to the honour or 
reputation of the author of the work of architecture." 
There is obviously considerable overlap between the adaptation 
right and the reproduction right. For example, a three - dimensional 
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sculpture may be a reproduction of a two - dimensional drawing, as well 
as an adaptation of that drawing. This overlap occurs because the 
reproduction right includes the right to authorise the making not only of 
identical copies but also of versions that are substantially similar to the 
original work. Were it otherwise, an infringer could escape liability by 
making some merely trivial variation in the infringing work. It follows 
that most, possibly all, derivative works will infringe the reproduction 
right as well as the adaptation right unless authorised by the author of 
the original work. 
It is important to recognise that adaptation may be protected by 
copyright law quite independently of the original works from which 
they are derived. Thus, as the Berne Convention recognises, two 
copyrights may subsist in a foreign language translation: one in the 
translation itself, and another in the underlying work. The Berne 
Convention also makes clear that copyright in an adaptation is without 
prejudice to copyright in the original work." It follows that a translation 
may not be copied without the consent of both the translator and the 
author of the translated work. 
Sometimes it may be difficult to determine whether a derivative 
work is entitled to its own copyright or not: a slavish copy of the original 
work obviously does not qualify for independent protection; as the 
United States court have aptly put, something more than a 'merely 
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tiiviaF variation is required.'* How much more is a question of fact to 
be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
(c) The Distribution Right : 
(1) The Basic Right ; 
The right of distribution is the right to authorise the distribution 
to the public of copies of a work. 'Distribution' for these purposes 
includes sale, lease, rental, lending or any other transfer of ownership 
or possession of copies of the work. 
Except in relation to cinematographic rights under the Berne 
Convention, the distribution right is not expressly recognised by Berne 
or the Universal Copyright Convention. Nevertheless, as the WIPO 
guide explains: 
In practice it (the distribution right) flows from the 
right of reproduction. The author, when he has 
made a contract about the reproduction of his work, 
can lay down conditions governing the distribution 
of copies, e.g. as to number (although in practice it 
is usually the publisher who decides on the size of 
the edition) and as to the countries in which these 
copies may be sold.'^ 
However, the distribution right is expressly mentioned in both 
U.K. and U.S. A.^ ** In India, it is included in the reproduction right.*' But 
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the 1994 Amendment has now, expressly provided for it by inserting it 
in Section 14. 
(2) First sale or Exhaustion : 
Traditionally, the distribution right has been viewed as extending 
only to the initial circulation of copies of a work; after the first sale of 
a particular copy, the distribution right was said to be 'exhausted' in 
relation to that copy, and subsequent purchasers were free to resell or 
otherwise dispose off it. This is the so called 'first sale' or 'exhaustion' 
doctrine which is explicitly recognised in the U.S. 
(3) Rentals ; 
In response to the rapid growth of a commercial rental market in 
sound recording, video cassettes and computer software, a number of 
countries have created a limited exception to the first sale or exhaustion 
doctrine by introducing a rental right in certain categories of work.^' 
The development of a rental market in records and films has been 
the subject of study at the International level by a group of experts 
convened jointly in 1984 by UNESCO and WIPO and a rental right in 
videograms and phonograms was recommended in the recent UNESCO/ 
WIPO statement of principles.*^ In favour of such a right, it was argued 
that: 'Rental and Public lending' undermine the normal exploitation of 
the works concerned and is prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the 
owners of copyright." It was also noted that rental or public lending 
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'may facilitate private copying', although it was argued that private 
copying and rental should be the subject of separate rights and separate 
provisions in national laws.^ *^  
The question of non-commercial rental, better known as the 
'public lending right', is also a matter for debate. In the United States, 
the rental right is limited to commercial rentals. By contrast, in the 
United Kingdom, the 1988 Copyright legislation creates a rental right 
in the rental of sound recordings, films and computer programs by 
public libraries, regardless of whether a rental fee is charged, and this 
new right is in addition to the existing public lending right in books. 
Another question for debate is whether the rental right should be 
subject to the obligation of national treatment, so that foreign authors 
are entitled to enjoy the same protection in relation to rentals as the 
nationals of the country in which protection is sought. In as much as the 
rental right is not expressly recognised under the Berne or the Universal 
Copyright Convention, it might be argued that the principle of national 
treatment does not apply in the absence of a bilateral- agreement 
between the countries concerned. However, the Committee of government 
experts jointly convened by UNESCO and WIPO to consider the 
statement of principles on audio-visual works and phonograms agreed 
that the principle of national treatment should apply in the case of rental 
rights.*'' 
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(d) The Public Performance Right : 
The public performance right, the right to authorise the 
performance of a work in public, is recognised both by the Berne 
Convention^* and the Universal Copyright Convention^' and by most 
national laws including U.K., U.S.A. and India. 
(1) The Works Covered ; 
For obvious reasons, the public performance right extends only 
to those works that are capable of being performed, namely literary, 
dramatic, dramatico-musical, musical and choreographic works, and 
pantomimes. Dramatico musical works are works created for the stage 
with musical accompaniment, such as operas, operettas, musicals etc.'" 
In respect of literary works, the right to authorise public performance 
is covered by the Berne Convention in a separate but comparable 
provision known as the 'public recitation right'. ' ' In U.K., U.S.A. and 
India, this public recitation right is subsumed under the general public 
performance right.'"^ 
(2) The Nature of 'Performance*: 
The public performance right embraces not only traditional 'live' 
performances by actors, singers or musicians on the spot, but also 
recorded performances. Thus, the owner of copyright in a musical work 
has the right to authorise its public performance both by a live orchestra 
and also by means of a sound recording or film or video cassettes. In 
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addition, where national law grants a separate public performance right 
in sound recording or film, the owner of copyright in that work also 
enjoys the right to authorise its public performance. The U.S. law, for 
instance, grants a public performance right in films but not in sound 
recording. Under such circumstances, therefore, the public performance 
of a sound recording or film may require two consents, one from the 
owner of copyright in the sound recording or film and another from the 
owner of copyright in the underlying work. The Indian law also after the 
1994 Amendment, now recognises specifically the rights of performers. 
While the Berne Convention^' contains a separate but comparable 
provision for the public performance of films and their underlying 
works, most national laws deal with film performances under the 
general public performance right.^'' In some countries such as U.S.A. 
broadcasting and cablecasting are also covered by the public performance 
right. Other countries such as U.K. and India etc, as well as Berne 
Convention and Universal Copyright Convention recognise a separate 
right to authorise a broadcast or cablecast of a work.^' 
(3) The Meaning of 'Public^ ; 
It is axiomatic that the right to authorise the public performance 
of a work applies only to performances. However, the copyright 
Conventions do not define what is meant by the term 'public' and it is 
a matter for each member country to draw the dividing line between 
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public performances for which the copyright owner's consent is required 
and private performances for which consent is not necessary. While 
some countries such as U.K. and India have left this decision to their 
courts, a growing number in recent years (France & Germany being 
most important) have enacted statutory definition either by defining 
what is to be considered a 'public' performance or by listing examples 
of performances that are not to be considered 'private'. Irrespective of 
whether the meaning of public performance is defined by Statute or by 
the Courts, the following trends and issues may be identified. 
First is the almost universal recognition that performances within 
a purely domestic circle are not performances 'in public'. A second and 
related point, exemplified in the U.S.A., is that the domestic circle is 
usually defined as including both a ' family ' and its 'social 
acquaintances''^. Thus, in most countries, a performance at a typical 
wedding reception would not be considered a 'public' performance, 
regardless of the fact that it may be attended by a large number of 
unrelated family friends conversely, a performance which takes place 
before an audience that is connected neither by family relationship nor 
by social acquaintance would not be considered a private performance, 
even though it is attended by very few people. 
Where national law treats the normal circle of a family and its 
social acquaintances as a private gathering, the question arises as to 
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whether a group of people connected only by social acquaintance rather 
than by family relationship is also treated as a private gathering. A 
related question is whether a social acquaintance may be inferred where 
a group shares facilities for work (e.g. in a factory), accommodation 
(e.g. in a residential training establishement) or for recreation (e.g. in 
a holiday camp). The emerging view is that mere social acquaintance in 
the absence of family relationship should not be enough to constitute a 
domestic and, therefore, a private circle, and that social acquaintance 
should not be inferred simply from the fact that people share facilities 
for work, accommodation or recreation. 
Another issue is whether a place where people are incarcerated 
against their will (e.g. a prison/or do not reside by choice e.g. a hospital) 
may be said to be 'public places'. Certainly such institutions are not 
'open to the public' in the usual sense of that phrase. Nevertheless, 
since the inmates or residents are not usually connected by family or 
social acquaintance, it follows that they are not members of a 'domestic' 
circle and that performances in such institutions should be treated as 
'public performances'. A similar analysis applies, a fortiori, to other 
institutions (such as hotels) in which people reside at their own free will. 
(e) The Broadcasting Right : 
The broadcasting right, the right to authorise the transmission of 
a work by any means of wireless diffusion, is found both in the Berae 
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Convention^** and in the Universal Copyright Convention''^ Under some 
national laws (U.S.), the broadcasting right is subsumed under the 
public performance right, while under other national laws (U.K. & 
India), it is separately stated. Irrespective of whether the broadcasting 
right is recognised as a separate right or as a part of the public 
performance right, its basic features are well established. 
(1) The meaning of 'Broadcasting* : 
In the first place, it may be noted that the broadcasting right 
applies both to sounds and visual images, i.e. to radio and television.^° 
Second, like the public performance right, there must be some 
communication to the public in order to invoke the broadcasting right.*' 
This doesn't mean that the broadcast signals must actually be received 
by the public, only that they are 'intended to be received directly by the 
general public'.*^ Thus telephone communications are not 'broadcasts' 
for copyright purposes.*^' By the same token, it is immaterial whether 
the broadcast signals are received by members of the public at the same 
place or at the separate places (e.g. in their houses) or at the same time 
or at different times (e.g. when a broadcast is transmitted for delayed viewing 
in different continental time zones), and this point is expressly recognised in 
the U.S. Copyright Statute.*'' The question of whether various kinds of 
satellite transmission constitute broadcasting raises difficult problems 
of law and fact which are discussed elsewhere in this study.*' 
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(2) The Scope of the Right ; 
The broadcasting right encompasses not only the primary right to 
authorise the initial broadcast of a work** but also a number of secondary 
rights. As stated in the Berne Convention and recognised in most 
national law including U.K., U.S.A. and India, these secondary rights 
include : 
First, the right to rebroadcastthe original broadcast ('rebroadcasting'). 
Secondly, the right to retransmit the original broadcast by cable ('cable 
transmission') 
Thirdly, the right to communicate the original broadcast by means of a 
loudspeaker, TV., screen, or otherwise in cafes, restaurents, 
bars, hotels and other public places. 
Since all of these secondary uses involve an additional audience 
not within the contemplation of the parties when authority to broadcast 
was originally given, they require consent from the owner of copyright 
in anywork included in the original broadcast, subject only to the 
compulsory licensing provisions described below. 
(3) Compulsory Licensing : 
The Berne Convention permits compulsory licensing of the 
broadcasting right under certain conditions.*^ and in most countries 
blanket licensing has evolved either by agreement between author's 
collecting societies and broadcasters or (in the absence of agreement) 
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by statutory or administrative decision. Whether blanket licensing is 
appropriate or not depends upon the nature of the work. In the case of 
musical works used by radio stations, where individual licensing is 
difficult or impossible because of the great number of works used by the 
broadcaster, blanket licensing may be a justifiable solution. But, as has 
been pointed out by the Committee of government experts convened by 
WIPO and UNESCO*^ no such justification exists in relation to dramatic 
or choreographic works (nor, it may be added, in relation to literary or 
audio - visual works), and individual licensing in such cases is to be 
preferred. 
(ii) MORAL RIGHTS : 
Moral rights 'stem from the fact that the work is a reflection of 
the personality of the creator, just as much as the economic rights reflect 
the author's need to keep body and soul together'.*^ The moral right is 
usually referred to by its French name because it originated in French 
law, from where it found its way into whole Continental European and 
Latin American laws and into the Berne Convention.^" Common law 
jurisdictions, such as the United States, often give similar protection to 
the author but base it on other parts of the law, such as the law of 
defamation, of unfair competition or of contract, But in the United 
Kingdom and India moral rights have now been expressly adopted.'' 
There are three basic moral rights. 
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(a) Droit de divulgation (the right of publication) is the right to 
decide whether the work is to be made public. 
(b) Droit de paternite (the right of paternity) is the right to claim 
authorship of published works. 
(c) Droit de respect de / ' oenvre'' (the right of integrity) is the right 
of the author to safeguard his reputation by preserving the 
integrity of the work. 
(a) Right of Publication : 
Although prominent in French law, this is only one of the three 
moral rights which is not part of the moral right in the Berne Convention. 
It consists of two rights the right of the author to decide whether and 
when his work is to be published. If his creditors want to publish a 
manuscript to satisfy their claims, the writer can stop them. If a 
composer wants to hear the first performance of an orchestral work 
before publishing the score, he can prevent publication of it. The other 
right is the right to withdraw the work after publication if the author 
wishes to do so. This is certainly the most audacious manifestation of 
the droit moral in the French law. In common law jurisdictions the case 
for withdrawal will have to be a very strong one to succeed, e.g. a 
philosopher or scientist who has changed his theory in the light of 
further work or new discoveries may succeed in having the rest of an 
edition withdrawn and corrections made in the next edition. 
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(b) Right of paternity : 
The right of paternity consists of three rights : 
First, the right to demand that the author's name appears in an appropriate 
place on all copies of the work and to claim authorship of it at all 
times; 
Secondly, Conversely, the right to prevent all others from claiming 
authorship of the work; 
Thirdly, the right to prevent the use of his name by someone else in 
connection with that other person's work. 
(c) Right of Integrity : 
This contains the right of the author to authorise or prohibit any 
modification of his work. This part of the right is mostly used positively 
by licensing the modification, e.g. turning a novel into a film or a play 
into a work for television, but can also be used negatively, e.g. by 
preventing an unauthorised broadcast version or dramatisation of a 
novel. 
It contains the author's right to prevent 'distortion' of his work. 
All adaptation (e.g., novel into play, play into film) demand a great deal 
of adaptation. Where the borderline between adaptation and distortion 
lies will be a question for the courts to decide in the circumstances of 
the case. Generally, the courts in civil law countries will apply a 
subjective test: does the author honestly believe that the action of the 
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adapter would be prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author? 
The courts in Common law countries usually apply an objective test : 
would a reasonable, right thinking, member of the public think that the 
alteration is prejudicial to the honour and reputation of the author? 
It is the essence of moral rights that, in the words of the Berne 
Convention, they are 'independent of the author's economic rights. It is 
unclear whether this means that the moral rights are inalienable whatever 
the author agrees to in a contract in which he transfers his economic 
rights, he can still exercise his droit moral afterwards. If, for instance, 
the contract says that the adapter can turn the novel into a play in the 
form that appears appropriate to him, the author of novel can still object 
when he reads the play. The alternative interpretation is that if the 
author simply transfers the economic rights, he is not held to have 
transferred his droit moral unless the contract is in writing and says so 
specifically. It is suggested that the latter interpretation is to be preferred, 
if moral rights are alienable under the law of the country where 
protection is claimed. Clauses to the effect that the adapter can modify 
the work as he wishes, or even that he need not mention the name of the 
author will be valid, if it is clear that the author at the time of making 
the contract was aware of the clause and agreed to it for valuable 
consideration. 
It is of the essence of the droit moral that it lasts during the life 
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of the author. Whether the right can be exercised by the heirs after the 
death of the author and for how long depends on the law of the country 
where protection is claimed. The 1971 Paris Revision of Berne 
Convention provides that the droit moral shall last at least until the 
expiry of the economic rights. Thus, this is a minimum of 50 years after 
the death of the author. However, a reservation is also permitted to limit 
it only for the life of the author.'^ In France, the droit moral is perpetual. 
Thus, it can be said by way of conclusion that the law on the 
subject - matter of copyright is fairly settled and at least two models in 
this regard are available i.e of giving a list of copyrighted works and the 
one which does not give any such list. Similarly on the question of 
economic rights of authors, the law in the three countries under study 
is almost identical. The recent recognition in these common law countries 
of the civil law concept of moral rights of authors is indeed a happy 
beginning. 
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CHAPTER-4 :165: 
COPYRIGHT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The International law is concerned with treaties or conventions 
between nations requiring their signatories to respect, in their own 
countries, the copyright of nationals of other signatories There is no 
general principle of international law requiring such protection and , 
before the making of international agreements regarding the matter, a 
book written by "foreigner and published abroad could obtain no 
protection in a given country" 
This chapter, therefore, examines issues relating to copyright 
under international law It discusses the classical distinction of interna-
tional law 1 e Public International Law and Private International Law 
and how these two have influenced the development of International 
Copyright Law It examines the question of why copyright protection is 
needed for a creator of an intellectual work not only m his country but 
also elsewhere"? Similarly important issues relating to treatment of a 
foreigner under international copyright law which matters a great deal 
today have been put to critical examination How different municipal 
laws or Private International have reacted to the question that foreign-
ers be or be not treated at par with nationals is also examined at length 
(A) THE TWO DISCIPLINES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW : 
The two disciplines of international law are (a) Public Interna-
tional law and (b) Private International law 
(a) Public International law ('Jus Gentium') is a system of law which 
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IS general in its source as it is based on customary law with a superstruc-
ture of international treaties and is common in its scope as it is to be 
applied everywhere It comprises those parts of the law which are 
international by definition, like the law of the Sea, Air law or Space law 
as well as International Humanitarian law ranging from the abolition of 
slavery as a personal status to Human Rights law It also encompasses 
International Economic law which deals with the ownership and use of 
natural resources and the production and distribution of goods (trade 
agreements, such as GATT, now called WTO, International Financial 
Agreements, such as IMF and the World Bank) This is the part of 
public International law which is nearest to copyright if one views 
authorship as a 'national resource', which it is and carries ('supports 
material' ) of copyright works such as books, films computer software 
or phonograms as 'goods', which they are 
It is, therefore, from this part of public international law that 
international copyright law has taken its principal tools and adopted 
them to its purpose These tools are 
(a) The application of minimum standards 
(b) Preferential treatment This can be 
(i) Most favoured nation treatment, 
(ii) Reciprocal treatment, 
(iii) National treatment i e the equality of treatment between 
foreigners and nationals 
(i) Most favoured nation treatment is characteristic of bilateral 
treaties, which is how as we have seen in an earlier chapter on historical 
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development of copyright that international copyright started both in 
Europe and in the Americas This technique was abondoned in interna-
tional copyright in favour of multinational treaties of which the Berne 
Convention of 1886 was the first and most important Since then 
'national treatment' and 'reciprocity' are the tools used by the Conven-
tions on International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights together with 
the application of minimum standards 
(ii) Private international law on the other hand is really a misleading 
term because it is not international law but part of national law It is a 
discipline within each national legal system There is no such thing as 
an 'international' in private international law This is only that part of 
English, American, Indian or French law which deals with international 
situations (in federal states there may even be a private international 
law of the states ofNew York or of Nevv South Wales) On the other hand 
there is no such thing as English or Indian public international law, that 
or would be a contradiction in terms There is infact only one public 
international law 
Private international is the body of rules (part of national law 
which deals with international situations, that is, legal situations with 
a foreign element (e g contracts of sale between persons belonging to 
different countries) The rules of private international law are either 
rules of customary international law, that is, general principles recognised 
by all civilised nations such as pacta sunt servanda or rules laid down by 
international treaties which have been ratified by the country concerned 
and thus have become part of its national law or rules of national law 
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applied to foreigners as well as to nationals 
(iii) International Copyright law is a hybrid In this area the main 
source of international copyright law is international conventions 
which are treaties between sovereign states and as such part of public 
international law The principle applied in these conventions like the 
principle of reciprocity or the principle of national treatment are 
principles of public international law but the situations to which they 
are applied are private international law situations 
Private international law is sometimes called 'conflict of laws' 
meaning the conflict between various national laws which may be 
applicable to one legal issue 
(B) THE VITAL QUESTIONS & CONFLICT OF LAWS : 
There are three questions which are to be answered here in a case 
of conflict of laws 
(i) What is the legal issue*^ 
(ii) To what category does this issue belong'^ 
(iii) What 'connecting factor' is relevant to solve the conflict'' 
(i) What is the legal issue ? 
The question which private international law has to solve is 
From which legal system do we derive the rule which will decide the 
legal issue before us*^  There may, of course, be several legal issues in 
one case, but each issue has to be decided separately and the answer may 
well be that the first issue in a case has to be decided according to one 
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law and the second issue according to another law 
(ii) To What Category Does the Issue Belong ? 
Is the issue the validity of a will or of a marriage or is it the 
distribution of a person's movable estate or a delictual liability'^ 
A simple traffic accident may present the choice of three legal 
systems An English motorist on holiday in France injures a pedestrian 
who IS also a tourist but domiciled in Germany If the issue is liability, 
that is whether the motorist or the pedestrian is to blame, it will 
probably be judged according to French law as the lex loci delicti If the 
issue is whether the motorist was covered by his insurance policy which 
is probably an English contract, that issue will be judged by the lex loci 
contractus which is English law If the pedestrian was killed, it would 
probably be for German law to decide - if he is held to have been 
negligent - who his heirs are and whether his estate is liable 
To choose a copyright example if an English author makes a 
publishing contract to have his work published in France and the 
published work is then performed in a slightly altered form without 
permission in Germany, the issue whether the performance constitutes 
an infringement will probably be judged according to German law as the 
country where protection is claimed, that is where the infringement was 
committed (the lex loci delicti whether the delict is a crime or a civil 
wrong or a tort) but the validity of the transfer of the right to the French 
publisher will probably be judged according to French law if the 
contract is a French contract (the lex loci contractus) 
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(iii) What is the Connecting Factor ? 
In other words what is the feature which connects the issue with 
one particular legal system*^ In the traffic example the question would 
be is It the nationality of the motorist or the nationality of the victim 
or the country where the accident took place*^ In the copyright example 
the question would be is it the law of the country of the author or the 
law of the country of the publishing contract or the law of the country 
where the alleged infringement has taken place*? 
Thus, the judge or the administrator dealing with the case or the 
legal practitioner advising on it will have to decide first what the issue 
is then to which class the issue belongs and finally which is the relevant 
point of attachment 
The dilemma in all cases of conflict is between consistency 
(similar decisions in similar cases) and international harmony (same 
decision on the same issue in whatever country the issue may be tried) 
In an ideal world the decisions would be both consistent and harmoni-
ous In practice this is not possible as legal systems vary widely and the 
rules of private international law are part of a national legal system 
which may be different from most legal systems Therefore, choices 
have continuously to be made, usually by judges, which are neither 
perfect nor completely logical but the best that can be done in the 
circumstances If one views consistency and harmony as a parallelo-
gram of forces within which the solution has to be found, the strongest 
force among the connecting factors which will decide a case is the lex 
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fori. This is so because private international law, being part of national 
law which the courts apply every day, the natural tendency of the judges 
will be to apply their national law, and those rules of private Interna-
tional law which are part of it, rather than a foreign law. 
The well known internatinal law writer, kahn-Freund' calls this 
the homeward trend^ pointing out that courts do not only prefer to apply 
their own law, but also do so more efficiently than if they have to apply 
foreign law. He concludes that the homeward trend should not necessar-
ily be considered as an aberration, or as a sign of intellectual inertia. It 
is also an expression of the craftsman's pride in his work and of an 
unwillingness to jeopardise the quality of the product through the use 
of unfamiliar tools. One suspects that many phenomena of private 
international law are partly the result of the homeward trend, the rule 
of ordre public fraude a'la loi treating as a rule of jurisdiction what 
might have been treated as a rule of choice of law, insistence on the need 
to assert the applicability of foreign law in the pleadings, the need to 
prove it by calling an expert rather than just producing the written law, 
are all signs of the conscious or unconscious desire of the courts to 
avoid the application of foreign law. 
(C) THE SOURCES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW : 
(i) International Customs : 
Since, as we have seen above, private international law is a set of 
rules which forms part of national law, it follows that, as Justice Storey, 
Judge of U.S. Supreme Court puts it^: 
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Whatever force and obligation the laws of one coun-
try have in another, depend solely upon the laws and 
municipal regulations of the latter; that is to say, 
upon its own proper jurisprudence and polity, and 
upon its own express or tacit consent. 
However both foreign laws and customary international law can, 
applying the terminology of English courts have 'persuasive authority'" 
meaning that the court adopts the reasoning of judgement without being 
bound by it. This is close to the position of custmary law in private 
international law, when it fills a gap in the national law.^  German jurists 
call it Erkenntnisquella (as apposed to Rechtsquelle) a source of 
reasoning as opposed to a source of law. Most ambitiously French 
jurists try to adduce general principles from the 'comity of nations' 
which constitute generally recognised rules of private international law 
based on 'national law'.* This doctrine is often referred to as the 
'universalist' or 'international' doctrine. The doctrine seeks to see 
adopted by the whole civilised world, identical rules on the conflict of 
laws and aspires to this goal by natural sentiments. It is a doctrine 
which, in the domain of action, seeks to get adopted, by the greatest 
possible number of nations, that identity of rules which may eventually 
lead to uniformity.^ 
Applied to private international law generally this perhaps is no 
more than the elegant expression of a pious hope. It is discussed here 
because it is precisely the philosophy which in international copyright 
inspired the Berne Convention and other Copyright Conventions which 
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followed It It IS most gratifying that in this sphere of international law 
It has proved highly successful 
(ii) International Conventions : 
The sparsity of customary law and the imprecise nature of what 
little there was, proved a major incentive in the 19th century to regulate 
international situations by state treaties Such treaties can be either 
inter partes-seeking to deal with conflict situations arising between 
contracting states - or erga omnes - seeking to be generally applicable 
The early conventions were of the first variety, either bilateral treaties^ 
or multilateral treaties specifying that they only applied between 
contracting parties There is a tendency in the 20th century towards 
convention erga omnes, seeking to codify the widest achievable inter-
national consensus in one specific field of law' One of the mam 
influences producing both the trends towards convention erga omnes 
and towards specialisation of subjects were the Hague Conventions on 
private International law Against this trend, the International Conven-
tions in the field of Industrial property*" and in the field of Copyright 
and Neighbouring rights are notable and most successful exceptions 
(iii) National Legislation : 
As private international law is, infact, part of national law, 
particularly in those countries which rely on codification rather than 
development of the law by court decisions That there has been com-
paratively little national legislation dealmg with private international 
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law js due to two reasons The first is that many aspects of the subject 
are controversial and many of the controversies have grown rather than 
diminished during the 19th and 20th centuries so that national legisla-
tions did not find the measure of agreement which would enable a 
statute to represent a consensus of opinion or at least a pre dominant 
majority opinion " The first major codification of private international 
law which has proved the most influential was contained in the French 
Civil Code of 1804 Of later national codifications the two in the major 
European countries, the German Law of 1900 and the Italian Law of 
1942, were passed by fairly authoritarian regimes The common law 
democracies did not attempt codification The other reason is that the 
task of regulating international situations by national legislation is 
politically highly sensitive as no country wants to give away more than 
it receives 
The French Civil Code 1804 contains three main rules The laws 
dealing with ordre public (such as police and security matters) govern 
all persons living in France, whether French citizens or not This is the 
origin of the ordre public doctrine which has since been much enlarged 
Land is governed by French law, whether owned by Frenchmen or 
foreigners and the rules dealing with personal status and capacity apply 
to all Frenchman whether living at home or abroad On this compara-
tively narrow base'^ the French courts have been able to build over a 
century and a half a fairly elaborate system of private international law 
In the U K and other common law countries including India on 
the other hand there has been no attempt to deal with private interna-
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tional law by general legislation. Only laws dealing with particular 
subjects contain some private international law provisions.'^ 
This explains why, when the first international convention in the 
copyright field was created'", French legal thinking and experience 
dominated the scene. 
(iv) Judicial Decisions & Juristic Works : 
The courts have an important role in the development of private 
international law not only in the common law countries but also m 
countries which rely to a large extent on codification to formulate the 
rules of conflict of laws such as France. Similarly the writings of 
academic lawyers have a significant role to play. 
(D) INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW : 
In the realm of the law of movable (physical) property, the law 
applicable to decide ownership is, generally, the law of the country 
where the property is acquired. If one bought goods in country A and takes 
them to country B, the question whether one has become the rightful 
owner of goods is to be decided by the law of country A. The position is 
different with regard to copyright. The law applying to the physical 
property of the corpus mechanicum such as the book, the film, the record 
containing the work is governed by the above mentioned rules. The 
property in the work, however, is governed by the law of country B, if that 
is where the right is claimed. Thus, 'the centre of gravity' of the work is 
the country where protection is claimed. 
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Copyright law, like patent law, started as a privilege conferred by 
the prince and developed into a right conferred by a statute Such statute 
law gave protection to the right owner but, like all other statute law, 
only withm the territory of that state However, once it was conceded 
that the creators of new works of many kinds should be protected, such 
protection becomes at best only partially effective and at worst totally 
ineffective if it is confined to national frontiers The idea that copyright 
arises from the act of creation of the work and not from any administra-
tive act leads naturally to the idea that once the right exists, it should be 
valid anywhere There is no good reason why a creator should be 
entitled both to moral recognition and to the pecuniary rewards of his 
works only in his own country and not abroad But even more important 
than the moral imperative is the Gresharm's law on international 
currencies that had money drives out good money applies to works and 
copyright protected matter If a 'work' protected by copyright in 
country A is not protected in countries B and C so that it can be freely 
reproduced in these countries, it may be imported into country A where 
It will then compete with copies on which copyright has been paid As 
the imported copies will not have paid any copyright, they will be 
cheaper and will, therefore, drive the home - made product, which has 
paid copyright, out of the market 
The effect is the same as if a tax was put on a home product, 
whereas the same product was allowed to come in from abroad tax free 
The greater the mobility of persons and goods the more serious will be 
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the result of this phenomenon. To cope with it (as well as protecting its 
citizens abroad) a state has to give a certain amount of reciprocal 
protection to foreigners. 
(i) The Treatment of Foreigners in Copyright Law : 
When faced with the question of the rights of foreigners in a 
country (country x) the following questions have to be answered in the 
following order ; 
(a) Can the foreigner claim protection under one .of the international 
conventions to which country x is a party? (in countries where 
such conventions are self- applying e.g.U.S. 
(b) If not, can he claim protection under a bilateral agreement to 
which a country is a party? 
(c) If not, can he claim protection under the national law of country 
X relating to foreigners? 
In this third case, national law may provide that he can claim no 
greater protection than that granted in his country of origin or it may 
apply the rule of material reciprocity. 
As the great majority of countries which are of importance for 
copyright purposes are parties to one of the Interntional Conventions, 
bilateral agreements have lost most of their importance. Thus, in most 
cases one will have to see whether the foreigner claiming protection is 
covered by one of the conventions and if not whether he is protected by 
the national law of the country where protection is claimed, in its 
provisions relating to foreigners. 
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The treatment of foreigners, apart from conventional protection, 
vanes considerably and within the confines of this study, a summary of 
comparison between the major European countries. United States and 
India will suffice by way of example 
(1) In the Republic of Germany," works are protected if they are first 
published in Germany or are works by German Nationals or 
assimilated persons (stateless persons and refugees) 
(2) In Italy, works are protected if they were first published in Italy or 
the author resides in Italy 
In both Germany as well as Italy foreign authors are protected (over and 
above conventional protection) subject to reciprocity 
(3) In the United Kingdom, works are protected if their maker at the 
time of publication is a qualified person (qualified persons are 
British and Irish nationals or persons domiciled or resident in the 
United Kingdom), or if they are first published in the United 
Kingdom or an associated territory 
(4) In France, foreign works are protected even if neither the author 
IS a French national nor the work was first published in France 
The only condition is that an exclusive right in the work exists in 
the country of origin However, it is perhaps significant that a few 
years after the French Copyright Act, 1957, France passed a law'^ 
to the effect that if a country which is not a member of any of the 
conventions to which France is a party does not grant adequate and 
effective protection'^ to work first published in France, works first 
published in such a country are not protected in France '* 
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(5) The United States having won indepedence from Britain and want-
ing to create their own culture became protectionist. Copyright 
was granted only to American citizens and residents in the United 
States. Even a century later when copyright was gradually granted 
to some foreign authors (country by country) copies of a foreign 
work had to be printed in the United States (under the so-called 
'manufacturing clause').'^ 
(6) In India,^° foreign works are protected if either the author is an 
Indian citizen or domiciled in India or the work was first pub-
lished in India. Such an order of giving protection is to be issued 
by the central government and will take into account the doctrine 
of reciprocity. 
(ii) The History of International Copyright Treaties : 
We have noted in the chapter on historical development^' that the 
first international treaties dealing with copyright were bilateral agree-
ments both in Europe and in America. In both cases they were found 
unsatisfactory as they produced particularly in America, a mosaic of 
differing relationships leading away from harmony instead of towards 
it. They came to an end in Europe with the creation of the Berne 
Convention in 1886 and in America - for all practical purposes - with 
the creation of the Universal Copyright Convention in 1952. The Pan -
American experience is illuminating in this respect. The first multina-
tional treaty was the Montevideo Convention in 1889, thus, almost 
contemporary with the Berne Convention 1886. Just as the Berne 
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Convention was initially a mainly European Convention but open to all 
countries^^, so the Montevideo Convention aimed at establishing a Pan 
- American Copyright system but was open to all countries and ratified 
by many American states as well as European ones ^^  However, there 
was an essential difference The Berne Convention was based on the 
principal of national treatment^'', treating foreigners like nationals if 
they belonged to member countries, thus, accepting broadly speaking the 
lex fori Under the Montevideo Convention on the other hand the rights 
of an author were governed by the law of the country of first publication 
or the law of the origin of the work which followed the work into all other 
countries of the Union, thus accepting the principle of the lex origims 
This meant that a court in country A when adjudicating on works 
originating from countries B, C and D had to apply three different 
foreign laws, those of countries B, C and D, whereas under the principle 
of national treatment the court would have applied only the law of 
country A its own Thus national treatment is a better principle 
There followed five further inter-Amencan Copyright Conven-
tions not open to non-American states '^ The most successful one was 
the Buenos Aires Convention 1910 which was ratified by 17 Latin 
American republics and the United States It has changed to the 
principle of national treatment After the second world war the mem-
bers of the Pan - American Union signed a revised convention in 
Washington DC in 1948 which was fashioned on the principle of the 
Berne Convention a number of minimum rights and the principle of 
national treatment If copyright was obtained in one state, a statement 
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appearing on the work indicating the reservation of copyright confers 
copyright in all states without any formalities. A notice like 'copyright 
reserved' was sufficient. Fourteen Latin American countries ratified it 
but the United States could not accept the granting of copyright without 
any formalities which were required under its own national law and did 
not ratify. With the largest American market outside the convention, it 
could not become really effective and the Latin American republics 
were clearly seeking worldwide rather than merely Latin American 
protection, which had to include both the U.S. and Europe. They turned 
towards the Universal Copyright Convention created six years later in 
1952 and although the Pan - American conventions are still operative, 
it is the Universal Copyright Convention that governs relations between 
the Latin American states and the United States and the Berne Conven-
tion as well as the Universal Copyright Convention governs the rela-
tions between them and the European States. Thus, all copyright and 
neighbouring rights Conventions are now based on the principle of 
national treatment. 
(iii) The Principles of International Copyright Conventions : 
Seeking to apply the general principles of private international 
law to a multinational copyright treaty, theoritically two of the prin-
ciples would appear to be suitable : the lex loci and the lex fori. The 
adaptation of the principle of lex loci (or lex originis) leads to the 
principle of country of origin of the work. This means treating a work 
like a person and saying that its nationality is either that of its father (the 
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author) at the time of its birth, which would be the time of its creation if 
It remains unpublished or the time of its first publication, if pubhshed 
Alternatively it would be the nationality of its birth place, that is the 
country of its first publication Like a person the work would then, so to 
speak, have a passport and take its nationality with it wherever'it goes For 
example, if India is a convention country, the work of an Indian author, 
first published in India, would have in the U K or France the same rights 
as It has in India 
The adaptation of the principle of lex fori to copyright leads to the 
principle of national treatment, or as it is sometimes called, the prin-
ciple of assimilation This means that persons protected by the conven-
tion can claim in all contracting states the protection that the law of that 
state grants to its own nationals Foreigners, if belonging to a conven-
tion country are 'assimilated' to nationals 
The work of the same Indian author, published in India, would 
have in the United Kingdom the same rights as if it were created by a 
U K author and first published in the U K 
It will be seen that the advantage of adapting the first principle, 
would be that the same work will receive the same treatment in all 
member countries The disadvantage is that lawyers and courts will 
continuously have to apply a large number of foreign laws, sometimes 
several laws in the same transaction or court case 
The advantage of the second principle, the lex fori, is that courts 
will always apply their own law The disadvantage is that the same work 
will get varying levels of protection in convention countries according to 
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the national law of the country where the protection is claimed 
(a) National Treatment (Assimilation) : 
In practice, the second principle, that of national treatment, has 
proved to be the only viable one This is so mainly for two reasons, one 
psychological and the other political The psychological reason is that 
courts prefer to apply their own law which they know to havmg to apply 
foreign law which they do not know, and thus, the quality of judgements 
will be better and the law, therefore, more certain under the principle of 
national treatment The political reason is that right owners in countries 
of low level protection will realise that they get better treatment abroad 
in high level protection countries than they get at home and will bring 
pressure to bear on their governments to raise the level of protection at 
home Thus, as the high level protection countries give a lead, the level 
of protection will gradually rise everywhere, thus, getting nearer to the 
ideal of uniform treatment but on a high level 
National treatment is also in accord with the ideal of interna-
tional law that all men are equal before the law, regardless of whether 
they are nationals or foreigners, and in a period of history where more 
and more eminent authors and creators are expatriates or refugees, 
conventions have also assimilated these to nationals so that they enjoy 
the same privileges m the country of their choice Theprmciple of national 
treatmentalsomeansthatboththequestionof whether the right exists and 
the question of the scope of the right are to be assured in accordance with 
the law of the country where the protection is claimed 
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A beneficial spin - off of the principle of national treatment is that 
confiscating measures valid under the law of the country where the 
confiscation takes place have no validity in other countries These 
countries have to treat the right owner as they treat their own right 
owners regardless of how he is treated in his own country 
For these reasons the principle of national treatment was adopted 
as the basic principle of the Berne Convention in 1886^^ and of the 
copyright and neighbouring rights conventions which followed the 
Berne Convention 
(b) Extensions of the Principle of National Treatment : 
(1) Minimum Rights : 
The principle of national treatment is extended in the copyright 
Conventions by providing minimum rights which may be claimed in all 
Convention countries yj^ re convenlioms regardless of the national leg-
islation In a strictly conceptual sence, these minima are not rules 
relating to conflict of laws as they contain no reference to another legal 
system They also do not compel a convention country to grant these 
conventional rights provided as minimum rights to its own nationals 
because the convention deals only with international situations and 
therefore, if nothing else is provided in the convention only compel a 
state to grant these rights to foreigners who are nationals of member 
states However, the principle of national treatment without minimum 
nghXs, jure conventwms might produce a serious imbalance which states 
would find unacceptable If countries A and B were members of a 
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convention which provides only for national treatment and has no 
minimum rights and country A grants performance and broadcasting 
rights as well as reproduction rights, whereas country B grants only a 
reproduction rights, the effect would be that the nationals of country B 
would enjoy performance and broadcasting rights in country A, but 
nationals of country A would not enjoy these rights in country B 
because the nationals of country B do not enjoy them either This could 
produce a serious disequilibrium which would be unacceptable to 
country A " 
The history of copyright and neighbouring rights conventions 
bears this out The Berne Convention which was agreed at a time when 
the level of protection granted to authors still varied greatly from 
country to country started with only a minimum term and a translation 
Tight jure conventionis The first task was to get as many countries as 
possible to accept these 'minimum rights' in their legislations which 
they had to do before they could ratify the convention Having thus 
created a common minimum level of protection in these respects the 
Revision Conferences added further minimum rights The high level 
protection countries gave a lead to the low level protection countries 
and It was hoped that the right owners of the lower protection countries 
enjoying rights abroad which they did not have at home would bring 
pressure to bear on their governments to introduce them These hopes 
subsequently, proved amply justified 
When the Universal Copyright Convention was negotiated over 60 
years later, the difference m the level of protection with regard to the 
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rights covered by the convention had become less marked, and thus less 
stringent measures to ensure against unacceptable differences in the 
level of protection were required The term of 25 years post mortem 
auctoris^^ and the translation right^' are minimum rights Whereas 
Article I requiring contracting states to provide for the adequate and 
effective protection of the rights of copyright owners and Article X 
requiring contracting states to adopt such measures as are necessary to 
ensure the application of the convention are only general guidelines 
However, this was considered enough to ensure that differences of levels 
of protection under the national treatment rule were not too great 
In the Rome Convention^^, the first neighbouring rights conven-
tion, the principle of national treatment is accompanied by minimum 
rights for each of the three beneficiaries a right ag?>'nst unauthorised 
fixation for performers, a reproduction right for phonogram producers 
and broadcasters, a performance right in phonograms (subject to reser-
vations) for producers and performers If reservations are made the 
reciprocity rule can be applied to the states making a reservation Thus, 
the principle of national treatment combined with minimum rights to 
assure a common denominator is moderated by the reciprocity rule to 
avoid injustices being caused by large divergences of levels of 
protection 
Minimum rights also make the gradual growth of a convention 
possible The convention can start with a small number of minimurn 
rights and add others as the years go by at revision conferences, thus 
providing a road towards both uniformity and higher standards of protec-
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tion The Berne Convention, for instance, started with the translation 
right and added the right of public performance and the broadcasting 
right, the droit moral, the cinematograph right The Universal Copyright 
Convention provided for the translation right only and in its revised 
version in 1971 added the reproduction right, the broadcasting right and 
the public performance right 
(2) Formalities : 
In a sense freedom from formalities is also an exception of the 
principle of national treatment as it compels national laws to grant 
rights to works from convention countries without making such rights 
subject to formalities which may otherwise be required This can be 
done either by requiring the granting of rights without any formalities 
like the Berne convention"" or by laying down a maximum of formalities 
which may be required to secure protection like the Universal Copy-
right Convention^^ with the symbol (c) or the Rome convention^^ and the 
Phonogram convention'" with the symbol (p) accompanied by the name 
of the copyright owner and the year of first publiction 
(c) Limitations of the Principle of National Treatment : 
(i) Reciprocity : 
The principle of national treatment can be limited, sometimes 
severely limited by the rule of reciprocity which in International law 
can be either 'material' (or 'substantial') reciprocity or 'formal' (or 
partial) reciprocity 
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'Material reciprocity' means that country A will protect the citi-
zens of country B in the same manner as country B protects the citizens 
of country A.Asa general rule the Copyright Conventions are opposed to 
material reciprocity though there are exceptions.^^ This is made plain in 
the 'Declaration Against Material Reciprocity' which is included in the 
Report of the 1971 Paris Revision of Berne Convention." One of the 
advantages of avoiding material reciprocity in Copyright Conventions is 
that the courts of member states do not have to interpret the laws of other 
member states to see whether protection is given in respect of a particu-
lar right. The rule of national treatment enables them instead to apply 
their own law to foreigners. A disadvantage is that it permits sometimes 
great disparities between the effective levels of protection^* so that the 
citizens of high level protection countries get less rights in some 
Convention countries than they enjoy at home, whereas the citizens of 
low protection countries get better protection m some Convention 
countries than they get at home. However, this is balanced by the advan-
tage that wide ranging copyright relations are facilitated between coun-
tries of differmg ideologies and differing stages of economic development. 
'Formal reciprocity' in copyright convention means that each 
member state will protect the works or citizens of other member states 
in some manner but from such reciprocity nothing is to be implied with 
regard to the nature of the protection. That is, generally, determined by 
the rule of national treatment.-^' 
The 'comparison of terms' under the Berne Convention'*" is an 
example. The term of protection is dealt with in the conventions by laying 
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down a minimum term : 50 yeaTspost mortem auctoris, but countries are 
free to grant a longer term. Comparison of terms means that a country 
which grants a longer term than 50 years to its nationals needs only grant 
that longer term to foreigners if that term is also granted by their country 
of origin. For example the Federal Republic of Germany given 70 years 
pma, but Germany needs only gives 50 years pma to United Kingdom & 
India right owners because that is the term of their own national law. It 
does not have to give the full 70 years it gives to its own national. 
(ii) Reservations : 
The rights granted by convention can also be limited by reserva-
tions, which give countries the opportunity to ratify the convention but 
to withhold the giving of some rights wholly or partly. Some conven-
tions, e.g. the Phonogram Convention, permits no reservations, others, 
e.g. the Rome Convention, provides for several."' The reservations can 
relate to the scope of a right or to the connecting factor, e.g. the 
reservation regarding the points of attachment in the Rome Conven-
tion"^ or to a whole right, e.g. the performance right in phonograms in 
the same convention."' The making of reservations is usually accompa-
nied by the application of the rule of reciprocity so that the nationals of 
country A which has made the reservation can be deprived of the 
exercise of those rights in country B because the nationals of country B 
are not granted these rights in country A. 
CHAPTER-4 : 190 : 
(E) CHALLENGES TO THE PRINCIPLE OF 
NATIONAL TREATMENT ; 
Thus, the principle of national treatment subject to extentions and 
limitations has proved itself as the fundamental principle of copyright 
and neighbouring rights conventions for nearly a century It, is however, 
at present in danger of being undermined as governments try to cope 
v^ith the rapid development of technology and communications When 
a new right is being granted to copyright owners, govenments have the 
option of granting it in the course of copyright revision and as a 
copyright, or of granting it as a new right in a separate law outside the 
copyright law If the government decides to grant the new right as a 
copyright, the international conventions apply and the principle of 
national treatment may demand that foreigners who are nationals of 
convention countries which have not yet granted the new right have to 
be given the same right, and thus, become entitled to the remuneration 
which flows from it If on the other hand the government decides to 
create the new right outside the copyright law the conventions will not 
apply and foreigners will not be entitled to national treatment and, 
therefore, will not be entitled to participate in any remuneration for the 
use of the new right Two practical examples will illustrate the position 
(i) Public Lending Right : 
This right has been introduced in several countries under which 
authors of literary works receive a royalty when their books are being 
borrowed from a library by members of the public In Germany this 
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right IS granted in the copyright law'''* and therefore, as Germany is a 
member of the Berne Convention and of the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion, foreigners who are nationals of Convention countries are entitled to 
remuneration if their books are borrowed On the other hand the Scandi-
navian countries'*^ or the United Kingdom"^ which also give a public 
lending right, have chosen to do so by separate legislation outside the 
copyright laws and are, therefore not bound to grant this right to foreign-
ers, although, like Germeny, they are also members of both conventions 
and the remuneiation paid for the public lending right is, therefore, 
limited to national authors *'' 
( i i) Reprography : 
This is the production of copies of printed matter by copying 
machines One way of dealing with such copies produced for commer-
cial purposes is to subject the reproduction right in respect of such 
copies to a compulsory licence and give the author a right to equitable 
remuneration as in the Federal Republic of Germany •** 
On the other hand, France, introduced a tax on the sale and impor-
tation of all machines producing reprographic copies in its Finance Act 
of 1976 Part of the revenue of this tax is paid to the copyright owners of 
the material copies, but it is paid only to French Copyright owners 
although France is a party to both copyright conventions The principle of 
national treatment does not apply as the compensation does not arise 
from a copyright and foreigners are, thus, not compensated 
The distinction between the two examples is that the reproduction 
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right is, generally, recognized in all copyright laws and is a fundamental 
right of both international conventions and unauthorised copying is only 
permissible as an exception (e.g. for private use), whereas a public 
lending right, far from being universally acknowledged, only exist in a 
few countries and does not form part of thejM^ conventionis of any of the 
international conventions. Thus, on grounds of natural justice and apply-
ing the principle of national treatment to a generally accepted right, the 
claim of foreigners who are convention nationals to compensation for 
reprographic use of the works is strong. In the case of the public lending 
right it IS, so far, still weak whilst only few countries grant it. 
Another distinction is that in the case of the reprographic right in 
the United States the royalty will be paid by the user, which is a 
characteristic of all copyright laws including India, whereas the com-
pensation (it is not termed a royalty) in the case of the public lendmg 
right in Scandinavia and in the United Kingdom is paid out of a public 
fund. That means that it comes from taxpayer's money as opposed to 
copyright user's money. 
Thus, by the simple device of calling the right to compensation 
something other than a copyright and introducing it by a separate piece 
of legislation"*' the application of the principle of national treatment can 
be avoided. Particularly in cases where the compensation is paid out of 
a government fund which can be called taxpayer's money, the tempta-
tion to restrict it to nationals is considerable. If that device is, generally, 
used by governments when dealing with the new uses of copyright 
material arising from new technology and new means of communication. 
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the fundamental principle of national treatment and with it the copyright 
conventions based on it, could be seriously eroded in the near future.*" 
(F) THE CONNECTING FACTOR : 
On the national level the question whether copyright protection 
does exist or not is decided by asking first whether the subject matter 
attracts copyright protection or not. For instance 'literary and artistic 
works' are protected in all copyright countries (countries whose legisla-
tion grants copyrights). Other works like (cinematograph) films enjoy 
copyright in some countries e.g. United Kingdom, U.S.A. and India, but 
not in other e.g. France. If there is a copyright the second basic question 
to ask is whether the protection sought is covered by the scope of the 
right, for instance all works enjoy a reproduction right in copyright 
countries but not all works enjoy a performance right; for instance, 
phonograms enjoy a performance right in the United Kingdom but not 
the United States. The third basic question to ask is what term the 
lagislation grants to the work or subject matter in question literary and 
artistic works in Berne Convention Countries enjoy a minimum of the 
life of the author and 50 years and in Universal Copyright Convention 
Countries a minimum of the life of the author and 25 years, whereas 
photographic works or works of applied art enjoy a shorter term (under 
the Universal Copyright Convention a minimum often years). On the 
international level a further question has to be answered : if the work is 
a foreign work or the author or the right owner is a foreigner, what is the 
criterion for deciding whether the work or the right owner is protected? 
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This is known as the connecting factor {point de rattachement, 
Ankunpfungspunkt), the factor which connects the work or the author 
with a particular country. It is usually defined as the country with which 
there is 'the closese and most real connection' when considering the 
possible connecting factors one has to bear in mind that copyright is an 
intellectual property right. It is a property right in the sense that it is a 
right erga omnes, thus resembling corporeal property rights, but the 
subject of that right is incorporeal. That means that although the work 
appears in the tangible (corpus mechanicum) of a book, a film, a 
phonogram in one place, it can be reproduced or performed in lots of 
other places whilst still remaining the same work. Different criteria 
from those applied to corporeal property rights have to be found to serve 
as the relevant factors connecting the work or subject matter or the 
author or the right owner of the work with one particular country. These 
factors are : 
(i) Personal status connection of the author (nationality, habitual 
residence etc.) - referred to as 'the country to which the author (or 
the maker) of the work belongs.^' 
(ii) Geographical connection of the work - referred to as 'the country 
of origin'." 
( i i i) Geographical connection with the public - referred to as 'the 
country of first publication'^^ the country where the work or 
subject matter of copyright was first made available to the public. 
(iv) The lex fori - referred to as the 'protecting country', the country 
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where protection is claimed, that is where the use of the work, be 
It legitimate exploitation or infringement, takes place 
(i) The Country to Which the Author Belongs : 
In accordance with the philosophy of the droit d' auteur that the 
quintessence of copyright is the progress of the work from the mind of 
the author to the general public, the personal status connection of the 
author and the geographical connection of first publication with the 
public were the essential points of attachment of the first International 
Copyright Convention, the Berne Convention The nature of the per-
sonal status connection was defined as nationality, but those persons 
who have their 'habitual residence' m the country of the Berne Union 
are 'assimilated' to nationals''' and the Universal Copyright Convention 
adopts the same structure using the common law concept of domicil 
instead of the civil law concept of habitual residence 
In essence habitual residence is a question of fact for the court 
that tries the case to be judged by the length of time during which the 
author has lived in a country, whereas the concept of domicil differs 
from country to country and may depend on where author ultimately 
intends to settle rather than where he resides, a matter sometimes more 
difficult to ascertain " 
In the recent past where refugee and stateless authors have become 
more frequent than they were in the 19th century they too have been 
assimilated to nationals " 
When the right owner is not a natural person, but a legaJ entity like 
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a corporation or company such as film producer or a phonogram producer 
or a broadcasting organisation the place of its Seat or Headquarters 
decides residence or Jomicil " 
In the case of the personal connecting factor the question to 
which country the author or maker of the work belongs may have to be 
answered differently at different times as he may change his nationality 
and even more easily his habitual residence The relevant date may be 
the date of the creation of the work m which case different works of the 
same author may have different connecting factors It may be his 
nationality or residence at the time of publication in the case of a 
published work, or it may be the time when protection is claimed The 
Berne Convention is silent on the point It is, thus, unless the national law 
provides for a solution, a matter for the courts to decide It is likely that 
the courts will choose the nationality or residence at the time when 
protection is claimed for the purely practical reasons that it is probably 
the easiest to ascertain 
(ii) The Country of Origin : 
At the earliest stage of drafting multinational treaties the concept 
of the country of origin of the work was at the centre of the scene The 
underlying thought was that once a work is created or published it 
should have the same rights abroad as at home The principle was tried in 
the Montevideo Convention 1889 It was not successful as a basic 
principle of a convention because it leads by definition to situations 
where different rights are attached to similar works, because one origi-
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nates in a country granting a high level of protection & the other in a 
country with a low level of protection. The creators of the Berne Conven-
tion did not make this mistake and based the convention on the principle 
of national treatment. However, the convention contains a definition of 
the country of origin^* to the effect that for a published work the country 
of origin shall be the country of first publication and for an unpublished 
work the country 'to which the author belongs'. Although the Paris Act of 
197 P^ still contains a more detailed definition*", to still same effect, the 
importance of this point of attachment seems to have declined with the 
years and neither the Universal Copyright Convention nor the neighbouring 
rights conventions contain the concept of the country of origin. It must 
be remembered that conventions deal only with International situations 
and, therefore, protection of nationals in the country of origin itself is 
regulated by the law of that country. Thus, if a national author publishes 
at home no problem arises. If he publishes abroad, the country of first 
publication takes the place of the country of origin. For unpublished 
works the country of origin becomes important if a subsequent publica-
tion e.g. of a translation, take place abroad. 
The main importance of the country of today is for measuring the 
duration of protection. The rule of the comparison of terms*' provides 
that although the term of protection is governed by the law of the 
country where protection is claimed, that term shall not exceed the term 
fixed in the country of origin of the work, unless the national law 
provides otherwise. When terms of protection varied widely the com-
parison of terms was often of crucial importance. It is less so now. 
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However examples are to be found in the relation between countries 
which give the minimum term of 50 years after the death of the author 
and countries which give a longer term. 
(iii) The Country of First Publication : 
First publication is an important connecting factor."^ ^ If a writer 
writes a book m China, (a state not a member of any international 
convention), it is unprotected anywhere else while it is unpublished. If 
he publishes it in China it is still unprotected anywhere else. If however 
he publishes it first in the U.K. or India it becomes protected by the 
Berne Convention or if he publishes it first in the United States it 
becomes protected by the Universal Copyright Convention. If the only 
publication within a convention country is an English translation 
published in the U.K., or in the United States, that translation becomes 
protected as a separate work, but the original in Chinese still remains 
unprotected. The result is that anyone can make another English 
translation (or indeed a French, German or Hindi one) and publish it in 
any convention country without the author's permission.^-^ The concept 
of simultaneous publication is of vital importance as a connecting factor 
because it may considerably enlarge the protection of the work if the 
work is published in a non-convention country and would otherwise be 
unprotected. If it is 'simultaneously' published in a convention country 
this secures its protection.^" The Berne Convention allows an interval of 
30 days between the first and second publication to qualify the second 
one as a simultaneous publication. So does the Rome convention for the 
CHAPTER-4 : 199 : 
publication of phonograms '•' Simultaneous publication is particularly 
important in cases of works published in the same language (a translation 
IS a new work) in several countries or in the case of musical works or 
phonograms ^^ 
(iv) The Protecting Country : 
This IS shorthand for the country where protection is claimed As 
in practice an action is usually brought in the country where the 
infringement is committed, this usually means the lex fori However 
there are exceptions where the infringement is committed in a country 
other than the one where protection is claimed It is another question not 
settled by the convention whether in cases of infringements abroad 
legal protection based on foreign copyright can be claimed In the past 
It has usually been accepted that the principle of territoriality applies 
and that legal protection before national courts can only be claimed in 
cases of infringements committed within the country concerned How-
ever as Ulmer points out^'' according to the general rules of private 
international law 'it seems consistent to expand the rule which may be 
derived from the conventions into a complete rule of conflict of laws 
whereby protection of intellelctual property rights, irrespective of the 
country in which the action is brought, is to be governed by the law of the 
country in whose territory the act of infringement took place (the lex loci 
delicti) 
The answer depends on the view taken by the national courts In 
the U K the general rule is that a wrongful act committed abroad is 
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actionable In England it would be actionable as a tort if had it been 
committed in England and is also actionable in the foreign country where 
It was committed *^ As in copyright cases the legal position is similar 
whether these are Berne Convention Countries or Universal Copyright 
Convention Countries, it is arguable that an action can be maintained if 
the infringement has taken place in that country ^ ^ 
In the United States the courts seem to take the view that it is a 
matter for their discretion and have refused to accept jurisdiction, 
giving as the reason that it would involve a judgement on the validity of 
a foreign right which would be more appropriately made by the courts 
of that foreign country '^^ 
However, the EEC (European Economic Community) Convention 
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgement in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters' (22 September, 1968)^' provides m Article 5(3) that in 
actions for delict and quasi delict persons may be sued in any 
contracting state in the court competent for the place where the damage 
or injury has occurred It would appear, therefore, that in the EEC an 
action for infringement of copyright can be brought both in the country 
where the defendant is domiciled and in the country where the infringe-
ment has occurred 
(G) THE SYSTEM OF CREATING RIGHTS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT CONVENTIONS : 
Thus, it IS clear that there are three systems of dealing with 
international situations in a Convention 
(i) The situation is dealt with in the convention by granting a rightyMz-e 
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conventionis and there are no exceptions, for instance, the trans-
lation right in the Berne Convention '^  
(ii) The situation is dealt with in the convention, but it is open to 
national legislation to introduce restrictions and fix modes of 
application for instance, the broadcasting right in the Berne 
Convention (Pans Revision 1971) ''^  Compulsory licence schemes 
are permitted although their scope is confined to the country 
permitting them 
(ill) The situation is defined in the convention but it is left to national 
legislation whether it grants a right or not for example the droit 
de suite in the Berne Convention (1971 )^ '* The right is optional 
m the sense that a member country need not introduce it (the 
United Kingdom for instance, has not yet introduced it) If a 
country does introduce it for its nationals it can make the 
application to nationals of other convention countries dependent 
on reciprocity (which is exceptional in the Berne Convention) 
The choice between these systems permits a gradual approach 
which allows a political judgement to be exercised at every stage during 
the life of a Convention A new right can be introduced in group 
(iii) giving member states the choice whether they wish to grant the new 
right or wish to wait If a country wishes to introduce the new right but 
makes it subject to a compulsory licence it can do so in group (ii) Once 
a right is established and generally accepted it can then be moved up to 
group (i). 
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(H) THE SYSTEM OF APPLYING INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT CONVENTIONS TO NATIONAL LAW ; 
The application of an International Convention by a country is the 
method by which the convention which is International law becomes part 
of the national law of the country 
At the Diplomatic Conference which establishes the convention, 
countries which are represented by an accredited phenipotentiary usu-
ally sign the convention However, such signature has no legal conse-
quences, although it may carry with it a moral obligation to ratify at a 
later stage 
If a country was not represented at the Diplomatic Conference or 
if its representative did not sign the convention it can later 'accede' to it 
The effect of accession is the same as ratification 
How the international law contained in the convention is trans-
lated into the national law of a state depends on the Constitutional law of 
that state 
(i) In some countries international conventions are self applying 
No further legal or administrative act is necessary The provi-
sions of the convention become part of the national law and 
override previous legislation The convention is 'self-execut-
ing' This is the case for instance in France, Germany, Italy and 
Latin American countries It leads to interpretation of the text of 
the convention itself by the national courts 
(b) Some countries, on the other hand, do not regard agreements between 
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sovereign states as part of the law of the land Conventions are not binding 
on their citizen until ratified by the legislature This is the case for 
instances in the Nordic countries. United Kingdom,U S A and India In 
these countries national legislation is needed to make the provisions of 
a convention binding on its nationals This may be done by makmg the 
whole convention part of the national law thereby falling for interpreta-
tion by the national courts It may also be done by draftmg national law so 
as to comply with the convention In that case it will be for the national 
courts to decide whether to take the convention text mto account when 
mterpretmg the national law 
Thus, as IS revealed from the above discussion, it can safely 
be said that international copyright law has done a commendable job in 
strengthening the copyright protection world over Infact, it is one of 
those areas where international law has influenced developments at the 
Municipal laws Moreover, unless effective protection is afforded to 
foreign authors, in the fast changing modern world which has come so 
close as to reflect a global village particularly after the recent advent of 
Internet, copyright law would become meaningless It is indeed satisfy-
ing to note that the International law dealing with copyright problems has 
now achieved a certain amount of uniform standards of copyright protec-
tion for the creators of intellectual property 
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COPYRIGHT IN LITERARY. DRAMATIC 
& MUSICAL WORKS 
It has been observed in the preceding chapter on subjects of 
copyright that there are at least two groups of countries as far as 
subjects of copyright are concerned. Some national legislations (U.K., 
U.S.A., India) provide for a definition of works protected, while others 
do not such as Italy. 
Broadly speaking there are two categories of works. The first is 
one which includes works named in the Berne Convention, 'literary and 
artistic works' which includes dramatic and dramatico-musical works. 
The second is a cateogry of recent types of works : cinematography 
films, sound recordings, broadcasts etc. 
This chapter examines the issue of copyright protection in 
literary, dramatic and musical works. The question of originality and 
literary value in this regard are discussed at length. The various types 
of works which have been held as "literary works" are given a detailed 
treatment. The question of copyright protection to dramatic works, 
essential requisites of dramatic works and its types such as pantomime 
is considered in some details. Similarly, the issue of copyright in 
musical works and the judicial response in this respect are also examined. 
(A) COPYRIGHT IN LITERARY WORKS : 
(i) Statutory Definitions : 
By Section 2(1) and (2) of the U.K. Copyright Act 1956, Copy-
right is conferred in respect of "literary works". This repeats, in 
substance. Section 1 of the Copyright Act 1911. In that Act, however. 
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"literary work'' was defined, as including ' 'maps, charts, plans, tables 
and compilations" whereas, in the Act of 1956, it was defined,^ as 
including "any written table or compilation^", so that maps, charts and 
plans are no longer protected as literary works but are protected as 
artistic works under the definition of "drawings" / 
The Act of 1956, by Section 48(1), defines "writing" as includ-
ing any form of notation, whether by hand or by printing, typewriting 
or any similar process. Presumably this definition would also be applied 
to "written", so that a compilation expressed in any form or notation 
will be protected as a literary work, for example, in braile or shorthand. 
Notwithstanding the inclusion in the definition of "literary works" of 
compilations, it was assumed this relates, not only to compilations of 
literary material, but also compilations of literary and artistic material 
and even of artistic material alone. 
The Copyright, Designs & Patents Act 1988 has, however, now 
provided that "literary work" means any work, other than a dramatic 
or musical work, which is written, spoken or sung, and accordingly 
includes (a) a computer program, and (b) table or compilation 
In the United States, the Copyright Act of 1976 extends copyright 
protection to literary works' which are defined as works, other than 
audio-visual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or 
numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material 
objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords. films, 
tapes, discs, or cards in which they are embodied.^ The term "literary 
work" does not connote any criterion of literary merit or qualitative 
value and includes catalogues and directories; similar factual reference 
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or instructional works; compilations of data; computer data bases, and 
computer programs.^ 
Under the repealed Indian Copyright Act, 1914,like its counter-
part in England, the term" literary work" included "maps, charts, 
plans, tables and compilation. But under the 1957 Act, these are no 
longer treated as, literary works" but protected as "artistic works". 
Under the Indian Copyright Act of 1957 which heavily borrowed 
from the U.K. Copyright Act of 1956, copyright subsists, under Section 
13, in three classes of work : (a) original Uterary, dramatic, musical and 
artistic works; (b) cinematograpy films; and (c) records. 
Literary, dramatic and cinematographic works are defined inclu-
sive by the Act whereas artistic, musical works and records are exhaus-
tively defined by Section 2. These differences in the way in which the 
definition clause has defined different categories of works have led (as 
will be noted later in the chapter) to some crucial differences'in respect 
of range of copyright protection. 
Section2(0) of the Act lays down that "literary work" includes 
"tables and compilations and computer programme, that is to say, 
programmes recorded on any disc, tape, perforated media or other 
information storage device, which, if fed into or located in a computer 
or computer based equipment is capable of reproducing any information". 
The 1994 Amendment has now provided for an improved defini-
tion by laying down that "literary work" includes "computer programmes, 
tables and compilations including data basis.* 
It is clear from the above discussion that the three countries 
whose copyright laws are studied here have brought changes in the 
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definition of "literary works" in order to keep pace with the techno-
logical challenges in general and that of software development in 
particular. 
(ii) Literary Works & Originality : 
Copyright in the three jurisdictions (U.K., U.S.A., & India) 
which form subject matter of present study subsists only if the literary 
work is "original". In University of London Press Ltd. V. University 
Tutorial Press,^'^ Peterson J. concisely stated that a "literary work" in 
law, means anything written or any printed matters and observed as 
follows : "Copyright Acts are not concerned with the originality of 
ideas, but with the expression, of thought, and in the case of "literary 
works" with the expression ofthought in print or writing". The learned 
judge further observed as follows'': 
It may be difficult to define "literary work" as 
used in this Act, but it seems to be plain that it is 
not confined to "literary work" in the sence in 
which that phrase is applied, for instance, to 
Meredith's novels and the writings of Robert 
Loistevenson. In speaking of such writings as 
literary works, one thinks of the quality, the 
style, and the literary finish which they exhibit. 
Under the Act of 1842, which protected' 'books", 
many things which had no pretensions to literary 
style acquired copyright; for example, a list of 
registered bills of sale, a list of foxhounds and 
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hunting dogs, and trade catalogues; and I see no 
ground for coming to the conclusion that the 
present Act was intended to curtail the rights of 
authors. In my view the words "literary work" 
cover work which is expressed in print or writ-
ing, irrespective of the question whether the 
quality or style is high. The word "l i terary" 
seems to be used in a sense somewhat similar to 
the use of the word "literature" in political, or 
electioneering literature and refers to written or 
printed matter". 
The question is not whether the materials are entirely new and 
have never been used before nor even that they have never been used 
before for the same purpose. The originality which is required relates 
to the expression of thought; the law does not require that the expres-
sion must be in an original or novel form, but that the work must not be 
copied from another work, that it should originate from the author.'^ The 
real question is whether the same plan, arrangement and combination of 
materials have been used for the same purpose, or for any other purpose; 
if they have not. the author of the said plan, arrangement and combi-
nation of materials is entitled to a copyright for the said production 
although he may have gathered hints for his plans and arrangement from 
existing and known sources. He may have borrowed much of the 
material from others, but if they are combined in a different manner 
from what was in use before, he is entitled to a copyright, infact, in 
literature, in science and in art, there are and can be few things, which 
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in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout.''' The man 
who goes along a street of a town and takes down the names of the 
inhabitants, with their occupations and street numbers, may obtain a 
copyright for his compilation (in the words of Lord Halsbury in Welter 
V. Lane^^ where he compares a person compiling such a directory, and 
a reporter of a speech in respect of copyright in their product) but 
anyone else may even use the other man's work to the extent of checking 
and verifying results, so long as he is not guilty of appropriating the 
results of another man's skill and labour. The principle is that a man 
shall not avail himself of another's skill, labour and expense by copying 
his written products thereof. In the cases of works not original in the 
proper sense of the term, but composed or compiled from sources 
common to all, the fact, that one man has produced snch a work, does 
not take away from anyone else the right to produce another work of the 
same kind and in doing so to use all the materials open to him; the 
guiding principle in all these cases, where the work of an author which 
cannot be absolutely original from its very nature, is that the author 
must bestow such mental skill and labour on his work so as to give it an 
original character and not make merely a colourable imitation if he uses 
earlier works on that subject; any new and original plan, arrangement 
or compilation of old material will entitle the author to copyright 
therein, whether materials, therein are new or old; and whatever be his 
own skill, labour and judgement, a person writes, he may have a 
copyright therein unless it be directly copied or closely slavishly 
imitated from another's work.'* 
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In U.S. also to be entitled to copyright, thus, the work must be 
original,' ' that is, it must be the result of independent labour and not 
copying.'" However, the work need not be the first of its kind.'** 
Although the concept of newness or novelty is a prerequisite in the law 
of patents, it has no place in copyright law. It is sufficient, under 
copyright laws of U.K., U.S.A. and India that the work of each author 
is new to him, that is, that it is original with him, and not copied from 
the work of another.^" 
The question of originality was also; considered by the Privy 
Council in the case of MacMillan & Co. Ltd. V. Cooper (K. & J.p\ in 
which it was alleged that there was copyright in a selection or abridg-
ment of a non-copyright. Lord Atkinson, in delivering the judgement of 
the court said : 
It will be observed that it is the product of i:he 
labour, skill, and capital of one man which must 
not be appropriated by another, not the elements, 
the raw material, if we use the expression, upon 
which the labour and skill and capital of the first 
have been expended. To secure copyright for the 
product it is necessary that labour, skill, and capi-
tal should be expended sufficiently to impart to 
the product some quality or character which the 
raw material did not possess , and which 
differenciates the product from the raw material". 
At a later stage in his judgement Lord Atkinson said : 
What is the precise amount of the knowledge, 
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labour, judgement or literary skill or taste which 
the author of any book or other compilation must 
bestow upon its compositions in order to acquire 
copyright can not be defined in precise terms.^^ 
It is here, as was pointed out by Mangham J. in Cambridge 
University Press V. University Tutorial Press, Ltd,^^ that the real 
difficulty arises. There is no guiding principle as to the quantum of skill 
or judgement required except that a man shall not avail himself of 
another's skill, labour, and expense by copying the written product of it.^ " 
It is submitted that, in determining whether the work is original 
and entitled to copyright the work must be looked at as a whole and if, 
notwithstanding that the author has used existing subject-matters, he 
has expended sufficient independent skill and labour, he will be entitled 
to copyright protection for his works.^' Thus it is clear that neither 
original thought nor original research is essential, and that the standard 
of originality required is a low one?^ 
(iii) Literary Works Must be in Print or Writing : 
In respect of literary works, it is essential that the same must in 
print or writing, i.e. some form of notation in the work is essential. 
Writing is sufficient. Obviously a work cannot be orally published. It is 
not worth its while for the writing to express any meaning. There is 
copyright in a list of meaningless words, e.g., in a system of short-
hand," or a telegraphic code.^* According to Peterson J. in University 
of London Press V. University of Tutorial Press^^, : 
in my opinion, a copyright is given to the first 
CHAPTER - S • : 216 
produce of a book whether the book be wise or 
foolish, accurate or inaccurate, or of literary 
merit or of no merit whatsoever. 
Similarly it was observed in Mishra Bandhu & Others V. S. 
KoshaP^, by Sen. J. as follows : 
In text-books on arithmetic or books of the above 
description, the amount of originality of the au-
thor may be small, but the expression of his thought, 
skill and labour may be tremendous, and it is that 
which is protected by law. 
(iv) Various Types of Literary Works : 
(a) Compilations : 
The definition of "literary work" as seen above in the three 
countries under study here specifically refers to compilations. Thus, by 
exercise of sufficient labour and skill in selecting and arranging exist-
ing subject matter, a person can secure a copyright for protection of his 
works or compilation composed from common sources or from matters 
available in the public domain. But in the latter case, it will not prevent 
another compiler from using the same material and even in substantially 
the same order, if no special plan or method is apparent, provided, 
however, that the second compiler is able to prove that he has obtained 
his material actually from the original source. Thus, Lord Porter in 
Cramp & Sons V. Smythsori^^ observed : 
Compilations are susceptible of copyright even 
though the matter compiled of itself contained 
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nothing new; nor does it matter if a substantial 
portion of the compilation be taken that the copier 
added fresh matter of his own or took only a part 
of the original compilation on the other hand no 
copyright exists merely in the order in which the 
various items are placed. It is their selection, not 
their position interse, which is alleged to consti-
tute copyright. It is conceded that, if the work, 
labour and skill required to make the selection and 
to compile the tables which form its items is 
negligible, then no copyright can subsist in it. 
In the same case. Lord Macmillan observed that if the compila-
tion involved independent skill, labour and judgement and such labour 
and ijkill was not negligible, protection is always given, on this prin-
ciple, protection has been given to such compilations as an arrangement 
of broadcasting programmes", school textbooks", a book of receipts''\ 
a directory'^^ a trade advertisement''^ a mining report'^ a list of 
foxhounds and hunting dogs'^ a list of stock exchange prices'^ a list of 
books"", football coupons'", an alphabetical list of railway stations*', 
birth and death announcements in newspapers"\ and sheets of election 
results.'"' 
(b) Selections : 
Selections of poems or prose compositions may also be pro-
tected"', and selections of incidents from real life."* The principle 
applicable to cases of publishing selections of works is that one person 
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is not at liberty to use or avail himself of the labour which another has 
expended for the purpose of producing his work, and sway the result of 
other's labour''^ 
In MacMillan & Co. V. Suresh**, plaintiffs who were the propri-
etors of copyright in Palgrave's collection of poems selected and 
arranged by the author "in the gradation of sentiments and feelings" 
sought injunction against the defendant for infringement by reproduc-
ing the selections contained in the book together with many notes in his 
book entitled Short Select Poems. Sir Arthur Wilson in upholding the 
claim, enunciated the principle of law as follows : 
In the case of works not original in the proper 
sense of the term, but composed of or compiled or 
prepared from the materials which are open to all, 
the fact that one man has produced such a work 
does not take away from anyone else the right to 
produce another work of the same kind and in 
doing so to use all the material open to him. 
But as the law is precisely stated by Hall V.C. in Hogg V. Scoft^^: 
the true principle in all those cases is that the 
defendent is not at liberty to use or avail himself of 
the labour which the plaintiff has been at for the 
purpose of producing his work, that is, infact, 
merely to take away the result of another man's 
labour or in other words his property. I think it is 
unnecessary to refer in detail to the cases; it is 
enough to say that this principle has been applied 
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to maps, to road books, to guide books, to street 
directories, ... 
The principle seems to be equally applicable to the case of a 
selection of poems. It was, thus, held that such a selection as Palgrave 
has made obviously requires extensive reading, case-study and com-
parison and the exercise of taste and judgement in selection. It is open 
to anyone who pleases to go through a like course of reading and by the 
exercise of his own taste and judgement to make a selection for himself 
But if he spares for himself this trouble, and adopts Palgrave's selec-
tion, he offends copyright. 
In A.C. Sampath Ayyangar V. Sarvashri Jamshed G. Kanga & A. 
Palkhiwala and Messrs N.M. Tripathi Ltd^^ the plaintiff who was the 
author of the book 'The Indian Income Tax Act' sued the defendants in 
the High Court of Madras for infringement of his publication by another 
book entitled 'The Law & Practice of Income-Tax' of which the 
defendents no. 1 and 2 were joint authors and the 3rd defendants for 
publishing the alleged infringing copies. The defendents denied any act 
of piracy and asserted that their book or compilation was an indepen-
dent effort. Dismissing the suit, Panchapakesa Ayyar J., observed : 
A perusal of the book (of defendants) has con-
vinced me that it will sell by its own merit 
It was further stated that though infringement is alleged on the 
basis of common headings, common conclusions, quoting of common 
extracts, common criticism of sections, and common mistakes yet that 
doesn't make out the case since both the commentators had gone to the 
common sources like the sections of the Act or the Income Tax Manual. 
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The learned judge held that the common conclusions could also have 
been arrived at by each author by considering the matter independently 
and arriving at the same conclusion and, thus, such examples of 
infringement are useless for proving piracy." 
In United States also similar rulings have been rendered. Thus it 
was held that in order to obtain copyright protection over the pre-
existing material employed in a derivative work, the author must 
contribute additional matters to the pre-existing work that constitutes 
more than a minimal contribution to i t ." But no copyright can be 
claimed to any part of a derivative or collective work that uses pre-
existing material unlawfully." This provision was designed not only to 
prevent an unlawful user of pre-existing material from benefiting from 
such use by obtaining copyright protection, but also to protect those 
parts of the work that did not employ unlawfully pre-existing material.'" 
(c) Annotations and Book Guides : 
Annotations to text books or to books of great authors or on legal 
points involve learning, labour and exercise of intellect, and so, where 
they are composed by the exercise of thinking, labour etc., the author 
of the annotations or composer of these annotations possesses the 
copyright in such compilations. 
In E.M. Foster V. A.N. Parsiiram^\ the respondent published a 
guide book to the novel "A Passage to India" by E.M. Foster, which 
was prescribed by the University of Madras as a text book for students 
taking the B.A. degree. The guide was styled as "E.M. Foster, A 
Passage to India, Everyman's Guide". It contained an introduction 
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which included studies of the life and works of Foster, Foster as a 
Novelist, the story in outline, the plot as analysed by the Respondent's 
textual essays skillfully arranged, sketches and character contrasts. It 
was held that the guide was an independent creation and was not a 
copyright infringement of the original novel. 
The question whether there has been an infringement of copy-
right depends upon whether a colourable imitation has been made, 
whether the work complained of is or is not a colourable imitation of 
another, is essentially a question of fact and the burden of proving that 
fact rests on the plaintiff." 
(d) Abridgments : 
Copyright may likewise exist in a genuine and just abridgment, 
for it is said that an abridgment may with great propriety be called a new 
book," and, therefore, is an original literary work. Whether an abridg-
ment is or is not, a piracy of the original work is more doubtful, but there 
are reasons for holding that the fact that a work is a piracy ought not to 
itself disentitle it to copyright. 
To constitute a true and equitable abridgment the entire work 
must be preserved in its precise import and exact meaning, and then the 
act of abridgment is an exertion of the understanding, employed in 
moulding and transferring a large work into a small compass, thus 
rendering it less expensive, and more convenient both to the time and 
use of the reader. Independent labour must be apparent, and the reduc-
tion of the size of a work, by copying some of its parts and omitting 
others, confers no title to authorship; and the result will not be an 
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abridgment entitled to protection. To shorter a work by leaving out the 
unimportant parts is not to abridge it in a legal sense. To abridge in the 
legal sense of the word is to preserve the substance, the essence of the 
work, in language suited to such a purpose - language substantially 
different from that of the original. To make such an abridgment requires 
the exercise of mind, labour, skill and judgement brought into play, and 
the result is not merely copying'* 
(e) Headnotes : 
The headnotes which appe'ar at the commencement of any law 
report or the side or marginal note of a report constitute the digest of 
such report and are a species of adridgment. In SM'cet V. Benning^'* 
Crowder J. refers to head notes as follows : 
The headnote is a thing upon which much skill and 
exercise of thought is required, to express in clear 
and concise language the principles of law to be 
deduced from the decision to which it is prefixed, 
or the fact and circumstances which bring the case 
in hand within the same principle or rule of law or 
practice. 
Thus, a reporter is also entitled to copyright not only in selection 
of cases, their arrangement but also in their headnotes, on the simple 
principle that another person can not save himself the time, labour and 
expense by availing himself of another's industry for his own profit.^" 
A report gives in such a case, a condensed report setting forth the facts 
and arguments in each case, and the judgments at length, but also sets 
out an abstract of the decision containing the principle on which each 
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decision is based and the pith and substance of the same/' 
In the United States also, it has been held that even the salaried 
reporter of the court who is charged by the statute with the duty of 
reporting the cases of the court^^, unless forbidden by statute, may 
secure copyright of the headnotes, statements of cases, title of the 
volume, arrangement or grouping of cases, index digest, synopsis of the 
arguments, and of all such portions of his compilation or authorship as 
require the exercise of intellectual thought and skill, where these are 
prepared by him and are the result of his labour and research.^-' But 
where the opinion or decision of the court and also the statement of the 
case and the syllabus or headnotes are exclusively the work of the 
judges of the court, the reporter of the court is not the author of any part 
of such matter, and can not obtain a copyright.^'' 
( 0 Titles : 
No copyright protection is extended to titles, of a novel, book, 
film or newspaper or journal, while every endeavour is made by 
copyright law in protecting all other copyrighted subjects as "original 
literary works". Not only in India but throughout the world, duplica-
tion of titles is rampant and is allowed with impunity. Thus copyright 
in the title of a novel does not entitle its author to restrain the same title 
being used by others in respect of dramas, poems etc." 
In United States also, the copyright of a literary or musical work 
does not give the owner of the copyright the exclusive right to the use 
of the title of the work." Similarly, title headings and article headings 
used in a statutory compilation are mere descriptions and have no value 
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separated from the articles which they describe and, therefore, are not 
copyrightable. 67 
(g) Letters : 
The author of a letter is entitled to copyright, as a letter consti-
tutes an "original literary work". The fact that letters are of no literary 
value is quite immaterial.^* The writer has a copyright in his letters even 
after their transmission.*^ In the eye of law, copyright in letters does not 
follow possession. It always remains in the writer or his heirs, however 
obscure the writer may be. Thus, the right to restrain publication of a 
letter belongs to the writer of the letter, although the property in the 
paper itself belongs to the receiver, who may hold it as a bailee. The 
latter may destroy it, or sell it as waste paper or for the value of the 
autograph signature, if he pleases, or recover it by action, if it should 
pass out of his possession. In any case, the receiver of a letter may use 
it for any lawful purpose, but he must not publish it in its literary form 
without the writer's consent.'" 
In British Oxygen Co. Ltd. V. Liquid Air, Ltd.^\ it was observed: 
"The publication of the letters of Pope was restrained by Lord 
Hardwicke, as was the publication of Lord Chesterfield "letters by lord 
Apsley ..."' It should be manifestly unfair that an unpublished literar>' 
work should, without the consent of the author, be the subject of public 
criticism, review or summary. Any such dealing with an unpublished 
literary work would not, therefore, in my opinion, be a 'fair dealing' 
with the work". 
It would appear that governments have a right, upon grounds of 
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public policy, to publish or to withhold all letters addressed to the 
public offices.'^ 
In an American case," where a soldier addressed letters to his 
young daughters before he was killed on the Korean front, it was held 
that any profits which arose by the use of such letters in producing 
motion pictures depicting incidents of war belonged to his estate. 
Apart from copyright, the publication of letters, and even the 
communication of their contents by the receiver, has often been re-
strained as a breach of trust or confidence.'* 
(h) Tradesmen's Catalogues : 
It is now well settled that tradesmen's catalogues can also be 
subject-matter of copy right in "literary work"." It was one time thought 
that the fact that a book was used solely for the purpose of advertising 
the goods of the author militated against its being held to be the subject 
of copyright,'^ but this view was overruled." It is, of course, always 
open to doubt whether the component parts of the catalogue are original 
or merely taken from a common source,''* hut a catalogue is generally a 
compilation upon which the compiler has exercised skill and judgement.''^ 
As to copyright in tradesmen's catalogues it has been argued that, 
in so far as skill and labour have been employed merely in selecting a 
desirable aggregate of saleable commodities, this was irrelevant to the 
creation of a copyright compilation. This argument has been used with 
regard to the compilation of the Football League Fixture list, it being 
said that the selection of appropriate dates upon which the teams should 
meet was for the purposes of the League activities and not for the 
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compilation of its fixture list. But UpJohn J. held*" that copyright 
subsisted in the list and that part of the skill and labour involved in its 
preparation was that of working out the appropriate dates of matches. 
This view has been upheld in the House of Lords in connection with the 
copyright in a compilation of football pools.*' 
The plaintiffs, in Purefoy Engineering Co Ltd. & another V. Sykes 
Boxall & Co. Ltd^\ who were carrying on the business of the Unit 
Tooling Company were printing and circulating to their customers a 
catalogue tabling a judiciously selected variety of sizes of machines 
parts, so as to be in a position to meet, at short notice, all likely 
requirements of various manufacturers, and at the same time to avoid 
uneconomic stocking of items of scant demand. Such tables or lists were 
varied from time to time by the plaintiffs according to their require-
ments. The defendants Sykes and Boxall used to be in the plaintiffs 
employment. After they left the services of the plaintiffs, they com-
menced independent business of a similar nature, and appropriated 
certain tables from the plaintfiff's catalogue. The plaintiffs filed the 
case for the infringement of copyright. It was held by Court of Appeal 
that the plaintiffs had copyright in each and every part of their catalogue 
and that the defendants had infringed certain parts of the plaintiff's 
catalogue. 
In the United States also, catalogues which contain matter on 
supplies, and clear descriptions of such supplies which are more than a 
mere collection of existing descriptions, are copyrightable material.*^ 
But catalogues which contain a mere notation of the figures at which 
stockes or commodities have sold, or of the results of a horserace or 
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baseball game can not be said to bear the impress of individuality and 
their production falls short of authorship. 
Illustrations in a catalogue are protected in the three countries 
under study here as artistic works and not as literary works. Thus, it has 
been held that where a design is subsequently produced in an artistic 
form e.g., by a photograph of the industrial object, the subsequent work, 
though embodying design, is also protected by copyright.*' Catalogues 
are covered by the definition of' 'literary works" which includes "table 
or compilations". 
(i) Advertisements : 
Advertisements are entitled to copyright protection either as 
literary works or as artistic works or as a combination of both. However, 
there can be no copyright in an adverstisement without original 
features, or which is a "merely dry list of names or goods".^^ 
Copyright may not subsist in advertising slogans as they consist 
only of a few ordinary works strung together. In Sinanaide V. LaMaison 
Kosmo^\ it was held that a phrase in an advertisement to the effect "A 
youthful appearance is a social necessity and not a luxury" was 
protected as an ' 'original literary work" and an injunction and damages 
were awarded. However, the decision was reversed on appeal after 
hearing evidence to the effect that the phrase that "Beauty is a modern 
necessity" has been previously advertised, and the court held that the 
matter was too trifling for action by the court. 
Copyright in an advertisement vests in the advertiser or his agent. 
As between an advertiser and an agent who has the copyright depends 
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upon the circumstances of each case."" 
In the United States the copyiightability of advertisements has 
long been recognised.*^ Advertising material qualifies for copyright 
protection if it exhibits some original intellectual effort as to concep-
tion, composition, and arrangement even in the absence of any high 
artistic or literary merits.^" 
(J) Blank Forms & Form Books : 
Blank forms are not copyrightable where they are designed for 
recording information and do not in themselves convey information.^' 
But there is an exception to the rule that blank forms or charts contain 
language explanatory of, and inseparably included in, the copyrighted 
text or material, then the forms or charts are protected because they 
convey information.^^ Blank forms such as Account books. Bank cheques. 
Diaries, etc. are not copyrightable. Although bank cheques and stubs 
are not copyrightable as blank forms or as a cheque stub system, they 
may be copyrightable for the art work thereon.^^ By contrast, forms 
which explain a particular plan or system and communicate ideas rather 
than merely serving as a depository for factual data have been given 
copyright protection.^^ Accordingly, the U.S. Copyright office regula-
tions have been interpreted to prohibit copyright protection only to 
blank forms which were designed for recording information and do not 
in themselves convey information, for example, account books which 
contain several pages of instructions preceding and following 31 pages 
of blank forms (one page for each day of the month), have been held 
entitled to copyright protection on the ground that such books convey 
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information and that the instructions and blank forms constitute part of 
an integrated work.'' 
(k) Lectures : 
The protection afforded to lectures was, under the previous laws (prior 
to 1956), of a very unsatisfactory character, and there was no copyright in an 
unpubhshed lectures. But both the U.K. Copyright Act of 1956 and Indian 
Copyright Act of 1957 specifically guaranteed copyright in lectures which was 
defined as including "j34dress, speech and sermon"'^ 
Copyright, however, can only subsist in lecture if it is a literary 
work, i.e. a work expressed in print or writing", and it would appear, 
therefore, that there is still no copyright in a mere extempore speech. It 
i s submitted, however, that where a speech is made fi-om notes, it might be held 
that anyone copying the speech was infringing the copyright in the notes. 
It is in this context that the recent controversy relating to the 
publication of lecture delivered by the Justice A.M. Ahmadi, Chief 
Justice of India at Jamia Millia, New Delhi is to be understood. 
Moreover, the U.K. Copyright Committee 1977 also recommended that, 
where, a speech or lecture delivered extempore is fixed, albeit by some 
one other than the speaker and whatever mode with his consent or not, 
there should be created a copyright in the material which will vest in the 
speaker, additional to the separate copyright in the recording or tran-
script as such.'^ Thus, publication of Chief Justice's speech without his 
consent was not appropriate. 
At the same time it should be realised that a lecture is not 
published by delivery,'* but it would appear that the issue of reports, or 
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even of copies of notes from which it was made, with the acquiescence 
of the author, would constitute publication, since such reports would be 
copies of the literary work in which the copyright subsists. 
(1) Statutes & Judicial Opinions : 
Neither judicial opinions nor statutes can have copyright.'"" In 
the United States, it has been held that nor may State, any more than 
individuals, obtain a copyright on what is the public domain. It is well 
settled that the literary production of judges acting in their official 
capacity as judges are not subject of copyright. This doctrine extends to 
whatever work they perform in their capacity as judges, and conse-
quently applies to their statements of cases and to the syllabi or 
headnotes prepared by them in their official capacity, as well as to their 
opinions and decisions themselves since the whole work done by the 
judges constitutes the exposition and interpretation of the law, which, 
binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a 
declaration of unwritten law or a Constitution or of Statute.'"' Judges, 
having no rights therein themselves, can not confer any special right on 
a reporter to copyright any part of their labours, nor can they confer this 
right on any other person, not even on the State itself.'"^ 
(m) Adaptation & Translation : 
Former Director of B.B.C., Val Gidgud rightly observed : "It is 
easy enough to say what adaptation should not be but to define what it 
should be is rather more difficult. Adaptation, in short, means the 
proper telling of the story in terms of a medium different from that in 
which it was originally conceived. It does not much altering the story. 
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although it may do so. It does mean preserving at all costs the spirit of 
the story, and the motivating purpose of the original author in telling it 
... The novelist uses the medium of words, the theatre uses the medium 
of living actors, and cinema uses the medium of the camera, and 
broadcasting uses that of microphone".'"'' 
Thus, there is almost a uniform definition of the adaptation. 
Section 2(a) of Indian Copyright Act, 1957, for instance lays down that 
"adaptation" means -
(i) in relation to dramatic work, the conversion of the work into a non-
dramatic work; 
(ii) in relation to a literary work or an artistic work the conversion of the 
work into a dramatic work by way of performance in public or other-
wise; 
(iii) in relation to a literary or dramatic work, any abridgment of the 
work or any version of the work in which the story or action is conveyed 
wholly or mainly by means of pictures in a form suitable for reproduc-
tion in a book, or in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical; and 
(iv) in relation to musical work, any aiTangement or transcription of the work. 
The aforesaid defintion of "adaptation" includes translation of 
the work as well. Translations are as much protected as original works. 
The author of a book has exclusive right to publish translations of his 
book.'"' The translations of a non-copyrighted work enjoys copyright in 
its own right. It was held in the case of Byrne V. Statist Co, '"^ where 
certain advertisements being a translation from the Portuguese were 
produced and published in the Financial Times, it was held that 
translation was a copyrighted work and the right rested in the translator. 
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It has also been observed incidentally by Lord Eldon in Gary V. Faden^"'' 
in refusing an injunction to restrain an infringement of the copyright in 
an earlier work as follows : 
Why, on principle, should anyone be at liberty to 
appropriate the translator's independent labour 
because his translation was not authorised by the 
author of the original work, who does not see fit 
to prevent the publication of the translation ? 
Moreover the unauthorised translation of today 
may become an authorised translation tomarrow. 
The whole idea of translations of the original works is essential 
in a countiy like ours where various languages are prevailing, so that 
it would enrich our country by securing translations in different 
languages. 
Copyright may be secured in the adaptation of a play which in 
itself is common property. Thus, in Hutton V. Keane^^^, where it 
appeared that the defendants had designed a dramatic representation, 
consisting of one of Shakespeares' plays, with certain alterations in the 
text, original music, scenic effects, and other accessories, the court did 
not doubt that the production, as a whole, was a proper subject of 
copyright, although the play itself was, in its original form, common 
property. 
Same is the case with musical compositions, not only an original 
composition but any substantially new arrangement or adaptation of an 
old piece of music is a proper subject of copyright.'"' 
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(n) Examination Papers : 
An essential feature of copyright legislation, as seen above, is 
that the work must be original. The quality of being original has nothing 
to do with literary or artistic merit of the work. Thus, Peterson, J. in the 
case of University of London Press V. University Tutorial Press Ltd."", 
in deciding whether copyright is available in respect of examination 
papers set for matriculation examination of the London University held 
that examination papers were literary work. Indian courts have also held 
that copyright subsists in the examination papers."' 
(o) Copyright in a Work Which itself Infringes Copyright ; 
The question whether copyright can subsist in a work which is a 
piracy of another copyrighted work is difficult one. It is submitted that 
copyright can subsist in such a work which, provided it is not a slavish 
copy, since in such a case there would be no "originality", thai is 
nothing originating from the author of the piracy."' As observed above, 
there is a copyright even in the case of unauthorised translation since 
translation involves considerable time, skill and labour by the translator."-^ 
But the problem is that even if such a work is entitled to 
copyright, will the courts grant relief where a substantial part of it has 
been copied? Will the courts grant relief in the case of a work which 
consists in part of pirated material, on which time, skill and labour has 
been expended and where the part copied, though a substantial part of 
the whole work, consisted entirely of pirated material ? It is submitted 
that the courts might well be unwilling to do so, in either case, on the 
grounds of public policy, and certainly not against the original copy-
right owner, unless, perhaps, he had later given permission. ""^  
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(B) COPYRIGHT IN DRAMATIC WORKS ; 
The copyright laws of U.K., U.S.A. and India as of most coun-
tries of the world now recognise copyright in dramatic works. 
In the United Kingdom, under the law prior of 1911, performing 
rights could only be claimed in respect of any "tragedy, comedy, play, 
opera, force, or any other dramatic piece or entertainment""^ or in 
respect of "any musical composition","^ but under the Acts of 1911 
and 1956, the right to perform a work in public is included in the 
copyright of all literary, dramatic and musical v^orks."' The definition 
of dramatic work in the U.K. Act of 1956 is slightly different from that 
in the U.K. Act of 1911, and the difference may be of material 
importance. As observed above, in the Act of 1911, dramatic work was 
defined as including "any piece for recitation, choreographic work or 
entertainment in dumb show, the scienic arrangement or acting form 
which is fixed in writing or otherwise""^ In the Act of 1956. dramatic 
work is defined as including " a choreographic work or entertainment in 
dumb show, if reduced to writing in the form in which the work or 
entertainment is to be presented"."' 
The expression "any piece for recitation" is left out, presumbly 
because its special mention was thought unnecessary. But the change 
from it fixed in writings or otherwise, to "if reduced to writing in the 
form in which the work or entertainment is to be presented' ' . may have 
significance. It was thought that, under the Act of 1911, a sketch or 
dramatic performance might acquire copyright protection if filmed or 
recorded at the moment of performance, but it would seem clear that this 
is not so under the Act of 1956. 
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But the U.K. Copyright, Designs & Patents Act 1988 has now 
provided for a more simpler definition by laying down that "dramatic 
work" includes a "work of dance or mime".'^*' 
The Indian copyright law as has been discussed in the chapter on 
historical development has closely followed the British enactments, 
and therefore, on the issue of "dramatic works" as well, the Indian law 
is almost similar to that of its counter part in England. 
Thus, the Copyright Act of 1957 says that "dramatic work" 
includes any piece for recitation, choreographic work or entertainment 
in dumb show, the scenic arrangement or acting form of which is fixed 
in writing or otherwise, but does not include a cinematograph film.'^' 
In the U.S., dramatic works, including any accompanying mu-
sic,'^^ are entitled to copyright protection, and the terms are not defined 
by Statute since such terms have fairly settled meaning'". Prior law also 
did not define dramatic works, but former copyright office regulations 
included within the classification of "dramatic and dramatico-musical 
compositions" works which are dramatic in character such as the acting 
version of plays for the stage, motion pictures, radio, television and the 
like, operas, operators, musical comedies and similar productions, and 
pantomimes. Under prior law, a dramatic work was defined as a work in 
which the narrative was not related, but was represented by dialogue 
and action'-^ that is, a work which tells a story'^' so that the audience 
sees the event or story live.'^* 
Copyright may protect not only the dialogue of a drama, but also 
all such means of expression as the author uses to give dramatic 
significance to the scenes of his work. '" But mere motions, voice and 
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postures of actors and mere stage business are not subject of copyright 
protection.'^* A copyright owner's protectable property in a play con-
sists of development, treatment, and expression of elements such as 
theme, locale, settings, situations, ideas, and bare basic plots, but the 
elements in themselves are not protectable,'^^ since it is expression of 
ideas, not ideas themselves, that is protected.'^" 
(i) Essential Requisites of a Dramatic Work : 
A dramatic work is something that is capable of being written or 
printed or reduced to some permanent form, subject, however, to its 
being so reduced, that it discloses a plot or a story and indicates the 
mode by which it should be expressed i.e. either with dialogue or by 
action. The expression of such work is called a dramatic performance. 
Hence, for any work to constitute a dramatic work, three ingredients are 
essential viz, (i) it must be reduced to a permanent form, (ii) it must 
disclose a plot or a story and (iii) it should be capable of being 
performed either with dialogue or by action or both. 
(ii) Dramatic Work & Publication : 
The term "performance'''"" includes any mode of visual or 
acoustic presentation, including any such presentation by the exhibi-
tion of a cinematograph film, or by means of radio-diffusion, or by the 
use of a record, or by any other means and, in relation to a lecture, 
includes the delivery of such lecture. 
However, it should be noted that public performance of a dra-
matic or musical work during the lifetime of the author is not publica-
tion of the work. In the case of such performance, the work will still 
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remain an "unpublished work" existing only in the manuscript of the 
author and is to be considered as an' 'unpublished work". There can not be oral 
publication, nor can there be any publication of a single copy. The test as to 
whether or not there has been an issue to the public would seem to be if copies 
were available to the public in sufficient quantities.'^^ 
If a dramatic work remains unpublished at the date of the death 
of the author, the public performance of such work after the death of the 
author will constitute publication of the work, and the provisions 
relating to "posthumous Works" will apply.'" 
(ill) Actors Gass not Copyrightable : 
It is to be observed that at no time actor's gags have been 
recognised by the copyright acts. By the term Gag is meant a minor 
incident or sequence of minor incidents, usually of a humorous nature, 
closely related to and made vocal by gestures and intonations.'^^ The 
dictionary meaning of the term gag is "words inserted by an actor which are 
not in his part; (slang) a joke, specially on the music-hall stage: 
In Tale V. Full hrook^^\ Lord Justice Voughan William observed : 
Gag can not be within the act; if it were, its 
authors would be actor not the writer of the piece, 
nor would it make any difference if the actor and 
the author were one and the same person, for the 
act does not extend verbal alterations and addi-
tions which vary from week to week and possibly 
from night to night in order to keep up with the 
events of the day. 
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Similarly actors "stage business" which includes mannerisms, 
gestures, expressions and other acting devices improvised by a skilled 
actor to portray his own role is not copyrightable. 
(Iv) Pantomimes and Choreographic Works : 
In the United States, the 1976 Act has now specifically added 
"pantomimes and choreographic works" to the categories of 
copyrightable subject matter.'^* The terms are not defined in this 
statute, apparently on the basis that their meanings are well - settled.'" 
Under prior law, such works were protectable only as part of a 
dramatic work.'-^* It was recognised that in pantomime the whole action 
is represented by gesticulation, without the use of words, and that it 
would deny the title of drama to pantomime as played by the masters of 
the art.'^* Similarly choreography that told a story, portrayed charac-
ters, or depicted emotions was copyrightable.'^^ Although the law now 
explicitly recognizes all forms of choreography, that should not be 
construed to include social dance and simple routines.'^" 
(C) COPYRIGHT & MUSIC WORKS : 
(i) Definition of Musical Works : 
There was no definition of musical work in the U.K. Copyright 
Act of 1911 and that of 1956. The Musical (summary Proceedings) 
Copyright Act 1902, which has now been repealed, defined a musical 
work as meaning "any combination of melody and harmony, or either 
of them, printed reduced to writing, or otherwise graphically produced 
or reproduced", thus expressly confining musical works to those which 
are printed or written. The Indian Copyright Act, 1957 has bodily lifted 
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this definition.'*' 
If the question is whether, if A improvises a tune in B's presence, 
which B carries away in his head and subsequently publishes, A has 
copyright in the tune, which he can sue B for infringing, probably A has 
no copyright in his tune, and in any case, the difficulties in the way of 
proving that B's published work is an infringement of A's improvised 
tune will be well high insuperable. What the Act protects was musical 
"work" and the expression seems to imply that the tune shall be 
recorded in some permanent form before it becomes entitled to copy-
right. This view is confirmed by the provision that, in the case of an 
entertainment in dumb show or a choreographic work, it must be 
reduced to writing in the form in which the work or entertainment is to 
be presented, and also by the requirement that a work is made when first 
reduced to writing on some other material form. But the U.K. Copy-
right, Designs & Patents Act 1988 now solves such problems by 
defining "musical work" as a work consisting of music, exclusive of 
any words or action intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the 
music. The 1994 Indian Amendment has also brought in a new defini-
tion which is much wider than the previous one "Musical Work" now 
means " a work consisting of music and includes any graphic notation 
of such work but does not include any words or any action intended to 
be sung, spoken or performed with the music". 
The 1976 United States law on the question of musical work is 
far less ambiguous. It extends copyright protection to "musical works, 
including any accompanying words"."'^ Since musical works which are 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
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developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device are 
copyrightable,'"^ copyright may be obtained regardless of whether the 
music compositions is notated in conventional written form, is recorded 
on tape or dick, or is embodied in some other material object or medium. 
Whenever a song is copyrighted as a musical composition, both 
the words and music are protected.""* Words alone, unaccompanied by 
music, are also entitled to copyright protection as a literary work, but 
a statutory copyright does not give a monopoly over an idea or a musical 
phrase; it merely protects against the unlawful reproduction of an 
original work."*' 
Although a musical composition is made up of rhythm, harmony, 
and melody, rhythm and harmony have been in the public domain for so 
long that neither can be subject of copyright; hence, originality must be 
found in the melody. 
(") Copyright in Musical Works & Films : 
Since musical works in films raise questions of copyrights of 
different persons, under the Indian Copyright Act of 1957, a major 
controversy arose on this issue.''*^ 
The Indian Performing Rights Society (IPRS) announced a tariff 
of fees, charges and royalties for public performance of composers of 
musical works and others on 29 September, 1969. The litigation arose 
between IPRS and the Exhibitors Association of India before the 
Copyright Board. Its decision of 16 may, 1973 was reversed on appeal 
by the Calcutta High Court on 13 February, 1974. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision on 14 March, 1977. The Board held the view that 
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the composers of music retained their copyright in their musical works 
embodied in the soundtrack of the film provided that such lyrical and 
musical works were written and that the authors had not validly 
transferred their rights to the owners of the film. The High Court 
reversed this decision. It held that, under proviso to Section 17 (b), the 
owner at whose instance the film is made becomes the first owner of 
copyright and, in terms of that clause when valuable consideration 
exists "the composer can claim a copyright in his work only if there is 
an express agreement" to that effect between him and the owner of the 
film. It accordingly held that there was no copyright of the authors of 
the musical works in the first place which could be validly assigned to IPRS. 
Since the matter raised substantial questions of law of general 
importance the High Court certified an appeal to Supreme Court on two 
questions First, is an "existing and future'" right of "music... com-
poser, lyricist capable of assignment?' Second, can the producer of a 
film defeat the same right by engaging such persons.'*' 
On the first question, the apex court had no hesitation in ruling 
that an existing and future right of a music composer and lyricist is 
capable of assignment. To this extent, this reaffirmation is welcome as 
the error of assuming that there just can not be any such right when a 
film is produced, and all such rights pass on (because of valuable 
consideration) to the owner of the film has been authoritatively recti-
fied. The High Court's decision on this issue was clearly negatived. To 
the second question, the court held that the film producer can defeat the 
rights of composers and lyricists by having recourse to Section 17 under 
which he becomes the first owner of copyright.''" 
This decision on this coimt is certainly misconceived since under the 
Act there is no bar on the multiple claims of copyright. For example, in the case 
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of record there may exist the owner of copyright in the recorded work and the 
owner of copyright in the record. Anyone wishing to perfonn the musical work 
in which these two sets of copyright exist must take pemiission from both 
owners (say, a jukebox operator). The same may be said about copyright in 
musical work and copyiight in film; they are distinct and co-existing.'"^ 
The IPRS case marks unfortunately a beginning of an overall trend of 
consistent misapplication of law. In Fortune Films Ltd. V. Dev Anand}^'^ 
following IPRS case, copyright was denied to actor acting in a film. 
Thus it can be concluded by way of conclusion that copyright in literary, 
dramatic and musical works is almost well settled in the three jurisdictions 
which form subject - matter of present study. A large variety of works are 
protected as 'literaiy works" though in cases of musical works the latest 
amendments in U.K. and India were long overdue and will go a long way in 
protecting musicians. 
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COPYRIGHT IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
One of the factors which has contributed greatly to the projection of 
the topic of copyright into a central position on the legal stage in recent 
years is the realisation of its potential application to the problems posed 
by the use of computers. 
There are two distinct aspects of the matter - both the extent to 
which computer programs can be protected against copying and other 
unauthorised acts, and also the extent to which copyright works, generally 
in the literary fields as observed in last chapter of this study, can be 
protected from unauthorised computer use. 
Computers have been with us in a commercially viable for less than 
thirty years, but the rate of expansion in their use has been phenomenal. 
In this area of technology as in a number of others there has been a 
reduction over the years in the physical size and relative cost of the 
equipment and a consequent increase in their accessibility. Computer 
technology has revolutionised our lives directly and indirectly over the 
last quarter of a century, but copyright law has only recently come to terms 
with this technology. 
The magnitude of the problem to provide copyright protection to 
computer programs is staggering: it has been estimated that some 15,000 
computer programs are written each day in the United States and the total 
value of this software is in the tens of billions of dollars'. 
The growth oriented change in the India's economic policy neces-
sitates availability of latest information to all in all fields. In order to 
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realise the dream of changing our country from developing into developed 
and from bulk importer to bulk exporter, the latest information had to be 
made available to the experts in different fields for action and interaction. 
In order to change the process from manual to electronic for information, 
not only are computers essential but various types of computers like desk 
top computers, master computers to feed desk top computers and super 
computers to which the master computers are linked, are essential. Thus, 
the purpose served by the memory bank in the shape of a monster machine 
will be of great utility in the development of our socio-economic, political, 
scientific and cultural life. Since a massive amount of time is required to 
create a computer program and the investment in terms of money is huge, 
reproduction of this software by pirating the original will be much easier 
and would not involve expenditure of so much of time and money. 
Therefore, some kind of protection must be provided to creators of 
software against piracy, otherwise, we may reach a stage when no one is 
willing to create software for the simple reason that returns are not equal 
to the investment.^ 
While it has been recognised world over that the computer technol-
ogy is best protected by the use of an array of legal rights, for example 
contract, patents, trade secrets and trade marks, it has been accepted 
widely that copyright protection normally would be the most important 
mechanism to rely upon. 
This chapter, therefore, examines at length the question of 
copyrightability of computer generated works, computer programs etc. It 
discusses the question of duration, joint - authorship and works produced 
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during the course of an employment. It also makes an attempt to evaluate 
the recent legislative amendments undertaken by U.K., U.S.A. & India 
with regard to copyright in softwares. 
(A) COPYRIGHT LAWS ON SOFTWARE & RECENT 
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY ; 
'Software' is a general term for what is fed into a computer, whereas 
the machines themselves are known as the 'hardwares'. Thus, the question 
of the extent to which proprietary rights may exist in computer programs 
has become an important issue. But the U.K. copyright Act 1956 and its 
Indian counter part, Indian Copyright Act 1957 and similarly the U.S. 
Copyright law prior to 1976 revision, were all silent on the question of 
computers probably as it were still early days for computers. 
United States was the first country which recognised that the 
computer databases represent an increasingly significant and valuable 
form of intellectual property, which the 1976 House Report specifically 
declared to be copyrightable as 'literary works'^. With respect to computer 
programs the report was a bit more guarded; it expressed the intention to 
cover them as 'literary works' to the extent that they incorporate author-
ship in the program's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from 
the ideas themselves^ Following the recommendations of the National 
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), 
the U.S. Congress amended the statute in 1980^ adding a definition of 
'computer' program' (a set of statements or instructions to be used 
directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain results')^ and 
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making clear that, although they were not expressly listed among the seven 
categories of copyrightable works, computer programs were eligible for 
copyright protection as literary works*. It has remained for the courts to 
determine whether particular types of programs were entitled to copyright 
protection. 
In United Kingdom also, the Copyright Act 1956, the former major 
source of copyright law, was silent on the question of computers as it were 
still early days for computers when the Act was brought into force. 
However, growing disquiet in the computer industry, and the perceived 
reluctance of the courts to come to grips with the question of copyright 
protection of computer programs, caused an amending piece of legislation 
to be passed. Known as the Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment 
Act, 1985. This Act confirmed that computer programs and works created 
using a computer or stored in a computer were protected by copyright. The 
Copyright. Designs and Patents Act, 1988 whose principal provisions as 
they relate to copyright came into force on 1 August 1989 further consoli-
dated the copyright protection of computer programs and works created 
using computers or generated by computer, by and large satisfactorily. 
There are, however, as detailed later in this chapter, some areas of doubt 
which have to be resolved by the courts. 
As far as Indian Copyright Act, 1957 is concerned, for the same 
reasons as its British counterpart, to begin with it did not have any 
provision granting protection to computer software. But in the early years 
of the last decade itself, the need of giving some copyright protection to 
the software was recognised by us since the cost of developing a program 
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is far greater than the one involved in duplicating it, this works as an 
incentive to pirates to go in for unauthorised duplication at the cost of 
original creator of a program. Therefore, the programs will be dissemi-
nated only if the creator can recover all his costs plus some kind of profit 
and he can spread his cost over sale of number of copies of his work with 
some kind of protection from unauthorised duplication since these works 
are the product of great intellectual effort and their utility can not be 
questioned. As a result of this recognition, the Copyright Act was amended 
in 1983 to give protection to software by including it in the definition of 
'literary'^ works. This was also justified because India did play a leading 
role in the Paris Revision of Berne Convention in 1971. 
The Copyright (Amendment) 1994 has also significantly altered the 
Indian copyright law and brought several areas in conformity with Uru-
guay Round Agreement on Trade - Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). These changes are of particular importance to the computer 
industry in that a new 'rental right' of computer programs has been 
created, the traditional fair dealing exception has been eliminated and 
radical new penalties have been imposed on users of infringing programs. 
(B) MEANING OF SOFTWARE ; 
For effective protection, it is essential to know in material details as 
what is sought to be protected. Therefore, there must be a workable 
definition of software program which qualifies for protection. 
Computer software is explained to constitute the following three elements: 
(i) "Computer program" - which is a set of instructions capable, when put 
in computer, or causing a machine having information processing capabili-
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ties to indicate, perform or a achieve a particular function, task or result; 
(ii) "Program Description" - which is a comprehensive procedural presen-
tation in verbal or other form, in sufficient detail to determine a set of 
instructions constituting a corresponding computer program; 
(iii)"Supporting Material" - which is any material other than a computer 
program or a program description, created for aiding the understanding or 
application of a computer program, i.e. problem descriptions and user 
instructions. 
Thus, the definition of software covers not only the actual software 
but also switching operations of hardware components according to a 
particular program and the action which translates other programs ex-
pressed in a programming language into the final form". It also covers 
many other kinds of programs complementing the hardware in a computer 
so as to make easy the carrying out of the new programs in view of this 
comprehensive definition, it is important to protect the rights of the 
individuals and the firms which develop software. 
(C) COMPUTER PROGRAMS : 
"Computer software", thus in all the three countries which form 
the subject matter of present study includes computer programs, computer 
files and associated printed documentation such as manuals for uses 
There has never been in both United Kingdom as well as U.S. & India any 
difficulty with regard to printed materials as these have been and continue 
to be protected by copyright as literary works in the case of diagrams or 
flowcharts, as artistic works. The protection of the computer programs 
themselves in United Kingdom has been less certain and before 1985, it 
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was unclear whether computer programs were protected by copyright. One 
view was that listings of source code programs were protected as literaiy 
works by analogy with codebooks or because they resembled written 
english to some extent. On the whole, the courts appeared to be sympa-
thetic towards the notion that computer programs were protected. For 
example, in Saga Enterprises Ltd. V. Richardo^^, which was concerned 
with the alleged copies of the computer game 'FROGGER' (the object of 
which was to get a frog across a busy road without being squashed by a 
lorry), the trial judge was of the opinion that the source code program was 
protected by copyright and the object code was protected indirectly as an 
adaptation of the source code version. However, this was an interlocutory 
hearing only and the case did not go to a full trial, so the point was not 
finally decided. Indeed, cases involving copying of computer programs 
did not seem to get beyond the interim stage, probably because the relief 
granted by the court was sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff. 
Following considerable pressure from the computer industry, nota-
bly from their lobby group FAST (the Federation Against Software Theft), 
the Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act was passed in U.K. 
in the year 1985 which made it clear that computer programs were 
protected as "literary works.'-^ The situation is made even clearer in the 
1988 Act. Section (1) says that copyright is a property right which subsists 
in accordance with the provisions of Part 1 of the Act in original literai-y 
works. Section 3(1) says that 'literary works' means any work (except for 
a dramatic or musical work) which is written, spoken or sung and 
accordingly includes : 
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(a) a table or compilation and 
(b) a computer program 
These wordings make it absolutely clear that computer programs are 
literary works and not simply to be protected as though they were literary 
works. Neither the word 'computer' nor the phrase 'computer program' is 
defined in the 1988 Act. This is sensible in view of the rapid rate of change 
in the computer industry as attempts to offer precise definitions would 
probably prove to be undue restrictive in the light of future changes in 
technology. It is better to allow the judges to use their discretion sensibly, 
permitting a degree of flexibility in this respect.'' In the United States, on 
the other hand, though the Copyright Act 1976 as noted above did not 
specifically include computer software within its ambit, yet the copyright 
office did in fact begin to accept computer programs for registration as 
'books'in 1964.'* The Supreme Court in 1972 quoted a 1966 report of the 
President's commission on the patent system to the effect that copyright 
protection, rather than patent protection, was available for computer 
programs.'^ The definitional provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976 
encompasses computer programs and data bases in the definition of 
"literai-y works. '** This definitional section was amended in 1980 by the 
Computer Software Protection Act to include a definition of a computer 
program as a "set of statements or instructions to be used directly or 
indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result. '* The copyrightability 
of computer programs is, therefore, said to be firmly established since 
1980 amendments'^ to the Copyright Act, 1976 though some doubts have 
been raised as to programs written in object code. 
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As far as Indian definition is concerned, the 1983 amendment in 
1957 Act has now provided in explicit terms a definition which is similar 
to one in United States. The "literary work", the amendment laid down 
includes "tables and complication and computer programs that is to say, 
programs recorded on any disc, tape, perforated media or other informa-
tion storage device, which, if fed into or located in a computer or computer 
based equipment is capable of reproducing any information."^" The sec-
tion was amended again in view of the concerns expressed by societies 
against theft of computer software and wider and more simpler definition 
has now been provided by the 1994 Amendment. It lays down that 
"literary work ' \ "includes computer programs, tables and compilations 
including computer data basis." -' Further unlike the and United Kingdom 
and United States, the 1994 Indian Amendments also give definitions of 
both 'computer' as well as "computer programs," "computer," it says, 
"includes and electronic or similar device having information processing 
capabilities"." "Computer programme" means "a set of instructions 
expressed in words, codes, schemes or in any other form, including a 
machine readable medium, capable of causing a computer to perform a 
task or achieve a particular result". 
(D) RECORDED IN WRITING OR OTHERWISE ; 
It is a pre-condition of copyright protection that there be some 
physical manifestation of the work. The 1988 U.K. Act provides in 
explicit terms that copyright does not subsist in a literary, dramatic or 
musical work unless and until it has been recorded in writing or otherwise. 
'Writing' is defined by section 178 to include any form of notation or code. 
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whether by hand or otherwise and regardless of the method by which, or 
medium in, or on which , it is recorded. This is a very broad definition and 
as a result software will be protected whether it is written out in long hand, 
entered on to a disc or tape or any other means of storing the computer 
software. However, it is absolutely clear that if the software, or any part 
of it, is only planned mentally, then copyright protection will not be given 
to that work unless and until it is recorded in one of the means included by 
the Act. Whilst not specifically set out in the Act, it is in the nature of an 
artistic work that it should be in some visible form.^" 
In the United States also, there is a great emphasis on some form of 
fixation before a work can be entitled to copyright protection. The U.S. 
Act, therefore, lays down that the work must be fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which it can 
be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.^^ A work is "f ixed" in any tangible 
medium of expression when its embodiment is sufficiently permanent or 
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated 
for a period of more than transitory duration.-^ The purpose of this broad 
definition was to overrule the former doctrine that copies, in order to be 
entitled to copyright protection, must be visually perceptible, that is, 
capable of being seen and understood by the naked eye.-^ 
Thus, under the Copyright Act of 1976, it makes no difference what 
the form, manner or medium of fixation may be, whether it is in words, 
numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic indicia, 
whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photographic. 
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sculptural, punched, magnetic or any other stable form, and whether it is 
capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or device now 
known or later developed.^* 
The Indian law on the point is also similar to that of U.K. and U.S.A. 
as it also requires some form of writing, fixation or otherwise. 
(E) REQUIREMENT OF ORGINALITY & 
COMPUTER PROGRAMS : 
It has always been a requirement in the three countries under 
discussion in the present study that a literary, dramatic, musical or aitistic 
work be 'original' and this is retained as has been seen, by section (1) of 
the U.K. Copyright, Design & Patent Act, 1988. This use of the term is 
most certainly not the same as used in connection with patent law. There 
have been many decisions on this issue, but it comes down to saying that 
a work is original to the author, in the sense that the author has not copied 
it from someone else. As Paterson J said in University of London Press 
Limited V University Tutorial Press Limited}^ 
The word original does not in this connection means 
that the work must be the expression of original or 
inventive form. Copyright Act is not concerned with 
the originality of ideas, but with the expression of 
thought, and, in the case of 'literary work', with the 
expression of thought in print or writing. The origi-
nality which is required relates to the expression of 
the thought. But the Act does not require that the 
expression must be in an original or novel form but 
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that the work must not be copied from another work 
- that it should originate from the author. 
A phrase often used in this context is to say that an original work is 
one upon which an author has expended sufficient skill, industry or 
experience. Similarly, Lord Devlin observed in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. 
V. William Hill (Football) Ltd"' : 
The requirement of originality means that the product 
must originate from the author in the sense that it is 
the result of a substantial degree of skill, industry or 
experience employed by him. 
Similarly in the United States, the essence of copyright protection 
is originality rather than novelty or invention.^' To be copyrightable, a 
work must be original in the sense that the author has created it by his own 
skill, labour, and judgement,^' but no large measure of novelty is neces-
sary,'^ all that needed is that the "author" contributes something more 
than a merely trivial variation, something recognizably his ou'w'-* Thus, for 
copyright purposes, originality is something less than the novelty or 
uniqueness necessary for patent protection.^^ In other words, copyrighted 
matter need not be strikingly unique or novel, and any distinguishable vaiiation 
resulting from an author's independent creative effort will suffice.''^  
Indian copyright law on the question of originality is the same as 
one in U.K. and United States. The requirement of originality in Indian 
law, as elsewhere, does not refer to ideas but rather to the manner and 
material forms of expression." The Copyright Act specifically emphasises 
the requirement of originality. Section 13 says that copyright subsists in 
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three classes of work : 
(a) original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works; 
(b) cinematograph films; and 
(c) records.^* 
But as noted above, the objective of copyright, it has been stressed 
in India, is not to create monopoly in ideas rather the protection aims at 
prevention of unlawful reproduction of dealing with the manner and 
material forms in which ideas are expressed.^' Consequently, originality 
also refers not to novelty or creativity in ideas but only to the manner and 
material form of their presentation. What is protected is the expression of 
thought - the form, formulation, order, plan, or arrangement of presenta-
tion - as testifying to the investment by the author or mental faculties, 
skills, competence, craftsmanship, knowledge, labour and capital in the 
production of any work.'*" 
(F) IDEA VERSUS EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY : 
A further distinction that causes much difficulty in practice is a 
differentiation between the idea and the expression. Copyright as noted 
above will protect the expression but not the ideas: this is axiomatic in 
copyright law. This matter in relation to computer software is considered 
more fully later in the chapter but for the moment it is enough to state that 
copyright law is intended to protect the particular way in which an idea is 
recorded, but it is not intended to give protection to the idea itself. 
(G) COPYRIGHTABILITY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE ; 
(i) Source and Object Code : 
Applying the above principles it can be seen that copyright will 
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protect computer software in the three countries which form subject 
matter of present study which is recorded in 'writing' (as defined widely 
in the U.K. Act of 1988) and which is ong;>7a/(which has also been given 
a wide meaning in the three jurisdictions by their courts). At this point, it 
is necessary to say something of the various ways in which the term 
'computer software' can be understood. At what is often known as a high 
level software is produced by the programmer in source code. This can be 
in one of many computer languages, which each consist of a series of 
commands addressed to a computer. This can be written out in longhand 
or it can be entered directly into a computer. It is often said to be human 
readable, since many computer languages use English words and expres-
sions set out in continuous lines of text. 
However, the computer can't cope with source code. Source code 
must be converted into a form which a computer can understand. To this 
end, source code is 'compiled" or 'assembled' by means of appropriate 
software to become the object code version, often said to be machine 
readable or low level. At this stage, the computer software no longer has 
the format of human language but is series of digits, either 0 or 1 and 
grouped together in bytes, each of which is the smallest possible store of 
information, e.g. a single character. A byte will normally consists of eight 
individual bits, each bit being a 0 or 1. 
At an even lower level, micro-code can exist in the form of micro -
instructions used in a micro - processor. Micro - code takes the instructions 
given to the computer by the object code and breaks it down into a series 
of steps to be performed by the computer. Such micro - code is often stored 
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in a ROM (read only memory) which is a hardware device containing the 
micro - code and which can not be changed by the user. 
There seems no reason to understand that the 1988 Act of United 
Kingdom does not protect computer program in any of these forms. The 
Act certainly unlike the 1994 Indian Amendment Act gives any definition 
of computer programs but wherever expression computer program is used, 
it is used in a very wide & broad sense. Section 21 (4) states that in relation 
to a computer program, a translation includes a version of the program into 
which it is converted into or out of a computer language or code or into a 
different language or code or into a different computer language or code, 
without specifying whether it is intended to exclude a particular variety of 
computer language or code at or below a certain level. This certainly 
includes, for example, the compiling of source code into an object code, 
or the decompiling of object code into source code as well as converting 
a computer program written in one computer language into another. 
It is important to be aware, however, that courts in other jurisdic-
tions have not always accepted this British position that all forms of 
computer programs are protected by copyright. For example in Computer 
Edge Pay Limited V. Apple Computer Inc.*^, the High Court of Australia 
decided that copyright did not vest in the object code form of original 
source code programs, but the effect of this decision was subsequently 
changed by Statute. On the other hand, in the United States, the courts 
have, after some initial hesitation,''^, been prepared to accept that software 
in objective code can be protected by copyright. Furthermore, the Ameri-
can Courts seem to accept that micro - code embodied within a read only 
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memory forming a micro - processor can also be protected by copyright/^ 
Since "object code'"*^ is not readable by people, the question in the U.S. 
has been raised as to whether a computer program written in object code 
is a " writing" within the meaning of the Copyright Act and, since such 
programs are normally written in source code and compiled by a separate 
program into object code, there is a further question whether such pro-
grams are authored by a person, rather than a machine.'" It has been 
suggested that even if object code is analogized to a recording of a 
photograph record or a tape in a form that the machine can recognize and 
play back such items being clearly copyrightable - the transposition of the 
binary code into a circuit design that replicates the on - off switching of 
the binary form object code using sophisticated optical, electrical, photo-
graphic, and other processes raises serious questions of copyright 
protectability since the work is not a/writing' but is, in microchip form, 
a part of a machine, a utilitarian object and hence not normally 
copyrightable."^ Some writers have, therefore, concluded that object code 
is probably not protected by copyright law under the Copyright Act of 
1976, as amended by the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980. 
It has been suggested that since the 1980 amendments did not 
change the definition of "copies" in the 1976 Act, the 1980 Act merely 
reinforces the view that copies of programs must be in intelligible form for 
them to be protected under the copyright laws."^ 
But there is a contrary authority as well. Thus, it has been said that 
the 1980 Computer Software Protection Act, by defining a computer 
program as a 'set of statements or instructions to be used directly or 
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indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result/^, includes both 
source code "statements used indirectly" in a computer) and object code 
("instructions" used directly in a computer), as well as microcode, whether 
Rom or Ram resident.'" The courts, too have generally recognised that 
copyright protection extends to programs in object code form stored on 
tapes, discs, or Read only Memory (ROM) chips, since such "works" are fixed 
in a tangible medium and can be reproduced with the aid of a machine.'' 
A computer program, whether in object code or source code, is a 
"literary work" within the meaning of the copyright Act and is protected 
from unauthorised copying, whether from its objects or source code 
version." It has been further held that where plaintiff had copyrighted the 
source code of various operating programs such copyright protected the 
object code as well.' ' 
The Indian Copyright Amendment Act of 1994 has taken care of 
aforesaid problems and has provided that literary work includes a com-
puter programme. The definition of'computer programme' is wide enough 
as noted above to include both object code as well as source code since 
there has not been any litigation on this issue, there is no judicial 
pronouncement on the question in India. 
(H) COMPUTER GENERATED WORKS : 
The 1988 U.K. Act provided for the first time in U.K. for the 
existence and ownership of computer generated works. By Section 178 of 
the Act a computer generated work is defined as a work which is generated 
by a computer without there being any human author of the work, but the 
precise scope of what sort of works are being referred to is not mentioned. 
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Section 9 (3) which deals with the question of ownership of rights in 
computer - generated works and speaks of the case of literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic works which are computer generated, so clearly the 
scope is potentially very large. 
(') Screen Dispiays : 
It is thought that English law also gives protection to screen 
displays produced by the computer program. Protection will be available 
for the underlying program in the ordinary way but provided that it can be 
shown that the screen display or form display passes the ordinary criteria 
for the vesting of copyright (in particular the question of originality) then 
copyiight will inhere in those forms. The position in U.S. and India is no different. 
Depending on what exactly it is that is being, displayed, copyright 
protection may be sought for the screen displays as a literary or as on 
artistic work. An artistic work is defined in Section 4 (1) of the U.K. Act 
of 1988 to include graphic works, paintings, drawings, diagrams, maps, 
charts and plans. The Indian definition of Section 2 (c) is also on the same 
lines when it says that an artistic work means - a painting, a sculpture, a 
drawing (including a diagram, map, chart, or plan), an engraving or a 
photograph, an architectural work of art and any work of artistic crafts-
manship. It is specifically stated in the definitions of both U.K. as well as 
India that artistic quality is not relevant consideration and, thus, pictorial 
representations of whatever sort appearing as part of a screen display will 
be protected as artistic works in their own right. 
If the screen display consists of a moving image, then copyright 
protection as a film could also be relied on. 'Film' is defined in the U.K. 
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Act'"* to mean recording on any medium from which a moving image may 
by any means be reproduced. Similarly Indian definition is very wide, 
infact wider than the one in U.K. is adopted by the 1994 Amendment to 
Copyright Act". Section 2 (f) now lays down that "cinematograph film" 
means any work of visual recording on any medium produced through a 
process from which a moving image may be produced by any means and 
includes a sound recording accompanying such visual recording and 
"cinematograph" shall be construed as including any work produced by 
any process analogous to cinematograph including video - films. Similarly 
in cases where computer program itself is responsible to some extent for 
deciding what is displayed on screen (e.g the component in a moving 
computer game), the protection for the work as a computer generated work 
might also be invoked. 
(ii) Electronic Videogames : 
In the field of electronic videogames, a copyright owner sometimes 
focuses on claimed infringement of the game display rather than on a claim 
that the computer program itself was copied. One reason for this is that a 
principal concern of the owner is that the game not be copied, even if it is 
possible to reproduce it with programming that differs in some respects 
from the original. Second, it often will be quicker to establish that the 
videogame rather than the underlying program has been copied. The 
problem in this connection did arise in the United States in 1982 case 
involving the spaceship game scramble. The defendant contended that the 
plaintiff's audiovisual display was not an original work of authorship 
because its features were determined by the underlying computer pro-
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gram. The federal appeals court in New York disagreed : "* 
Thcfeaturesofthe audiovisual display are plainly 
original variations sufficient to render the display 
copyrightable even though the underlying written pro-
gram has an independent existence and is itself eli-
gible for copyright. 
The court also dealt with the issue of whether the variable nature of 
the audio - visual display meant that the game was not "fixed" in a tangible 
medium of expression. The court rejected this argument, stating in part: 
No doubt the entire sequence of all the rights and 
sounds of the game are different each time the game 
is played....Nevertheless, many aspects of the sight 
and the sequences of their appearances remain con-
stant during each play of the game... it is true... that 
some of these rights and sounds will not be seen and 
heard during each play of the game in the event the 
player's spaceship is destroyed before the entire 
course is traversed. But the images remain fixed, 
capable of being seen and heard each time a player 
succeeds in keeping his spaceship aloft long enough 
to permit the appearances of all the images and 
sounds of complete play of the game. The repetitive 
sequence of a substantial portion of the rights and 
sounds of the game qualify for copyright protection 
as an audiovisual work.". 
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Thus, an electronic or videogame'* may be copyrightable as an 
audiovisual work,'**, since such a game consists of visual and aural features 
of an audiovisual display containing original variations sufficient to 
render the display copyrightable as an audiovisual work^° even though the 
underlying written program has an independent existence and is itself 
eligible for copyright.^' 
(iii) Databases : 
Copyright protection for the information assembled in a computer-
ised database is less certain under the English law. For the same reason, 
it was decided not to address this issue in the 1988 Act and there are no 
English cases which give guidance in this area. 
Looking at the traditional law on copyright, where information is 
extracted from a diversity of sources and compiled into one directory or 
compilation, then a copyright as a literary work will vest in the 'author' 
or person who performs the work of compiling according to ordinary 
principles. Naturally, the requisite amount of originality must be shown, 
and it is, therefore, necessary to show that skill and labour have been spent 
in the work of compilation. Section 3 (1) of the U.K. Act expressly 
provides that a literary work as defined extends to cover 'a table or 
compilation'. A copyright will subsist in the compilation which is separate 
from any copyright which may subsist in any of the works comprised in the 
compilation. 
This can be seen by the case of Black Lock & Co. Ltd. V. Pearson 
Ltd.^^, where copyright protection was held to vest in a well known 
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national publication giving the railway time - tables for the index thereof. 
More recently, in Independent T. V. Publications Ltd. V. Time Out Ltd.''\ 
protection of copyright was held to exist in the compilation of the T. V. and 
radio programs as they appear in the radio times and T. V. times and it was 
held an infringement for these to be copied and produced in the magazine 
Time out. However, where selection of materials is trivial or common 
place then copyright protection will be denied.^'' There indeed seems to be 
no reason in principle why cases which apply to manually maintained 
databases should not also apply to computerised databases.^' 
In the United States, on the other hand, in December 1980, the 
Congress amended the 1976 Copyright Act so as to explicitly place 
copyright owners of computer programs in the same general copyright law 
position as owners of other literary works. The 1980 Amendment as noted 
above defines a computer program as a set of statements or instructions to 
be used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result. 
The 1976 Copyright Law's standards for copyrightability are, by and 
large, indifferent to medium in which a work of authorship is embodied. 
Because compilations of data on paper have often been recognised as 
capable of qualifying as works of authorship, there would seem to be no 
special problem in carrying over the context as observed above regarding 
British position, to compilations when in the form of machine - readable 
materials such as magnetic tapes and disks. 
The 1976 Congress was thus willing to acknowledge that copyright 
would apply, but it was unsure as to precisely how it should apply in 
connection with computer user of computer data bases or, indeed, of other 
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copyrighted works. Consequently, congress retained the status quo and 
while it waited for CONTU to complete its studies and report. The way in 
which Congress preserved the status quo was to include in the 1976 
copyright law a provision stating that the law. 
Does not afford to the owners of copyright in a work 
any greater or lesser rights with respect to use of the 
work in conjunction with (computers)... than those 
afforded to work under the law in effect on Decem-
ber 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a 
court in an action brought under ....(the 1976 copy-
right law)" 
The notion of preserving the pre - 1978 law was not a satisfactory 
long - term solution, as few, if any, people were confident that they knew 
what the applicable legal standards were. This area of law was quite 
undeveloped. CONTU, after studying the issue of computer data bases in 
the context of a general provisions of the 1976 Statute, concluded that the 
ordinary statutory standards were, by and large, suitable for coping with 
the issues that arise when works are used in conjunction with computers. 
And, in order to make the general copyright law provisions applicable to 
such matters, CONTU recommended that the clause quoted above be 
deleted from the law.^" Congress followed that recommendation in its 1980 
Amendment to the Statute. 
Coming to India, the Indian Copyright law after the 1983 amend-
ment did define 'literary work' to include compilation and computer 
programs, that it to say, programs recorded on any disc, tape, perforated 
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media or other information storage device, which, if fed into or located in 
a computer or computer based equipment is capable of reproducing any 
information and thus was sufficient to include databases but the 1994 
Amendment further made the position more explicit by expressly including' data-
bases' in its new definition of "literary work" which now includes computer 
programs, tables and compilations including computer data bases.*^ 
(iv) Documentations : 
Documentation in the form of instruction manuals and the like will 
consist of written text along with diagrams or perhaps, pictures and 
photographs as well. It is clear that such works will be protected in the 
three jurisdictions as literary or artistic works as appropriate. 
(I) OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHT 
(i) Authorship and Ownership Distinguished : 
In the three countries which are under study, two concepts are used 
i.e. authorship and ownership. The author in relation to a work, means the 
person who creates it. For instance the 1994 Indian Amendment to 
Copyright Act lays down in Section 2 (d) (vi) that in relation to any 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer generated, 
the author shall be the person who causes the work to be created. Secondly, 
there is the concept of first owner, the person in whom copyright vests 
immediately, as from its creation (regardless of the subsequent devalua-
tion or dealing in that copyright). 
hi these countries as in most other jurisdictions, the author is the jBrst owner of any 
copyright in it but tiiere are exceptions to this rule which are to be examined. 
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(ii) Computer - Generated Works : 
In relation to computer generated works, Section 9 (3) of the U.K. 
Act 1988 states that where any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work 
is computer generated, then the author is taken to be the person by whom 
the arrangement necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken. 
There appears to be two candidates for the role of the person who makes 
the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work. Either this could 
mean the person who produced the computer program in the first place 
which was responsible for generating the work in question, the operation 
of the program which generated that work. It is submitted that the Section 
is aimed at the latter person, the person who controls the actual operation 
of the computer program. However, the matter is not beyond doubt and a 
written agreement between the parties expressly dealing with the issue of 
copyright ownership of computer - generated works is always advisable. 
This new provision dealing with computer generated works is an 
important and innovative feature of the 1988 Act. With the widespread use 
of programming tools and automated processes, there are increasing cases 
of works, including computer software, being created where there is little 
or no identifiable human skill or labour. Examples of these computer 
generated works include the telephone directory, crossword puzzles, 
weather maps produced by communication from a satellite to a computer 
and the output of expert systems. 
However, care must be taken to distinguish between 'computer 
generated works' and so called 'computer aided work's. Where the use of 
a computer is incidental to the creation of a copyright work, and it can be 
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said that there has been an expenditure of human skill and effort, then the 
availability of copyright protection for these works produced with the aid 
of a computer will be subject to the normal rules and not the special 
provisions of Section 9 (3). A common example of a computer aided work 
is a literary work written using a word processor. 
(iii) Employees And Freelance Programers : 
The author of a work is the first owner of the copyright in the work. 
An exception which applies to literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, 
is where the work is done by an 'employee in the course of his employ-
ment'in which case, in all the three countries i.e. U.K., U.S.A. & India, the 
employer becomes the first owner of the copyright in the work. This raises 
the vital questions such as who is an employer? What is the meaning of in 
the course of an employment and what is the position regarding 'freelance 
computer programmers' and 'consultants'? 
Both the U.K. Act of 1988 and Indian Copyright Act, 1957 do not 
specifically define these terms but state that 'employed' 'employee' and 
'employer' and 'employment' refer to employment under a contract of 
service or apprenticeship." 
(iv) The Employee and the Course of Employment : 
As regards persons who can safely be classified as employees, their 
employers can not safely assume that they will own the copyright in 
everything produced by those employees. For example, if an employee 
writes a computer program to help with his work but he is not employed 
as a computer programmer, his job is not to write computer programs and 
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an employer can't necessarily assume that he owns the copyright of that 
particular program. A lecturer normally owns the copyright in any book or 
article he writes because he is primarily employed as a teacher and not as 
a writer of books and articles, even though his employer may encourage 
such writing. A person employed as an accountant who writes a computer 
program to help with the production of financial accounts will own the 
copyright in that program if he wrote it in his own time, using his own 
equipment. Initially, this may create no problems because the accountant 
may have been motivated by interest and a desire to improve his own 
efficiency at work, but problems could arise later, if the accountant moves 
to another firm or discovers that his program is commercially viable. If an 
employer is faced with the situation where an employee has in his own 
time and using his own equipment, developed a useful computer program, 
then the employer should immediately try to reach agreement on question 
of ownership and use of the prgrams with the employee concerned, rather 
than allowing the program to be used without such agreement. 
If an employee has produced a computer program outside the 
normal course of his duties, but has used his employer's equipment or 
done it during the hours of his employment, the ownership of copyright 
is more difficult to predict, although it is more likely that the employer will 
be treated as owner. But, even here, it is wiser to seek agreement at the 
outset rather than leave matters until there is some disagreement about the 
continued use or the exploitation of the program.''' 
The construction of the words 'in the course of his employment' has 
on occasions, created difficulties which have received judicial attention. 
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For example, in Byne V. Statist company?^, the court had to consider this 
question in connection with a translation of a speech made by an 
employee. The employee in question was on the editorial staff of the 
Financial Times and actually performed the work of translation in his own 
time and received a fee for this. It was held in action by the employee 
against another journal which had reproduced the text of the speech, that 
the employee was the owner of the translation as it had not been made in 
the course of his employment. To create a translation from Portuguese into 
English was outside the normal functions of an employer on the editorial 
staff of a daily newspaper. 
In a more recent case on this matter. Judge Paul Baker was prepared 
to extend an interlocutory injunction until trial against a defendant who, 
it was alleged, has created a rival computer program whilst working for the 
plaintiff and not withstanding that the defendant might have produced his 
program in his spare time and or his own machine, the facts were in 
dispute and the judge was not prepared to make any decision on the law, 
but, in accordance with America! C';;«aw/(a^  principles found, he could not 
say 'that the plaintiff had no real prospect of success.'^ 
(v) Freelance Staff : 
In many cases, freelance staff, hired to perform a particular task 
such as writing or modifying a specific computer program, will be deemed 
to be self-employed. The consequence of this is that the copyright in any 
program they write vfill, prima facie and in the absence of any agreement 
otherwise, belong to the freelance programmer. It is essential, therefore, 
when employing freelance staff or anyone else who is not employed on a 
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permanent contract of employment, to make contractual provision for 
determining ownership of copyright. The organisation hiring the program-
mer or consultant may want to own the copyright so that it can exploit the 
resultant program itself, or it may simply want to prevent its competitors 
from obtaining a copy of it. In either of these situations the contract should 
specifically state that the first ownership of the copyright belongs to the 
organisation and not to the programmer, and furthermore, there should be 
a written assignment of copyright, signed by the freelance programmer. 
It is possible in the case of a commissioned work that there is an 
enforceable contract, the party issuing the commission will be considered 
an equitable owner, entitled to call on the author who, according to the 
statute, is the legal owner, to make a proper legal assignment of his entire 
interest to the commissioner. Such cases have been rare, but an English 
example was Merchant Adventures Ltd. V. MGrew & Co.^^, where, the 
plaintiff had commissioned certain designs for electrical light fittings and 
it was held that the plaintiff acquired an equitable title sufficient to form 
the basis for an interlocutory injunction. It should be noted that the action 
was not taken against author of the copyright work, and he indeed made no 
claims to the works he had produced. In one case which is otherwise of 
interest on the question of interlocutory injunctions, a commissioner of 
software was held to have an 'immensely' arguable' case that he was 
beneficial owner of it'^ on a hearing for interlocutory relief, but the Court 
of Appeal, like the judge at first instance, did not elaborate on this or 
investigate in detail the merits of the case. 
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(vi) Joint Authorship and Ownership : 
It is often the case that a software house will establish a software 
development team of programmers comprised both of its own staff and of 
independent freelancing programmers. If the contract for the engagement 
of the freelance programmers says nothing to the contrary, then it is 
certainly possible that a work of joint, authorship has been created. This 
is defined in all three countries (U.K., U.S.A. & India) to be a work 
produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the 
contribution of each author is not distinct from that of the other author or 
authors.^* In this case, copyright could then vest in all the authors, or their 
employers. In the illustration given above, this would mean that the 
software house would own the resulting software jointly with the indepen-
dent third party programmers. 
However, the above illustration must be distinguished from the 
position where a number of people have made separate contributions to a 
software development project, each of which can be identified as such. In 
this case, a number of different and separate copyrights may exist in the 
programs and related documentation. 
(J) DURATION OF COPYRIGHT : 
If copyright vests in a work, then it will vest as from the moment of 
that work's creation. Unlike U.S., under the English & Indian laws, 
copyright begins automatically without the need for compliance with any 
formalities. 
In relation to a computer program, copyright expires at the end of 
the period of 50 years from the end of the calendar year in which the author 
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dies.*" In U.S., generally it is for 75 years from the first publication. It does 
not matter that the first owner of the copyright is a different person from 
the author : thus, if a computer programmer is under a contract of 
employment with a company, and produces a computer program in the 
course of his employment, then according to the normal rules, the first 
owner of the copyright will be the employer not the author but the duration 
of that copyright will be worked out by reference to the lifespan of the 
employee programmer plus 50 years. 
The right for exploitation of a work under the Copyright Acts, are 
given for too long a time. It is submitted that with the fast changing 
reproduction technology, the authors can get returns in the market much 
faster than their counterparts could get in past. Therefore, there is a need 
to reduce this time for exclusive use of a work by the author, more so in 
the case of a fast-changing electronic technology and computer software. 
It is, therefore, suggested that five or seven years period will be sufficient 
for the creator of software to get returns in the market with fair share of 
profit. This has the effect of modifying the present system where the 
protection is available to the authors for the lifetime and until fifty years 
after their death from the beginning of the calendar year next following 
the year in which such author dies and in case of institutional work, it is 
available for fifty years from the beginning of the calendar year next 
following the year in which the work is first published.*' 
(i) Computer - Generated Works : 
Section 12(3) of the U.K. Act of 1988 provides that if a work is 
computer generated, copyright expires at the end of the period of 50 years 
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from the end of the calendar year in which the work was done. 
(ii) Works of Joint Authorship : 
It should be noted that different provisions apply in relation to a 
work of joint authorship, where in general the copyright will last for a 
period of 50 years after the end of the calendar year in which the last of 
the author dies.*^ 
Where work is of unknown authorship, then copyright expires at the 
end of the period of 50 years from the end of the calendar year in which 
the work is first made available to the public. In both U.K. & India, the 
identity of an author will be regarded as imknown if it is not possible for a person 
to ascertain his identify by reasonable inquiry and if the identify of an author is 
once known, a work can not subsequently be regarded as unknown. 
(K) RESTRICTED ACTS OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS : 
The copyright laws in the three countries give the owner of copy-
right the exclusive right to do certain acts and these are referred to as acts 
restricted by the copyright. Of the acts restricted by copyright, three are 
worthy of special mention as far as computer programs are concerned, 
these are : 
(a) Copying, 
(b) Issuing copies to the public, and 
(c) Making an adaptation 
It may seem strange, but the word 'copy' is new in the U.K. Act of 
1988, as the word used in the Copyright Act of 1956 was 'reproduce'. 
However, copying in relation to a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
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work means, by Section 17(2), reproducing the work in any material form 
which includes storage in any medium by electronic means; for example, 
making a copy of a computer program on a magnetic disk. Additionally, in 
relation to all forms of copyright work, copying includes making copies 
which are transient or incidental to some other use of the work (Section 
17(6). This implies that the act of loading a computer program into a 
computer only for the purpose of running the program will be considered 
to be making a copy of the program, even though this 'copy' will be lost 
as soon as the computer is switched off. In this way, any unauthorized use 
of a computer program will infringe the copyright in that program. 
Issuing copies of a work to the public is a restricted act and will 
infringe copyright if done without the permission of the owner of the 
copyright. As regards computer programs, sound recording and films, 
Section 18 widens this restricted act to include rental of copies to the 
public. However, this restricted act is only relevant in the context of a 
particular work if copies of that work have not previously been put into 
circulation. The restricted act would apply to a situation where a person 
acquires a computer program which is not available to the public and then 
sells or sends copies of the program to the public. Usually, there would 
also be an infringement of copying by making copies of the program. 
Making an adaptation of a literary, dramatic or musical work is 
restricted act. In terms of a musical work, a new arrangement of a song is 
an adaptation of the original. Changing a cartoon strip into a story told by 
words only is also an adaptation, as in a translation of a literary or dramatic 
work*\ For computer program, by section 21(4) of the U.K. Act 1988 a 
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translation has been given a special meaning and includes : 
a version of the program in which it is converted 
into or out of a computer language or code, other-
wise than incidentally in the course of running the 
program. 
If a high level, source code computer program is compiled (con-
verted) into an object code program, this will be an adaptation of the 
source code program and therefore, a restricted act. At first sight, it would 
appear that the object code program, because it a 'computer program', 
should be protected as a literary work in its own right. However, the 
elements of skill, labour and effort will be missing from the object code 
version which will have been created simply by using an appropriate 
compiler program.*" These elements will, of course, be present as regards 
the source code program. Therefore, it is desirable that object code 
program are protected as adaptations of literary works. 
It could be argued that the meaning of'translation' is too wide as it 
seems to catch a version of a source code program written in different high 
level language from that used for the original program. If a computer 
program is written using BASIC and someone then re-writes the program 
in COBOL, the latter will be an adaptation of the BASIC program because 
it has been Converted into a different computer language. But, to produce 
a program in a different high level language is not merely a question of 
translating the program instructions from one language to another as with 
the spoken languages : the programmer would have to reduce the original 
program to its underlying concepts and ideas and from those concepts and 
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ideas (not from the computer programs itself) develop a new version of the 
program in another high level language. 
The difference between the two programs could be as wide as those 
between Romeo and Juliet and West Side Story, and as a basic principle, 
Copyright should not protect ideas as such, only the expression or 
recording of those ideas. However, it seems that the new version of a 
program in a different highlevel language will be an adaptation, regardless 
of the quite considerable amount of skill and effort required to 'translate' 
the program. 
Restricted acts apply to a work as a whole or to any substantial part 
of it.*^ What is substantial is a matter of fact and the courts will look to 
quality as well as quantity.** 
(L) 'LOOK & FEEU AND THE LIMITS OF 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION : 
The copyright laws in the countries under discussion, more particu-
larly in the United Kingdom and the United States, clearly take copying 
beyond a literal, word-to-word reproduction of a copyright work. Copying 
can be done 'either directly or indirectly'**. An illustration of the meaning 
of this expression is that if, for example, A writes a novel and B (with A's 
permission) turns it into a play and C without authorisation copies B's 
play, then C has infringed A's copyright in the original novel (as well as 
any separate copyright that might exist in the play). This could doubtless be 
applied by analogy to computer software in the appropriate circumstances. 
As we have seen above that straight copying of a computer program 
is obviously an act restricted by the copyright. The act of copying may. 
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however, be much more subtle. Take the situation where an employee is 
employed as a computer programmer to write a computer program to 
perform a specific function. That employee may leave and join a compe-
tition of his former employer or go into business in his own account. He 
may then produce his own program which performs identical function as 
the software which he wrote for his previous employer, but he might have 
started the coding from search and done it completely differently, perhaps 
written it in a completely different computer language. What he might 
have copied, if 'copy' is the correct term to use here, is the underlying 
design, he saves himself the labour of going back to the very beginning and 
working out the sequence and flow of a program, work which was all done 
before the initial act of coding commenced when working for his employer. This 
is often referred to as copying the look and feel of computer software. 
How is copyright law to regard this practice ? It is plainly not 
copying as that word is normally understood, yet it is certainly a practice 
which enables an individual to take advantage of the investment put in by 
another party. Copyright as has been noted above does not give a 
monopoly in ideas; what it does is to prevent a person from copying or 
otherwise capitalizing on tangible expression of ideas made by other. 
Copyright protects expression not idea. Therefore, in principle, it is quite 
acceptable to write a novel about a secret agent in the style of Ian Fleming 
as long as it doesn't contain copies of parts of James Bond novels. 
In the United States, attempts are being made to widen the scope of 
copyright so that it can protect the ideas behind the particular work. But 
in the case of computer programs it is difficult to distinguish between idea 
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and expression. However, the structure, sequence and organisation of the 
program alleged to be the copy provide useful guidelines. This problem 
was recognised in an American case Whelan Associates Inc V. Jaslow 
Dental Laboratory*'^ probably the first case anywhere in the world where 
this issue was litigated, where the court said:** 
the coding process is a comparatively small part of 
programming. By far the larger portion of the ex-
pense and difficulty in creating computer programs 
is attributable to the development of the structure 
and logic of the program, to debugging, documenta-
tion and maintenance, rather than to the coding. 
The court in that case seemed to accept that as little as 20 percent 
of the cost of program development is directly attributable to the 
operation of coding itself and that the remaining 80 percent of effort is 
directed to ancillary matters. 
(I) Different Procedural Approaches Under 
United States and English Law : 
This whole area is a matter that has been litigated on many occa-
sions in the United States but seems hardly to have been raised in English 
case-law to date. This can be explained by the difference in the conditions 
for granting remedies between the U.S. courts and the English courts. 
In cases of copyright infringement in U.K., the plaintiff will nearly 
always want, wherever possible, to apply for an interlocutory or prelimi-
nary injunction. Under, the U.S. law, one of conditions for obtaining a 
preliminary injunction (the equivalent of an English interlocutory injunc-
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tion) is that the plaintiff must show 'a substantial likelihood of success on 
the merits''" or as it has been put in another case 'a reasonable probability 
of success on the merit' ' '. 
This contrasts with the situation in English law where the grounds 
for obtaining an interlocutory injunction were set out in American Cyanamid 
V. Ethicon LtcP^ where Lord Diplock seems to suggest three ways of 
expressing the same test. First, the court must be satisfied that the claim 
is not frivolous or vexatious; secondly, the court must be satisfied that 
there is a serious question to be tried; and thirdly, the Court must ask itself 
whether the plaintiff has any real prospect of succeeding at main trial. A 
moment's reflection will indicate that these are all rather different 
standards and in fact in the subsequent case law on this subject, the courts 
seem to have required the plaintiff to show what is described as an 
'arguable case'. In any event, the standard of proof required of a plaintiff 
on an application for an interlocutory injunction by the English courts 
seems to be somewhat lower than that required by the U.S. Courts and for 
this reason, the English courts have had little opportunity to examine in 
great detail a case involving allegations of infringement by look and feel. 
It may therefore be instructive to look at the American case law at some 
length so as to see the general approach adopted by the courts in the United States. 
(ii) U.S. Law ; Whelan Associates V. Jaslow Dental Laboratory 
It is necessary to start by looking at Whelan case as the basic facts 
in that case are illustrative of a not uncommon situation. In this case, 
Jaslow Dental Laboratory was in the business of manufacturing dental 
prosthetics and devices. Jaslow retained the services of one Elaine Whelan, 
CHAPTER - 6 :289 
then employed by Strohl Systems Groups Inc to write a computer program 
for their business. This program was written in EDL (Event Driven 
Language) and was designed to run on an IBM series I machine. Elaine 
Whelan left her employer and set up her own business to market the 
program which she has written and her previous employer assigned to her 
all rights (including copyright) in that computer program. Jaslow agreed 
to market this computer program and signed an agreement to that effect. 
Rand Jaslow, one of the owners of Jaslow Dental Laboratory, then wrote 
a program in BASIC to run on personal computers. This program had a 
similar function to that produced by Whelan. Jaslow set up a company to 
market their new product and terminated their existing marketing agree-
ment with whelan. 
The court found as a fact that the program written by Jaslow was not 
a direct translation of the original program (which it could not be owing 
to the differences between the two computer languages) but was substan.-
tially similar to it because structure and overall organisation were substan-
tially similar. The court also found that Jaslow had been able to produce 
a program with such substantial similarities because it had access to the 
original program. On these facts, the court, both at first instance and an 
appeal, found that the copyright owned by Whelan in the program that she 
had written had been infringed because Jaslow, whilst not making a literal 
copy of Whelan's software, had copied its structure, sequence and 
organisation. 
The court seems to have taken a policy decision. We have already 
seen how the court took account of the proportion of work spent in coding 
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compared to the amount of work that is spent in pre-coding research and 
organisation. The court clearly felt that this was effort that deserved to be 
protected by copyright law. As the court said :" 
we must remember that the purpose of the copy-
right law is to create the most efficient and produc-
tive balance between protection (incentive) and 
dissemination of information, to promote learning, 
culture and development. 
The difficulty that the court faced was in distinguishing the idea 
from the expression of that idea. We have already seen that copyright does 
not exist to protect ideas, but only those ideas as they are expressed in a 
form acceptable to copyright law. In this case, the court recognised that 
the expression of the idea resided in the literal coding developed in 
Whelan, and the idea was the function of the program as expressed by that 
coding. In the literal coding, the expression was protected, how far could 
protection be afforded to the way in which that expression had been 
organised or, to put it another way, to what extent could copyright protect 
not just the literal coding, but the overall structure, sequence and 
organisation of that literal coding ? 
The U.S. court came up with the solution which it expressed as follows^'': 
... the line between idea and expression may be 
drawn with reference to the end sought to be achieved 
by the work in question. In other words, the purpose 
or would be the work's idea, and everything that is 
not necessary to that purpose or function would be 
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part of the expression of the idea ... where there are 
various means of achieving the desired purpose, then 
the particular means chosen necessary to the 
purpose, hence there is expression, not idea. 
In other words, where there are several ways of achieving one 
utilitarian object by means of a computer program, then to apply the same 
means that object would be to risk copyright infringement. If, on the other 
hand, there is only one utilitarian solution to a stated problem, then 
copyright can not be obtained in that single solution, as this would be to 
grant a monopoly to one person. 
(iii) U.S. Law : After Whelan - Limits to the Doctrine : 
Courts in the United States have to wrestle with the same problem 
in subsequent cases. One such case was Plains Cotton Co-operative 
Association ofLubbok Texas V. Goodpasture Computer Service Inc.^\ In 
this case the plaintiff (Plains Cotton) developed a computer program 
which it proceeded to market. Certain employees who had been involved 
in developing that computer program left and formed their own company. 
One way in which they wished to develop their business was by producing 
a new version of their former employer's program, but which would work 
on personal computers. They ultimately came up with a design whilst in 
the employment of the defendants in the case. The court found that the PC-
based product was very similar to the original main frame product on the 
functional specification, programming and documentation levels. The 
court found that several pages of the manuals for the PC based product 
seemed to be direct copies from the pages of the design manual created 
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while the former employees had been working for their own company. The 
defence was run on the basis that idea and expression were one and that 
the form of expression chosen was the only one available to express the 
idea. It will be recalled from what was said about Whelan case above that 
the court found that only where there were several ways of expressing the 
same idea could infringement of copyright be found, provided the defendent 
had copied the same manner of expression. If there was only one method 
of expressing the idea, then the court would not find that the defendant had 
infringed copyright by using that same manner of expression. 
The court in the Plains Cotton Co-operative Case thus, held that 
idea was merged with expression when it said that the record supports the 
inference that market factors play a significant role in determining the 
sequence and organisation of cotton marketing software, and we decline 
to hold that those patterns can't constitute 'ideas' in a computer context. 
(iv) English Copyright Law & "Look Feel Cases" : 
The position under American law has been dealt with at some length 
since there is no relevant reported English and Indian case law which gives 
a similar degree of assistance in this difficult area. Yet we can examine the 
considerations which an English court would take into account. 
First, it is necessary to look at the English case of Ms. Associates 
Limited V. Power,^'' which was a case where 'look and feel' principles were 
raised in an application for an interlocutory injunction. As was shown 
above, it is not necessary for an English court to review at great length the 
issues relating to merits in such situations and accordingly, on the facts of 
the case, Faulkner, J., was prepared to find that the plaintiff had made out 
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an arguable case of copyright infringement. 
(a) Ms. Associates V. Power : 
Ms. Associates case was another case where action was taken 
against a previous employee. In this case, one Mr. Power had been 
employed by Ms. Associates Limited and in the course of his employment 
had written the code for the library section of a program called 'C-Gen'. 
This program translated computer software written in BASIC into C 
language. Mr. Power left and set up on his own account and became an 
authorised distributor of C-Gen. Mr. Power then formed a company and 
this was in turn nominated an authorised distribution for C-Gen. During 
this time, Mr. Power wrote his own translator program and called it 
'B-Tran'. A great deal of expert evidence was submitted to the court for 
consideration and the plaintiff relied on the 'many objective similarities 
in structure and in detail' between the library section of B-Tran and that 
of C-Gen. As is usual in copyright cases, the plaintiff laid great stress on 
the opportunity for the defendants to gain access to the plaintiff's work 
and, therefore, the opportunity to copy it. Evidence was put in as to 
simultaneous claim between the lines of code involved. The defendants 
put in evidence that out of a total of 15,000 lines of code, the line 
similarities between the two programs were only some 43 in total. The 
plaintiff's response to this evidence was to rely on evidence of similarities 
of structure. The court does not appear to have considered the American 
cases and the conclusion reached by Faulkner J. on the question of an 
arguable case was quite simply stated : 
Giving the matter the best consideration I can, on 
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the materials now before me, it seems to me that the 
plaintiffs have shown that they have an arguable 
case in that they have a real prospect of succeeding 
in obtaining a permanent injunction at the trial. 
The court was proceeding on the basis that copyright infringement 
could be made out but without a full consideration of all the issues. The 
decision is of doubtful authority.'^ 
(b) English Law ; A more Recent Decision : 
More recent is the decision in Computer Aided Systems (U.K.) Ltd. 
V. BolwelP^. This again was a case concerning an action brought against 
ex-employees who were alleged to have written a program which, whilst 
not being a translation of their previous employer's computer program, 
was alleged to copy the overall design, structure and organisation of their 
previous employer's program. Again, evidence was led of the access that 
the defendant had to the plaintiff's copyright material and the court was 
asked to infer from the short time available to the defendants that it was 
impossible that they could have originated their own computer program 
without recourse to copying their previous employer's work. Again, in this 
case, a direct translation was impossible as the defendants had written their 
progiam in a fourth generation language called Progress whereas the program 
which they had allegedly copied from had been written in COBOL.^ ^ 
This again was an application for an interlocutory injunction and 
the court seems to have been prepared to accept that the overall structure of a 
computer program was a matter in which copyright could subsist, following 
American authority of Whelan. However, in this particular case, the court 
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was not prepared to find that there was an arguable case on the evidence, 
(c) English Law ; General Principles : 
What then would be the principles that a court should apply in 
England? It has always been the case that to make out a case of infringe-
ment of copyright it is not necessary to rely on a literal copyright word for 
word or letter for letter. This is obvious, otherwise a defendant could avoid 
infringement by merely minor changes. How far a court will go in giving 
protection against non-literal copying is, however, a fine question depend-
ing on the facts of each case. 
The breadth of copyright protection for computer programs, thus, is 
potentially very generous, extending to program structure, screen displays 
and preparatory materials.'^' But it is shocking that in U.K., this has been 
significantly compromised by the Copyright (Computer Programs) Regu-
lation of 1992 which came into force on 1 January 1993. The Regulations 
were made in order to ensure that the United Kingdom complied with the 
European Community Directive on the legal protection of computer 
programs.'"-
(M) INDIAN COPYRIGHT (AMENDMENT) ACT 1994 
& COMPUTER SOFTWARE : 
Though 1994 Indian Amendment has already been discussed in the 
chpater, few specific things even at the cost of repitation need further 
elaboration. The Copyright Act of 1957 was amended in 1983 and then 
again 1994 to give effective protection to computer programs. 
After the 1983 Amendment, Section 2(0) in its definition of "liter-
ary work" included : 
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"tables and compilations and computer programmes, that is to say, 
programmes recorded on any disc, tape, re perforated media or other 
information storage device, which, if fed into or located in a computer or 
computer based equippment is capable of reproducing any information." 
After the 1994 Amendment, above section now reads as follows : 
"literary work" includes computer programmes, tables and compilations 
including computer data basis." 
The 1994 Amendment now specifically gives definition of "computer" 
and "computer programme" by inserting new clauses in Section 2(ff). 
"Computer" includes any electronic or similar device having 
information possessing capabilities. 
"Computer programme" means a set of instruction expressed in 
words, codes, schemes or in any other form, including a machine readable 
medium, capable of causing a computer to perform a particular task or 
achieve a particular result." 
It is indeed strange to note that though the amendment was intro-
duced in 1992 and was referred to Parliamentary Joint Select Committee, 
yet it uses the word "computer programme" though the appropriate 
expression is "computer program". The latter spelling of "program" is 
the correct usage in relation to computers, both as noun and as verb. 
Similarly there could be a legal loophole with regard to the interpretation 
of term "information". It is, therefore, proposed that the section be 
amended and should read : 
"Computer" includes any electronic or similar device having 
information and/or data processing capabilities. 
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The 1994 Amendment confers following exclusive copyright rights 
in respect of computer programs -
(i) to reproduce the work in any material forms including the storing of 
it in any medium by electronics means; 
(ii) to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in 
circulation, 
(iii) to perform the work in public, or communicate it to the public; 
(iv) to make any cinematograph film, or sound recording in respect of 
the work; 
(v) to work any translation of the work; 
(vi) to make any adaptation of the work: 
(vii) to do, in relation to a translation or an adaptation of the work, any 
of the acts specified in relation to the work in sub-clauses (i) to (v). 
The above rights are available to computer programs in company 
with literary, dramatic or musical works. But there are some rights which 
have been specifically guranteed such as to sell or give on hire, or offer for 
sale or hire, any copy of the computer programme, regardless of whether 
such copy has been sold or given on hire on earlier occasions. 
Since computer programs are "used" by customers who pay a 
licence fee to the owner of the copyright in the program to permit them to 
" u s e " the program, it should have been explicitly declared that the right 
to use is one of the rights vested in the copyright owner. Accordingly the 
clause should have read : 
to sell or give on hire, or offer for sale or hire, or use_ 
any copy of the computer program, regardless of 
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whether such copy has been sold or given on hire or 
put to use on earlier occasions. 
As to the acts which do not constitute an infringement of copyright, 
the 1994 Amendment inserted following clauses in Section 52 in relation 
to computer programs: 
" the making of copies or adaptation of a computer programme by the 
lawful possessor of a copy of such computer programme, from such copy-
(i) in order to utilise the computer programme for the purpose for 
which it was supplied, or 
(ii) to make back-up copies purely as a temporary protection against 
loss, destruction or damage in order only to utilise the computer 
programme for the purpose for which it was supplied." 
This also needs a minor amendment to use expression "lawful 
uses" instead of "lawful possessor". 
Then the Amendment has inserted Section 63B which provides: 
Any person who knowingly makes use on a computer of an infring-
ing copy of a computer programme shall be punishable with imprisonment 
for a term which shall not be less than seven days but which may extend 
to three years and with fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand 
rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees. 
Provided that where the computer programme has not been used for 
gain or in the course of trade or business, the court may, for adequate and 
sepcial reasons to be mentioned in the judgement, not impose any sentence 
of imprisonment and may impose a fine which may extend to fifty 
thousand rupees." 
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It seems that the minimum sentence of seven days is too liberal. The 
original proposal of one month's minimum sentence in the 1992 Bill 
should, therefore, be brought back. 
Thus it has been noticed in this chapter that copyright protection to 
computer software is the need of this last decade of 20th century. As 21st 
century is going to a century of computers, complicated legal issues are 
bound to arise and, therefore, more indepth studies in this vital area are 
urgently required. It is also to be noted that in all the three countries which 
form subject matter of present study i.e. U.K., U.S.A. and India, the 
legislative activity on copyrightability of software has been quite recent 
one and these countries in quest of keeping pace with fast changing 
computer technology are trying to bring in quick amendments in this area. 
It is quite satisfying to note that India has not lagged behind in this vital 
area, so crucial for our development and both 1983 and 1994 Copyright 
Amendments did try to provide best possible software protection. 
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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION & ARCHITECTURAL 
PLANS, DRAWINGS AND DESIGNS 
An 'architect'' expresses his thought and reveals his artistic 
personality in his 'writings'^. In this respect, he is similar to all other 
creators of intellectual properties. Unlike the writer of books, the 
architect is not limited to words. In addition to words, he uses, among 
other things, technical signs and symbols and graphic representations to 
communicate his ideas. The architect might be compared to the 
composer of music. The architect's signs, symbols, and graphic repre-
sentations are to the builder what a composer's notes and performance 
instructions are to the musician. 
Generally speaking all of the architect's writings are put under 
the collective caption of "plans, drawings and designs". Architects, 
generally use the "drawings" to cover all written expressions of their art. 
How much protection is available to the creator of architectural 
plans, drawings, and designs under copyright principles? How the 
protection to architectural works came to be recognised ? And whether 
this protection is similar in scope to that granted to such producers of 
intellectual property as authors, artists, and composers ? are the 
major queries which this chapter undertakes to examine. It also exam-
ines issues such as ownership of property, copyright in plans, infringe-
ment of copyright in architectural works and the question of publication 
in this regard etc. 
(A) ARCHITECTURAL WORKS UNDER BERNE CONVENTION ; 
The original Convention of 1886 covered "les oeureres de dessin 
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(ie penture, desculpture de f^ravtire ". It also included les lithographies 
together with illustrations and geographical charts. These are "artistic 
works", par excllence, as distinguished from literary works. They are 
different form of expression of the intellect. The expression aeuveres de 
dessin is very broad in the French language, comprising even sculp-
tures. 
Architectural works were not included in the Convention of 
1886, except that "plans, sketches and artistic works relating to archi-
tecture were enumerated in Article 4. While the claim of the architect 
to copyright in his plans, designs and sketches was widely recognised, 
that of copyright in the construction was generally not. At the three 
Berne Conferences which elaborated the Convention of 1886, the 
question was not discussed. It was in 1890 that the Belgian author Jules 
de Borchgrave for the first time raised a plea for the protection of 
architects, and following further discussion, especially at the 
Congresses of the International Association, a proposal was made by 
many delegations at the Paris Conference of 1896, for the inclusion of 
works of architecture, besides works of sculpture, in the enumeration of 
artistic works."* It was rightly argued that an edifice may embody an 
original creation on the part of an architect, the same as a artistic work 
of a sculptor. The protection afforded by the prohibition of copying the 
plans or drawings of an architect was not sufficient, because this did not 
protect against copying of the architectural work itself. Plans or 
drawings are not absolutely essential to the construction of such works. 
This proposal was objected to on the part of the German delega-
tion on the ground that there are constractions lacking any artistic 
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character, and their reproduction could not be considered an infringe-
ment of a work of art. The British and Norwegian delegations were also 
opposed to the inclusion. The fact was that in no country at that time 
were architectural works explicitly protected by legislation, although in 
some countries the law was construed to afford copyright protection to 
such works. It was, therefore, agreed to insert in the Final Protocol a stipulation 
on works of architecture similar to that of choreographic works. 
Thus paragraph I of the Final Protocol, as amended by the 
Additional Act of Paris, provided : 
In the countries of the Union in which protection is 
granted not only to architectural plans, but also to the 
actual works of architecture, such works are admit-
ted to the benefit of the provisions of the Conven-
tions of Berne and of this Additional Act. 
It was clearly understood, in view of the general principle of 
Article 2, that in countries in which this protection existed, nationals of other 
countries of the union were to be protected without condition of reciprocity. 
At the Berlin Conference in the year 1908, the German govern-
ment abandoned in this, as in several other questions, its previous 
narrow attitude, and proposed the works of architecture be protected by 
the convention.^ This was agreed upon, and the works in question w ere 
inserted in the enumeration of literary and artistic works in Article 2. It 
was understood at the conference that protection was to be secured on 
original artistic works of architecture, and not on common construc-
tions which did not reveal the personality of the author. The purpose for 
which the building was to be used should be immaterial. A building 
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might at the same time be useful and artistic. It mattered not that its 
utilitarian value predominated over its artistic character. 
Works of architecture include palaces, churches, triumphal arches, 
monumental fountains, and the like. Ornaments, forming an inseparable 
part of a building, may constitute the principal characteristic of a 
construction, and they are to be deemed covered by the protection 
accorded to architectural works. On the other hand, such ornaments, 
when separable, such as statue within a niche, are works of sculpture 
and protected as such. The protection of these works involves protection 
against their being copied by the construction of similar edifices as well as the 
graphic reproductions (drawings, photographs, etc.) 
Several countries of the Union, before or after the Conference at 
Berlin, amended their laws, with the view of affording protection to 
architectural works. 
(B) COPYRIGHT IN ARCHITECTURAL WORKS 
UNDER COMMON LAW : 
As said above that an architect expresses his thought and reveals 
his artistic personality in his "writings". To cover all written expres-
sions of their art, the architects normally use the word " drawings". 
However, the word has acquired too narrow an interpretation in the 
average person's vocabulary to warrant its use as a complete description 
of an architect's writings. Nor is the term "design" an apt means of 
describing all of an architect's writings. Like a carefully phrased 
campaign promise, it means different things to different people. For our 
purposes, a design is not only a two dimensional model of such work, 
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it is also any eye-pleasing drawing, detail, pattern, form or arrangement 
of material which is primarily intended to have an artistic or ornamental 
effect. The artistic use of wood strips, or "tiim" on the exterior of a house to 
enhance its charm is an example of the latter use of the term "design".' 
In addition to drawings and designs, an architect uses the ' 'plan", 
a two dimensional medium, to express his ideas for the erection of three 
dimensional structures. For structures such as houses, the most basic 
plan is the "floor or ground plain". This is a graphic or schematic 
drawing which delineates the form, size, room arrangement, and con-
struction features of one floor of a structure as if seen from overhead, 
ceiling or roof removed. The floor plan gives a horizontal structural 
description. To describe vertical planes, such as walls, windows, doors 
or facades, "elevations" are employed. These may be "framing eleva-
tions" which reveal the construction details, or "skeleton" of a struc-
ture, or they may represent the completed vertical planes with their 
" sk in" on. And, of course, there are interior and exterior elevations. 
The modes of expression or writing available to the architect are 
many. Yet the law was clear that his unpublished work, be it denomi-
nated plan, drawing or design, was protected under common law 
principles from any unauthorized use.^ The wrong - doer was enjoined^ 
and, in some cases, held liable for damages.^ 
Of course, the work must be original^ as well as unpublished, that 
is, it must be the result of independent labour and not of copying'". 
However, the work need not be first of its kind." Although the concept 
of ncM'ness or novelity is a prerequisite in the law of patents, it has no 
place in the fields of common law'^ or statutory copyright.'^ 
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Novelty is a concept incapable of clear cut definition. Novelty 
does have some measurable basis where its scope is limited in territory 
and time.''' To require an author, who has created something original, to 
warrant and prove that it is also novel, that it has never been done before 
anywhere at any time, is to confront him an obstacle too difficult to 
overcome. History has recorded numerous incidents where two gifted 
men, working unaware of the other's efforts, have arrived, almost 
simulataneously, at the same results or discoveries. Yet if absolute 
novelty must be proven before either could restrain the unauthorized 
publication of his work, neither would receive protection. It should be 
sufficient that the work of each author is neM' to him, that is, that it is 
original with him, and not copied from the work of another."* 
An original unpublished "naked idea" was not protectable at 
common law." The undeveloped idea that a house should be built in a 
circular form to permit all the rooms to receive sunshine at sometime in 
the day is an example. At this stage, the idea is nothing but a thought -
ephemeral, intangible, impermanent. To be protected at common law, 
the unpublished original work must be expressed in a concrete or 
tangible manner. This does not mean that the author's thought must be 
set forth in some kind of writing, and that each premise must be 
completely developed. The requirement of concreteness for intellec-
tual productions would appear to be satisfied where the creator's 
thoughts are contained in such non-abstract form as would permit the 
impress of his mark of ownership.'^ 
Should the unpublished work be "not capable of distinguishable 
proprietary marks" ' ' because of its vagueness of expression, it would 
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be proper to deem it non-concrete. It would be non-protectable because 
non-persuasible, and non-persuasible because it lacked indicia certia. 
As an eminent English jurist has observed.'*: 
The subject of property is the order of words in the 
author's composition : not the words themselves, 
they being analogous to the elements of matter, 
which are not appropriated unless combined, not the 
ideas expressed by those words, they existing in the 
mind alone, which is capable of appropriation. 
As indicated, the architect employs a specialized form of writing. 
He expresses himself, primarily, by the use of technical signs, symbols, 
and graphic representations. Substitute these terms for the term "words" 
in the above quotation, and one will note its applicability to an 
architect's intellectual productions.'^ Publication counsel could advise, 
"do this - avoid doing that", and all would be well - the common law 
copyright would be preserved against any unauthorized reproduction. 
But, alas! the law was not clear, the theory of publication is simple enough, but 
its correct application to a particular set of facts is another matter. 
At least in three reported cases from United States of America, 
courts have discussed as to what constitutes a publication of architec-
tural plans, drawings, and designs. A New York Appellate Division 
case^" held that the filing of unpublished plans in a municipal building 
department which required such filing before construction could be 
approved, was such a publication of the plans as to destroy the architect's 
common law rights in them. A Missouri Appellate Court^' and a 
Philadelphia city court^^ have held that the building of structure from 
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hitherto unpublished plans, and its exposure to public gaze, was also 
such a publication as destroyed the common law copying in the plans. 
It is submitted that these cases are wrong in principle and 
destructive in practice of an architect's intellectual property. Should 
these three lower court cases be deemed to represent the true state of the 
law, an architect may never properly exploit his unpublished intellec-
tual productions. The two acts which the nature of an architect's calling 
require him to perform, in order to earn his living, are turned, by these 
three decisions into the very means of depriving him of the right to profit from 
his own labour at the exact moment such profit is realisable.^^ 
From the business point of view as well as law, these decisions 
are unjust and unsound. This contention is supported by an examination 
of the authorities on the concept of publication. 
(i) Publication : 
"Publication", as a legal term, is possessed of many definitions. 
It means one thing in the law of wills, another thing in the law of 
defamation, and yet another in the law of copyright. The act publication 
communicates the content of a work to others, generally by the circu-
lation of copies. However, the copyright law distinguishes between 
communications which divest one of his common law rights in his 
work, and communications which do not. The former act is deemed a 
general publication, the latter, a limited publication. "The use of the 
word "publication" in these two senses is unfortunate, and has led to 
much confusion, "2"* 
By definition, di general publication is such a disclo-
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sure, communication, circulation, exhibition, or dis-
tribution of the subject of copyright, tendered or 
given to one or more members of the general public, 
as implies an abandonment of the right of copyright 
or its dedication to the public. 
A limited publication is one which communicates a 
knowledge of its contents under conditions 
expressly or impliedly precluding its dedication to 
the public^^. 
The above definitions are certainly succint. But, as a matter of 
practice, how may one type of publication be distinguished from 
another ? The nature of the work concerned has some bearing on the 
question." For example, the performance of dramatic piece or a 
musical composition is never any kind of a publication thereof. Here the 
law admits of no doubt.-^^ However, the certainty one seeks in the law 
becomes less apparent when other intellectual productions are exam-
ined. For instance, it is not only wholly clear whether the act of 
exhibition per se of a painting is a publication, and, if so, whether it is 
general or limited. ^ ^ In so far as the technical writings of an architect are 
concerned, they are neither dramatic or musical works, nor intended 
solely for exhibition purposes. It is evident, therefore, that they are 
capable of being published, in the fullest legal sense of that term. 
But the nature of the intellectual production aside, what other 
factors determine whether a communication is a publication, and if so, 
whether it is general or limited ? Is the printing of copies a general 
publication ? Does the amount of copies matter ? May a work be 
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published generally by the circulation of manuscript copies ? 
It is submitted that the mechanical means employed to reproduce 
a work, or the number of copies made and distributed are not determi-
native of the question of general publication.^" The test is one of 
intention. The U.S. Supreme Court has declared^': 
It is a fundamental rule that to constitute publication 
there must be such a dissemination of the work of art 
itself among the public as to justify the belief that it 
took place with the intention of rendering such work 
common property. 
Clearly, an author is not to be lightly divested of his common law 
protection, and hence of his property, without clear indicia of his 
intentions. For the law to find a general publication, the facts surround-
ing the publication must reveal a desire to abandon all rights in the 
work. A creator of intellectual productions who by conduct, custom or 
contract, restricts the use or circulation of his work has made no general 
publication.^^ Thus an architect who discloses his unpublished plans 
drawings or designs to a prospective client, or services of clients, does 
not do so with the intention of abandoning his rights in his work. Such 
publication as he makes is certainly a limited one. 
Does an architect intend to make a general publication when, in 
conformity with the dictates of a building ordinance, he files his plans 
in a governmental office ? Obviously not. The purpose of the filing 
requirement is to protect the public from unsafe construction - not to 
divest the architect of his property. Conversely, if the filing is intended 
as a condition precedent to the states' action of granting a limited 
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monopoly to the creator, as where a patent right is concerned, the filing 
is tantamount to a general publication." This is wholly proper. Since the 
creator has obtained the exclusive right to exploit his work for a limited 
time, he is not harmed by having his production exposed to public 
examination. The filing of architectural plans for building permit 
purposes should be held, at most, to be a limited publication. The 
architect files solely with the intention of receiving government ap-
proval of his plans. 
The requirement that plans must be filed and approved before a 
building permit is issued is a valid exercise of a municipality's police 
powers. It is submitted, however, that such an ordinance is patently 
unconstitutional where it is construed as working a general publication 
of an architect's plans. In effect, such an ordinance takes an architect's 
property without due process of law.^ '* 
Let us examine the question whether the architect intends to 
make a general publication of his plans by building the structure they 
describe. The answer must be in the negative. It is only by repeated uses 
of the same set of plans (or modifications thereof) that the architect 
commences to profit from his intellectual production. 
But business intentions aside - is it legally sound to suppose that 
a completed structure is a publication of its plans ? It is submitted that 
it is not. For a work to be published it must be reproduced, that is, there 
must be an issuance of copies to the general public.'* A completed 
structure is no more a copy'* of its underlying plans than a phonograph 
record is a copy of its underlying musical notations. An architectural 
plan is a technical writing. It is capable of being copied only by similar 
C H A P T E R - 7 :318 
technical writings that is by other plans etc. A structure is the result of 
plans, not a copy of them." It follows that building a structure and 
opening it to public gaze can not be a publications of its plans. 
After the Paris Act of 1971, the construction of a work of 
architecture is not a publication thereof in most countries. 
For the above reasons, it can be concluded that neither the filing 
of plans in a government office, nor the erection of the structure 
described in such plans constitutes a general publication of the ideas. 
An examination of Anglo-American legal history explains dual-
ity of copyright i.e. common law as discussed above and statutory 
copyright to be discussed below. The first English Copyright Statute (8 
Anne, c.l9) as noted in chapter on historical development was passed 
in 1709. It was designed to aid authors of published works by giving 
them the right to have penal sanctions applied to infringers. The court 
of king's Bench interpreted this statute in 1769 in Miller V. Taylor^^. It 
held that the act was declaratory of the common law, that it was a penal 
statute which gave an additional remedy to an author in his fight against 
literary piracy, and that it was not intended to divest the author of his 
perpetual common law right in his property, whether published or 
unpublished.'^ 
In 1774 the Statute was again subjected to scrutiny. The case of 
Donaldson V. Becket*'^ come before the House of Lords upon an appeal 
from a decree by the Lord Chancellor which had made perpetual the 
injunction granted in Miller V. Taylor. It was the defendant's argument 
that, the Statute of Anne was not declaratory of the common law. But 
introductive of a new law, to give learned men a property they had not 
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before. By a court of six to five, the eleven judges hearing the argument 
of the case voted to reverse Millar V. Taylor. They held that the statute 
did take away an author's common law right in his published work."' 
The law in the United States remained in accord with Donaldson 
V. Becket till 1976 revision of Copyright Act. The Statute of Anne, c. 
19, not being a part of the common law, was never applicable to the 
United States. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court in Wheaton 
V. Peters*^ cited the above decision as its authority for holding that the 
first federal copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1790,'^ destroyed 
common law rights in published works. Thus, in both the United States 
and the United Kingdom, copyright in published works was earlier 
deemed to be a creature of Statute. 
Since the passage of the Copyright Act of 1911, there has been no 
common law copyright in the United Kingdom, all intellectual produc-
tions, published or unpublished, being protected only by statutory fiat. 
In United States, the dual system continued till 1976 because the U.S. 
Copyright Act of 1909 itself provided that nothing in the Act should be 
construed to annul or limit the right of the another of an unpublished 
work, at common law. or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, 
or use of such unpublished work without his consent. 
But this dual system proved unwieldly, particularly in view of 
technological advances which diminished the importance of publica-
tion as the principal factor determining which body of law applied. By 
passing the 1970 Act, congress intended to abolish the dual system and 
to adopt a single system of federal statutory copyright from "creation", 
that is, from the time a work is "fixed" in a copy or phonorecord. For 
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the first time/" the Copyright Act of 1976 now provides that on and after 
January 1, J 978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any 
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright, whether 
created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, 
are governed exclusively by the Federal Copyright Act, and that after 
such date no person is entitled to any right in any such work under the 
common law or statutes of any state."' After the effective date of the 
Act, all legal and equitable rights equivalent to copyright are governed 
exclusively by the new Act."* 
(C) STATUARY CQPRYRIGHT PROTECTION TO 
ARCHITECTURAL WORKS 
As noted above that it was at the Berlin Revision of Berne 
Convention in 1908 that copyright protection to architectural works 
was guaranteed and parties to the convention were held to be bound to 
grant protection. 
The Committee appointed by the British Government, in the year 
1909, to consider what alterations in the English law were necessary in 
order that England should come into line with the other countries who 
were parties to the Revised Berne Convention, only by a majority 
reported in favour of the inclusion of works of architecture amongst the 
subjects of copyright. Further opposition to the claims of architecture 
was met during the passage of the Copyright Bill. The architects, 
however, triumphed to this extent, that" architectural works of art", 
were included amongst the works to be protected under the Copyright 
Act of 1911, although the remedies for the infringement of the copyright 
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in those works were considerably less drastic than those inserted in the 
Bill as originally laid before Parliament. 
The Act of 1911, therefore, not only preserved the right of the 
architect to copyright in his plans, which had existed under the old law, 
but created a new right by including "architectural work of art" 
amongst artistic works capable of enjoying copyright protection. It was 
unsuccessfully contended in the case oi Meikle V. Maufe'*'' that there 
could not be a separate copyright in building, as distinct from a 
copyright in the plans on which the building is based, and in fact there 
seems no reason to doubt that the Act of 1911 created a new and distinct right.^ "* 
Then came in the U.K. Copyright Act 1956 which governed the 
copyright law till recently. The 1956 legislation had confirmed the 
position of architects by including, in the definition of "artistic work", 
"work of architecture, being either buildings or models for buildings.""''^ 
So far as plans and sketches are concerned it was little curious 
that under the Act of 1911. plans were protected as "literaiy works", 
and sketches as "artistic works". This resulted from the definition of 
"literary works" contained in that Act, which included amongst liter-
ary works, "maps, charts, plans, tables, and compilations", whereas an 
"artistic work" included "drawings"^'* . The Act of 1956, however, 
while continuing to include "drawings" in the definition of "artistic 
work"^' then proceeds to define "drawing" as including any diagram, 
map, chart or plan.^- Consequently, under the 1956 law, all of an 
architect's work is included in the definition of "artistic work, whether 
consisting of sketches, plans, elevations, diagrams or other two dimen-
sional representations, or whether it consists of actual building or 
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models for buildings. Though the Acts of 1956 employed a simpler 
definition and protects original works of architecture, being either 
buildings or models for buildings, "building" being defined as includ-
ing any structure. It is thought, however, that the simpler definition has 
not produced any substantial alteration in the law. While drawings and 
plans are protected "irrespective of artistic quality", these words are 
omitted in relation to works of architecture. Thus the position under the 
Act of 1911 under which architectural works were required to have "an 
artistic character or design" is in effect, maintained. 
An architectural creation is, thus, capable of protection at three 
stages; (a) as a two dimensional technical writing, that is, as a plan, 
drawing or design; (b) as a two dimensional artistic representation of 
the projected structure- or as a three dimensional model of the said 
structure and (c) as a completed structure. 
All the three stages are protected in most of the countries of the 
world including United Kingdom and India. Unhappily for the Ameri-
can architect, such is not the case in the United States. Architectural 
plans, drawings, and designs have been the subject of statutory protec-
tion in United States only since the passage of the Copyright Act of 
1909.'Mt is not yet clear, to what extent, if any. this statute protects the 
contemplated structure itself. This uncertainty stems from the language 
of the Act. In addition to the basic right "to print, reprint, publish, copy 
and read the copyrighted work",5'' the statute grants a collateral right 
"to complete, execute and finish it (the copyrighted work) if it be model 
or design for a work of art."" However, there is no express provision in 
the law, as there is in the U.K. Act, which affords copyright protection 
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to an architectural work such as a building or other structure.*'' 
The creator of a copyrighted model or design for a work of art has 
the exclusive right to execute and complete the contemplated structure 
or object. Architecture is one of the arts. The copyright office has long 
accepted models or designs of architectural works such as dwelling 
places, mansoleums, and other structures for registration as models or 
designs for works of art. It would appear that an architect may obtain the 
exclusive right to build the structure he has designed if he registers a 
claim to copyright in his model or design - as opposed to merely 
copyright in his plans. Indeed, a leading writer on copyright has observed.": 
.... no good reason seems to exist under this section 
[ 1 (b)], why adequate protection may not be obtained by 
architects if they copyright their model or designs. 
The right under section 1(b) is apparently limited to completing 
the contemplated work only. Thus, if an architect designed a civic 
monument and copyrighted his design or model, he had the exclusive 
right "to complete, execute and finish it". But having once constructed 
the monument, others could now freely copy it - provided they did not 
thereby copy those technical writings which the architect may have also 
copyrighted. 
To the architect who designs "one of a kind" structures, such as 
bridges, sky-scapers, and luxuriously -built houses, the protection 
afforded by Section 1(b) is adequate. This would not be the case where 
the architect was engaged in designing private dwellings for small 
rental units. Here repetition, with limited variations, of the basic model 
or design is the means whereby the architect collects the bulk of his 
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fees. Section 1(b), under the above interpretation, would protect him 
only in the completion of the first structure. Therefore, such protection 
as was available would have to come from the copyrighting of his 
technical writings : his plans, drawings, and designs. 
Section 1(a), which grants to the copyright proprietor the exclu-
sive right "to print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted 
work ' \ extends its protection to architectural plans, drawings, and 
designs. No other section of the copyright law is applicable to these 
technical writings. The section is designed solely to prevent the pro-
tected work from being "copied" that is, there may be no unauthorized 
printing, reprinting, publishing, copying or vending of the work. Any 
use of the intellectual production which does not constitute a copying 
is not an infringement of Section 1(a). 
The creators of such intellectual production as books, periodicals 
and maps are adequately protected under Section 1 (a). The moment, a 
book, periodical or map is published, it can be fully exploited, cultur-
ally as well as commercially. These works need merely be sold to be of 
value of their creators, and to be read, to be of valve to the user. Nothing 
more must be done. The prevention of copying gives the authors of these 
works all the protection they need. 
However, there are many intellectual productions which are 
neither economically nor intellectually complete when rendered solely 
as published copies. Music is not fully exploited merely by the printing 
of notes on paper. It springs into life only when these notes are played, 
A lecture may be enjoyed when published as book, nevertheless, to be 
fully exploited, it is necessary that it be delivered before an audience. 
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Dramatic works (and these include motion picture) may be read and 
disseminated as plays and scripts. However, they are of limited value 
unless they are performed. A representation of a contemplated piece of 
sculpture will not impart the true nature of the work until the represen-
tation is executed. By the same token, an architect's plans, drawings, 
and designs are of little practical value until their information is turned 
into a structure.'* Clearly, something additional must be done with 
certain works to make them more valuable to the creator and the public. 
Section 1(a) is concerned solely with the "copyright". It is incapable 
of adequately protecting works which are primarily intended to be 
played, delivered, performed or executed. Architectural plans, draw-
ings, and designs are no more an end in themselves than is a piece of 
sheet music. They are primarily intended to be executed, to be turned 
into structures. The publishing and vending of copies is purely inciden-
tal. Nevertheless, under the law as discussed above, in the United 
States, the architect doesn't have the exclusive right to build the 
structure embodied in his technical writings. He is limited to such 
protection as is afforded to him by his "copyright" in these writings" 
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, architectural and engineering 
drawings also fall within the subject matter of copyright" since it is the 
custom of the profession that architects retain ownership of plans unless 
an express agreement to the contrary exists.^ Support for the holding 
that congress intended copyright protection to continue to extend to 
architectural drawings and plans is also found in the definitional 
Section of the Copyright Act of 1976^" which includes "technical 
drawings, diagrams and models" in the definition of pictorial, graphic. 
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and sculptural works." In some cases the copyrightability of architec-
tural plans has been assumed. Thus where a developer paid an architec-
tural firm for architectural plans for an apartment project and then used 
such plans for the construction of another apartment complex on an 
adjoining place without further payment to the architectural firm, the 
developer and contractor employed by it were held jointly and severally 
liable for copyright infringement." 
In United States the protection afforded, in economic terms, to 
the copyright owner of architectural plans, seems quiie questionable in 
view of that the courts have stated that while copyright protects an 
architects' drawings, it does not grant him the exclusive right to use the idea 
or concept contained in the drawings and does not cloth their author with the 
exclusive right to construct the structure depicted in the drawings.*" 
Under the prior law, the unauthorized construction of a building 
based upon copyrighted plans was held not to constitute copyright 
infringement of the plans,*' since, even if an architect's plans and 
drawings were protected by copyright, copyrightability did not neces-
sarily extend to the structures themselves since the latter were consid-
ered "useful articles" and as such, had an intrinsic utilitarian funcrion 
which is not copyrightable. Thus under the 1976 Act, purely 
nonfunctional or monumental structures are subject to copyright pro-
tection as are artistic sculptures or decorative ornamentations or embel-
lishments added to a structure." Where the only elements of shape in an 
architectural design are conceptually inseparable from the utilisation 
aspects of the structure, copyright protection will not be available." 
As far as the position of the architects under Indian copyright law 
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is concerned, it is found that the copyright protection to architects under 
the Indian Copyright Act 1957 is similar to one under the British Act of 
1956. As India is also a signatory to the Paris Revision (1971) of Berne 
Convention, all the rights which are guaranteed by the convention are 
also available to foreign architects. 
Under the Indian Act of 1957, "architectural work of ar t" means 
any building or structure having an artistic character or design, or any 
model for such building or structure.^^ The definition of the British Act 
of 1956 is somewhat broader in the sense it does not require "artistic 
character or design". 
The definition of "artistic work" given under the Act also 
includes "an architectural work of art". It thus provides -
"artistic work" means — 
(i) a painting, a sculpture, a drawing (including a diagram, map, 
chart or plan), an engraving or a photograph, whether or not any 
such work possesses artistic quality; 
(ii) an architectural work of art; and 
(iii) any other work of artistic craftsmanship;*^ 
It is interesting to note that here the requirement of "artistic 
quality" has been abandoned and thus the restrictive definition of 
"architectural work of art" which emphasized "artistic character" is 
somewhat broadened. 
The Act clearly lays down that the copyright under the Act 
subsists throughout India in original artistic works".™. Then in the case 
of architectural work of art, the work must be located in India." The 
copyright protection of an architectural work of art shall subsist only in 
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artistic character and design and is not available to processes or 
methods of construction.^-
(D) OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHT IN ARCHITECTURAL PLANS ; 
The law as to the ownership of copyright in architectural designs 
is almost similar in both United Kingdom and India. 
There is no custom or any general binding usage to the effect that the 
plans belong to the architect and not to his employer." 
While the position of the plans presents little difficulty, it may 
not be easy to decide the ownership of the very large number of 
miscellaneous documents and correspondence which normally come 
into existence during the course of the architect's administration of a 
building contract. It is suggested that the test is whether a document 
comes into existence or is obtained by the architect as a part of the 
discharge of his function as an agent of the employer for which he is paid. 
So far as copyright is concerned, in the absence of express 
provision in the contract of employment, the copyright in all plans and 
drawings remains with the architect.''' Independently of this copyright, 
the architect has a copyright in the artistic character or design of the 
building itself (but not of any process or method of construction), so 
that, for example, if the employer commissions an extension internal 
layout of an existing building, there will be a breach of the copyright 
in the building owned by its original architect even if his plans are long 
lost and not used for extension or addition.'' This does not, however, 
mean that the original architect has any right to be employed on later 
work, or that his damages for breach of copyright have any connection with the 
project he would have earned had he been engaged on the later project.'^  
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As noticed above that copyright law doesn't alter the rule as to the 
prima facie ownership of an architect's plans, namely, that these 
generally become the property of the client. But that does not mean that 
copyright passes to the client. This would only be so if the architect 
assigned the copyright in writing", or he were under a contract of 
service with his client.'* However, an architect, by an agreement in 
writing made before the plan or building is created, can confer on the 
client the future copyright in the work so that, when the work comes 
into existence, the client will be the owner of the copyright therein.'^ 
But unless the client has acquired the copyright in the plans, he 
may not copy them, nor may he reproduce the building in which 
copyright subsists as a work of architecture. It was held, under the Act 
of 1911, that a client for whom an architect had designed an existing 
building could not reproduce the plans or the building, even for the 
purposes of making extensions to that building*" This appears still to be 
the law, though it is provided in the Act of 1956 that where copyright 
subsists in a building as a work of architecture, the copyright is not 
infringed by any reconstruction of that building.*' Then, no copyright 
is violated where the architect has parted with the copyright if he 
reproduces part of his work in a subsequent work by use of sketches, 
plans, models or studies made for the purposes of earlier work provided 
he does not repeat the main design of the earlier work.*' 
(E) PARTIAL SERVICES BY ARCHITECT ; 
Two cases came before the courts in England dealing with the 
position where the architect had prepared plans but his engagement had 
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been terminated before completion of his service and the then appli-
cable R.I.B.A. condition of engagement made no express provision for 
the position as to copyright. In the first,*^ the architect was engaged to 
prepare plans suitable for obtaining full planning approval. He did this 
and charged the full scale fee applicable for work at that stage. 
Subsequently the owner sold the land and handed over the plans which 
were used by the builder. It was held that there was no breach of 
copyright because the architect had granted an implied licence to the 
owner. In the second case, *^  the architect again agreed to carry out 
certain design work with a view to obtaining planning approval. Both 
parties were familiar with the then R.I.B.A. scale of fees. They agreed 
upon a fee to 100 guines which was nominal in comparison with the full 
stage payment. It was held that while it was necessarily implied that the 
architect licensed the owners to make use of the drawings for the 
purpose of obtaining planning permission, there was no implication, in 
the circumstances, of a licence to use the drawings for erecting a 
building. While the particular implication must depend upon the ex-
press terms and the surrounding circumstances in each case,*'' it seems, 
from the casesjust referred to, that the implied licence, if any, will only 
take effect from the time of payment (or, probably, tender of payment) 
by the client,**• 
There is, therefore, no necessary implication that whenever an 
architect is engaged to prepare plans for the purpose of obtaining 
planning permission, his client has a licence to use such plans, not only 
for that purpose, but also inter alia, for the purpose of erecting the 
building, should planning permission be granted. The decision referred 
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above, however, leave unresolved the further questions whether the 
implied licence extends to modifying the architect's plans and building 
in accordance with the plans so modified,** and whether the implied 
licence is dependent on the architect having been paid his agreed fee.*^ 
All that can be said is that the extent of the implied licence in each case 
will depend on its own facts,** one important factor being the amount of 
the architect's remuneration. 
(F) INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT : 
Copyright is infringed by the production of something which, to 
the eye, is a copy of the original, and the use of processes or methods 
of construction would, it is thought, constitute an infringement. No 
great significance seems to have been attached, in decisions under the 
U.K. Act of 1911, to the requirement of "artistic character or design", 
and it is doubted whether this meant more than that there must be 
something beyond the use of common stock features which would not 
be sufficient to constitute a copyright.^^t was held that the requirement 
of originality did not imply more than that the work was the personal 
effort of the architect.'" Not only this, it has also been held that there 
was copyright in the design of certain semi-detached villas on the 
ground that they exhibited something apart from the common stock of 
ideas and which struck the eye as uncommon.'• 
Architects are concerned with infringements of their rights in 
three different forms. These are, copying of plans in the form of other 
plans,'^ the copying of plans in the form in the buildings and the copying 
of a building by another building.'' 
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The definition clause of the Indian Copyright Act does not define 
infringement as such; but the definition of an infringing copy**^  provides 
some standards and criteria for the determination that an infringement 
has occurred. As regards an artistic work an infringing copy is that copy 
which is a "reproduction thereof otherwise than in the form of 
cinematograph film". The familiar question with regard to unautho-
rized reproduction of copyrighted work raises the standard issues 
regarding meaning of originality, copying and extent of reproduction. 
On the issue of reproduction it is said that, "In India, the expression 
'infringing copy', without doubt means copies which reproduce the 
whole of the infringed work'\^^ The reasons for this view are that the 
term 'infringing copy' has been for the first time defined in India by the 
1957 Act. The 1914 Indian Act, which followed the British Act of 1911, 
did not define the term. But a position had emerged, both in U.K. and 
India that a copy was an infringing copy if it reproduced a substantial 
part of the original work.^* Whereas the U.K. Act of 1957 made this 
position clear," the Indian Act of 1957 choose not to define the extent 
of reproduction as an aspect of the 'infringing copy'. Even the 1994 
Amendment did not touch this aspect. Thus under the present Indian 
law unless the whole of an architect's work has been reproduced, no 
infringement of copyright occurs. It is suggested that the Indian law 
should be amended on the lines of the British Act so that the require-
ment of reproduction of the whole work is substituted by "substantial 
reproduction". As seen above the requirement of whole reproduction 
makes it almost impossible for an architect to claim copyright protec-
tion because the infringers can simply escape by making minor modifi-
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cations or alterations in the architect's work. 
It can, therefore, be said by way of conclusion that copyright 
protection to architectural designs has been a controversial issue. The 
protection offered to architects under the U.S. law prior to 1976 was 
highly insufficient as compared to the protection enjoyed by their 
counterparts in United Kingdom and India. The 1994 Indian Amend-
ment has infact further broadened the protection to the architects by 
replacing the term "architectural work of ar t" by "work of architec-
ture' which is a much wider expression. But then unless an awareness 
of their copyright is created amongst the Indian architects, the protec-
tion afforded to them shall remain only on the Statute book and their 
plight by virtue of large scale infringements shall continue. 
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1. Term "architect" should be recognised as referring to "design-
ers" as well. 
2. The courts (both in U.K. and U.S.) have given a liberal interpre-
tation to the term" writings as contained in the constitutional 
provision authorising copyright protection. The leading decision 
on the point is Burrow - Giles Lithographic Co. V. Sarowy, III 
U.S. 53 (1884). 
3. LADAS, STEPHEN. P., THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 
OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, VOL I (1938) 
New York, P.223. 
4. In the meantime, Germany legislated for the protection of archi-
tectural works in Article 2 of the law of January 9, 1907. 
5. Designs, in the latter sense, may be protectable under either 
the copyright or patent laws, or under both. Copyright protection 
is not dependent upon the intended use of the object upon 
which the copyrighted design is placed. Rosenthal V. Stein, 98 
U.S. P.Q. 180, 205. 
6. DRONE, S. EATON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROP-
ERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRIT-
AIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1879), 101, 102. 
7. Gee V. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Ref. 670 (Ch. 1818); Bakes V. Libbie, 
210 Mass, 549, 97 N.E. 109 (1912). 
8. Jefferys V. Booney, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854); Calinga V. Inter 
Ocena Newspaper 215 U.S. 182 (1909). 
9. "Originality is alone the test of validity (of a copyright)". Hand, 
J., in Fisher V. Dillingham, 298 Fed 145, 149-152 (S.D.N.Y 
1924); DRONE, supra note 6, at pp. 198-199. Also see 
YANKWICH, ORIGINALITY IN THE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, II F.R.D. 457 (1951). 
10. DRONE, S. EATON, Supra note 6, at p.208. 
11. "No one doubts that two directories, independently made, are 
each entitled to copyright, regardless of their similarity, even 
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though it amount to identity. Each being the result of original 
work, the second will be protected, quite regardless of its lack of 
novelty", Hand J., in Fisher V. Dillingham, 298 Fed 145, 150. 
12. DRONE, S. EATON, supra note 6, at pp. 199-200. 
13. "Unlike the subject matter of a patent, copyrighted material need 
not be new, but only original". Clark, C.J., in Baker V. General 
Electric Co., 162 F. 2 d 141 (2nd Cir, 1947); Chamberlin V. Urin 
Sales Corp., 150 F. 2d 512 (2nd Cir 1945); Fisher V. Dillingham, 
298 Fed 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
14. Nimmer. B. Melville in his article 'The Law of Ideas', 27 Calif 
L. Rev. 119(1954), points out the confusion engendered by many 
courts by their misuse of the terms originality and novelty. 
Confusion must result as to the true nature of copyright where the 
courts interpret the element of novelty as an aid to establishing 
the originality of a work in those cases where both the plaintiff's 
and defendant's properties use similar stock incidents and char-
acters. It is submitted that when courts speak of the requirement 
of " a n ew conception or novel arrangement" they mean only that 
an author's work must be sufficiently different in expression or 
development as to indicate that it is original and not copied from 
the protected work of another or from public domain material to 
which the plaintiff had access. See Simonton V. Gordon, 297 Fed 
625 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
15. However, an unpublished "naked idea" which has been revealed 
through a breach of trust or confidence is protectable under 
common law principles. Here the protection is not the affirmative 
kind. It is negative in nature, the wrongdoer is prevented from 
profiting from his tortious acts. See COPINGER AND SKONE 
ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 38, 39, 8th ed (1948). 
16. "The best rule both of reason and justice seems to, to assign to 
everything, capable of ownership a legal and determinate owner''. 
MAUGHAM, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF LITERARY 
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PROPERTY 4(1928); Also see, the survey of Anglo-American 
decisions in Pannone, "Property Rights is an Idea and the require-
ment of concreteness", 33 Boston U.L. Rev. 396 (1953). 
17. Millar V. Taylor, 98 Eng Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769). But a work is 
protectable if it does have a capacity to be distinguished, at, 2340. 
18. Erle,J.,inJefferys V. Boosey,4H.L. Cas815, 867, 10 Eng. Rep. 
681, 702(1854). 
19. Katz, S. Arthur , "Copyright Protection of Architectual Plans, 
Drawings, And Designs", 19 Law and Contemporary Problems 
(1954), 224, atp.232. 
20. Wright V. Eisle, 86 App. Div. 356 N.Y Supp. 887. (2nd Dep't 1903). 
21. Kurfiss V. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 121 S.W. 2d(1938). 
22. Gendell V. Orr, 13 Phil. 191 (1879). It is difficult to agree with 
the reasoning of this case or of Kurfiss V. Cowherd, ibid., 
persuasive on the point that erection of a building is a publication 
of its technical writings. 
23. If the filing of plans, drawing, and designs in governmental 
offices, or the erection of the structure they describe is held to 
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COPYRIGHT LAW AND PERFORMERS RIGHTS 
Performers are recognised by the society as vital links between 
literary, dramatic and musical works and the public. There is no doubt 
that performers spend sufficient skill and labour to merit copyright 
protection. Our great musicians - vocalists and instrumentalists, 
talented dancers, popular actors on the stage and on the screen, and 
other performing artists who delight the hearts and feast the eyes and 
ears of millions of people everyday by their visual or acoustic presen-
tations who keep alive our rich and varied cultural heritage did not 
enjoy protection till recently. Performer's position in law, thus, has 
been quite weak as the copyright law did not recognise the rights of 
performers. Laymen, including performing artists, were apt to raise 
their eye-brows in disbelief at this state of our law. 
This chapter examines the question as to the definition of a 
performer. It tries to evaluate the reasons for the weak position of 
performers. It makes a critical assessment of judicial response to 
performer's right in the three countries which are studied here. It also discusses 
the impact of recent changes in the performers position in India. 
(A) DEFINITION OF PERFORMERS : 
The classic definition in international law is "actors, singers, 
musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, 
play in, or otherwise perform literary or artistic works. ' ' ' The definition 
is wide in that it includes performances of works in the public domain, 
but narrow in that it excludes all those who do not perform "work ' ' , e.g. 
variety artistis, acrobats, sports personalities or extras on stage or in 
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films.^ The defintion of performer under the 1994 Indian Amendment 
takes care of many such performers and is quite wider. It provides that 
"performer" includes an actor, singer, musician, dancer, acrobat, 
juggler, conjurer, snake charmer, a person delivering a lecture or any 
other person who makes a performance."^ 
It is rather paradoxical that although of all neighbouring right 
owners* they are closest to derivative authors such as translators of 
literary works or adaptors of musical scores who receive full author's 
rights their rights are in many jurisdictions and in the international law 
the weakest. Unlike other neighbouring right owners, they are physical 
persons, like authors, and from a purely philosophical point of view it 
is difficult to see the essential difference between the work of a 
derivative author, say a translator, or an arranger, and that of a per-
former. Just as the translator renders the original work as faithfully as 
possible in another language, so the performer interprets the spirit of the 
work as truly as he can musically or on the stage. Just as the arranger, 
although basing himself on the original work adds another dimension to 
the work, so does the performer and different performances of the same 
work by different artists vary greatly from one another. Most languages 
emphasise the creativity of the performer by expressions like an actor 
'creating" a part or a pionist presenting a most 'personal' or 'original' 
rendering of a well-known concerto. 
This is applying the most stringest tests of the droit d auteur. In 
'copyright' terms there is not much doubt that performers "spend 
sufficient skill and labour" to merit copyright protection. 
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(B) REASONS FOR WEAK POSITION OF PERFORMERS 
UNDER COPYRIGHT REGIMES : 
There seems to be two reasons for the weakness of the performer's 
position in law. The first is historical and social. Actors or "strolling 
players" were regarded as "vagrants" by the law during the formative 
period of copyright. Adam Smith in his work The Wealth of Nations, 
gave "players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singer, opera-dancers" as 
classical examples of "unproductive labour".^ Modern times have 
removed this social stigma and from the bottom of the social scale, star 
performers have gone to the top and some have become the idols of 
modern society. The second reason is historical and technological. 
Adam Smith, goes on to say : "The work of all of them perishes in the 
instant of its production". This was perfectly correct in his days. We 
have noted in the preceding chapters that fixation of the work in a 
tangible form, so that it can be reproduced, is in many jurisdictions a 
requirement for protection. The ephemeral nature of a performance 
may, therefore, have provided a valid reason for denying a copyright to 
performers. This reason was removed with the invention of records, 
films, radio and television. From the time when performances could be 
fixed and the fixations both reproduced in large numbers and performed 
to large audiences, thus involving the two basic rights in the copyright 
'bundle', the reproduction right and the performance right, the second 
reason too had been removed. 
(C) NECESSITY OF PROTECTING PERFORMERS: 
The copyright law recognises and protects the economic interest 
of the person creating an original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
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work. The copyright protection was not required as seen above in the 
chapter on historical development as long as literary, dramatic or 
musical works could not be multiplied or reproduced on a commercial 
scale. But with the development of modern technology, the multiplica-
tion or reproduction of the work has become easy. The economic value 
of the work has increased greatly with the invention of sound recording, 
photography, radio and television. The law protects these economic 
interests by conferring on the author exclusive cinematography, record-
ing and broadcasting rights. 
As far as the fixation of the performance is concerned, it was not 
possible till the first half of the last century as the technology has not 
developed by then to enable the live performance of a performer to be 
fixed. Due to this the performer was to repeat his performance again and 
again, as that was the only way to hear or see his performance. 
But now the rapid development of modern technology has made 
it possible to fix a live performance whether the performance is on the 
stage or in the broadcasting studio, and use the recording for making 
more records for commercial use or for broadcasting by radio or 
television. The new technology has had two consequences for perform-
ers. The one that favours performers is that the demand for programme 
material embodying their performances has multiplied and is still 
increasing, thus, creating new employment opportunities. The one that 
militates against performers is the task of controlling the uses made of 
their recorded performances. Once a performance is recorded it can be 
repeated in public without the necessity of engaging the performer 
whose performance has been recorded or indeed without the presence 
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of any performer at all. In this respect their plight resembles that of 
authors in the field of "reprography" or phonogram producers in 
respect of "home taping". Performers have, thus, lost countless em-
ployment opportunities. This may be called as "technological unem-
ployment" of performers. 
Thus, if someone records the performance of a performer without 
his consent, reproduces it and sells the records, or performs them in 
public, the performer himself had no remedy against such a person. 
Once a performance is fixed in a record or in a cinematograph film, the 
record-producer or the film producer as the owner of the copyright was 
protected by being given exclusive rights regarding the records or the 
film. The performer had not been given a right to share the royalties 
received by record producers or film producers for public performance 
or broadcasting of records or films. This was simply an unjust situation 
and, therefore, protecting performers was the need of hour to meet the 
challenge of new technology. 
The minimum safeguard that is a performer's due and the legal 
system must afford him is protection from "bootlegging'' (illicit re-
cording of his live performance) by ensuring that his live performance 
(wherever given) is (a) not "fixed"^ in a tangible or material form 
without the performer's consent; and (b) not broadcast or publicly 
performed without his consent. Bootlegging deprives the performer of 
his livelihood. Therefore, it is also necessary to protect him against: (i) 
reproduction or multiplication from such unauthorised fixation of his 
live performance; (ii) broadcasting or public performances of such 
unauthorised fixation. Finally, even where his performance is fixed 
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with his consent, and therefore, is authorised fixation, it is necessary to 
protect him against reproduction of the autfiorised fixation for purposes different fi^om 
those for vAnch the performer gave consent for the initial fixation. 
(D) STATUS OF PERFORMERS IN U.K., U.S.A. & INDIA : 
(i) Dramatic & Musical performer's Protection Act 1925 
In United Kingdom till recently there was no copyright in a 
performance.'" U.K., whose copyright system is the basis of Indian 
Copyright law, protected performers by using criminal sanctions with-
out giving them a copyright or neighbouring right. 
The Gregory Committee" considered that undue complexity in 
dealings would arise if performers as well as entrepreneurs were to have 
property rights against third parties. The committee which was invited 
to make recommendations in favour of creating new rights for the 
protection of performers of musical and dramatic works, felt that if a 
right of this kind was conferred it would add to the number of licences 
which were needed when performances by mechanical means were 
given in public and that the further extension of copyright, or a similar 
right, in this direction was not justified. It, therefore, only recom-
mended certain modifications of the existing provisions of the Dramatic 
and Musical Performer's Protection Act, 1925*', which gave to per-
formers a summary remedy in the cases therein mentioned.'- Thus, this 
Act was only modified and not repealed by the Copyright Act, 1956. 
(ii) Performer's Protection Act. 1958-1972 : 
However, the Act of 1925 together with the amending provisions 
of the Act of 1956, were repealed and re-enacted by the Dramatic and 
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Musical Performer's Protection Act, 1958.'" The Act of 1958 has itself 
been amended by the Performer's Protection Act, 1963, in order to give 
effect to the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations'^ entered 
into at Rome on October 26, 1961 and by the Performer's Protection 
Act, 1972. The fines payable under the provisions of the 1958 Act and 
the 1963 Act have been increased by the performer's protection Act 
1972 and a liability to imprisonment for not more than two years has 
been added '* Protection extends to the performers of literary and 
artistic works as well as of dramatic and musical works as from August 
31, 1963, when the Act of 1963 came into force. It is clear that the 
introduction of the word "artistic" into sub-section (i) of Section 1 of 
the Act of 1963 resulted from a misapprehension. The Convention uses 
the expression "literary or artistic works" in the same sense as they 
were used in the Brussels Convention as including everything in the 
general field of art, such as drama and music which are not specifically 
mentioned. But the Copyright Act 1956, Section 3(1) uses "artist ic" in 
the narrower sense of drawing, painting and architecture. By failing to 
appreciate this, and repeating the copyright words "literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic works" in sub-section (1) of Section 1 of the Act of 
1963 this Statute has created the odd conception of a performer per-
forming a drawing, a painting or a house.'^ 
Section 1 of the Act of 1958, as modified by the Act of 1963, 
gives to actors, singers, musicians, dancers or other persons who act, 
sing, deliver, declaim, play in or otherwise perform literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic works a remedy which may be imposed summarily or 
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an indictment, in the case of a person knowingly making a record 
directly or indirectly from or by means of, the performance of such 
performers without the consent in writing of such performers. 
It is also an offence to sell, hire, distribute for the purpsose of 
trade or perform a record so made, further, if such record is made in a 
country outside the United Kingdom and the law of that country 
contains a provision requiring the consent of any person to the making 
of the record, such record is deemed to have been made contrary to the 
Act of 1958, if, whether knowingly or not, it was made without such 
consent and without the consent in writing of the performers. 
The Act of 1958 also makes it an offence, by Section 4 thereof, 
to possess contrivances for the making of such records, and, by Section 
5 thereof, gives power to the court to order the destruction of such 
records and contrivances. Where an offence committed by a body 
corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or 
connivance of, or to be attributable to any neglect on the part of, any 
director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corpo-
rate or any person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as 
well as the body corporate, shall be guilty of that offence and shall be 
liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.'* 
An offence is committed only when the consent of each perfomer 
is not given in writing and the defendant acts knowingly. In particular, 
he must know about the absence of consent,'^ and he is entitled to rely 
on the apparent authority of a person purporting to act as the performer's 
agent unless he had no reasonable grounds for doing so. As with only 
criminal offence where specific mens rea has to be made out, this puts 
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a burden of proof on the prosecution which may well be difficult to 
discharge. For the future, the Whitford Committee proposes that (as 
with other regulatory offences) the factor should instead be treated as 
one of defence, it being for the defendant to show that he had reasonable 
grounds for supposing that the performer had consented.^' 
Certain offences, in the nature of fair dealing, are prescribed. No 
recording or filming of a performance requires consent if the defendant 
proves that it was for his private and domestic use only.^^ A record, film, 
broadcast or diffusion may be excused by showing that its purpose was 
to report current events or that the performance was by way of back-
ground or in some other way purely incidental.^-' 
(iii) Civil Action For Damages : 
As Section I of 1958 Act provides only for penalties in criminal 
proceedings against a person found guilty of statutory offences and 
does not impose any defined duty to any particular class of person, no 
civil action can be brought for a simple breach of statutory provision.-^ 
The Act does not define any duty to performers. There is jurisdiction in 
equity, however, to restrain a defendant from doing an unlawful act in 
contravention of the provisions of the 1958 Act where a person can 
show that he has a private right which is being interfered with by the 
criminal act. causing him special damage over and above the damage to 
the public in general. For example, the court will grant an injunction 
against a person making unauthorised recording of live performances, 
"bootlegging", where it is established that the record companies with 
whom the performers have exclusive recording contracts are losing 
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sales and the performers are, in consequnce, losing royalties on the lost 
sales." An injunction may also be granted and damages awarded on the 
basis of interference with the trade or business of another by unlawful 
means and without just cause or excuse. Both the performers and the 
record companies are entitled, in appropriate circumstances, to an 
injunction and to an order to compel the defendant to permit the 
plaintiff to search his premises. 
The new Copyright, Design and Patents Act of 1988 further 
attempts to improve the position of performers by providing them 
statutory civil rights of action. The new rights which are described as 
'rights in performances' are not limited just to the performers them-
selves but they are extended to those who have recording rights in 
relation to performers. The rights of performers are not copyright 
subject matter but are related rights. 
Section 181 of the 1988 Act provides for a performance if either 
it is given by a qualifying individual or takes place in a qualifying 
country. Performers rights are infringed by a person who, without his 
consent -
(a) makes, otherwise than for his private and domestic use, a record-
ing of a whole or any substantial part of a whole or any substantial part 
of a quaJifying performance, or 
(b) broadcasts live, or includes live in a cable programme service, 
the whole or any substantial part of a qualifying performance.^^ 
But Section ftulher provides that damages for above infringement will not 
be awarded against a defendant who shows that at the time of the infringement he 
believed on reasonable grounds that consent had been given.^' 
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A performer's right under the Act is also infringed by a person 
who, without his consent imports into the United Kingdom otherwise 
than for his private and domestic use, or in the course of a business 
possesses, sells or lets for hire, offers or exposes for sale or hire, or 
distributes, a recording of a qualifying performance which is, and which 
that person knows or has reason to believe is, an illicit recording.^" 
In addition to the remedies of damages and injunction, which are 
available as a consequence of infringement being regarded as a breach 
of statutory duty, a person having rights in a performance may seek an 
order for delivery up of illicit recordings.^^ A court may order the 
destruction or forfeiture of a recording delivered up or seized under the 
above provisions taking account of the adequacy of the other remedies 
available for the infringement.^" 
The period of protection of rights in relation to a performance 
will be 50 years from the end of the calender year in which the 
performance takes place.^' 
The Act. in addition to above mentioned civil remedies, also 
provides criminal sanctions, section 198 of the Act creates a range of 
offences which are broadly similar to those now applicable in respect 
of commercial dealing with infringing copies of copyright works. The 
main changes from previous Act's provisions are that the penalties have 
been enhanced and brought into line with the penalties for copyright 
offences, and possession and importation of illicit recording are in-
cluded for the first time." 
In sum, the value of present U.K. Act is that it has finally 
recognised the performer's right which were long over due. 
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(iv) Performer's Rights & U.S. Statutory Copyright Law : 
In the United States, the author's public performing rights were 
first included in statutory copyright in respect of dramatic works by the 
Act of August 18,1856." In the Act of Januaiy 6, 1897'" the public 
performing rights were extended to musical works. Neither the 1856 nor 
the 1897 Act contained any specific limitations on the new rights, 
except that they related only to "public performances". 
The 1909 Act^' further extended the public performing rights to 
works prepared for oral delivery. At the same time, the Act imposed the 
"for profits" limitation on the performing rights in works prepared for 
oral delivery and musical works but not on the performing rights in 
dramatic works. 
Finally, by the Act of July 17,1952^^ the author's public perform-
ing rights were extended to nondramatic literary works, subject to the 
"for profit" limitation. 
The recognition of performer's rights was criticised from various 
sides by people who feared that the provision would unduly restrict the 
free enjoyment of music and thus interfere with the legitimate public 
interests. Some felt that copyright should not extend to performing 
rights," while others, who did not consider such rights as outside the 
proper scope of copyright, argued that they should be limited to certain 
performances of vital interest of the author^*. To compromise the 
various views suggested, Mr. Arthur Stuart, a representative of the 
American Bar Association, proposed to limit the author's public per-
forming rights in musical works to public performances/o/-/>ro///.^' 
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While the for profit limitation was extended to musical works, 
the same was not true of dramatic works. The final report on the Bill 
gave the following explanation for the different treatment accorded to 
dramatic works : 
It is usual for the author of a dramatic work to 
refrain from reproducing copies of the work for 
sale. He does not usually publish his works in the 
ordinary acceptation of the term, and hence in 
such cases never receives any royalty on copies 
sold ... if an author desires to keep his dramatic 
work in unpublished form and give public repre-
sentations thereof only, this right should be fully 
secured to him by law. We have endeavoured to so 
frame this paragraph as to amply secure him in 
these rights.'" 
Stephen P. Ladas in his work adds another argument. He says : 
The law considers that persons attending a perfor-
mance of a dramatic work will not ordinarily attend 
a second performance of the same work and, there-
fore, an unauthorized performance, though gratu-
itous, will cause the author a monetary loss, by 
depriving him of a potential audience.*' 
Another significant change in the U.S. Copyright law in connec-
tion with public performing rights was brought about by the Act of July 
17, 1952. This Act among other things extended the author's public 
performing rights to nondramatic literary works. The first bill intro-
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duced for this purpose placed the peifonning rights in nondramatic literaiy 
works in Section 1(d) concerning diamatic works, thereby giving these new 
rights the same wide scope as dramatic peifonning rights. 
In only a few cases have the courts been presented with the 
question of what constitutes a "public" performance. The more diffi-
cult and significant question has been the scope of the "for profit" 
limitation. Although the words ' 'for profit'' as such may seem clear and 
well defined, the complications of modern economic conditions render 
them ambiguous in certain situations, and it has taken a number of court 
decisions to give them a more precise meaning.''^ Specifically, the 
courts have had to deal with practical situations where the profit 
element in a public performance was more or less indirect, 
(v) Judicial Response To Performer's Rights in U.S. : 
The first important case to deal with such a situation was John 
Church Co. V. HiUard Hotel Co'*^ The litigation involved a musical 
composition which had been performed in the dinning room of a hotel 
belonging to the defendant. The case turned upon the meaning of the 
words "for profit" and the court held that the performances in question 
were not for profit in as much as no admission fee or other direct fee had 
been charged to the patrons hearing the performances. It was argued for 
the plaintiff that the performance of music in the hotel restaurant was 
a means of attracting paying customers and hence was for profit 
although no direct fee was charged for the music, but this contention 
was overruled by the court. 
Other important problem came up in connection with the growing 
broadcasting industry, namely whether or not the broadcasting of a 
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public performance constitutes a new public performance; and simi-
larly, whether or not, the playing of radio in public places, whether by 
means of standard radio receivers or more elaborate receiving installa-
tions such as those frequently found in large hotels, constitutes a new 
public performance aside from the broadcast. 
The cases involving instances of "multiple performances" do 
not deal directly with the question of whether a performance is "pub-
l ic" or with the " for profit" limitation. However, they represent an 
important chapter in the development of the author's performing right. 
Unfortunately, the problem of "multiple performance" was somewhat 
obscured by the fact that the early litigations involved instances in 
which the initial performances were unauthorized. 
The first case to come up was Jerome H. Remick & CO. V. 
General Electric Co.'^* A copyrighted song had been played by an 
orchestra at a hotel, and "picked up" by the defendant broadcaster. The 
court held that the broadcasting of the restaurant music was not a 
separate performance, but that the broadcast of an unauthorized public 
performance made the broadcaster a contributory infringer. 
Another case, Buck V. Dehaum*^ concerned a situation involving 
an authorised initial performance. The defendant, a restaurant owner, 
had turned on a radio in his restaurant. The station he turned in brought 
a musical programme which included the copyright song "Indian Love 
Call". The plaintiff, who was president of ASCAP and sued on behalf 
of his organisation, contended that the said acts infringed the author's 
right of public performance for profit although the broadcast of the song 
had been duly licensed by ASCAP. The court held that the acts of the 
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defendant did not constitute a new performance and consequently that 
there was no infringement of the said right. 
The issue of importance in this connection was whether or not the 
"picking u p " of the broadcast constituted a new performance. The 
court held that it did not. 
But the Supreme Court''^ in an opinion delivered by Justice 
Brandeis held that the said acts did not constitute a performace of the 
music, thus, establishing the theory of "multiple performance". Al-
though the Supreme Court clearly established that the "picking u p " of 
a radio broadcast is a separate performance, it did not decide whether 
or not such performance infringes the author's performing rights in 
cases where the broadcasts are authorised by the authors. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that in the case of literary, 
musical, dramatic and choreorgaphic works, pantomimes, and motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works, the copyright owner has the 
exclusive right to perform such works publicly.^^ Thus, unlike the 
exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation and distribution, which 
apply equally to all types of copyrighted works, the performance right 
is limited to the enumerated works and excludes pictorial, graphic and 
sculpture works and sound recordings. Pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
works by their nature not capable of being performed although they may 
be displayed. Since to perform a work "publicly" means to perform it 
at a place open to the public or at any place where a susbtantial number 
of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquain-
tances is gathered,"^ it seems clear that performance in "semi-public" 
places such as clubs, lodges, summer camps, schools, and the like are 
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public performances."' The Act also defines "to publicly perform" as 
meaning to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance by means 
of any device or process, whether the member of the public capable of 
receiving the performance receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times.''* In other words, a 
performance includes not only the initial rendition but also any further 
act by which that rendition is transmitted or communicated to the 
public. 
While the Copyright Act of 1909 contained provision which 
depended upon whether a performance y\a.s for profit, but the 1976 Act 
has abolished this distinction and provides an exclusive public perfor-
mance right irrespective of profit. Thus, an unauthorized public perfor-
mance need not be for profit in order to constitute an infringement of the 
exclusive right to perform although nonprofit requirement still exists 
with regard to certain exempted performances." 
(vi) Non Recognition Of Performer's Rights in India ; 
The Indian Copyright recognises and protects as seen in the 
preceeding chapters of this study the rights of an author in his original 
literary or dramatic work; of a composer in his original musical work; 
and of an artist in his original artistic work (including that of a 
photographer in the photograph taken by him). By the requirement that 
the work must be original, to qualify for copyright protection it is 
evident that these works are created for the first time by the writer, or 
the composer, or the artist, as the case may be. 
Thel aw, however, found no difficulty in recognising that copy-
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right can subsist in translations" of literary and dramatic works, as well 
as in compilations, selections", abridgments'" and other adaptations of 
literary and dramatic work, and in arrangements and transcriptions of 
musical works, even though they are not original in the sense that they 
are created for the first time, but are only derivative works being 
derived from an existing (basic) literary, dramatic or musical work. 
The performer quite often performs" an existing work and in that 
sense his performance is derivative in the same way as a translator 
translates or an abridger abridges an existing work. The performance 
may be live performance before a public or private audience, or a live 
perforrnance over radio or television, or a performance fixed in a 
cinematograph film, or a performance recorded in a sound record. But 
the copyright law has not found it possible to confer any rights on the 
performer in respect of his performance when he performs iii a motion-
picture, the copyright law confers on the film producer alone an 
independent copyright in the cinematograph film (including the sound-
track) apart from the separate copyright in the work in respect of which 
or a substantial part of which the film is made.^'' Similarly, when a 
sound-recording is made of the performance of a performer, the copy-
right law confers on the record-producer an independent copyright in 
the record, apart from the separate copyright in the work in respect of 
which or a substantial part of which the record is made. Thus, it is clear 
that in no case has the performer anything in the nature of a copyright 
in his performance. If the performance is over the radio or television, 
once again the performer has no control over its use. The Act confers a 
special right, called "broadcast reproduction right" to protect the 
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broadcasting authority. 
Thus, the performance of a performer is not a "work" in which 
copyright can subsist under the Act. Nor does the Act confer anything 
like a ' 'neighbouring right'' to performers as it does to the broadcasting 
authority. Copyright is a creature of the statute and does not subsist 
outside or beyond it. 
(vii) Performers Rights & Indian Judicial Response : 
It is indeed a matter of great shock that an attempt before the 
Bombay High Court to claim copyright in his performance by a cine-
actor failed in Forture Film International V. Dev Anand}'' 
It is in the fitness of things to recapitulate the case in details. The 
film producers entered into a contract to engage the popular cine-actor 
to play the leading male-role in their Hindi production "Darling 
Darling" and to pay him a hefty Rs. 7 lakh as remuneration. The 
payment was to be made by annuity policies of the L.I.C. in specified 
sums on or before the release of the film in seven named territories such 
as Deihi/U.P. (Rs. 1 lakh), Bengal (Rs. 35 lakhs), Tamil Nadu (Rs. 0.25 
lakhs) etc. The producers further covenanted that: 
Your work in our picture on completion will belong 
to you absolutely and the copyright therein shall 
vest in you and we will not be entitled to exhibit the 
said picture until full payments... are secured to you 
by way of annuity policies of L.I.C. It is, however, 
agreed that upon the deliveries of the said annuity 
policies..., your copyright will automatically vest 
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in us. We, therefore, agree that until the said poli-
cies are delivered to you, we shall not release the 
said picture nor exhibit or distribute or exploit or 
part with any prints of the said picture to any 
party.... for the purpose of exhibition, distribution 
or exploitation in the territories specified above. 
The picture was duly released in three of the seven named 
territories.'* The actor sought injunction to restrain the producers from 
releasing the picture in the other four named territories as well as 
territories not named (Bombay and overseas) until full payment was 
made to him. He claimed that the stipulation vested the copyright in the 
film in him and totally prohibited the producers from exhibiting the film 
anywhere until full payment was made to him as agreed with a provision 
for relaxation in favour of the producers giving them a limited right to 
exhibit the picture in any of the named territories after making the 
payment as stipulated for that territory. 
The court rejected the claim of the actor that the covenant vested 
in him the copyright in the film as a whole and held that it only 
purported to vest in him the copyright in his work, that is, his perfor-
mance in the film. It was, therefore, squarely in issue whether such a 
copyright was recognised or protected by the Copyright Act. 
It was contended for the actor that the performance of an actor 
was covered by the definition of "artistic work" or "dramatic work". 
Alternatively, it was argued that the actor's performance must be 
regarded as a component or part of the cinematograph film in which 
copyright subsisted as a "work" under the Act. 
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On the other hand it was argued for the producer that "work" 
meant a work tangible in nature and did not include the performance of 
an artists and that the agreement could not vest in the actor something 
which in the first place did not and could not exist under the Act. 
Accordingly, the actor could not restrain the producers from releasing 
the film in territories other than the seven named territories on the basis 
of his copyright either in the film or his work therein. 
The division bench which heard the appeal preferred by the 
producers from the order of a single judge granting the injunctions 
sought for by the actor upheld the contentions of the producers. 
Examining the provisions of the Act, the bench proceeded to consider 
whether the performance of an actor in a film is covered by the 
definition of "artistic work" or "dramatic work" or "cinematograph 
film" and thus protected as a "work" under the Act. 
The performance of a cinema actor, being neither a painting, nor 
a sculpture, nor a drawing, nor an engraving, nor a photograph, is 
clearly not an "artistic work" as comprehensively defined in the Act. 
Examining the definition of "dramatic work", the court rejected the 
contention that the performance of an actor which is fixed in the film is 
a dramatic work within that definition. Nor would the court counte-
nance the argument that there could be one owner of the copyright in a 
cinematograph film as a whole and different owners of the copyright in 
portions thereof consisting of the performers who have collectively 
played roles in the motion pictures. In sum, the Copyright Act 1957 does 
not recognise the performance of an actor as a "work'' protected by the Act. 
The detailed treatment of above case is warranted by the fact that 
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it is the only case in which the claim of a performer to copyright in his 
performance came to be tested in the courts and that the decision which 
is of general validity in respect of all performers, whether an actor, or 
a singer or a musician, or a dancer, or any other performing artist. It is 
also a warning to them that they can expect no protection from the 
copyright law.^ ^ Their only protection must be sought from carefully 
drafted contractual stipulations. A stipulation vesting in them the 
copyright in their performance is an exercise in futility. It is puzzling 
why Dev Anand contract linked up payment with only seven specified 
territories letting the producer free to market his film merrily in the 
other vast markets without any safeguards for the actor. 
(viil) Indian Copyright (Amendment) Act 1994 & Recognition of 
Performers Rights : 
The Copyright Amendment Act J 994 now seeks to make a 
dramatic change in the existing copyright law. One of the objects of the 
Amendment is to extend protection to all performers by means of a 
special right, to be known as the "performers's right", in respect of the 
making of sound recordings or visual recordings of their live perfor-
mances, and of certain related acts. The conferment of copyright 
protection on performer's right will be in conformity with the require-
ments of the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers. 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisation, 1961. 
For the first time the Amendment Act has inserted a definition of 
"performer" under Section 2(qq) which reads as under : 
"performer" includes an actor, singer, musician, 
dancer, acrobat, juggler, conjurer, snake charmer, a 
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person delivering a lecture or any other person who 
makes a performance. 
The Act also defines "performance" in relation to performer's 
right, which means any visual or acoustic presentation made live by one 
or more performers.'^ 
The Act has substituted new sections for Section 38 and Section 
39 which deal with the "performer's right". 
Clause (1) of Section 38 lays down that where any performer 
appears or engages in any performance, he shall have a special right 
known as the "performer's right" in relation to such performance. 
Clause (3) provides that during the continuance of a performer's 
right and without the consent of the performer anyone who does any of 
the following acts in respect of the performance or any substantial part 
thereof, namely -
(a) makes a sound recording or visual recording of the performance; or 
(b) reproduces a sound recording or visual recording of the perfor-
mance, which sound recording or visual recording was -
(i) made without the performer's consent; or 
(ii)made for purposes different from those for which the performer gave 
his consent; or 
(iii) made for purposes different from those referred to in Section 39 
from a sound recording or visual recording which was made in accor-
dance with Section 39. 
(c) broadcasts the performance except where the broadcast is made 
from a sound recording or visual recording other than one made in 
accordance with Section 39, or is a re-broadcast by the same broadcast-
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ing organisation of an earlier broadcast which did not infringe the 
performer's right; 
(d) communicates the performance to the public otherwise than by 
broadcast, except where such communication to the public is made from 
a sound recording or a visual recording or a bro< dcast. 
shall, subject to the provisions of Sectin 39, be deemed to have 
infringed the performer's right. 
But what is shocking is that clause (4) of Section 38 has taken 
from performer's what was given to them by the Amendment since it has 
laid down jn explicit terms that once a performer has consented to the 
incorporation of his performance in a cinematograph film, the provi-
sions of sub-Sections (1), (2) and (3), shall have no further application 
to such performance. Thus, the position of cine actors still remains same 
what it was after Dev Anand case. In view of this Amendment, the cine 
actors have to rely on their contracts with their producers rather than the 
copyright law. 
It can, therefore, be concluded that while performers rights have 
now been adequately recognised in United Kingdom in its 1988 Act and 
with the U.K. joining the Rome Convention, performer's position under 
the British system is further strengthened. The protection to performers 
in U.S. is also sufficient though a lot more is to be done in this regard. 
As far as Indian Copyright law and its protection to performer's rights 
is concerned, despite the 1994 Amendment and major changes brought 
by It, the position of performers in cinematograph films has not 
improved. The cine actor, therefore, still remains so far as the copyright 
law goes, a wage - earner whose performance is not protected as an 
intellectual creation. Recognition of cine-actor's right in respect of his 
performance in films should, therefore, be recognised urgently. 
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N E I G H B O U R I N G RIGHTS 
The history of copyright as seen above in chapter on historical 
development reflects the deveJopment of technology. Copyright devel-
oped as the means by which 'works', i.e. materials deserving copyright 
protection, reach the public. At the beginning it was the invention of the 
printing press which gave copyright its impetus. The protection of 
printed material against unauthorised reproduction was the main con-
cern of copyright and the right to prevent such reproduction, the 
reproduction right, was the basic and the main right, followed by the 
translation right in literary works. Until the second half of the 19th 
century the printing press was the sole technology involved in taking 
literary works of all kinds to their public. In the case of dramatic and 
musical works the main route of the work to its public was live 
performance and in the case of artistic works, exhibition. In the second 
half of the 19th century technology created photography, sound record-
ing and silent films and in the 20th centuiy, films with sound tracks, 
radio and television. These creations entirely transformed the copyright 
scene. This chapter, therefore, discusses the problem of deciding 
whether, in the terminology of 'copyright', these new subject matters 
need and deserve full copyright protection and, in the terminology of 
the droit d' auteur, whether they constitute 'works' to be protected. It 
examines the issue of neighbouring rights in the historical retrospect. 
The role of various International Conventions in this regard is also 
evaluated. The recent changes in the three countries under study in this 
regard are also put to close scrutiny. 
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(A) HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT & IDEOLOGY : 
It became fairly clear by the first decade of the 20th century thai 
photographs, cinematograph films and sound recordings deserved and 
needed some protection. Apart from terminology, the debates ranged 
over the question of who the initial copyright owner should be and what 
the scope atid term of the right should be ? 
The history of the protection of photographic works over a 
century has nearly all the ingredients, both under national and interna-
tional law, which characterise the copyright treatment of new technol-
ogy and should be studied for that reason. The photograph had the 
advantage over other creations of modern technology that the 'author' 
was a physical person but the handicap was that it was doubtful whether 
taking a photograph demanded sufficient or any originality to qualify as 
a "work" . 
The Diplomatic Conferences in 1884 and 1885, which led to the 
Berne Convention, failed to agree on how to treat this new phenomenon. 
The final protocol of the original text said : 
...it is agreed that those countries of the Union where 
the character of artistic works is not refused to 
photographs engage to admit them to the benefits of 
the Convention... They shall, however, not be bound 
to protect the authors of such works further than is 
permitted by their own legislation, except in the case 
of.... bilateral agreements.^ 
The Paris Diplomatic Conference (1886) brought photographs in 
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the Final Protocol. National treatment was to be granted to 'photo-
graphic works' except for the term. The term could be subject to 
reciprocity. Member states were to grant such national treatment where 
photographs were classed as artistic works in that country or had a sui-
generis, protection. A voeu was added to the effect that all member 
countries should protect photographic works and 'works produced by 
analogous process' for a minimum period of 15 years. 
In the Berlin Act (1908) photogrpahic works were for the first 
time included in the text of the Convention/ which provides that 'this 
Convention shall apply to the photographic works. However, they were 
not classed as 'litereary and artistic works', thus leaving both the nature 
of protection and the term to national legislation. 
It was not until the Brussels Act (1948) that photographic works 
were included in the list of 'literary and artistic works'. The general 
report says that photographic works had 'reached the supreme rank of 
general protection'. The question of what kind of photographs were 
protected was discussed at length, but no agreement was reached. 
The Stockholm Act (1967) was again preceded by protracted 
discussions and changed the text of Article 2(1) from the former text to 
'photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a 
process analogous to photography'. The significance of this definition 
is that although works by any similar process are protected they 
nonetheless, have to be 'works', i.e. a certain undefined quantum of 
skill and artistic merit can be required by national legislation. The 
significance of the change in language is making the manner in which 
the work was 'expressed' rather than the technical process the decisive 
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factor in the definition. The Stockholm Convention agreed for the first 
time on a minimum term for photographic works of 25 years from the 
making of the work.' 
The Berne Convention countries require no formalities for pro-
tection but, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the person whose 
name appears 'in the usual manner',^ on the work will be presumed to 
be the another. In these circumstances it must be advisable to put a 
copyright - claiming symbol, e.g. the name of the photographer and the 
year, date of publication on all photographs which may be considered 
'works'. 
In the Universal Copyright Convention (1952), photographic 
works are not listed in Article 1(7) in the non-exclusive list of works, 
but Article 4(3) results in protection for foreign photographic authors 
if national photographic works are considered artistic works under the 
national legislation. The term shall not be less than 10 years. 
In the member countries of the Universal Copyright Convention, 
the copyright symbol, the name of the photographer, the year and the 
date of publication of the photograph are sufficient on a published 
picture to comply with any formalities required by the domestic law of 
another member country. 
On the national level, the main problem has always been that the 
artistic character of photographs has been questioned. 'A mere pressing 
of a button', 'any child can do it', or 'it is the camera not the human 
being that produces a picture', have been the most common formula-
tions of the doubts expressed and, within the frame work of the 
Conventions, national laws still vary considerably.' 
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In the United States of Amercia the courts have held most 
photographs to be protected by copyright, ever since the Supreme Court 
held in 1884* that they can constitute 'writings' within the Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution. In that celebrated case, a camera portrait of 
Oscar Wilde was held to show sufficient originality to qualify for 
copyright protection. Under the Copyright Act, 1976, photogrpahs are 
protected as works. 
In the United Kingdom photographs are now protected' irrespec-
tive of'artistic quality' as works under the Copyright Act, 1988.^ 
In India also photographs are protected by the Copyright Act, 
1957.'" Whether or not they possess any artrstic quality. 
The only photographs which may now not qualify as 'works' 
would be, for instance, passport photographs taken by a coin-operated 
machine, or traffic photographs taken by automatic traffic control 
cameras on the basis that they lack authorship. 
Thus, after nearly a century of debate photographs are recognised 
as works, provided they contain some original elements. These could be 
the choice of the subject, the composition of the picture, the angle from 
which and the light in which they are taken, the choice of technical aids 
(like filters or lenses), the development, the cutting, or any other human 
influence. As learned Hand J. put it, 'no photograph, however simple, 
can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author'. 
The next step beyond photograph was taken by the Paris Addi-
tional Act 1896, adding to 'photographic works', 'works produced by 
an analogous process', this meant films - then in their infancy. The 
cinematograph film presented the first doctrinal problem of ownership: 
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who should be the initial owner of the copyright ? 
The common law legislations answered : the 'producer', mean-
ing the company that produced the film. The French and other European 
legislations answered : 'the author of the cinematographic', which in 
practice means, a plurality of individuals as joint authors ranging from 
the cameraman (the person 'analogous' to the photographer) to the 
director and actors starring in the film. The problem of how to treat 
cinematograph films was the first to show the great divide between those 
legislations, which followed the doctiine of the droit d' auieur (all Europe, 
with the exception of the U.K., the Republic of Ireland and all Latin 
America) and those which followed the doctrine of 'copyright' (mainly 
countries of the British Commonwealth including India and the U.S.). 
The main difficulty is not, as has often been maintained, the lack of 
originality or of quality of these new works. Right from the beginning, 
copyright recognised derivative works which by definition demand a 
pre-existing work. Such works are not original in the sense that they 
create something out of nothing, like willing a book or a song. Translations and 
musical airangements were the fiist examples of such works to be recognised as 
suitable for copyright protection. Thus, its derivative nature is not the reason 
why the droit d' auteur doctrine found it impossible to recognise the producer 
of a film or data of a phonogram or a broadcast as an initial right owner. Lack 
of artistic or intellectual input in the making of a film, a record or a 
broadcast as there is in adapting an orchestra score for piano as much 
skill and labour as there is in compiling a street directory. This doctrine 
had never had any difficulty in recognising such adaptors or compilers 
as initial owners of copyright. 
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The real difficulty Jay elsewhere. It lay in the fact that the adapter 
and the compiler are, like the photographer, physical persons, whereas 
film producers, phonogram producers and broadcasting organisations 
are companies or corporations. The difficulty is emphasised when one 
contemplates the moral, as opposed to the economic rights. Moral 
rights, it is said, which are based on the expression of the author's 
personality and his intellectual link with his work, can't exist in a 
company or corporation. The 'copyright' legislation of common law 
countries which, while recognising some moral rights, do not put much 
emphasis on them, they did not consider this difficulty insuperable and 
gave a copyright to the producer of a film or phonogram. In the light of 
the history of 'copyright' this is not illogical. The first copyright 
owners were 'printers', in modern terminology publishers, of books 
who combined artistic skills and judgement with technical skills and 
made the initial investment. They were individuals in the 17th and 18th 
centuries but in the 19th century many became companies. Thus, the 
copyright resided in the company. When broadcasting was invented 
'copyright' legislations had no difficulty in granting a copyright to the 
broadcasting organisations which were responsible for creating and 
disseminating the programmes.'-
In most countries copyright is a creature of statute, so that new 
copyrightable matter has to be protected by new legislation whereas the 
law of torts was largely, although not entirely developed by courts. 
However, in the history of copyright too there are exceptions to 
development by Statute. In France, for instance, the development of the 
droit d' auteur was left entirely to the courts for over a century and half 
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(between the first law of 1783 and the second of 1957), a period of 
rapidly developing technology. Thus, list of copyright owners has been 
added to from time to time, by legislation but sometimes by the courts, 
as new technology demanded it. The droit d' auteur has roots which are 
different from the common concept of 'copyright'. It stems from the 
doctrine of natural law and the ideas of French Revolution. This 
resulted in a highly personalised approach to copyright which links the 
work with the personality and individuality of author. The difficulty of 
recognising such rights as dwelling in a limited company thus becomes 
almost insuperable. 
When faced with the new technology the t/ro/r c/' at/fe?<r jurisdic-
tions reacted differently to each new invention. The photograph could 
still be fitted in by giving the original rights to the individual who takes 
the photograph. Nowadays, most photographs that have commercial 
value are taken by employees of companies (press, news agencies etc), 
but that can be dealt with, by the law under the separate heading of 
'employed author \ Films produced a major problem. It was resolved by 
a fiction, i.e. that a film is no more than a series of thousands of 
photographs stuck together, and cinematography was, until 1948 (Brus-
sels Act), classed as a 'process analogous to photography'. That makes 
all the individuals who participated in this process, or at least most of 
them, co-authors : cameramen, cutters, actors, (at least stars, directors-
scriptwriters, composers of music, etc. The film producing company 
has to acquire these rights from individual co-authors. This is very 
cumbersome but still feasible. The sound engineer or the 'producer' 
who is in charge of recordings in the studio or the performing artist as 
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the co-authors of a recording was felt to be stretching the point too far 
and the experience of treating films in this way had not been too 
encouraging. Even so, the making of a recording in a studio might still 
have been accepted as a team effort by named individuals. When it came 
to the making of a broadcast, the analogy became too strained. A 
broadcasting corporation is too large an enterprise to conceive as a team 
of co-authors. Thus, on the international plane for phonograms and 
broadcasts a new solution had to be found which would be acceptable 
to droil d' auteur countries. 
The International compromise which led droit d' auteur but is 
nonetheless an intellectual property right and, as such, it is close to, 
connected with, or neighbouring or, the droit d' auteur. Italian law, one 
of the first to recognise these new rights in 1941, called them, diritti 
conessi (connected rights), German law verwandle schutzrechte, (re-
lated rights) French law droit voisins (neighbouring rights). In English 
Law the term "neigbouring rights" is now most commonly used. The 
Indian law does not use term "neigbouring rights". 
The difference between granting these right owners a copyright 
or a neightbouring right can, as Prof Francon'-^ remarks be both in space 
and in time : 
A given work may enjoy a copyright in one country, 
but only a neighbouring right or related right in 
another. This is the case with photographs, enjoing 
a copyright in France, but only a neighbouring right 
under several other laws. Other works, formerly 
granted only a neighbouring right, may one day 
become the beneficiary of a copyright. 
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He adds : "this is, perhaps, the present direction of French 
Jurisprudence with respect to performing artistis". These were pro-
phetic words, which seem to have been headed by the courde cassation 
in 1982 in the Spedidame case "*. This concept has now been put into 
statutory form and rights akin to both copyright and neighbouring rights 
have been accorded to performers and producers of phonograms in the 
French legislation of 3rd July 1985. 
In International law the first move towards neighbouring rights 
was made in 1928 by the Rome Revision Conference of Berne Conven-
tion when Conference, although refusing to grant a copyright to per-
formers, as had been suggested, expressed a voeu at the end of the 
Conference that members of the Berne Convention should "consider the 
possibility of measures intended to safeguard the rights of performers". 
It was envisaged that a Convention or later two Conventions (one for 
Performers and Producers of Phonograms and one for Broadcasting 
Organisation) should be "annexed to the revised Berne Convention". 
Meanwhile, some countries, e.g. Austria in 1936 and Italy in 1941. 
granted neighbouring rights to performers and record producers. At the 
Brussels Revision in 1948 three voeux were expressed pointing in the 
same direction. On this occasion most states took the view that the 
rights of performers, phonogram producers and broadcasters were 
inter-linked and that a fair and equitable balance between them could 
only be achieved in one instrument. This view was widely shared and 
led, more than two decades later, to the signing of the Rome Convention 
in 1961. It was followed by the Phonogram Convention 1971, giving 
phonogram producers further rights which could be implemented by 
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national legislation granting a copyright or a neighbouring right and by 
the Satellite Convention 1974 which took broadcasting rights into the 
realm of public international law. 
The term neighbouring rights in the narrow sense covers only the 
rights of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting 
organisations. In a wider sense it also covers other rights similar to 
copyright, such as rights in photographs in certain countries, the rights 
of film producers in certain countries or the rights in first editions of 
books or typographical arrangements. These others rights are referred 
to as related rights. 
(B) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AUTHORS' RIGHTS AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS : 
Neighbouring rights are nearly always rights in derivative 
works because they presuppose a pre-existing work. Performers are 
usually only protected if they perform works (thus excluding variety 
and circus artists). Phonograms are nearly always recordings of work 
(birdsong or sound effect being the unimportant and rare exceptions). 
Broadcasts consist largely of performances of works (the broadcasting 
of sporting or public events being some of the notable exceptions). Thus, 
the comparison to be made is with copyrights in other derivative works. 
Derivative works can be of many kinds. The first, historically, 
was the translation of a work of literature into another language and 
transcriptions of musical works (either upwards, e.g. orchestrating a 
vocal or piano score, or downwards, e.g. by reducing an operatic score 
to a version for the piano). Later followed the derivative works which 
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are achieved by changing the medium e.g. novel into film or play into 
radio or television play. 
There is little merit in the argument that these works, as deriva-
tive works, are inferior because they demand only technical and not 
artistic skills. It is difficult to argue that there is more artistness in 
transposing the archestral score of the triumphal march from Aida for 
piano than in making a recording. The argument becomes untenable 
when giving a copyright to the photographer who (sometimes at any 
rate) only presses a button, and denying it to the maker of a film. The 
only distinction which is valid beyond argument is that the initial 
copyright owner in the case of neighbouring rights is in most cases a 
corporate body (with the notable exception in the case of performers) 
whereas the initial owner of other copyright is almost invariably a 
natural person (with the notable exception of the case of employed 
authors), whereas this - the only valid distinction - does not justify 
division of all copyrights into copyrights stricto sensu and neighbouring 
rights, it does have several consequences : 
(i) Moral rights will, with the exception of performers rights, by 
definition in most cases be confined to authors 
(ii) The scope of copyrights is, also by definition, widei than the 
scope of neighbouring rights, which encompasses only three categories 
of rights : the reproduction rights, the public performance rights and the 
broadcasting rights. 
(iii) The term of neighbouring rights is, again by definition, almost 
invariably shorter than that of other copyright, as 50 years from the 
death of the author is always longer than 20 or 30 or even 50 years, from 
CHAPTER - 9 : 382 
publication, performance or broadcast. 
The quality of the reproduction right in neighbouring rights is 
often equal to a copyright. The phonogram producer, for instance, has 
the same absolute right to prohibit the unauthorised copying of his 
phonogram as the author of a book has to prohibit the unauthorised 
copying of his book. On the other hand performance right of the author 
is in many countries stronger than that of the neighbouring right owner. 
The author usually has an absolute right with the exception of broad-
casting, where Article 11 his of the Berne Convention permits a 
compulsory licence which, if a country makes use of the provision, may 
reduce the author's right, in effect, to a right to equitable remuneration. 
The phonogram producer or the performer has in most countries a right 
to equitable remuneration, such as under Article 12 of the Rome 
Convention. 
Three fears were expressed on behalf of authors with regard to 
the establishement of neighbouring rights. The first was that some 
countries may protect neighbouring right owners while not protecting 
the original authors. This fear was allyed by Articles 23 and 24 of the 
Rome Convention which provide that a country can only ratify the 
Rome Convention if it has already ratified either the Berne Convention 
or the Universal Copyright Convention. The second fear was that where 
several authorisations were required, one from the author and one from 
the neighbouring right owner, the former may give his authorisation but 
the later may withhold it, thereby frustrating the use of the work and 
depriving the author of his royalty. An example would be a piaiiist 
performing a copyright work in a concert hall but objecting to the 
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recording of the concert, thus, depriving the composer of his royalties 
on the sale of the record. Such cases are rare and, in practice, the pianist 
will only object if he fears the conditions are not conducive to a good 
recording, in which case the moral right of the author will suffer 
together with the reputation of pianist. 
The third fear was most substantial of the three and concerned the 
performance right. If a user has to pay two royalties for the same 
performance, one to the author and another to the neighbouring right 
owner, it was feared that he would only be prepared to pay less to the 
author. This is known as the cake theory. There is supposed to be only 
one cake and if the neighbouring right owners get a slice of it, the slice 
of the another would be smaller. Practice has proved these fears to be 
unjustified. The Intergovernmental Committee of the Rome Convention 
finally laid this fear at rest in 1979. After a very thorough investigation 
of the problem their report says'^ : 
Several states members of the sub-committee ex-
pressed the firm view that the evidence in their 
countries, and the evidence available to the sub 
committee, indicates conclusively that copyright 
royalties have not decreased as a result of the 
remuneration paid to performers and producers of 
phonograms. // is, therefore, clear that there is no 
evidence to support the proposition that author's 
revenue has decreased as a result of neighbouring 
rights, (emphasis supplied). 
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(C) OWNERSHIP, SCOPE AND TERM OF 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS : 
As to ownership, invariably it is a company or corporation in the 
case of phonogram producers and broadcasting organisations. It is 
usually an individual or a group of individuals (orchestra, chorus, 
popgroup) in the case of performers although some orchestras have 
formed companies for business purposes. 
In the case of author's rights the scope of the right is a large 
bundle of rights which comprises apart from the basic reproduction 
right, inter alia the translation right, the performance right, the broad-
casting right and the film rights. The scope of these new rights, whether 
they are classed as copyright or neighbouring rights, is confined to the 
reproduction right, the performance right and the broadcasting right. 
Throughout the history of copyright the duration of the right has 
always been 'at the heart of the policy argument''*. The statutory term 
represents the compromise between the interests of the rightowner and 
the public interest in the widest possible access to all works. For 
published works, most countries have now accepted the '50 years after 
the death of the author' term of the Berne Convention for works not 
published in the author's lifetime the period is usually 50 years from the 
end of the year in which the work was first 'published'. It is the latter 
type of term, i.e., a number of years from publications, that has become 
the rule for neighbouring rights. In the case of phonograms and broad-
casts where the original right owner is not a physical person this is the 
only logical solution. 
The minimum term under both the Rome Convention and the 
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Phonogram Convention is 20 years.'^ Under national laws the term 
varies from 25 years in the Nordic countries and Germany,'" 50 years in 
the U.K. and India to 75 years in the U.S.' ' 
In the case of performers, the starting point of the term is in most 
national laws the time when the performance took place or when the 
performance was fixed. As performers, unlike producers of phonograms 
or broadcasting organisations, are physical persons with a natural 
lifespan, such a term, if it is as short as 20 years, leads to abnormal 
situations. When the performer who has made a recording in his 
twenties or thirties reaches his forties or fiftes his new and protected 
recording may have to compete in market with his own earlier recording 
which are already in the public domain. 
Thus, the rights in the new materials are always of shorter 
duration by definition and sometimes much shorter. 
(D) NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS & PERFORMERS ; 
(i) Definition of Performer : 
The classical definition in international law is actors, singers, 
musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, 
play in, or otherwise perform literary or artistic works'". The definition 
is wide in that it includes performances of works in the public domain, 
but narrow in that it excludes all those who don't perform works, e.g. 
variety artists, acrobats, sports persons or extras on stage or in films. 
It is rather paradoxical that although of all neighbouring rights 
owners - performers are closest to derivative authors such an translators 
of literary works or adaptors of musical scores who receive full authors 
rights are in many jurisdictions and in international law the weakest. 
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Unlike other neighbouring rights owners they are physical persons, like 
authors, and it is difficult to see the essential difference between the 
work of a derivative author, say a translator, or an arranger, and that of 
performer. 
There seems to be two reasons for the weakness of the performers 
position in law. The first is historical and social. Actors or 'strolling 
players' were regarded as vagrants by the law during the formative 
period of copyright. Adam Smith, in his work gave players, buffoons, 
musicians, opera-singers, opera - dancers as classical examples of 
unproductive labour ^'. Modern times have removed this social stigma 
and from the bottom of the social scalae star performers have gone to the 
top and some have become the idols of modern society. The second 
reason is historical and technological. Adam Smith goes on to say : "The 
work of all of them perishes in the instant of its production". This was 
perfectly correct in his days. This reason was, however, removed with 
the invention of records - films, radio and television, from the time 
when performances could be fixed and the fixations both reproduced in 
large numbers and performed to large audiences, thus involving the two 
basic rights in the copyright bundle, the reproduction right and the 
performance right, the second reason too had been removed. The 
question of what, if any, rights performers, should have in law has been 
debated among jurists and legislators ever since. 
When eventually some protection was given it took different 
forms in different countries. Germany, was the first country to follow 
the way shown by the Berne Convention. When faced with the new 
phenomenon of the film, the Convention declared it a process analogous 
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to photography. Although this is like saying that modern man is 
analogous to the Neanderthal man it seemed to serve the purpose of 
appeasing the traditionalists. Granting a right appeared not as an 
entirely new departure but as a gradual development. German Law 
followed this example in the field of performer's protection. It said, in 
effect, that the performance of a musical work by a performer is 
analogous to an adoption of the original work.^^ The German Courts 
had, in 1940, when called upon to interpret the performance right of 
recorded performances, held" that the right was given to all artists as 
performers of work from the start to the last violin in the orchestra and 
the last member of the chorus in an opera. 
In Italy, the Copyright Law, 1941, one of the first laws to use the 
term neighbouring rights did't give performers a right to allow or forbid 
the fixation of their performance but a right to equitable remuneration 
if their performance was recorded or broadcast.-'* The term is 20 years. 
By subjecting the right to a kind of compulsory licence and giving it a 
much shorter term the law indicated that it was not quite like a droii d' 
auteur but a neighbouring right. 
In France, Statute law completely disregarded performer's rights 
as other neighbouring rights. The laws of 1791 and 1793 were not 
revised until 1957 and then proposals for performer's rights were 
rejected. However, the courts recognised a performer's droit moral as 
early as 1937^^ saying that whereas performers had no copyright it was 
equitable to recognise a right in their personal creation, i.e., the 
interpretation they give to their roles, which is the sole manifestation of 
their art perceptible by the senses and thus punished. 
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Then in thelandmarkjudgementin^pec/zc/amccase, •^^ the caurde 
cassalion (supreme court) held that : 
Whereas artists do not benefit from the protection 
of the Copyright Law 1957 they are nonetheless 
entitled by virtue of the rules of the common law 
to demand that their performance is not used for a 
different purpose from that which they have 
authorised. 
Finally, the law of 1985 put the position into statutory form 
giving the performer the basic rights he has under the Rome Convention 
which France has subsequently ratified. 
In the United Kingdom, performers were not given either a 
copyright or a full neighbouring right but protection by way of criminal 
sanctions.^^ The offence is to make a phonogram or a film of a live 
(unfixed) performance without the consent of the performer or to 
broadcast such a live performance (including diffusion, by wire) with-
out his consent. In each case, to constitute the offence the user has to act 
both knowingly and without the written consent of the performer. The 
advantage of this method of protection is immediacy. A private prosecu-
tion for an infringement can be undertaken by the performer and be 
concluded by a fine very quickly. The disadvantage is the practical 
difficulty of securing the presence of the artist, particularly foreign 
artists, in court to give evidence and the fact that penalties, being fines, 
have constantly to be kept under review because of inflation otherwise 
they cease to be an effective deterrent. 
Faced with the problem of illicit recording of live performances 
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(known as bootlegging) the courts in the U.K. had to reconsider both the 
scope of the general economic torts and the extent to which injunctive 
relief may be available against the commission of the criminal of-
fences.^^ It has been held in the U.K. that where a performer's perfor-
mance has been recorded without his permission and phonograms made 
from this illicit recording and sold, he is entitled to an injunction.^" 
Under the 1988 Copyright Act, rights similar to copyright are conferred 
upon performers in relation to their live performances and recordings of 
these performances. India has also followed this in 1994 Amendment of 
Copyright Act, 1957. 
In Latin America, Mexico^' was the first country to give perform-
ers rights which are akin to author's rights and subsequently other Latin 
American countries followed the suit. 
(ii) Rights of Performers : 
The basic rights given to performers under various legislations 
are the right to : 
(a) Control the fixation of a live performance; 
(b) Control the broadcasting or communication to the public of a live 
performance; 
(c) Control subsequent reproductions of the first fixation; 
(d) Control the broadcasting or communication to the public (includ-
ing communication by cable) of such a fixation. 
The first two rights are usually expressed as a right to authorise 
or forbid. They are absolute rights. The right to 'control' subsequent 
reproductions of the first fixation is under the Rome Convention 
CHAPTER-9 : 390 
exercisable only if the reproduction is made for purposes different from 
those for which the performers gave their consent.'^ The right to control 
the broadcasting or public performance of the first fixation, i.e., a 
phonogram, is also invariably granted in the form of an equitable 
rumeneration for the use of phonogram on the air or in public. This is 
a form of a compulsory licence. It is justified by the fact that the user 
would not be able to obtain the authorisation of the performers for each 
separate use. 
In view of the fundametal differences of approach between 
national legislations, the first international instrument, the Rome Con-
vention, adopts the solution of the lowest common denominator. Per-
formers have 'the right to prevent' unanthorised fixations of their live 
performances. This can be implemented on the national level by an 
absolute right (e.g. Germany, Japan) or a neighbouring right (e.g. the 
Nordic countries) or protection by criminal provisions (e.g. the United 
Kingdom until 1988"). 
Some countries grant certain moral rights to performers in re-
spect of their performances. Thus, they have the right to oppose any 
diffusion transmission or reproduction of their performance which 
might be prejudicial to their honour or reputation.^'* These provisions 
echo Article 6 his (1) of the Berne Convention equating the performer 
to an author in this respect. However, in International Convention law 
there is as yet no recognition of such a moral right. 
It has been said that even the granting of a copyright or a 
neighbouring right doesn't fully compensate the professions of 
performence, particularly musicians, for the fundamental changes 
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brought about by the new media (fihns, records, broadcasts), usually 
referred to as technological unemployment . Once a performance is 
recorded it can be repeated in public without the necessity of engaging 
the performer whose performance has been recorded or indeed without 
the presence of any performer at all. Performers have, thus, lost 
countless employment opportunities." It is also being brought out^ * that 
the performance right in their recorded perfromances benefit the stars 
for more than the rank and file musicisons who rarely get into a 
recording or film studio and, therefore do not benefit from any 
additional income for the profession as a whole. The exercise of any 
rights performers have under various national legislations suffered 
from the additonal difficulty that quite frequently many performers are 
participating in one performance. Provision had, therefore, to be made 
for the collective exercise of their rights and collective societies formed 
for the purpose. 
There is no doubt that there is growing sympathy among legisla-
tors for the idea of legal protection for performers. The most recent 
laws, e.g. in France, Spain, U.K. India, and Latin American countries 
clearly show such a trend. The impetus comes undoubtedly from the 
Rome Convention, but the most recent legislation shows a tendency to 
grant more extensive rights than the Convention provides, such as moral 
rights for performers in Spain and Latin America and a wider definition 
of 'performers in India' than the Rome Convention (article 3), which is 
restricted to performers who perform literary or artistic works. The new 
definitions include variety artists but not yet sportsmen and women. On 
the otherhand, the development of technology, such as digital recording 
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and satellite broadcasting, has underlined the serious weakness pro-
duced by Article 19 of the Rome Convention which has the effect that 
as soon as a performer consents to the inclusion of his performance in 
a film (including cinema, television or videogram), the protection 
which Article 7 of Rome Convention ceases to apply and he can't 
prevent any further uses made of the fixed performance. Thus, once 
released the fixed performance can be used in ways which the performer 
has not agreed to or which were not even within his contemplation. 
His only remedy is against the maker of the original film if the 
contract provides such a remedy. This leads back to the position before 
the Convention, when the only protection of performers was contrac-
tual. It makes the rights of the performer dependent on his bargaining 
power. The 'Star' will alone be able to insist on terms protecting his or 
her interest. The relatively unknown performer will not. His only 
remedy lies in collective bargaining by performers union. These collec-
tive agreements are frequently negotiated as 'multi-media' agreements 
under which the first user accepts responsiblity for subsequent uses of 
the performance. 
(E) NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS & PRODUCERS 
OF PHONOGRAMS : 
(i) Legal Status of Phonograms : 
In the early days, a phonogram was no little more than a recording 
of sounds, a kind of fascimile reproduction of a performance of musical 
or literary works, or both, involving only technical skills. But gradually 
advancing technology made record production an act form which 
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probably demands as much creativity as any other derivative work. 
Phonograms were first included in the list of 'work' in the United 
Kingdom in 1909; other common law countries such as India and 
Australia followed. 
(ii) Rights of Producers of Phonograms : 
Producers of phonograms enjoy the three basic rights in the 
'bundle of rights' granted to right owners : the reproduction right; the 
public performance right; and the broadcasting right. 
The reproduction right is a right erga omnes to authorise or 
prohibit any reproduction of a protected phonogram. The Rome Con-
vention gives the right to prohibit reproduction whether such reporduction 
is 'direct or indirect'-'^. These words replaced the words 'directly or 
when broadcast' and it was understood that 'indirectly' covered 
reproduction from a matrix (in case of disc) or from a pre-existing 
phonogram, such as a tape or from a 'recording off the air'. The last 
mentioned method of reproduction is known as 'home taping", an 
activity which is simple with the equipment now available in the market 
in most countries. Home taping would be contrary to interntional law in 
countries which have ratified the Rome Convention unless it is covered 
by the private use exception of Article 15(l)(a) which is a matter of 
national law. 
If the phonogram which is home taped contain works protected 
by copyright, usually musical works, it also infringes the author's right 
under the Berne Convention.^' The .1967 Revision Conference of the 
Berne Convention made the meaning of Article 9 (2) very plain : 
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If it is considered that reproduction conflicts 
with the normal exploitation of a work, repro-
duction is not permitted at all. If it is considered 
that reproduction does not conflict with the nor-
mal exploitation of the work, the next step would 
be to consider whether it does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitima+c interests of the author. 
It seems clear that the practice of home taping both 'conflicts with 
a normal exploitation of the work'. Therefore, the practice doesn't seem 
to be covered by fair use exception but is an infringement. The 
Whitford, Committee in the U.K. came to the same conclusion i^*^  
We reject the suggestion that fair dealing should 
be extended generally to permit some free audio 
and video recordings because fair dealing to an 
extent such as is accepted as reasonable for liter-
ary works, for example, would not satisfy the 
need for most users, while a widening of the term, 
would create a virtual free-for-all with copyright 
owners getting no benefit. 
However, the exercise of the reproduction right both by the 
author and by the phonogram producer in these circumstances would be 
an intolerable intrusion in the privacy of the user's home and the right 
is, therefore, unenforceable in practice. The practice of home taping is 
a good example of new technology eroding the most basic right of the 
copyright owner, the reporudction right, to such an extent that only 
legislation can restore the balance. The only practical legislative 
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approach seems to be the one first adopted in Germany. The law of the 
erstwhile Federal Republic of Germany provides for a royalty on the 
recording equipment"' and for a royalty on the blank tape used for the 
recording/^ Under these provisions a royalty is based on the sale of each 
piece of recording equipment or on the sale of each blank tape or both."^ 
The royalty is shared by authors, performers and phonogram producers. 
Similar solutions were subsequently adopted in other major European 
countries such as France and Spain. In the United Kngdom, such a 
solution was rejected in the Copyright Act of 1988, so was in India in 
1994 Amendment. 
The reproduction right in phonogram applies to parts of 
phonograms since, as the Rome Convention Report states, 'the right of 
reproduction is not qualified, and is to be understood as including rights 
against partial reproduction of a phonogram'."" This is important as it 
prevents the copying of one track of an LP (long playing record) and 
probably even part of a track if the part is substantial. 
The right owner is the entity which first fixes the sounds. This 
exludes both the technicians or operators employed by the recording 
company and any entity merely pressing records, i.e., duplicating the 
first fixation which is the original recording. 
The protection under the Phonogram Convention is on the one 
hand, wider and, on the other, less strictly defined. It is wider because 
it gives a distribution right and a right against importation of illicit 
reproductions as well as a reproduction right."^ It is less strictly defined 
because the means of implementing the reproduction right is left to 
national legislation which is free to ensure protection by such means as 
CHAPTER - 9 : 396 : 
the law of unfair competition without granting a reproduction right. 
However, most legislations now give the phonogram poroducer a 
reproduction right/* 
(Hi) Rental Rights : 
New technology in the form of compact discs (CD) and digital 
audio tape (DAT), apart from improving the quality of the sound base, 
created a much more durable phonogram, they can be played many 
times without deteriorating. This makes it possible to offer phonograms 
for hire as well as for sale. A new trade in renting phonograms 
developed first in Japan"' which introduced a rental right in phonogram 
in 1985. In U.K., U.S.A., France and Spain phonogram producers have 
an absolute right to authorise or probhibit the rental of their phonograms. 
This new right is yet another right which can probably only be exercised 
collectively by a collective society on behalf of all right owners. 
(iv) Remedies for infringement of the 
Reproduction Right in Phonograms : 
As the copying of pre-recorded tapes is now a very simple 
operation which almost anybody can carry out and even the illicit 
copying of discs which requires a plant can be made extremely profit-
able, 'piracy' (illicit copying for commercial purposes) of phonograms 
is today practised in many countries, with far larger number of copies, 
than piracy of books and printed matter ever had been. Thus, enforce-
ment of the reporduction right and the remedies available to authors and 
phonogram producers at the national level have become of prime 
importance. 
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Like other copyrights, the copyrights and 'neighbouring rights' 
of producers of phonograms and performers are usually governed by 
contracts and these contracts provide contractual remedies in cases of 
breach. These remedies include injunctions and action for damages. But 
the distinguishing feature of copyright is that, being a right erga omnes, 
it can be enforced against all types of persons with whom the owner of 
copyright or the neighbouring right has no contractual relation, but who 
has infringed his rights. 
(a) Civil Remedies : 
(I) Search & Seizure : 
In the United kingdom as discussed at length in the next chapter 
the courts make orders exparte, after hearing in camera and in the 
absence of the defendant, ordering the defendant or the occupier of his 
premises to permit the plaintiff and his lawyer to inspect the defendant's 
premises. The order enables the plaintiff's lawyers to take possession 
of infringing copies and documents and other relevant materials or 
require the defendant to keep infringing stock, thus securing or preserv-
ing the evidence. The order is known as an 'Anton Filler Order', named 
after one of the first reported cases in which such an order was made.^^ 
(II) Injunction : 
This is an order made by the court directing the defendant to 
desist or refrain from committing acts which infringe the plaintiff's 
copyright or neighbouring right. Such injunctions can be granted at the 
end of the trial (Final injunctions) or at the outset (interlocutory 
injunctions). For wilful breach of an injunction the courts can impose 
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fines or even imprisonment. 
It is the interlocutory injunction which is most effective because 
of its immediacy, speed and low cost. In practice, it often has the effect 
of settling the case, as the defendant, deprived of the opportunity to 
make a quick profit, desists and allows final judgement to be given 
against him without trial. This is particularly so in the case of phonograms 
of popular music or newspaper articles or topical broadcasts where at 
the end of the trial, many months later, the infringing copies would no 
longer be of much value. The courts require an undertaking from the 
plaintiff to make good the damage which may be caused to the defendant 
should the defendant succeed at the trial. Then the remedy of Delivery 
up is usually coupled with an injunction which orders the defendant, to 
surrender infringing copies and the machinery or other equipment used 
in the process of production. 
(Ill) Compensatory Remedies : 
Generally, the purpose of an award of damages is to restore the 
plaintiff to his position before the infringement. Such damages are thus 
compensatory. However, the courts can also award punitive damages in 
copyright cases. Whereas the measure of damages in the case of 
compensatory damages will generally be what the plainfiff could have 
charged for a licence or the value of lost sales or royalties, the measure 
of punitive damages is always at the discretion of court. They are 
awarded in cases where the breach is flagrant and the defendant stood 
to make substantial profits from his conducf", as 'it is necessary for the 
law to show that it can not be broken with impunity'.''* 
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(b) Criminal Remedies : 
In the countries where the producers of phonograms have a 
copyright or a neighbouring right, the law usually provides criminal as 
well as civil remedies by making infringement an offence. Such of-
fences usually show three characteristics : 
(I) a public prosecution will, generally, only be undertaken on the 
application of the injured party.*' In countries where the legal 
system permits private prosecutions the injured party can itself 
prosecute;" 
(II) the prosecutor must prove that the infringement was intentional; 
(III) the primary sentence will be a fine and only in cases of recividism 
or exceptionally large scale infringements a prison sentence may 
be imposed. 
Criminal remedies have three disadvantages, first, the strict 
proofof copyright is sometimes very difficult;" secondly, fines fixed by 
law become derisory in countries with high inflation rates and have to 
be periodically revised or indexed to remain effective; and thirdly, in 
many countries the courts are reluctant to impose prison sentences for 
copyright offences. 
(V) Performance Rights in Phonograms : 
This right is granted either to the phonogram producer*"* or to the 
performer" or to both". In many cases the right is subject to compulsory 
licence being expressed as a right to equitable remuneration. 
(a) The Public Performance Right : 
Producers of phonograms usually have a right in the public 
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performance of their phonograms. This takes the form either of an 
absolute right or of a right to equitable remuneration when protected 
phonograms are played in public. This right can be effective if exercised 
by a collective society. 
(b) The Broadcastine Right : 
Producers of phonograms have in many countries a right in the 
broadcasting of their phonograms" which can be an absolute right or 
can take the form of a right to equitable remuneration. This right is 
always exercised by a bulk licensing contract with a broadcasting 
organisation or with a group of broadcasting organisations. 
Performers also have in many countries a right in the broadcast-
ing of their recorded performances which has also taken the form of a 
right to equitable remuneration. It also has to be exercised in conjunc-
tion with record producers as the user is only bound to pay one single 
equitable remuneration to both. 
(F) BROADCASTING ORGANISATIONS : 
In order to understand the relative dearth of private international 
law relating to broadcasting organisations, one must look at the nature 
of broadcasting organisations and the history of their international 
relations. Among the beneficiaries of the Rome Convention, performers 
are private individuals and phonogram producers are private or public 
companies whereas broadcasting organisations are either departments 
of state (usually in authoritarian countries), public law corporations 
with a charter (mainly in Western Europe), or commercial organisations 
(mainly in North and South America) which need a licence from the 
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government in order to be able to operate. Thus, their dependence on the 
government or their proximity to the government and also their influ-
ence on the government is far greater than that of either authors or 
publishers among the copyright owners or of the other two neighbouring 
right owners. They perform a public service and their task is cultural 
and artistic as well as being a leading agency of news and current 
affairs. It is, thus, not surprising that the international problems being 
encountered by broadcasting organisations with regard to their rights 
tended to be dealt with either at the diplomatic level or by public 
international law, whereas copyright is, in its essence, the exercise of 
a private right. Thus, in the early days of broadcasting (sound broad-
casting) in the 1930s and 1940s the interest of broadcasting organisations 
in solutions based on copyright was not of very great importance to 
them. The Rome Act, of the Berne Convention 1928 had established the 
broadcasting right of copyright owners jure conventionis and broad-
casting organisations regarded themselves primarily as users of copy-
right material. 
At the Brussels Revision Conference of the Berne Convention in 
1948 the broadcasters played the role of the largest user achieving a 
compulsory licence and other user benefits. 
Immediately, thereafter, and in the 1950s, broadcasters repre-
sented by the EBU (European Broadcasting Union'*) actively partici-
pated in the preparatory work for the Rome Convention. This period 
did, however, also see the advent of television which made broadcasting 
organisations the largest single user of copyright of all kinds (news, 
literature, drama, music etc.). 
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In the 1950s and 1960s broadcasting organisations felt several 
anxities about their rights in their broadcastings : 
First, there was a widespread fear in the 1950s that hotels, 
restaurants and other public places would increasingly charge entrance 
fees from their customers (either openly or through increased charges 
for food and drink or other services) for watching television programmes. 
Thus, an European Agreement on the Protection of Telvision Broad-
casts which was concluded in 1960 and is still in force. This threat to 
the rights of broadcasting organisations subsided as soon as most 
households acquired televisions sets and the demand to see television 
programmes in public places diminished. 
Secondly, cable networks and community aerials were taking 
television programmes, they are known as CATV (Community Anten-
nae Television), and making them available to private homes charging 
subscription fees but denying the rights of broadcasting organisations in their 
programmes. Broadcasting organisations pleaded for a right against 
cable operators at the Diplomatic Conference for the Rome Convention 
in 1961, but failed because hardly any of the countries represented had 
any legislation to support such a right.^^ With the exception of the 
European Agreement for the Protection of Television Broadcasts, the 
problem is still largely unreasolved at the international level. 
Thirdly, when first communication satellite were launched the 
major broadcasting organisations represented by the EBU were con-
cerned that other less scrupulous broadcasting organisations would take 
their programmes off the satellites instead of entering into agreements 
with the organisation originating the programme and paying royalties or 
CHAPTER - 9 : 4 0 3 : 
at least entering into programme exchange agreements. They succeeded 
in achieving the Satellite Convention 1974 but during the preparatory 
stages, due to legal and political difficulties, copyright or neighbouring 
rights protection had to be abondoned and replaced by public law 
commitments to be entered into by ratifying governments. The subject 
of protection is not the programme, which should be the subject of 
either a copyright or a neighbouring right, but the programme carrying 
signal. Thus, with respect to this problem at any rate, the broadcasting 
organisation were forced to return to protection by public as opposed to 
private international law, which is where they had started from half a 
century earlier. 
However this histoiy is not concluded, because with the advent 
of direct satellite broadcasting, when broadcasts transmitted via 
satellite are receivable in private homes without the help of a 
receiving earth station, the protection of the programme (as 
opposed to the signal) once more returns to the sphere of private 
international law. 
(i) Broadcasting Via Satellite : 
Recent technological development and, in particular, broadcast-
ing via satellite have made it possible for television programmes 
to reach a wider public than originally intended outside the 
borders of the originating broadcasting organisations. This has 
created both political and legal problems. The political problem 
is how to regulate programme content without resorting to cen-
sorship of one kind or another. This has been addressed in the 
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European Community by a Draft Directive on Television Without 
Frontiers and in a Draft Convention by the council of Europe. 
The tendency is to impose minimum programme standards, pro-
tect children, guard against obscenity and try to encourage 
European Programme Production. Only the legal problems are 
examined here. 
There are two types of satellite broadcasting direct broadcasting 
by satellite (DBS) and transmission by fixed service satellite 
(FSS). DBS is broadcasting for direct reception by members of 
the public, although the signal is transmitted via a satellite. FSS, 
sometimes referred to as point to point broadcasting, is the 
transmission of the signal via satellite to a ground station from 
which it is rebroadcasted or distributed by cable. 
(ii) Broadcasting Via - DBS : 
Following question have to be considered in this regard : 
(a) is broadcasting by DBS broadcasting as defined by the 
International Conventions ? 
(b) where does broadcasting by DBS take place ? 
(c) which national law (or laws) is applicable ? 
(d) which broadcasting organisation is responsible for com-
pliance with appropriate law ? 
(e) what are the rights of copyright owners and neighbouring 
rights owners in broadcasting by DBS ? 
As far as first question is concerned it is generally ac-
cepted that broadcasting via DBS is broadcasting as defined in Interna-
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tional law and that the satellite is for legal pu'pose not different from 
a territorial transmission although it is orbiting in space. 
The ITU (International Telecommunications Union) Regulations 
define broadcasting as 'a radio communication service in which trans-
missions are intended for direct reception by the public.'^" The Berne 
Convention, when defining the scope of the author's right Article 11 bis, 
para 1, speaks of'the broadcasting of their works or the communication 
thereof to the public by any other means of wireless diffusions of signs, 
sounds or images.' The words'communication to the public by any other 
means of wireless diffusion' clearly envisages not only one kind of 
communications to the public, by means of wireless diffusion (the 
traditional one), but also other possible kinds of communications to the 
public by other means of wireless diffusions. Thus, the elements, of a 
definition of broadcasting which emerge are : 'Communication of works 
or other subject-matter to the public by wireless means.' With such a 
clear a definition emerging from the major International Convention 
there is no need to go any further or to borrow a definition from another 
International Instrument, such as the Radio Regulations whose subject 
matter is not copyright. 
The Rome Convention defines broadcasting in Article 3(7) as 
'transmission by wireless means for public reception of sounds or of 
images and sounds'. The Universal Copyright Convention mentions 
broadcasting in Article IV his but does not define it. The Satellite 
Convention does not contain a definition of broadcasting either; it deals 
with signals which it defines in its Article 1 and excludes DBS broad-
casting in its Article 3. 
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As to the second question, the leading International instrument, 
i.e.. Article 11 bis of the Berne Convention, defines broadcasting in 
terms of communication to the public and speaks of diffusion (not 
emission) broadcasting and diffusion are held to take place where the 
communication to the public takes place. In the case of a DBS broadcast 
this is in all countries covered by thQ footprint of the satellite.*' The 
view that satellite broadcasting by DBS takes place, in the country of 
emission' of the broadcast, meaning the country of the broadcasting 
organisation emitting the signal containing the broadcast, seems contra-
dicted by the fact that the concept oi emission which is narrower than 
communication to the public or diffusion is not used in any of the 
International Instruments. A satellite broadcast certainly starts with the 
emission of the signal towards the satellite but it does not end there. The 
communication involves both the so-called up-leg phase of the broad-
cast and the down leg phase and only the combination of both is to be 
considered as broadcasting. The motivation for the emission theory is 
that other interpretations would result in considerable practical diffi-
culties, which is probably the case. 
The third question as to the application of national laws is of 
considerable practical importance as some countries, members of the 
Berne Convention or of the Universal Copyright Convention, or both, 
treat the broadcasting right of copyright owners as an exclusive right to 
allow or forbid the broadcasting of their works, whereas others apply-
ing a compulsory licence system treat it merely as a right to equitable 
remuneration. 
As the Berne Convention demands national treatment the appli-
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cable law must be the national law of each country covered by the 
footprint of the satellite, liihdit footprint covers several countries, the 
broadcast must comply with the laws of each of the counrties so 
covered. It is here that the supporters of the emission theory see the 
difficulties. They point out that it would be difficult to enforce the laws 
of other countries if the case was brought before the court of the countiy 
of emission. However, this difficulty arises in many cases where the 
courts have to deal with conflict of law situations. They also point out 
that enforcement against a broadcaster whose headuarters are in another 
country may be difficult. 
In view of these difficulties, broadcasters take the view that 
national legislation in the country where the broadcasting organisation 
emitting the broadcast is established should be applicable to the transmis-
sion of the programme and the rule adopted by the 3rd World Confer-
ence of Broadcasting Unions in Tokyo (27 Feb. 5th March 1980)* -^ and 
confirmed by the 4th and 5th Conferences in 1983 and 1986 lays down 
this principle. 
Against the legal and practical difficulties which no doubt exist 
in many cases, it must be said that unless there is impossibility as 
opposed to difficulties, such difficulties should in the large majority of 
cases not be sufficient to deny the copyright owners their rights." 
As to the fourth question, the responsibility for compliance with 
the applicable copyright laws rests with the broadcasting organisation 
that gives the order for the broadcasting through DBS. "No other entity 
has any responsibility. In particular no person who receives the broad-
cast in any country has any responsibility for such reception"/'' 
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Broadcasters generally accept that it is the broadcaster originat-
ing the direct broadcasting by satellite (that is the body determining the 
programme and giving the order for its distribution) which is respon-
sible vis-a-vis the owners of the copyright concerned.*' 
Finally, as far as rights of copyright owners and neighbouring 
right owners in broadcasting by satellite (DBS) are concerned, both 
according to the definition of the Berne Convention/^ which is the 
leading International Instrument for author's rights, and under the 
definition of the Rome Convention,^^ which is the leading International 
Instrument for neighbouring rights, satellite broadcasting by DBS is 
broadcasting. The rights involved are the rights flowing from broad-
casting, and both the authors in their phonograms, and broadcasting 
organisations in their programmes, enjoy the same rights as in the case 
of traditional broadcasting. 
(ill) Broadcasting Via FSS : 
As these transmissions are not for direct reception by the public 
the situation is less clear and opinions seem to differ on the question 
whether the transmission of a signal to a satellite intended, with the aid 
of an earth station, for public distribution, constitutes broadcasting 
within the meaning of this Article.** One view is that it is broadcasting, 
as the programme is ultimately destined for reception by the public. 
Others argue that there is no need to protect copyright owners against 
FSS transmission as they are already protected against distribution by 
cable, from the point of reception of the signal which is communication 
to the public according to the Berne Convention.*'^ 
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National legislations have only recently begun to deal with this 
problem. The French law of July 1985 assimilates transmission of a 
work towards a satellite to a performance including the Act of 
telediffusion. This is any distribution by telecommunication process 
and includes broadcasting by telecommunication process and includes 
broadcasting and cable diffusion. U.K. law "^ provides that FSS trans-
missions, lawfully receivable by the public, will count as broadcasting 
for the purpose of copyright and neighbouring rights protection.^' 
The Satellite Convention 1974 puts an obligation on contracting 
countries to prevent unauthorised distribution of programmes transmit-
ted by way of FSS satellite when these programmes are not intended for 
direct reception by the public, but it expressly excludes broadcasting 
via DBS.^2 
The principles agreed by the government experts", no doubt 
speaking de lege ferenda stipulate that both the laws of the country of 
emission and of the countries of the fmal phase of broadcasting should 
be taken into account. They also suggest that both the broadcasting 
organisation emitting the programme through fixed service satellite and 
the organisation distributing it by cable should be considered separately 
and jointly liable to copyright and neighbouring right owners.^^ 
(iv) Distribution of Broadcasts by Cable (Cable Casting) : 
The difference between broadcasting and Cable Casting from the 
general public's point of view is that anyone can pick up broadcast 
programmes provided liis receiving set is suitable, whereas a cable cast 
is addressed to a known public of subscribers. There are two kinds of 
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distribution of programmes by cable, captured broadcast programmes 
(also known as cable retransmission) and cable originated programmes' 
The captured programmes are those originated by a broadcasting 
organisation and picked up and distributed simulataneously with the 
original broadcast. This form of cable distribution is frequently used 
when there are geographical difficulties for reception such as mountain-
ous countiy or large cities. The cable originated programmes are those 
which are either produced by the cable company or picked up off air but 
modified in content or in time, i.e., either altered in some way or 
broadcast later, not simultaneously.^^ 
Whereas broadcasts including satellite broadcasts by DBS are 
covered by Article 11 bis, para (1) (i) of the Berne Convention as 
communication to the public by .... means of wireless diffusion, cable 
transmissions are covered by Article 11 his para (1) (ii) as 'communi-
cations to the public by wire. Wire is referred to as cable in modern 
terminology. The working definition in the annotated principles'*^ says 
cable means a wire, beam or any other conducting device through which 
electronically, generally, generated programme carrying signals are 
guided over a distance ...'. The issue for national legislation is whether 
in both cases (captured or originated programmes, the authorisation of 
the right owner is required or whether distribution is permitted without 
such authorisation but subject to the payment of an equitable remunera-
tion. However, it is generally agreed that captured programmes must be 
authorised by right owners if the communication by cable is made by an 
organisation other than the original one which broadcasts the work." 
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(V) Rights of Broadcasting Organisations : 
Generally speaking broadcasting organisations have following 
rights: 
(i) An absolute right to 'authorise or prohibit the rebroadcasting of 
their broadcasts'.^* 
This can be said to be the basic broadcasting right, the equivalent 
to the reproduction right of copyright owners. 
Rebroadcasting in the strict sense^'' means the simultaneous relay 
of the programme. Deferred broadcasting must by definition imply the 
fixing of the broadcast first so that, if done without the consent of the 
original broadcasting organisation, the infringement already takes place 
at the time of fixation and before the fixation is rebroadcast. 
(ii) Broadcasting organisations have an absolute right to authorise or 
prohibit the fixation of their broadcast. ^ '^  The right is the equivalent of 
a recording right but usually takes the form of a reproduction right as a 
copy of the fr.st fixation is made and sent to the other broadcasting 
organisations under a contract between the two broadcating organisations 
(either against payment or by way of programme exchange agreement), 
(iii) Broadcasting organisations have an absolute right to 'authorise or 
prohibit the communication to the pnhjif, n( ih^i4i-'U'Af\j\<'tTTrr^rcta(\-
•casls*'. This right is the^  equivalent of a public performance right and 
may be subject to a compulsory licence. The right is, however, re-
stricted to the public performance of television broadcasts as opposed 
to sound broadcasts and exercisable only if the communication to the 
public is made in places accessible to the public against the payment of 
entrance fee. Public places which install television sets, e.g. hotels. 
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restaurants, bars, public houses, don't charge an entrance fee' but it is 
arguable that a fee for such facilities is included in calculating the prices 
for food and drink or accommodation. 
The basic right of broadcasting organisations is, therefore, a kind 
of reproduction right. The subject of the right is the broadcast. This 
meant the content of the programme which is being broadcasted. Like 
the phonogram the broadcast is a derivative work. It may, and usually 
does include other works such as the script of a talk or a play or a 
musical work, all of which are separately protected as original works. 
It may include derivative works such as the performance of actors or 
singers or phonograms, or it may contain a combination of all of these 
which is very common. On the other hand, if it is a live broadcast of a 
state occasion - like a swearing - in ceremony or a funeral, a sporting 
event or a political event do not contain any original protected works, 
yet it is still the subject - matter of copyright or a neighbouring right. 
As in the case of phonograms, if the legislation gives broadcasting 
organisations a reproduction right it does not matter whether it is called 
a copyright or a neighbouring right. It entitles broadcasting organisations 
to allow or foribid the rebroadcasting or the fixation of their programmes 
without their consent. 
It can, thus, be said by way of conclusion that neighbouring right 
are now firmly recognised and they are certainly going to stay. Some 
countries have infact treated neighbouring rights at par with copyright. 
But it is, indeed, shocking to note that performers in films still do not 
enjoy adequate protection. 
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The position of performers can only be improved if the law recognises 
multiple rights in a cinematrographic film. But at the same time it 
should also be understood that the salvation of performers and other 
neighbouring rights owners really lies in the collective administration 
of neighbouring rights since at the individual level they will find it 
extremely difficult to get what is their due. 
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INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT 
Free trade doesn't require that one should be allowed to appropri-
ate the fruits of another's labour, whether they are tangible or intan-
gible. The law has not found it possible to give full protection to the 
intangible. But it can protect the intangible in certain states, and one of 
them is when it is expressed in words or print. The infringement of 
copyright of another, therefore, assumes great importance. Infringe-
ment of copyright may be divided into direct infringements which 
consists of the unauthorised exercise by persons not being the copyright 
owners of rights restricted by relevant copyright statute, and indirect 
infringements, which consists of unauthorised dealings with works 
which are themselves direct infringements or unauthorised importations. 
After discussing the nature and scope of copyright in its various 
manifestations in the preceding chapters, this chapter examines the 
issues relating to infringement of copyright such as what constitutes 
infringement ? What are the types of infringements ? How far defence 
of "fair use" can be taken in a case of infringement ? How does "fair 
use" balance the interest of the copyright owners and that of public ? 
(A) BASIC CONCEPTS OF INFRINGEMENT ; 
The copyright statutes of the three countries which form subject 
matter of this study define in some detail the types of activity which 
constitute infringement of the various forms of copyright. 
The rights of the copyright owners may roughly be classified into 
"reproduction" rights and "performing" rights. The more detailed 
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Statutory categories which can be placed under these heads are to be 
taken up later in the Chapter. But first, there are four basic matters to 
discuss : Copyright must be distinguished from rights in the physical 
embodiment of the original work; then come two aspects of the subject-
matter improperly taken-the need to show that the defendent has 
misappropriated the actual work and that this has been to a substantial 
extent; the last concerns the infringer - the degree to which he may 
infringe by authorising the acts of others. 
(i) Ownership of the Original Work : 
Copyright in a work gives rights that are distinct from ownership 
of the physical embodiment of the original work - the manuscript, letter, 
painting or whatever. When one person sends another a letter, he will 
normally be taken to intend a gift of the paper on which it is written and 
the recipient becomes its owner. Only if the conditions of confidence 
exist, can the author prevent it being shown, given or sold to other.' But 
sending a private letter implies no assignment or licence of the copy-
right in it and the recipient has no right to make copies or give 
performances of its content.^ The same is true of artistic works. The 
artist's lack of rights in the original painting or sculpture, once he 
disposes it off, is often a considerable economic disadvantage and has 
led a few legal systems to introduce a special right to share in the 
proceeds of certain re-sales.' But such a sale assigns no copyright 
unless this is separately expressed or can be implied from the purpose 
of the transaction.* 
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i i) Misappropriation 
Misappropiration can be studied under following sub-heads, 
a) Casual Connection 
The plaintiff must prove that, directly or indirectly, the defendant's 
alleged infringement is taken from the work or subject-matter in which 
he claims copyright. - This is fundamental to the whole concept of 
copyright, and distinguishes it from the full monopoly of the patent 
system. Despite the very term, copyright, the U.K.legislation has, until 
1988, mostly avoided reference to "copying". Now that word is used 
in relation to the making and marketing of reproductions. But equally 
there must also be copying in a general sense for infringement of the 
performing rights. The owner must show that this casual connection is 
the explanation of the similarity between the work and the infringement 
- the other possibilities being that he copied from the defendant, that 
they both copied from a common source, or that they arrived at their 
results independently.^ On the other hand, he does not have to show that 
the defendant knew that his copying constituted an infringement. As 
with other rights of property recognised at common law, the primary 
exclusive rights may be asserted even against the defendant who 
honestly believes that he purchased the right to reproduce the work.^ 
If the evidence shows that there are striking similarities between 
the two works, that the plaintiff's was the earlier in time and that the 
defendant had the opportunity to get to know the plaintiff's work, then 
a court may well find copying proved in the absence of any convincing 
explanation to the contrary by the defendant." But the judges have 
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hesitated to fetter the assessment of each case on its facts by the 
introduction of rules formally shifting the burden of proof from plaintiff 
to defendant at any stage of the trial.' Some subject - matter, such as 
factual and historical information, may well drive from independent 
effort or a common source.'" 
(b) Sub-Conscious Copying : 
Particular difficulty arises when the defendant denies any inten-
tion to copy and the court believes him. Some judges have accepted that 
copying could occur subconsciously where a person reads, sees or hears 
a work, forgets about it but then reproduces it, genuinely believing it to 
be his own." In such a case, proof of copying is said to depend on "a 
number of composite elements : The degree of familiarity (if proved at 
all, or properly inferred) with the plaintiff's work, the character of the 
work, particularly its qualities of impressing the mind and memory, the 
objective similarity of the defendant's work, the inherent probability 
that such similarity as is found could be due to coincidence, the 
existence of other influences on the defendant the... quality of the 
defendant's... own evidence on the presence or otherwise in his mind of 
the plaintiff's work.'^ 
(c) Indirect Copying : 
It has long been accepted that a work may be copied by imitating 
a copy of it : "to hold otherwise would be to open the door to indirect 
piracies, which 1 am not at all disposed to do."'^ Like wise if a novel is 
turned into a play, which is in turn converted into a ballet, the same will 
apply. In I'urefoy v. Sykes Haxall, P made a trade catalogue with 
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illustrations of his products and D also published a catalogue with 
pictures of his own products, which were copied from P's products. In 
this alone there was no infringement of P's catalogue, for it was not that 
catalogue but the products which were the starting point in the chain.'^ 
On the other hand, if the plaintiff's parts were reproductions of copy-
right drawings, the defendant's illustrations would derive from those 
drawings. But to establish the linkage is not enough. It is also necessary 
to show that the defendant's ultimate use is substantial reproduction of 
the plaintiff's work - this is simply the general requirement discussed 
below. In providing that infringement may be direct or indirect, the 
latest U.K. Statute also renders it immaterial that any intervening act 
does not itself constitute infringement.'^ 
(B) SUBSTANTIAL TAKING : 
Where there has been copying and all or virtually all of a work is 
taken without emendation, the proof of infringement is straightforward; 
difficulties arise to the extent that this is not the case. The copyright 
statutes of the three countries require that a substantial part must have 
been copied.'* This test is a major tool for giving expression to the 
court's sense of fair play so "the question whether the defendant has 
copied a substantial part depends much more on the quality than the 
quantity of what he has taken".'"' Likewise it has often been insisted that 
the copying must be of the expression of ideas, rather than just of the 
ideas. But that is a distinction with an ill-defined boundary. Judges who 
incline to the view that "what is worth copying is prima facie worth 
protecting"'^ may well stretch the notion of "expression" a consider-
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able way. Once convinced that the defendant unfairly cut a competitive 
corner by setting out to revamp the plaintiff's completed work, they will 
not easily be dissuaded that the alternations have been sufficient.''' In 
this approach, the taking of ideas alone is confined to cases where the 
defendant does not start from the completed work at all, save in the 
sense that he goes through a similar process of creation : as where he 
paints for himself the scene that the plaintiff painted^", or draws his own 
cartoon for the same basic joke.^' 
The assessment of each case turns a good deal on its own 
circumstances. But there are some general considerations which may 
well have a bearing on the result. These are worth illustrating. 
(i) Unaltered Copying : 
If the defendant has copied without additions or alterations to the 
part taken, the proportion of that part to the whole of the plaintiff's work 
need not be large : a short extract from a poem, a recognisable segment 
ofa painting, the refrain of a pop-song. The issue is not much contexted, 
but, given the new copying technology, its practical importance is 
considerable. 
(li) Extent of Defendant's Alteration : 
Where the defendant has reworked the plaintiff's material there 
comes a point beyond which the plaintiff has no claim. Whatever may 
have been the position in the part, the fact that the defendant has himself 
added enough by way of skill, labour and judgement to secure copyright 
for his effort does not, under the present law, settle the question whether 
he has infringed : rather the issue is whether a substantial part of the 
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plaintiff's work survives in the defendant's so as to appear to be a copy of it.-' 
Particular difficulty arises when the plaintiff's work is taken with 
intent to satirise - whether the butt in mind is the work itself or some 
quite different object. In Glyn V. Weston Feature^^ a filmed burlesque 
(or, in today's language, "send-up") of Elinon Glyn's once notorious 
novel. Three Weeks, was held not to infringe because very little by way 
of incident was taken over from novel to film. Likewise in Joy Music V. 
Sunday PictoriaP, a song lyric had been parodied in pursuit of Prince 
Philip; but only one repeated phrase was taken, and that with pointed 
variation. Again there was no infringement. In both decisions it was 
asked whether the defendant had bestowed such mental labour on what 
he had taken and subjected it to revision and alteration as to produce an 
original work.^ "* This must be understood as a way of emphasising that 
nothing substantial must remain from the plaintiff's work.^' While in 
the past, English judges have seemed loathe to find sufficient copying 
in borderline parody cases, they have now also to consider the moral 
right of integrity. 
A rather similar difficulty relates to resumes - summarised plots 
of plays, abridgments of novels, head notes of law reports, and so on. 
There has been a tendency to treat a really substantial precis of contents 
as permissible because it is useful or because it is no serious interfer-
ence with the plaintiff's interests. To this end it has been asked whether 
the defendant has really produced a "new work".^* In this context the 
phrase seems to indicate a very substantial condensation and revision of 
the material. With this should be contrasted the Court of Appeal's grant 
of an interlocutory injunction in lilanco V. Mandops .^' The defendants 
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first copied the plaintiff's instruction leaflet for a weed killer and had 
to withdraw it; they then produced a revision giving the same detailed 
information in other words. This was held to create an arguable case of 
infringement because the defendants were not entitled to make use of 
the plaintiff's skill and judgement in securing the information. 
(lit) Character of Plaintifrs or Defendant's Work : 
Certain types of work are treated as having a particular value; to 
appropriate this feature is accordingly of qualitative significance. This 
is particularly true of dramatic works and films. In periods when stock 
dramas made the staple of so much Englifh theatre, there were frequent 
allegations of improper borrowings. After 1911, a series of cases-** 
settled that "if the plot of a story, whether some of it be found in a play 
or in a novel, is taken bodily with or without some minor additions or 
substractions for the purposes of a stage or cinema film, there is no 
doubt about the case".^^ It was not necessary to copy the actual words 
used to work out the plot.^" This approach shows, the concept of mere 
ideas being confined to "starting point" conceptions - it would be no 
more than an idea, for instance, to conceive of a play about the return 
of a husband who has been presumed dead.^' But where the works in 
question are both nondramatic, probably more by way of detailed 
incident and language must be taken before there is substantial copying. 
Whether the works are artistic, and the court is testing sufficient 
similarity by appeal to the eye, stress is sometimes laid upon the 
"feeling and artistic character" of the plaintiff's work." 
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(iv) Nature of Plaintifrs Effort : 
In some cases, the plaintiff's "skill, labour and judgement" form 
a distinct part of the whole result. This may well be so where the effort 
consists of such secondary work as editing, compiling or selecting 
material. A court will treat the whole work as the subject of copyright. 
But whether there is substantial taking falls to be judged by reference 
to the plaintiff's contribution. In Warnick Film V. Eisinger^^, an author 
published an edited version of Oscar Wilde's trials, a transcript of 
which had earlier appeared. He acquired copyright in the whole from 
his work in selection and providing linking passages. But a defendant 
who took from it passages of the transcript but very little of author's 
edition was held not to infringe. 
This nearly adjusts the scope of protection to the author's literary 
effort. The same approach can be seen to apply to some cases where the 
real skill lies in some commercial assessment distinct from the expres-
sive content of the work : thus in the football pool coupon cases, where 
it is the particular selection that is so significant, protection goes to 
taking the selection more or less as a whole. This corelation of protec-
tion with achievement is not easily made in all such cases. Where, for 
instance, the skill consists in recording some one else's performance, it 
is arguable that there should be infringement only where some consid-
erable part of the whole is taken. The same might be said of the 
entrepreneurial copyright - particularly that for typographical format, 
since it is not associated with the artistic execution of performers, 
directions or the like. But this sort of consideration is at present 
speculative. 
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(v) Extent of Plaintifrs Effort : 
If the plaintiff's labour, skill and judgement have only been just 
enough to earn him copyright, infringement may arise only where there 
is exact imitation of such features as are of some individuality. In 
Kenrick V. Lawrence,-'^ the plaintiff claimed copyright in a simple 
drawing of a hand, made with the intention of showing voters where to 
register their vote on a ballot form. But it was held that only an exact 
copy of the drawing would infringe, if the plaintiff were not to be 
conceded a monopoly in drawings of hands for this and other purposes. 
Through this consideration also the court is able to take account of the 
overall merit of the plaintiff's work. 
(vi) Manner in Which the Defendant Had Taken Advantage 
of Plaintiff's Work : 
Where the plaintiff's work records information, the use that a 
defendant may make of it for his own purposes has been carefully 
circumscribed. The defendant is entitled to use the plaintiff's work as 
a source of ideas or information if he takes it as a starting point for his 
own collation of information or as a means of checking his own 
independent research.^' But he is not entitled to copy what the plaintiff 
has done as a substitute for exercising his own labour, skill and 
judgement. And he will not escape having his conduct so regarded 
merely by taking the plaintiff's work and checking that its contents are 
accurate. Thus, it was improper to compile a street directory by sending 
out slips for checking, which contained entries from the plaintiff's 
directory.'* Equally, it is wrong to adopt the same quotations which 
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have been selected for a critical edition of a Shakespeare play", or an 
account of historical incidents which digest the available sources^*. In 
such cases, a defendant who is shown to have adopted the plaintiff's 
imaginative emibellishments or plain errors will be in particular jeopardy. 
(vii) Where the defendant's use will seriously interfere 
with plaintiff's exploitation of his work : 
While infringement may occur even if there is no likelihood of 
competition between plaintiff and defendant, the possibility of such 
competition or its absence may nevertheless be treated as a relevant 
factor. This factor undoubtedly played a more significant role while 
copyright was still in the process of acquiring its character as a full right 
of property, and before substantial taking was distinguished from 
notions of "fair use"'^. But it remains a practical consideration that 
courts are unlikely even entirely to discount.^" Thus, it is referred to by 
Farwell J. in deciding that four brief lines from a popular song did not 
infringe when taken as a heading for a serial story in the Red Star Weekly*^ 
(viii) Reproduction by the Original Author : 
Suppose that an author creates a work, and subsequently, at a 
time when he doesn't own the copyright,^^ he reproduces it in a second 
work. Some concession in his favour seems called for, in order to allow 
him to continue doing the kind of the work at which he is proficient. But 
across the spectrum of copyright it is difficult to know how far judges 
would accord him greater freedom than is permitted to others. In respect 
of artistic works, a special compromise is embodied in legislation : the 
artist may make substantial reproductions, even using the same mould 
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sketch or similar plan, provided that the subsequent work doesn't repeat 
or imitate the main design of the earlier works/^ Where other types of 
work are concerned, a similar approach might well be adopted : the 
relation between the two end products would be considered rather than 
the relation between the first work and what has been copied from it. 
The fact that the author made his reproduction unconsciously (if he can 
be believed) would probably enhance any claim not to have infringed/^ 
(C) INFRINGEMENT CARRIED OUT BY OTHERS : 
Infringement of copyright being a tort, in the ordinary run of 
things an employer will be vicariously liable^^ for any infringement 
committed by an employee in the course of his employment and for the 
acts of independent contractors which he specifically requested. Under 
earlier law, these principles seem to have delimited the scope of one 
person's liability for infringements by another.^^ But, in contrast with 
the case of patents, judges have more recently been ready enough to 
extend the scope of responsibility for the infringement by others. 
In this they have been assisted by the legislature, which has 
introduced three forms of infringement : (i) "authorising" infringe-
ment by others:"*' (ii) "permitting" a place of public entertainment to be 
used for performance of a work^*; and (iii) providing apparatus for 
performing, playing or showing a work, etc.'*' (of these, (ii) and (iii) are 
now forms of secondary infringement which require proof of the 
defendant's com plicity in some way). 
"Authorise" has been read as bearing its dictionary meaning of 
"sanction, countenance or approve".'" In line with these broad syn-
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onyms, it has been said that "indifference, exhibited by acts of commis-
sion or omission, may reach a degree from which authorisation or 
permission may be inferred".' ' Accordingly in a case concerning 
performing rights both authorising and permitting may be alleged, and 
they amount to much the same thing. "Permitting" performance is 
expressly stated to be subject to the defences of reasonable innocence 
and absence of profit making; "authorising" is not the subject of 
specific exceptions, but the meaning given to the world excludes 
liability when the defendant could not reasonably except that another 
would infringe. It is also necessarv to show an act of infringement that 
had occurred as a result of the authorisation." 
To take some examples : People who organise public entertain-
ments by hiring musicians and independent contractors are likely to be 
authorising or permitting infringement if they simply leave the choice 
of music to the musicians." Accordingly they ought to procure an 
appropriate licence from the Performing Right Society themselves or 
require the musicians to do so. Where the defendant is not the organiser 
of the entertainment, but only, for instance, the owner of the hall, he is 
unlikely to be held culpable if he is simply "indifferent" to the choice 
of music.^^ 
In other fields, authorising may also occur by implication. A 
person who transfers the serial rights in a book authorises their publi-
cation in that form, since the specific intent is apparent." An Australian 
University was held to have authorised infringement by allowing 
library readers to use it's copying machine without giving precise 
information about the limits of copying within the copyright legislation 
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and without attempting any supervision to prevent infringement : the 
degree of indifference was too blatant to escape liability.'* On the other 
hand, those who provide the copying machinery or the material for 
home taping will rarely be found to have necessary control over what is 
then done, to be "authorised"." The manufacturer of a twin-deck 
cassette recorder did not authorise infringement of particular copy-
rights, even though he advertised the capabilities of his product, since 
he also drew attention to copyright obligations.'* 
(D) CLASSES OF PROHIBITED ACTS : 
The United Kingdom legislation of 1988 defines the "acts re-
stricted by the copyright" in general terms, each type applying to the 
various categories of work unless a specific exception is given. The 
1956 Act, by contrast, took each category of subject-matter and listed 
the relevant acts of infringement. The new technique seems rather more 
straight forward. The U.S. Act of 1976 talks of exclusive rights of 
copyright owners, and violations of such rights, basically expressed in 
general terms, classes them infringements. Similarly, the Indian Copy-
right Act 1957 as amended in 1994 also says that doing of anything, the 
exclusive right to do which is by the Act conferred upon the owner of 
the copyright is the infringement of copyright. 
In the patent law, as we know, the monopoly right was extended 
to use, as well as manufacture and sale, thus enabling the patentee and 
his associates to exercise whatever control over their own products 
seemed advantageous. In copyright law, the same basic assumption has 
not been made." The typical act of infringement has been the making of 
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copies. Control over them and their contents once legitimately made has 
been conceded only on a case-by-case basis : the rights over public 
performance and broadcasting are one form of control over use; the 
newly created rental right in sound recordings, films and computer 
programs is another. 
Often enough the various rights that make up copyright are 
separately assigned or made the subject of an exclusive licence. The 
assignee or exclusive licensee is then entitled to sue only in respect of 
his own part and it may be necessary to decide just what his part is if the 
division up has been made by reference to the different acts listed in the 
statute, then the question will turn on the meaning of the statutory 
words.*'' If some other, more specific right has been conceded (such as 
the right to translate into French, or the right to engrave a picture for a 
particular book) then the particular assignment or licence will require 
interpretation. 
(E) RIGHTS CONCERNED WITH REPRODUCTION 
& ADAPTATION : 
The U.K. Act of 1988 distinguishes two broad categories of 
infringement : restricted acts (or primary infringement) which occur 
without regard to the defendant's state of mind: and secondary infringe-
ment which are committed only if the defendant know or had reason to 
believe a defined state of affairs relating to infringement. Similar 
provision is made in the Indian law by the 1994 Amendment.*" 
(i) Primary Infringement : 
Copyright in a work in all the three countries i.e. U.K., U.S.A., 
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& India, may be infringed by copying it; issuing copies of it to the 
public or by making an adaptation of i t ." Copying a work, so far as 
concerns literary, dramatic, musical and artistic copyright, means "re-
producing the work in a material form' - a formula introduced by the 
British Act of 1911.*'' Some of the material forms are specifically listed: 
storing the work in any medium by electronic means - which clearly 
covers computer storage and presumably extends to the incorporation 
of the work in a record or film, converting a two-dimensional artistic 
work into three dimensions, and vice-versa^^. But other changes of form 
may also count: for instance, turning a story into a ballet, copy a 
photograph by painting,^^ making a knitting pattern into a fabric" and 
turning a drawing, such as a cartoon, into a revue sketch,^ "* Novel 
analogies can be made, subject always to the need to satisfy the test of 
substantial taking. 
Quite apart from this, certain acts of adaptation constitute in-
fringement : turning a literary work into a dramatic work or vice versa 
: translating either kind of work or turning it into a picture form (such 
as a comic strip) ; arranging or transcribing a musical work (by, for 
instance, harmonizing or orchestrating it).*^ 
The new U.K. legislation is not so specific as its predecessor 
about what acts of "copying' ' infringe sound recording, film, broad-
casting and cable-casting copyright. Presumably, as before, this in-
cludes making recordings or films that are substantial copies; but could 
it now also cover the transcription into written form of the material on 
(say) a recording ? 
Copying also includes specific cases. Making a photograph of the 
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whole or a substantial part of any image forming part of a film, 
broadcast or cable programme - for instance for a post-card or poster -
is such an infringement.™ And the publisher's copyright in typographi-
cal format is infringed (solely) by making a facsimile copy, even if it is 
enlarged or reduced.^' 
Issuing copies of a work to the public is the form of primary 
infringement which relates only to first putting the copies in question 
into circulation, and not, in general, to subsequent distribution, sale, 
hiring, loan or importation into the United Kingdom^^ (since these acts 
fall under the heading of secondary infringement). However, to this 
there is now one important exception. In respect of sound recordings, 
films and computer programs, it is an act of primary infringement to rent 
copies to the public, and this includes not only supplying a copy on 
terms that it will or may be returned for payment or as part of services 
or amenities of a business, but also lending by public libraries whether 
or not for a charge." 
(ii) Secondary Infringement : 
Infringement of all forms of copyright may be committed by a 
defendant concerned in the commercial exploitation of copies, if he 
knows or has reason to believe that the copies were infringements when 
they were made. In the case of imported copies this includes notional 
infringements, i.e. Copies that would have infringed if they had been 
made in Britian or would have constituted a breach of an exclusive 
licence agreement relating to that work. The stages of expolitation in 
question are : importing, possessing in the course of a business, selling, 
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letting for hire, offering or exposing for sale or hire, and exhibiting in 
public in the course of a business, and distributing either in the course 
of a business, or otherwise to an extent that prejudicially affects the 
copyright owner. 
As to the defendant's state of mind in secondary infringement, 
the previous law required it to be shown that the defendant had 
knowledge that the copies in issue were infringements.^* But that had 
been read as requiring only that he had "notice of facts such as would 
suggest to a reasonable man that "breach of copyright was being 
committed".^^ The new phrase, "knew or had reason to believe", for 
all its apparent subjectivity, is likely to be understood in the same sense. 
(F) Rights Concerned With Performance And Broadcasting : 
(') The Various Performing Rights : 
The extension of copyright from the making of copies to the 
giving of public performances began in 1833. With modern technology, 
this has grown into a bundle of related aspects of copyright that can be 
loosely grouped as "performing rights". These include, performing, 
playing or showing a work in public; broadcasting it or including it in 
a cable programme (cable - casting).^^ 
The possibilities of infringement in this field have become 
complete. If, for instance, a copyright musical work is performed to a 
public audience at the same time as being televised, both the perfor-
mance and the broadcast require licence. If broadcast is received and 
shown publicly this calls for licence of the copyright in the music , and 
save (where the showing is free) of that in the broadcast. If the original 
performance was recorded this will be either in the form of a sound 
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recording or a film with associated sound track (each of which will be 
a form of reproduction). If either the recording or the film is broadcast, 
this needs a licence. But the owner of copyright in the sound recording 
or film (as distinct from that in the musical work) has no right in respect 
of free public playings or showing of the broadcast. 
Performance is too ephemeral a phenomenon for it to be easy for 
copyright owners to enforce their performing rights individually. Those 
who have copyright in musical works and associated lyrics have been 
leaders in establishing societies for the collective enforcement of their 
rights. The great proliferation in the exploitation of music through 
recording and broadcasts has made this economically feasible in many 
countries and an international network of performing right societies 
now exists. In Britain, where record companies have performing rights 
in their recordings, they have a separate collecting society to assert their 
rights. In various countries, indeed, the economic power of collecting 
societies has become suspect. 
(>") Performance In Public : 
It has been left to the courts to draw the line between perfor-
mances in public and in private. In 1984, the Court of Appeal 
characterised as "quasi-domestic" - and therefore private -an amateur 
performance of a play in Guy's Hospital to an audience of doctors and 
their families, nurses, attendants and students." But this was regarded 
(even in the decision itself) as marking the extreme outpost of free 
territory. To be in public performance does not have to be a playing 
audience or by paid performances;""* it is enough that entertainment is 
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being offered as an incident of some commercial activity (such as 
running a hotel, or even a shop that is seeking to sell the records being 
played)," or of industrial production ("music while you work")''" Even 
such worthy institutions as Women's Institute and a Football Club's 
Supporter's Association engage in public performance, whether they 
restrict audiences to their own members or allow in guests;*' and the Act 
makes clear that a school play or other performance will not be exempt 
if parents or friends are present. Green M.R. laid particular stress on the 
need to consider the relationships of the audience to the owner of the 
copyright rather than to the performers.*^ This is one way of emphasising 
the primacy of the owner's entitlement to an economic return from his 
proprietary rights; the fact that an organisation is socially desirable 
does not normally give it a claim to free use of copyright material. The 
one general exception concerns the sound recording right (as distinct 
from copyright in music and words) where records are played at a 
charitable or similar club or organisation. 
(F) FAIR DEALING AND LIKE EXCEPTIONS : 
The requirement of "substantial taking" prevents the owner 
from objecting to minor borrowings from his copyright work. And, as we 
have just seen above, the requirement that a performance be in public 
means that his licence is unnecessary for a private performance even of 
the complete work. In the copyright legislations of three countries under 
study presently, a detailed list of exceptions is found." Some of them, such as 
those relating to education, concern important conflicts of interest. Here they 
are listed in order that they can be compared in the round. 
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(i) Fair Dealing : 
The three most important of these exceptions turn upon a quali-
tative assessment. They exempt copying for certain purposes if it 
amounts to no more than" fair dealing". In these cases the courts are 
left to judge fairness in the light of all the circumstances. But other 
exceptions are more factual; for instance, unduplicated copying in the 
course of instruction is exempt irrespective of the amount copied. 
Priorto earlier legislations (1911 of U.K., 1914 of India & 1909 
of U.S. A), the three main "fair dealing'' exception were fore-shadowed 
in the case-law as forms "fair use", a concept that was not clearly 
distinguished from "insubstantial taking". If there is substantial 
copying, it is a nice question today whether the use could nevertheless 
be justified for a reason beyond the confines of statutory exceptions. 
Certainly this would be difficult if the case was closely analogous to 
one of the statutory exceptions but just outside it; the more so if the 
statutory exceptions are to be strictly construed as limitations upon 
property rights.*^ Nonetheless a 'defence' of publication in the public 
interest has been recognised to exist and now has a place in the 
statutes.*' In Australia it has been held that it is less extensive than in 
a claim based on breach of confidence*^; but in England the tendency 
been to treat the two cases alike.*^ 
The first fair dealing exception is that covering purposes of 
research or private study, which now applies to the copyright in literary, 
dramatic, musical and artistic works, and published editions. 
The representatives of educational, author, and publisher 
organisations agreed upon certain guidelines which are described in the 
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United States House Report as a reasonable interpretation of the 
minimum standards of fair use.*' These guidelines provide, with respect 
to books and periodicals, that a teacher may, subject to certain prohibi-
tion make a single copy of a Chapter from a book, an article from a 
periodical or newspaper, a short story, short essay or short poem, a 
chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon or picture from a book, periodi-
cal, or newspaper, for the purpose of scholarly research, use in teach-
ing, or for preparation to teach a class. Multiple copies for classroom 
use, but not to exceed in any event more than one copy per pupil in a 
course, are permissible, provided each copy bears a copyright notice 
and the copying meets the text of (I) brevity^* ,^ (2) spontaneity^', and (3) 
cumulative effect. ^ ^ 
The congressional guidelines were designed to give teachers 
direction as to the extent of permissible copying and to eliminate some 
of the doubt which had previously existed in this area of the copyright 
laws."^ The guidelines were intended to represent minimum standards 
of fair use. These guidelines, while not intended to limit the types of copying 
pennitted under the standards of fair use, and while recognising that certain 
types of copying permitted under the guidelines may not be permissible in the 
future, or that in the future other types of copying not permitted under the 
guidelines may be permissible under revised guidelines may nevertheless 
be persuasive in determining proper educational fair use. 
The copying permitted by the guidelines may not be used to 
create, replace, substitute for authorities, compilations, or collective 
works, and copying is not allowed from such "consumable" works as 
workbooks, exercises, standardized tests, answer sheets and similar 
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materials, nor may the student be charged for the copy beyond the actual 
cost of photocopying. Where a teacher created a "learning activity 
package" concerning cake decorating, by copying II out of the 28 
pages of a copyrighted booklet, used such package over several aca-
demic years and didn't acknowledge the owner's authorship or copy-
right, such copying did not qualify as fair use under these guidelines.''^ 
The copying of a computer programme for use by students is probably 
not a "fair u se" because of the need to copy substantially the entire 
programme. Similar guidelines have been adopted in regard to educa-
tional uses of music.' ' But no guidelines for classrooms use have been 
developed with respect to off-the-air taping of copyrighted audio-visual 
works incorporated in radio or television broadcasts although it has 
been recognised that the fair use doctrine has some limited application 
in this area.'^ The use of excerpt from copyrighted works for the purpose 
of educational broadcasting activities, where such use is not otherwise 
exempt and is not subject to compulsory licensing provisions'^ may 
nevertheless be a fair use, depending on whether the performers, 
producers, directors, and others responsible for the broadcast were 
paid, the size and number of excerpts taken, and in the case of recording 
made for broadcasts, the number of copies reproduced and the extent of 
their re-use or exchange.'* 
(il) Parody, Satire Or Burlesque : 
A ' 'parody" protected by the fair use provisions has been defined 
as a work in which the language or style of another work is closely 
imitated or mimicked for comic effect or ridicule and in which some 
critical comment or statement about the original work is made reflecting 
CH.APTER - 10 : 442 
the original perspective of the parodist, thereby giving the parody social 
value beyond its entertainment function.^^ It is in the interest of 
creativity, not piracy, to permit others to take well-known pharases and 
fragments from copyrighted works and add their own contributions of 
commentary or humor.'"" The parody branch of the fair use doctrine is 
a means of fostering the creativity protected by the copyright law : it 
balances the public interest in the free flow of ideas with the copyright 
holder's interest in the exclusive use of his work. 
"Sa t i re" forpurposesof the fair use provision is defined as work 
which holds up the vices or shortcomings of an individual or institution 
to ridicule or derision, usually with an intent to stimulate change or the 
use of wit, irony, or sarcasus for the purpose of exposing and discred-
iting vice or folly.'"' Similarly, it has been said that the law permits more 
extensive use of the protected portion of a copyrighted work in the 
creation of a burlesque than in the creation of other fictional or dramatic 
works not intended as burlesque.'"^ 
Parody and satire have been said to be deserving of substantial 
freedom, both as entertainment and as a form of social and literary 
criticism. Where the parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of 
the original work than is necessary to recall or conjure up the object of 
his satire. While, a parody song to a copyrighted tune may be a fair 
use,'"^ a burlesqued or parodized presentation has been held to be no 
defence to copyright infringement when substantially more material 
was "borrowed" from the copyrighted original than necessary for 
successful burlesque."''* 
Although it has been that the Copyright Acts do not expressly 
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exclude pornographic materials from the parameters of the fair use 
defence since an obscenity exception to the fair use defence could 
fragment national Copyright Act standards,'"^ the U.S. Courts have 
generally been reluctant to permit the use of the "fair use" defence when the 
alleged parody or satire has resulted in a sexually explicit work. 
(iii) Photographs, Reporting of Current Events : 
This fair dealing exception permits all works other than photo-
graphs to be used for reporting current events. '"* Photographs have been 
differently treated in order to preserve the full value of holding a unique 
visual record of some person or event. To come within the exception, 
the event itself be current and not the pretext for receiving historical 
information : the death of the Duchess of Windor did not justify an 
exchange of letters between her and the Duke being published without 
copyright licence.'"^ The exception must be read in conjunction with a 
number of cognate provisions.'"* Together they are of particular impor-
tance to the public affairs media and will be related to that field later. 
(iv) Criticism, Review etc : 
It is this fair dealing exception that is most general of all, 
allowing works to be used for purposes of criticism or review (of 
themselves or another work), one precondition of fairness being that the 
source should be sufficiently acknowledged Despite its potential range, 
the defence has not been much elucidated in the case-law. The Court of 
Appeal has held that the criticism or review may concern the ideas 
expressed as well as the made of expression"". It has also been said that 
it can not be "fair" to publish an unpublished work for this purpose at 
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least if it is known to have been improperly obtained"" and the courts 
will not permit wholesale borrowing to be dressed up as critical 
quotation'". Lord Denning M.R.'s remarks stressing that fair dealing is 
inevitably a matter of degree can usefully be applied not only to this 
head but in spirit equally to the other two : 
You must consider first the number and extent of the 
quotations and extracts. Are they altogether too many 
and too long to be fair? Then you must consider the 
use made of them. If they are used as a basis for 
comment, criticism or review, that may be a fair 
dealing. If they are used to convey the same informa-
tion as the author, for a rival purpose, they may be 
unfair. Next, you must consider the proportions. To 
take long extracts and attach short comments may be 
unfair. But short extracts and long comments may be 
fair. Other considerations may come to mind also. 
But, after all is said and done, it must be a matter of 
impression."' 
Beyond above cases of "fair dealing" and the like, there are 
numerous exceptions which, as a whole, are not easily classified. Thus 
in the final analysis, in determining whether the use made of a work in 
any particular case is fair use the factors to be considered shall include -
(a) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit or educational 
purposes; 
(b) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
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(c) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(d) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
Under the first factor, one must determine if the use is commer-
cial; under the fourth factor, one must determine the impact of the use 
on the potential market for or economic value of, the work. The second 
factor focuses on the nature of the work, and the third focuses on the 
amount used in relation to the total work. These factors make sense only 
in economic terms, particularly in view of the philosophy underlying 
U.K., U.S.A and Indian copyright laws: the protection of the copyright 
owner's economic rights in the market place. 
It can, thus, be said that there is a remarkable similarity in the 
three copyright systems under study on the question of infringement & 
law in these jurisdictions on this issue is almost settled. The 1994 Indian 
Amendment on the issue of infringement of copyright in computer 
software has put the Indian copyright law at par with the Internatially 
recognised standards. 
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REMEDIES FOR COPYRIGHT VIOLATIONS 
The infringement of copyright as noted in the last chapter of this 
study gives rise to a range of remedies, civil & criminal. All the 
remedies are of far reaching importance in today's context, particularly 
given the very considerable quantity of unauthorised copying that is 
currently rife in the software, records, films and television industries. 
The precise value of a right must be measured in terms of the remedies 
that lie for its enforcement. The range of relief provided by law is quite 
wide and that is the one of the most significant consequences of 
characterising copyright as property. 
This chapter, therefore, examines the issue of copyright rem-
edies. It discusses the nature of remedies, their types etc. It evaluates 
the attitude of the courts in matter of grant of these remedies. The 
issuance of injunction both temporary and permanent, quantum and 
types of damages and Anton Pillor Order are examined in great detail. 
The questions relating to criminal remedies such as nature of the 
offences and punishment prescribed are also taken care of. 
(A) WHO MAY SUE : 
The copyright statutes of the U.K., U.S.A. and India provide that 
subject to other provisions of the statutes concerned, infringements of 
copyright shall be actionable at the suit of the owner of the copyright 
and in any such action, such relief, by way of damages, injunction, 
accounts or otherwise, shall be available to the plaintiff as is available 
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in any corresponding proceedings in respect of infringements of other 
proprietary rights.' 
Thus, as remedies are for the copyright owner, the first issue 
which is to be considered in any case is the question of ownership of 
copyright. Under the statutes of the three countries which form subject 
matter of present study, an "owner of copyright" is either the original owner, 
or a person deriving title under him by a valid assignment or othei-wise. 
Under the U.K. Act of 1911, on which was based the Indian Act 
of 1914, in the case of an assignment of an interest in copyright not in 
existence at the time of the assignment, the assignee had no right to sue 
in his own name for infringements of copyright.^ The older cases in 
which courts of equity had enforced the rights of equitable asignees-' 
were cases of interim injunction only, and unless the legal owner was a party 
to the proceedings, either as joint plaintiff or as a defendant*, a perpetual 
injunction could only be granted under very special circumstances. 
Under the U.K. Copyright Act of 1956, however, provision is 
made for an assignment by a prospective owner of copyright so that, on 
the coming into existence of the copyright, the assignee, or a person claiming 
under him, acquires the legal title forthwith and, consequently, is entitled to sue 
and obtain all remedies open to an owner of copyright'. 
It is essential that at the date of the issue of the writ the plaintiff 
has a legal or equitable title to the copyright, for title is an essential 
ingredient of the cause of action for infringement and, without any title, 
the plaintiff has no cause of action.*. The cause of action must exist at 
the date of the issue of the writ. The plaintiff may commence the 
CHAPTER - 11 : 456 : 
proceedings relying on the equitable title to the copyright and get in the 
legal title afterwards or join the legal owner, but the plaintiff with no 
title to the copyright can not sue, but acquire a title to the copyright by 
written assignment subsequently and then obtain the leave of the court 
to amend so as to validate the writ ex post facto''. A writ which is issued 
before the plaintiff has acquired any title to the copyright and before, 
therefore, the plaintiff has any cause of action, is incurably bad. The 
plaintiff's proper cause in such a case is to issue a new writ founded on 
his new cause of action. 
It is also clear that a person who is entitled to call for the 
assignment of the copyright io him is the owner of the copyright in 
equity and is entitled to obtain an interlocutory injunction^ as is an 
exclusive licensee under written exclusive licence. 
On the other hand a mere agent to sell has no such interest in the 
work as to entitle him to claim relief. A simple licensee is not the owner 
of the copyright or any interest in it, and can not bring an action'". The 
essence of a licence is a contractual or personal relationship whereby 
the licensee is permitted to do an act or acts which would, but for the 
licence, be an infringement. It has been held that the licensee under a 
"sole licence" could bring an actionfor infringement in his own name, 
but had to join the proprietor of the copyright, either as co-plaintiff 
with himself, or as defendant". 
Where a joint proprietorship exists either party may sue; and 
where a plaintiff has an assignment from some only of several part 
owners, he is entitled to sue to prevent a stranger from interfering with 
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his rights'^, or even a co-owner'\ An exclusive licensee has the same 
rights of action as the owner of the copyright except against the owner 
of the copyright, but so that a defendant is to have any defence available 
which he would have had if the action had been brought by the owner 
of the copyright. The court may give the plaintiff leave to proceed with 
his action without the joinder of the copyright owner as a plaintiff or his 
addition as a defendant'^. 
Under the U.S. copyright law, a person who claims ownership of 
copyright or any of its exclusive rights by virtue of a transfer, must 
submit in the court, the recordation of the document of transfer in the 
copyright office as a pre-requisite to suit. This is in consonance with the 
emphasis on registration under the U.S. copyright law. As noted above 
although an unregistered copyright is valid in U.S., registration of the 
copyrights must be made before an action for infringement can be 
commenced". 
The legal or beneficial owner'^ of an exclusive right under U.S. 
copyright is entitled to institute an action for any infringement of that 
particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it'^. This is 
in accordance with the concept of divisibility of copyright ownership 
introduced into the Copyright Act, of 1976, permitting any of the 
exclusive rights of copyright to be owned separately. Under the statute, 
a beneficial owner such as an author who parts with legal title to the 
copyright in exchange for percentage royalties based on sales or licence 
fees is a proper party plaintiff. Therefore, a composer of songs who 
transfered legal title to the copyright to a wholly-owned corporation 
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was a proper party plaintiff*. When a composer assigns copyright title 
to a publisher in exchange for the payment of royalties, an equitable 
trust relationship is established between the two parties which gives the 
composer standing to sue for infringement of that copyright since 
otherwise the beneficial owner's interest in the copyright could be 
diluted or lessoned by a wrong-doer infringement'^. Hence, where 
plaintiff composed an original piece of music, later called ABC^'s 
Monday Night Football Theme which plaintiff assigned to ABC in a 
contract providing that the music composed by them and all rights 
therein shall be ABC's sole and exclusive property to do with as (ABC) 
wishes, free of any obligation other than as set forth expressly herein, 
and composed by the plaintiffs and where ABC, under another contract, 
simultaneously assumed certain obligations as publishers to pray plain-
tiffs such royalties as might be earned from the exploitation of the 
theme, the court stated that although ABC had the right not to exploit 
the property, the parties clearly contemplated that it would do so, 
resulting in the payment of royalties to the composers by the performing 
rights society of which they were members. Otherwise, said the court, 
there would have been no point in negotiating lengthy contracts dealing 
with the royalties they might realise from the publication and perfor-
mance of their work.^" Therefore, plaintiff's right to royalties, although 
contingent on ABC's exploitation of the theme, gave them a sufficient 
beneficial interest in the copyright to give them standing to seek judicial 
relief under the copyright law against an alleged infringement. 
The Copyright Act of 1976 has codified holdings under prior law 
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that if one holds legal title to a copyright and another holds the equitable 
title, either expressly or as a trustee, the courts will treat the equitable 
owner as the copyright proprietor and permit him to maintain an 
infringement action.^' Whereas, under prior law, an exclusive licensee 
could bring suit only if the copyright owner was joined as a party 
plaintiff or, if need be, as a party defendant,-' exclusive licensees now 
have standing to sue in their own name and right, without joining the 
copyright owner, with respect to infringements of the particular exclu-
sive licensed right.^' 
(B) WHO MAY BE SUED : 
(\) Primary Infringers : 
The persons who are primarily liable to be sued are individuals 
and companies who, without the licensee of the owner of the relevant 
copyright in the work, do, or authorise other persons to do, in relation 
to that work in the United Kingdom, United States of America and India 
any or more of the separate and dictinct acts which are restricted by the 
copyright in that work.^" Thus, in relation to a published book which is 
alleged to infringe copyright of the authors, printers, publishers and 
wholesale and retail sellers are all liable to be sued for infringement of 
copyright. Persons may also be liable for indirect acts such as importa-
tion.^' Although authorising does not apply to such acts, a person 
authorising such an act might be liable as a joint tortfeasor. 
In the United States, the courts have held the following to be 
proper defendants in a copyright infringement action : publishers,-* 
printers", vendors^\ and the owners of premises on which an infringing 
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performance takes place.^'. 
A television station is liable as a vicarious or contributoi^ 
infringer when it televises an infringing play over its facilities''", and 
sponsors of infringing radio or television programmes, which had the 
power to supervise and control the programme content, have been found 
liable''. Similarly, a corporation which acted as manager for concert 
artists and which sponsored the creation of local concert associations to 
provide audiences for artists was held liable as a vicarious and contribu-
tory infringer where it knew that the artists used copyrighted composi-
tions in their performances and that neither the local association nor the 
artists would secure copyrighted licenses^^. Thus where a television 
commercial is alleged to infringe the plaintiff's copyright, the advertis-
ing agency that prepared the commercial, as well as the advertiser itself 
and the television station are all potential defendants. In the case of a 
song, the composer of the song, the record company and its producers, 
that is, any one who facilitates copying by the infringer, may be sued. 
Under all the three jurisdictions, (U.K., U.S.A. & India) if a 
company has committed one or more of the acts restricted by the 
copyright in a work, the directors may in certain circumstances be liable 
for having personally authorised the company to commit acts of in-
fringement. Prima facie directors of a company are not liable simply 
because they are directors for infringements committed by servants of 
the company. The position is different, however, if the directors ordered 
or procured the infringing acts to be done. If the directors themselves 
directed or procured the commission of the infringing acts they are 
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liable in whatever sense they did so". Further, if a company is formed 
for the express purpose of committing infringing acts the individuals 
promoting the company will be personally responsible for the conse-
quences-"*. 
At any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter the court 
may on such terms as it think just, and either of its own motion or on 
application, order that there should be added as a party any person who 
ought to have been joined as a party or whose presence before the court 
is necessary to ensure that all issues in dispute in the cause or matter 
may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon. 
The court may also order to be added any person between whom and any 
party to the cause or matter there may exist a question or issue arising 
out of, relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the 
cause or matter which in the opinion of the court, it would be just and 
convenient to determine as between him and that party as well as 
between the parties to the cause or matter. Thus, in an action against an 
importer, a foreign supplier may be joined or in a case against a retailer 
of allegedly infringing articles, the importer may be joined^'. 
(i) Joint Tortfeasors, Conspiracy and Contribution : 
In certain circumstances a person may be liable for infringement 
of copyright by reason of having been a joint tortfeasor. For example, 
if there is a concerted design by two persons to sell goods which 
infringe copyright then the parties, who have such a design and execute 
it, are joint tortfeasors and are both liable for infringement^*. This is so 
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even if the underlying agreement between the parties had been made 
abroad and one of the parties had done nothing within the jurisdiction. 
Provided that an act of infringement is infact committed in the (U.K., 
U.S.A. or India as the case may be) and it is proved that the defendants 
had a common design to commit that act. It does not matter whether the 
agreement which is the basis of such design was made within or outside 
the jurisdiction, nor does it matter that the person himself has not done 
any act within the jurisdiction, which taken by itself could be said to 
amount to a several infringements". It is a case of one tort committed 
by one of them on behalf and in consent with the other. 
Parties to a conspiracy to infringe copyright, or commit acts of 
passing-off or breach of confidence are also liable to be sued. A 
conspiracy to injure may be established in cases where there is an 
agreement between two or more persons to effect an unlawful purpose 
resulting in damage to the plaintiff*. In the case of a conspiracy to 
injure, the distinction between lawful and unlawful purpose depends 
upon the actual state of mind of the persons who combined together. In 
its simplest form the contract is between the deliberate purpose of 
inflicting injury or causing damage, and the purpose of pursuing a 
legitimate and, knowing that the result will, in fact, cause injury or 
damage. Thus, if the predominant purpose or object which the persons 
combining together have in view is the promotion of their own interests, 
no action will lie if they are shown to have no real or substantial 
interests to pursue and that they have vindictive feelings towards the 
plaintiff, it will be much easier to infer that their true and deliberate 
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purpose is to inflict injury or damage on the other party^^. 
A defendant who is liable in respect of any damage suffered by 
the plaintiff may recover contribution from any other person liable in 
respect of the same damage, whether jointly with him or otherwise^". In 
any proceedings for contribution, the amount of contribution recover-
able from any person shall be such as may be found by the court to be 
just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person's respon-
sibility for the damage in question^'. 
The U.S. Copyright Act 1976, similarly, makes no change in the 
existing rule that a person who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner is an infringer and that all who unite in infringement 
are liable, joint and severally, for damages resulting from such infringe-
ment. Although the Copyright Act doesn't expressly render anyone 
liable for infringement committed by another*-'. A defendant may be 
held liable as a contributory infringer if he acts with knowledge of 
copyright infringing activity to induce, cause, or materially contribute 
to the infringing conduct of another'*''. But liability can be imposed for 
vicarious or contributory infringement even without regard to a 
defendant's intention to infringe, or his knowledge of the infringe-
menf*'. The dispositive factors in a determination of vicarious liability 
are whether the defendant had the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing activities, and had a direct financial interest in such activities*^. 
(C) INNOCENT INFRINGERS AND CONVERSION ; 
The relationship between the remedies against infringers and in 
respect of conversion and detention has given rise to some difficulty 
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with regard to the liablity of defendants. For example, in order to 
establish that a retailer of books or records is liable for infringement of 
copyright by selling or offering for sale books and records, it must be 
proved that the retailer knew at the relevant time that the making of the 
article in question constituted an infringement of copyright or (in the 
case of an imported article) would have constituted an infringement of 
that copyright if the article had been made in the place into which it had 
been imported. The most common way of fixing the retailer with the 
requisite knowledge is by giving him express notice by letter of the 
plaintiff's allegation of infringement^^ The copyright laws of the three 
countries under study have confered on a plaintiff owner of copyright 
of indepedent and separate cause of action for conversion and that 
knowledge of the infringement on the part of the defendant retailer is 
not an ingredient of that cause of action. There may, therefore, be a 
cause of action in conversion against a defendant who, by reason of his 
innocence of the infringement has not committed any infringement of 
copyright^^. On this view, all that is necessary is that there has been an 
infringement with resulting infringing copies which the defendant 
possesses and has converted or is threatening to convert to his own use. 
In other words the remedy in conversion is not confined to those cases 
where the defedant is an infringer, though it must, of course, be 
remembered that an innocent defendant has a defence to any pecuniary 
remedy for conversion of infringing copies. 
It has been doubted in U.K., however, whether it is correct to treat 
the remedy in conversion in the same way as the normal case of an 
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action for conversion based on actual ownership of the article alleged 
to be converted. The right in conversion under Copyright Act, arises 
solely out of the notional attribution of ownership in the substance 
upon which the infringing work is reproduced. In other words, the right 
in conversion arises solely out of the infringement and it may be that the 
innocent possessor of infringing copies is, when sued for conversion, 
entitled to the same shield (i.e. requirement of knowledge) which exists 
in respect of a claim against him for infringement'". 
(D) CIVIL REMEDIES : 
The Copyright Statutes of the United Kindgom, United States of 
America and that of India provide the owner of a copyright with a potent 
arsenal of remedies against an infringer of his work, including an 
injunction to restrain the infringer from violating his rights, the 
impoundment and destruction of all reproductions of his work made in 
violation of his rights, a recovery of his actual damages and any additional 
profits realized by the infringer or a recoveiy of statutory damages, and attorneys 
fees. The U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, rightly referred of a copyright 
owner's "potent arsenal of remedies against an infringer"^'. 
(i) Remedy by Injunction : 
(a) Temporary Injunction : 
The most important remedy for infringement of copyright is an 
injunction. An injunction may be either interlocutory that is one granted 
prior to the trial and only until after the trial or further order, or it may 
be final and permanent. 
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Applications for interlocatory injunctions are frequently made in 
actions for infringement of copyright since damages are rarely an 
adequate remedy for the injury suffered by the plaintiff^ The object of 
an interim injunction is to give to the plaintiff temporary protection 
against injury by continuing violation of his rights for which he can not 
be adequately compensated in damages in the action. This need to 
protect the plaintiff must be weighed against the corresponding need of 
the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his being 
prevented from exercising his legal rights and for which injury he could 
not be adequately compensated under the plaintiff's cross undertaking 
in damages. An interlocutory injunction is, thus, a temporary discre-
tionary and exceptional remedy. It is available before the rights of the 
parties have been finally determined and, in the case of an ex-parte 
injunction, even before the court has been appraised of the nature of the 
defendant's case". It is no part of the court's function at this early stage 
in the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to 
the facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend. The 
evidence is incomplete because it is not until the trial that it is tested by 
oral cross-examination. Perfect justice can not be achieved since the 
court is acting on imperfect information. It is not, therefore, appropriate 
for the court to decide conflicting questions of fact or difficult ques-
tions of law which call for detailed argument and mature consideration. 
At the hearing of the application for an interlocutory injunction 
the court must first be satisfied that the plaintiff has a real prospect of 
succeeding in his claim for a permanent injunction at the trial'^. If the 
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court is of the view that the claim is frivolous or vexatious an injunction 
will not be granted. The word "frivolous' and "vexatious", in this 
context are understood in a somewhat different sense than the same 
words are when used or on application to strike out a statement of claim 
or a defence as being frivolous or vexatious^^ What the affidavit 
evidence must disclose is that there is a serious question to be tried and 
that the plaintiff has prospects of success which exist in substance and 
reality^^. The plaintiff does not, as was formerly thought, have to 
establish that he has a strong prima facie case or even a probability that 
he will succeed at the trial. The burden on the plaintiff is the lesser one 
of showing an arguable case to be tried. 
The position under the United States copyright law is almost 
similar to one in United Kingdom. Thus the plaintiff under the U.S. law 
must show irreparable harm from continued infringement" and either : 
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits^\ or 
(2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a 
fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping 
heavily towards the party requesting the preliminary relief^. 
But because injury normally can be presumed the plaintiff in 
a copyright case is entitled to a preliminary injuction even without a 
detailed showing of irreparable harm if the plaintiff demonstrates 
probable success on the merit or a prima facie case of infringement*^". In 
other words, the irreparable injury which must be shown for purposes 
of obtaining a preliminary injuction will normally be presumed from a 
showing of copyright infringement'*', thus making the test for obtaining 
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a preliminary injuction in a copyright case slightly rigorous than in most 
cases*'. In determining the likelihood of success on the merits, factors 
such as the failure of the defendant, who was present in the court, to 
testify in denial of copying that was apparent from the close similarity 
of line drawings to paragraphs in a fiimiture catalogue*^ and to testify in support 
of his claim of a common historical source''^  have been considered. 
Preliminary injunctive relief may be warranted even where it may 
be impossible for the copyright owner to gather sufficient proof of his 
damages*^ A preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy where the 
irreparable harm caused by the defendants can not be adaquately 
calculated or compensated in money damages as where the harm is 
caused by adverse effects on plaintiff's marketing strategy, business 
relationships, good-will, and relations with the public**. A United State 
Court has found a likelihood of irreparable harm justifying a prelimi-
nary injunction where industry trade shows in upcoming months would 
give the defendant an opportunity to pass off his product as his own 
creation, when, in fact, it was a copy of plaintiff's creation*^. And a 
showing of irreparable harm was held to have been established where 
the alleged infringer, by marketing his video game, jeopardized the 
substantial investment plaintiff's had in their game, in view of the fact 
that video games are of short-lived nature and in view of the fact that in 
order to play defendant's allegedly infringing game, the purchaser must 
buy defendant's game console, thus, impacting on plaintiff's entire 
videio game system and not only sales of the particular game''\ In 
determining whether a competitor should be enjoined from infringing 
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copyrights on computer programs is far greater than the cost of their 
duplication, so that even without the presumption of irreparable harm 
generally applied in copyright infringement cases, the jeopardy to a 
computer manufacturing investment and competitive position caused 
by a competitor's wholesale copying of many of its key operating 
programs would satisfy the requirement of irreparable harm needed to 
support a preliminaiy injunction*'. 
A preliminary injunction, will however, be denied, where plain-
tiff fails to make the required showing of probable success on the merits 
and irreparable harm™. Lack of a valid copyright destroys the likelihood 
of success''. In an action by a publisher of religious music against two 
religious organisations, arising out of the use of unauthorised copies of 
copyrighted hymnals in various dioceses, based upon the organisations 
failure to provide adequate direction to dioceses and parishes as to the 
proper use of such copyrighted material, a preliminary injuction would 
be denied in view of the defendants lack of authority to supervise or 
control the infringing activities, the lack of receipt of any financial 
benefit from such activities, and the ability of the publisher to assess the 
damages resulting from lost profits'^. 
One commentator believes that keeping in view above decisions, 
the presumption of irreparable harm explains the great case of prelimi-
nary relief in copyright cases". Paul Golstein, while expressing 
concern that courts may be too quick to grant "coercive relief" when 
the defendant's work consists only partly of infringing material, 
concedes that such caution is rarely observed^^ As a rationale for the 
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ready presumption that damages may undercompensate he suggests: 
"copyright protects more than the author's strictly economic interests; 
her personal, aesthetic and reputational interest may also be at stake". 
Melville Nimmer suggests as an explanation the transitory value of 
most copyrights in such fields as "dramatic works, fabric designs and 
possibly video games"^^ But, as he demonstrates with clouds of 
citations, the rush to presume irreparable harm is not confined to such 
alleged ephemera". 
The most through recent appellate consideration of preliminary 
injunction tests emphasizes their interdefence. In Concrete Machinery-
Co V. Classic Lawn Ornaments Inc.,''^ Concrete charged classic with 
copying its lawn statuary - deer, swans, and such. Classic in the brief 
preliminary injunction hearing, emphasized differences in the crea-
tures. The trial court denied the injunction, the court of appeals 
reversed. In addition to expounding subtantive principles for finding 
infringement, the court of appeals made its own possitive appraisal of 
the plaintiff's likelihood of success, and cautioned against giving undue 
weight to expected hardship on the defendant if it was banned from the 
concrete lawn ornament business for the time being. Such solicitude, 
the court observed, would favour a defendant where principal business 
was illicit copying. As for the public interest factor, the court said there 
was clearly a public interest in protecting copyrights, since congress 
has beneficiently authorised them''. This is a conventional quick way of 
dealing with the public interest. 
One emerges from all this weighing of imponderables with a 
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sense that likelihood of success is the dominant factor. But if the 
defendant can take arms to oppose a preliminary injunction, it is 
customarily asserted that the entire matter is entrusted to the discretion 
of the trial court. The trial court may and will deny the injuction/" if the 
plaintiff does not seem to have much of a case. Nevertheless, a 
persistent plaintiff, as in concrete, can sometimes avoid the denial. 
Whatever the reasons, the copyright plaintiff has a distinct edge in a 
preliminary round that may turn out to be decisive. 
The Indian courts have heavily relied on the aforesaid British and 
American decisions in matters of injunctive remedy in copyright cases. 
Thus, Avadh Behari Rohatgi J. made following observation in Penguin 
Books Ltd. England V. Ms India Book Distribution'^^: 
As most infringements of copyrights consist of a 
continuous process of successive infringing acts 
such as importation of infringing copies as in this 
case the most important remedy and in many cases 
the only effective one is the injunction. This is 
always in the discretion of the court and the court 
has to weigh the possible damage to the plaintiff if 
the injuction is not granted against the possible 
damage to the defendant if it is granted. Thus, once 
the infringement and its continuance is proved the 
plaintiff will usually be entitled to an injunction, but 
the injunction would not be granted if the damage 
caused to the defendant by granting the injunction 
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would be out of all proportion to the seriousness of 
the infringement or to the possible damage to the 
plaintiff. In actions for infringement of copyright 
damages are often not an adequate remedy since 
there are difficulties in both ascertaining and quan-
tifying such damage as injury to the plaintiff's 
property, business and good will. 
In this case, Penguin Books Ltd. of England (original plaintiff) 
brought a suit for perpetual injunction against the respondents. M/s 
India Book distributors of New Delhi, Bombay, Madras. Calcutta 
(original defendants) restraining them from infringing Penguin's tciri-
torial copyrights licence in 23 books, the subject matter of the suit. 
Admittedly India Book Distributors, Bombay are importing, distribut-
ing and offering for sale in India, 13 out of these 23 titles. Penguin 
asked for a temporary injunction in the suit but were denied the same by 
the lower court. Upholding the plea of Penguin, the Delhi High Court 
held that the balance of convenience is in favour of Penguins. There is 
prima facie an infringement of an "exclusive right". A continuance or 
repetition of infringement is threatened in future as well. Further, the 
court took a serious view of the fact that American editions which are infringing 
copies are being sold at lower prices than the British Penguins. 
Similarly in N. T. Raghunathan and other V. All India Reporter 
Ltd^^, plaintiff. All India Reporter (at the trial court) published a 
monthy law journal known as the All India Reporter. Apart from reports 
of judgements of various High Courts in India and of the Supreme Court 
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of India it publishes at the head of the reports, notes and head notes on 
points decided in those judgements. In 1955 the plaintiff commenced 
the practice of reporting in addition to the judgements, their respective 
head notes without the original judgements. These it published sepa-
rately in the monthly parts of its publication and called "Notes of 
Unreported Cases" or N.U.C. The defendant who is the editor of the 
law journal called Modern Weekly Notes recently published an "All 
India Digest, 1951-55, civil, criminal and revenue". In this Digest, he 
has pirated the notes and head-notes published by the plaintiff in his 
"NUC"s. The court granted injuction to the plaintiff and observed: 
The principles upon which a court grants temporary 
injuction are well settled, and they are that there 
must be a bonafide contention between the parties 
and that on the facts before the court it must be 
satisfied that there is a probability that the plaintiff 
is entitled to the relief, or in other words, that he has 
a prima facie case and if there is a prima facie case 
the court has to see on which side in the event of 
success or will lie the balance of inconvenience if 
the injuction does not issue"". 
On the other hand where in a suit for injunction restraining the 
infringement of copyright and damages the plaintiff sought for issue of 
a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from selling their 
books, pending the disposal of the suit, the court held that if the injury 
with which the plaintiffs were threatened was not irreparable and the 
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direction by the trial judge to the defendants to keep separate and 
regular accounts of the sale of their books was sufficient, no case for 
grant of temporary injunction is made out^^. 
Where only part of a work has been copied, and the part which has 
been copied from the plaintiff's work can be separated from that which 
has not been copied, an injunction will be granted only against the 
objectionable part or parts^'. But even where a very large proportion of 
a work of a piratical nature is unquestionably original, if the parts which 
have been copied can not be separated from those which are original 
without destroying the use and value of the original matter, he who has 
made an improper use of that which did not belong to him must suffer 
the consequences of so doing, for an injunction will be issued against 
the whole*^. 
' 'As to the hard consequences which would flow from granting an 
injuction", said Lord Eldon, inMawman V. Tegg, "*^  "when a very large 
proportion of the work is unquestionably original, I can say that, if the 
parts which have been copied can not be separated from those which are 
original, without destroying the use and value of the original matter, he 
who has made an improper use of that which did not belong to him with 
what belongs to me, and the mixtures be forbidden by law, he must again 
separate them, and he must bear all the mischief and loss which the 
separation may occasion if an individual chooses in any work to mix my 
literary matter which belongs to me; and if the parts of the work can not 
be separated, and if by that means the injunction, which restrained the 
publication of any literary matter, prevents also the publication of his 
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own literary matter, he has only himself to blame". 
(b) Permanent Injunction : 
If the plaintiff succeeds at the trial in establishing infringement 
of copyright, he will normally be entitled to a permanent injunction to 
restrain future infringements. The question whether an injunction ought 
to be granted permanently is one which is determined by reference to 
the circumstances and state of the law existing at the date when the 
question falls to be determined and the court's consideration is not 
confined to those circumstances existing at the date of the writ****. 
If, after a trial on the merits, plaintiff succeeds in establishing 
copyright infringement, he is entitled to a permanent injunction in 
addition to the recovery of monetary damages^'. A permanent injunc-
tion is particularly appropriate where money damages would not suffice^". 
(E) ANTON FILLER ORDER : 
In the United Kingdom, in certain cases the High Court has an 
inherent jurisdiction, or an application made to the court by a plaintiff 
ex-parte, and in camera, to take a mandatory order requiring a defen-
dant to permit or allow the plaintiff and his representatives to enter the 
defendant's premises, as specified in the order, so as to inspect articles 
and documents relevant to the proceedings and to remove them or take 
copies of them". The order does not authorise the plaintiff or his 
solicitors or anyone else to enter the premises unlawfully against the 
will of the defendant. It is not a search warrant; the order only 
authorises entry and inspection by permission of the defandant. The 
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defendant, therefore, has the safeguard that the plaintiff or his agents 
must get his permission before entry onto the premises. The defendant 
is, however, ordered by the in personam to give his permission with the 
result that, if he does not do so, he is in contempt of court. 
An Anton Filler Order is only made in the most extreme circum-
stances, for the form of the order is drastic and its effects are far 
reaching. This form of order has, in many copyright and passing off 
cases, proved to be one of great efficacy, because the defendant knows 
nothing of the proceedings until he is required by the order to admit the 
plaintiff and his representatives to his premines. So effective have been 
these orders that the jurisdiction is now frequently exercised in cases of 
infringement of copyright^^, passing off, infringement of patent & 
breach of confidence'^. 
The justification for the exercise of this exceptional jurisdiction 
is that, on the facts of the particular case, it is essential that the plaintiff 
should have inspection, so that justice can be done between the parties 
and where there is grave danger that, if an unscrupulous defendant is 
forewarned, evidence of vital importance in the litigation will be 
destroyed or concealed from the court and from the plaintiff, or lost, or 
taken out of the jurisdiction, so that the plaintiff will be deprived of his 
remedy and the ends of justice thus defeated. 
Great care is taken in the exercise of the jurisdiction and in the 
framing of the precise terms of the order to safeguard the defendant so 
as to ensure that no real harm is done to him and that his rights are 
respected. 
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Three conditions must be satisfied before the court will make an 
order: first, the plaintiff must show that he has an extremely strong 
prima facie case; secondly, the plaintiff must show that he has suffered, 
or is likely to suffer, very serious and irreparable damage if an order is 
not made; and, thirdly, there must be clear evidence that the defendant 
has in his possession incriminating documents or things and that there 
is a real possibility that he may destroy such material before any 
inter partes application can be made on notice^^. 
The U.S. & Indian Copyright Laws do not specifically provide for 
this drastic remedy in their copyright statutes yet it can be used under 
the general injunctive powers of the courts. 
(F) DAMAGES : 
The next remedy in the three jurisdictions in case of infringement 
of copyright is damages. A holder of copyright will be entitled to 
recover damages for the infringement of his right. The measure of 
damage is the depreciation caused by the infringement to the value of 
the copyright as a cause of action^'. Thus, if the violator of copyright 
has dealt with the copyright holder's copyrighted work as if he had a 
licence, the defendant ought to pay as damages an amount equivalent to 
the fair fee which he would have had to pay for a licence to do the acts 
which he has done^*. There will also be taken into account any loss 
which the copyright owner has suffered by reason of the diminution of 
thesalesofhis work, orthe loss ofprofit which he might otherwise have 
made", but these will not be taken into account under his head any 
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benefit which may have accrued to the violator by the use of his work. 
The fact that the pirated work may have injured the reputation and 
vulgarised the original is also a fact that may be taken into consideration 
in assessing the amount of damages^*, and generally the damages may 
be said to be at large'^. 
In United States, under the Copyright Act of 1976, an infringer of 
copyright is liable for either (I) the copyright owner's actual damages 
and any additional profits of the infringer, or (2), statutory damages'"". 
The Act, thus, resolved the conflict under prior law as to whether actual 
damages as well as profits were recoverable cumulatively or alterna-
tively"". Under the 1976 Act, the copyright owner may elect, at anytime 
before final judgement is rendered, to recover, instead of actual dam-
ages and profits, as award of statutory damages'"', but if the copyright 
owner elects to recover actual damages and profits and fails to prove 
either, the court can't impose statutory damages"'^ 
Although it has been argued that, given the availability of statu-
tory damages, there is no need to have a comprehensive concept of 
actual damages or of infringer's profits, this contention has been 
rejected by a court which noted that since the maximum statutory 
damages are only $ 50,000 and an infringing work used as a marketing 
device could generate much greater profits for the infringer than $ 
50,000 and cause much greater losses to the copyright owner, it would 
be unsound to infer from the provision for statutory damages a congres-
sional intent to overthrow normal tort damage principles'"^ Under the 
statute, the copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages 
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suffered as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer 
that are attributable to the infringement and "are not taken into ac-
count""^' in computing the actual damages. The "not taken into ac-
count" clause eliminates an ambiguity with regard to the possibility of 
double recovery under the prior law and bars the owner from receiving 
an additional award of damages based on an infringer's profits; in other 
words, if the profits the owner would have made but for the infringe-
ment are equal to the amount made by selling the copyrighted item, and 
the owner proves his lost profit, he can not recover both his lost profits 
and the profits made by the infringer'"^ On the other hand, if the 
coyright infringer makes greater profits from the sale of the copyrighted 
item than the owner lost because, for example, the infringer is a more 
efficient producer than the owner or sells in a differant market, the 
copyright owner is allowed to capture the additional profit in his 
damage award even though it does not represent a loss to him'". While 
it may seem wrong to penalize the infringer for his superior efficiency 
and to give the owner a windfall, the purpose of the law is to discourage 
infringement; by preventing infringers from obtaining any net profits, 
it encourages any would be infringer to negotiate directly with the 
owner of the copyright that he wants to use rather than stealing the 
copyright and forcing the owner to seek compensation through the 
courts. Furthermore, some of this "windfall" may actually be profit 
that the owner would have obtained from licensing his copyright to the 
infringer had the infringer sought a licence'"*. On the other hand, it has 
been said that the statute did not contemplate that a court would award 
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damages which would provide plaintiff with a windfall'"^. 
The statutory provision making registration a prerequisite to 
certain remedies for infringement, bars statutory damages for the 
period before registration but is not a prohibition against the award of 
actual damages; actual damages are proper for acts of infringement 
occurring both before or after the effective date of the registration"". 
In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is 
required to present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the 
infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses and the 
elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted 
work'". Thus, the holder of copyright can make out a prima facie case 
for an award of infringer's profits by showing the defendant's gross 
revenues from the sale of the infringing copies, but it is enough to show 
the defendant's gross revenues from the sale of everything he sold. 
After the plaintiff proves the defendant's gross receipts, the burden 
shifts to the defendant to prove any deductible costs or expenses"-. 
Similarly, once a copyright holder establishes with reasonable prob-
ability the existence of a casual connection between the infringement 
and a loss of revenue, the burden shifts to the infringer to show that this 
damage would have occurred had there been no taking of copyrighted 
expression"^ 
An infringer's profit need not be apportioned in direct relation to 
the amount of material plagiarized. Thus, a publisher's profits from the 
sale of an infringing book is not apportioned, although the plagiarized 
material constituted only a comparatively small part of the plaintiff's 
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work, since the profit was due to the book as a whole, not to any 
particular part thereof"^. Similarly, where plaintiff sold a 5 record 
album which constituted the only complete set of Scott Joptin s works, 
as assertion by defendants that since the infringing material which they 
were not authorised to record filled only one side of 5 record set, and 
that therefore plaintiffs were only entitled to iO% of the profits, was 
properly rejected by the District Court as a meaningless percentage 
since, as the court observed, the inclusion of the infringing composition 
made defendant's album the only "complete set" of Japlin's work. 
Hence, in the absence of evidence by defendant to dispute the contri-
bution of each composition to the marketability of the album, an award 
of one half the profits from the complete works was not unreason-
able"^. And if a book is essentially worthless if the infringed material 
were removed, the entire profits from the sale of such books should be 
awarded to the holder of copyright'". 
(i) Statutory Damages : 
Under the U.S. Copyright Act, 1976, a copyright owner may 
elect, at any time before final judgement is rendered, to recover 
"statutory damages" instead of actual damages and profits"'. Statutory 
damages may be elected whether or not there is adequate evidence of the 
actual damages suffered by the copyright owner or of the profits reaped 
by the infringer"^ But normally an action for statutory damages is 
appropriate where the measure of actual damages is difficult to prove"'\ 
A statutory award is made for all infringements involved in the action, 
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with respect to any one work for which any one infringer is liable 
individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly 
and severally'^". Thus, one defendant who infringes one copyrighted 
work is liable for statutory damages no matter how many acts of 
infringement are involved in the action and regardless of whether the 
acts are separate, isolated or occurred in a related series'^'. If the action 
involves the infringement of two or more separate and independant 
copyrighted works, statutory damages must be awarded for each such work'--. 
Unless the infringement was committed wilfully or the infringer 
sustains the burden of proving that he was not aware and had no reason 
to believe that his acts constituted an infringement, the award of 
statutory damages must be no less than $ 250 nor more than $ 10,000 for 
all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work' '\ 
Within this permissible limit, the amount of statutory damages is within 
the discretion of the court'^^. 
Where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and 
the court finds, that infringement was committed wilfully, the court in 
its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of 
not more than $ 50,000'^'. Proof that a warning of infringement was 
received and disregarded is essential to show wilful infringement'-*. 
Where the infriger sustains the burden of proving that he was not aware 
and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the 
award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $100'". 
As far as Indian copyright law is concerned, the Copyright Act of 
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1957 also mentions "damages" as one of the civil remedies available 
to an owner of copyright against an infringer. Laying emphasis on the 
system of civil remedies, the Delhi High Court observed in Penguin 
Books Ltd. England VM S. India Book Distributors : 
If copyright is to possess any value to its owner, it 
must be capable of enforcement. Laws in general are 
enforced in one of the two ways : (i) Publicity by 
means of the police, custom officers, or similar 
agency, such as registrar of copyright, or (ii) Pri-
vately by legal action taken by the person who 
suffers from any breaches of the law. Most copy-
right law falls into the record category, for copyright 
is an essence of a private legal right. It is for the 
owner of the copyright to go to court to prevent a 
wrong from taking place or to seek redress when a 
wrong has taken place. It is for the copyright owner 
to seek a 'civil remedy' for any infringement (actual 
or potential) of his legal interest. 
As seen above in most cases in India, the relief which has been 
claimed in copyright cases was injunctive and, therefore, the law as to 
damages is not all that developed yet the rules evolved in U.K and U.S. 
will be good in India wherever need may so arise. 
(ii) Additional Damages : 
The U.K. Copyright Act of 1988 makes provision for the award 
of additional damages having regard to all the circumstances and in 
CHAPTER - 11 : 484 : 
particular to the flagrancy of the infringement and any benefit accruing 
to the defendant by reason of the infringement'^^. Where the court 
having regard, in addition to all other material consideration, to the 
flagrancy of the infringement and any benefit shown to have accrued 
to the defendant by reason of the infringement, is satisfied that effective 
relief would not otherwise be available to the plaintiff, the court in 
assessing damages for the infringement shall have power to award such 
additional damages as the court may consider appropriate in the circum-
stances'^'*. The section is directed to providing effective relief for the 
plaintiff. If, for example, effective relief is available to the plaintiff in 
respect of anothc" cause of action, such as libel or breach of confidence, 
relief may not be given by an award of additional damages for the 
infringement of copyright'^'. It is thought that damages under this 
section might be appropriate where a defendant adopts a policy of 
continual infringement, but an injunction is not an appropriate remedy 
because the defendant reproduces different material on each occasion. 
Additional damages may also be awarded where the conduct of the 
defendant has been deceitful and treacherous, thereby obtaining ben-
efits for himself and inflicting on the plaintiff humiliation for which it 
is difficult to compensate'-*^. Flagrancy implies scandalous conduct, 
deceit including deliberate and calculated infringement where a defen-
dant reaps a pecuniary advantage in excess of the damages he would 
otherwise have to pay'^\ 
In the United States, punitive damages are not available under the 
Copyright Act of 1976'^^. Whenanawardof statutory damages is made. 
CHAPTER - 11 : 485 : 
particularly under Section 504 (c) (2) providing for an increase of 
statutory damages to $ 50,000 for wilful infringement, punitive or 
exemplary damages are inappropriate since the public policy rationale 
for punitive damages (punishing and preventing malicious conduct) can 
properly be accounted for in the provisions for increasing maximum 
statutory damages from $ 10,000 to $ 50,000 per infringement found to 
be wilful'". 
As in United States, the Indian law also does not specifically 
makes a provision for the award of additional damages in the Act itself 
yet the courts in its general power to award damages can very well make 
an award of exemplary damages to meet the ends of justice. 
(G) CRIMINAL REMEDIES : 
In most cases of copyright infringements, the owners of the 
copyright resort to civil remedies yet in many cases of wilful infringe-
ments, the civil remedies are not considered sufficient and therefore 
more stringent course is allowed by the copyright statutes of the three 
countries which form subject matter of the present study i.e. U.K., 
U.S.A. & India. 
Section 107 of the U.K. Copyright, Designs Patents Act 1988 
provides that an offence is committed by any person who, without the 
licence of the copyright owner makes for sale or hire or imports into the 
United Kingdom otherwise than for his private and domestic use or 
possesses in the course of a business with a view to committing any act 
infringing the copyright or in the course of a business sells or lets for 
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hire or offers or expose for sale or hire or exhibits in public or 
distributes otherwise than in the course of a business to such an extent 
as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright, an article which is. 
and which he knows or has reason to believe is an infringing copy of a 
copyrighted work. 
Similarly the 1988 Act declares that a person commits an offence 
who makes an article specifically designed or adapted for making 
copies of a particular copyright work, or has such an article in 
possession knowing or having reason to believe that it is to be used to 
make infringing copies for sale or hire or for use in the course of a 
business'^^. 
In the same manner, where copyright infringed (otherwise than 
by reception of a broadcast or cable programme) -
(a) by the public performance of a literary, dramatic or musical 
work or, 
(b) by the playing or showing in public of a sound recording or film, 
any person who caused the work to be so performed, played or 
shown is guilty of an offence if he knew or had reason to believe that 
copyright would be infringed'-*^. 
The offences prescribed above are punishable on summary con-
viction''^ The offences of making, selling, exhibiting, importing or 
distributing infringing copies are punishable, for a term not exceeding 
six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both. A 
person found guilty on conviction will be punished with a fine or 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or both. A person 
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guilty of any other offence as mentioned above is liable on summary 
conviction to imprionment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine 
not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both. 
It is further provided that the court before which proceedings are 
brought against a person for an offence under above section may, if 
satisfied that at the time of his arrest or charge he had in his possession, 
an infringing copy of a copyrighted work or he had in his possession. 
custody or control an article specifically designed or adopted for 
making copies of a particular copyrighted work, knowing or having 
reason to believe that it had been or was to be used to make infringing 
copies, order that the infringing copy or article be delivered up to the 
copyright owner or to such other person as the court may direct'^'\ 
Where an offence under Section 107 committed by a body 
corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or 
connivance of a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of 
the body, or a person purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well 
as the body corporate is guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded 
against and punished accordingly'^". 
As in United Kingdom, so in United States, despite above crimi-
nal offences, prosecutions in cases of copyright violations are ex-
tremely rare. The U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 at first provided a 
maximum fine of $ 10,000 for criminal infringement which could under 
certain circumstance be raised to $ 50,000"". In 1982, Congress amended 
the Copyright Act of 1976'^ ^ to provide that anyone who infringes a 
copyright wilfully and for commercial advantage or private financial 
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gain shall be fined up to $ 250,000 or imprisoned for up to 5 years if the 
offence involves a reproduction for distribution, during any 180 day 
period, of at least 1,000 phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright 
in one or more sound recordings, or of at least 65 copies infringing the 
copyright in one or more motion pictures or other audiovisual works, or 
is a record or subsequent offence. 
A similar fine, or imprisonment for not more than 2 year is to be 
imposed if the offence involves a reproduction for distribution, during 
any 180 day period, of more than 100 but less than 1.000 phonorecords 
or copies or of more than 7 but less than 65 copies infringing the 
copyright in one or more motion pictures or oilier audiovisual works. 
For an infringement involving a smaller number of copies or 
phonorecords than stated above, the maximukm penalty is $ 25,000 and 
imprisonment for one year. 
When any person is convicted of criminal infringement, the court 
in its judgement of conviction must order the forfeiture and destruction 
or other disposition of all infringing copies of phonorecords and all 
implements, devices, or equipment used in the manufacture of such 
infringing copies or phonorecords'^^ Where the infringement involves 
sound recordings, such sound recordings and the materials used to 
make, reproduce or assembled may be seized and forfieted to the United 
States"'^ 
Moreover, it is also provided that anyone who knowingly traffics 
in a counterfiet label affixed or designed to be affixed to a phonorecord, 
or a copy of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, shall be fined 
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up to $ 250,000 or imprisoned for up to 5 years or both. For the purposes 
of this provision the term "counterfeit label" means an identifying 
label or container that appears to be genuine but is not. 
As far as Indian law on the point is concerned, it is not all that 
redical as its American counterpart and is similar to one in the United 
Kingdom. Section 63 of the Copyright Act of 1957 says that any person 
who knowingly infringes or abets the infringement of the copyright in 
a work or any other right conferred by this Act shall punished with 
inprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but 
which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less 
than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to two 'akh rupees'^-. 
But where the infringement has not been made for gain in the 
course of trade or business*•*^ the court may impose a sentence of 
imprisonment for a term of less than six months or a fine less than fifty 
thousand rupees. 
Section 63 A which was inserted by the 1994Amendment pro-
vides for enhanced penalties on second and subsequent conviction. It 
lays down that whosever having already been convicted of an offence 
under above Section (Section 63) is again convicted of any such offence 
shall be punishable for the second and for every subsequent offence, 
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one lakh 
rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees. 
The Act also punishes a person who knowingly makes, or has in 
his possession, any plate for the purpose of making infringing copies of 
any work in which copyright subsists with imprisonment which may 
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extend to one year, or with fine or with both'^'. 
As to the offences by companies also, Indian law is at par with the 
British law as discussed above. 
An analysis of above provisons in the three countries of our 
study, thus, reveals that as far as copyright offences are concerned, the 
requirement of mens rea i.e. guilty mind is invariably insisted upon. 
Normally it is the element of '"knowledge" or "reason to believe'" 
which is being talked about. Then without doubt. United States provides 
more stringnt penalties to the infringers of copyright as compared to 
United Kingdom and India. There is, therefore, an urgent need to effect 
further amendment in the Indian law on the issue and make more 
extensive use of criminal remedies to overcome large scale violations of 
copyright. 
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RECAPITULATION & FUTURE 
CHALLENGES TO COPYRIGHT LAW 
(A) RECAPITULATION : 
Holding the entire study in retrospect, it becomes necessary to 
recap the discussion and make predictions based on the preceding 
chapters as to the direction in which copyiight law is likely to go in fiiture. 
It emerges from the study that the idea of copyright protection 
only began to emerge with the invention of printing, which made it 
possible for literaiy works to be duplicated by mechanical processes 
instead of being copied by hand. This led to the emergance of a new 
trade - that of printers and book sellers, in the United Kingdom called 
Stationers. These entrepreneurs invested considerable sum in the pur-
chase of paper, in buying or building printing presses, and in employ-
ment of labour involving an outlay which could only be recouped with 
a reasonable return over a period of time. In this situation, without any 
form of protection against competition from the sales of unauthorised 
copies, the investment in the p inting and selling of books was a 
precarious and speculative venture, and many were ruined. The pres-
sures grew for some form of protection; and this came in the shape o'' 
privileges granted by various authorities; in the United Kingdom and 
in France by the Kings; and in Germany by the Princes of the Various 
States. These privileges gave the beneficiaries exclusive rights of 
reproduction and distribution, for limited terms, with remedies avail-
able for enforcement by means of fines, seizures, confiscation of 
infringing copies, and possibly damages. The resulting situation as 
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revealed in the chapter on Historical development of copyright exhib-
ited many of the basic features of the copyright system as we know it today. 
By the end of the 17th century the system of privileges - i.e., the 
grant of monopoly rights by the Crown - was being more and more 
criticized and the voices of authors asserting their rights began increas-
mgly to be heard; and this led in England in 1709 to what is acknowl-
edged to be the first copyright statute- the Statute of Anne. The object 
of this law was expiessed in the long title of the Bill as being - for the 
encouragement of learning and for securing the property of copies of 
books to the rightful owner thereof. The emphasis of the Act was on the 
protection against unauthorised copying of published works, and in 
practice the principal beneficiaries were the publishers/booksellers. 
The 18th century saw a continuous dispute and litigation over the 
relationship between the copyright subsisting at common law and 
copyright under the Statute of Anne. This was finally settled by the 
House of Lords in the case oiDonaldson V. Beckett in 1774 which ruled 
that at common law the author had the sole right of printing and 
publishing his books, but that once a book was published the rights in 
it were exclusively regulated by the statute. Thus common law in 
unpublished works lasted until the Copyright Act, 1911, which abol-
ished it. The first Indian statute on copyright, Indian Copyright Act, 1914 
was a replica of U.K. Act of 1911. In United States, the common law of 
copyright, in unpublished works continued until 1976 when the current 
United States Copyright Act was enacted. But one feature of statute of 
Anne is still retained in the United States i.e., the requirement of 
registration and deposit. 
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The study brings out the conceptual differences between the 
Anglo-United States systems on the one hand and civil law systems on 
the other. The common law countries including India treat copyright, in 
effect, as a form of property, capable of being created by an indi\ idual 
or a corporate author, and once created, susceptible to commercial 
exploitation in the same way as any other form of property, the 
component rights being exclusively directed to securing enjoyment of 
the economic potential of the property. In civil law countries the 
author's right is also regarded as having "property" characteristics, 
and the copyright law seeks to protect the economic content of that 
property to the same extent as does the common law system but, and 
herein lies the difference, there is an added dimension to authors 
rights, i.e., the intellectual or philosophical concept that the work of an 
author is an expression of his personality which by natural justice 
protects just as much as the economic potential of the work. These 
different approaches do have an impact on the two systems in practice. 
The first difference is one of terminology. In common law 
systems, the protection is described as copyright, whereas in ci\il law 
systems the expression is authors right. Thus, in common law the right 
is related to the work or the property, whereas in civil law systems it i>; 
related to the individual creator of the work or property. 
The next distinction flows, in a sense, as demonstrated in the 
chapter on Neighbouring Rights, from the first. Under the philosophy 
of civil law countries, notably France, only an individual can be the 
author of a work protected by copyright and in the legislation of such 
countries, although it is recognised that works brought into existence 
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Otherwise than by individual authors - for example, films created by a 
film company or a sound recording created by a record producer are 
entitled to protection, that protection is never described - as an authors 
right. The term used is neighbouring right, i.e., a right analogous to an 
author's right. In common law countries on the other hand, the protec-
tion which is given to broadcasts, audio-visual works, sound recordings 
etc is described as copyright; and the author of such work ma\' be -
indeed, usually is not an individual but a corporate body. 
Another marked difference is the treatment given by the two 
systems to the ownership of copyright. Consistent with the concept that 
copyright is an author's right, the laws of civil law countries al\va>s 
vest the copyright in the author and there are no exceptions to this 
general principle. But in common law countries, while it is normal 
practice to declare as a general rule that copyright vests initially in the 
author, it is also usual to qualify that by enumerating a number of 
special cases where the copyright vests in some person other than the 
author, unless he has secured by an express contractual term that it 
should vest in him. Thus, as discussed in chapters on architectural 
plans & ''opyright in Computer software, both in United Kingdom and 
United States as well as in India, there are express provisions which 
stipulate that where an author is employed under a contract of service 
and produces a work in the course of his employment, th '^ copyright in 
that work will initially belong to the employer and not to the author 
unless the latter is able to reserve by contract the copyright to hiinst.-
Within the common law systems, as has been demonstrated throughout 
the historical survey, most of the major controversies dealing with 
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copyright can be traced ultimately to the basic debate over the nature of 
copyright itself. For over two hundred years two conflicting theories of 
copyright have alternated in ascendancy, one claiming that copyright is 
a natural-law property right of the author by reason of creation (the 
creative-work theory), the other asserting that copyright exists only as 
a statutory grant of a limited monopoly by reason of legislation (the 
statutory-grant theory). This conflict in theories had its genesis in 
eighteenth century England, when the booksellers first introduced the 
claim of an author's common-law copyright. The legacy of that period 
has been the dual and contradictory theoretical bases for copyright that 
have generated confusion in both the creation and application of 
copyright rules ever since. Perhaps the most unfortunate result of this 
duality is that it has obscured the crucial distinction between a work and 
the copyright for that work, since only the recognition of a single 
theoretical base can resolve this problem. Only a unified theory of 
copyright can ensure that the rules relate to each other and to the whole 
in a consistent way, which is to say that only a unified theory can 
provide the needed basis for integrity in the law of copyright. 
In modern times, the natural-law property theory of copyright is 
often referred to simply as the author's property theory. But the 
natural-law theory continues to have an impact on the judicial interpre-
tation of a statute that clearly makes copyright a limited statutory 
grant. As a general rule, property is a relative term, subject to many and 
varying limitations and constraints, and this is true also of copyright. 
But copyright is deemed to be more than a property right: it is a natural-
law property, which gives rise to the idea that it is or should be, an 
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absolute right (that is, nothing is more one's own than that which an 
individual creates). Despite the statutory limitations imposed on copy-
right, then, the author is still generally thought by many to own a newly 
created work as a natural-law property. It can't, thus, be concluded that 
the statutory copyright is merely a codification of the common-law 
copyright with some limitations added. But it is certainly easy to 
conclude that the statutory copyright is also ultimately grounded in 
natural law and is, therefore a plenary property right of the author. From 
this, it follows that non-recognition of copyright or too many limita-
tions on it is an incursion contrary to the dictates of equity. Yet it can 
be said by way of conclusion that copyright must accommodate the 
interests of authors, entrepreneurs as well as users. This accommoda-
tion as revealed by the present stud> can be satisfactorily achieved only 
by legislation, and only if the court interprets that legislation in a 
manner consistent with the theory upon which it is based. 
As to the subject-matter of copyright, the chapter on the Suhjeci 
matter d^ Authors rights (Sc other chapters reveal that in the three 
countries which are under study there is a general agreement that the 
quality or merit of a work are matters of taste and don't enter into the 
question of what is a work. Nor is there a prescribed degree of ability 
or amount of skill and knowledge necessary to create the work, or a 
measure of resources used to produce it. In these jurisdictions (U.K., 
U.S.A., and India) it will in each case be 'a question of degree whether 
the labour or skill or expense involved' is sufficient to warrant a cla rn 
of copyright. Unlike for a patent, where novelty is essential, there is no 
such requirement for copyright. However, it is generally the case that to 
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be copyright-protected a work must be original. This has to be under-
stood in a very wide sense and does not mean novelty. It means no more 
than the creator can truthfully say - This is all my own work. Moreover, 
as chapter on (\)pyri^ht in Literary, Dramatic <K' Musical Works shows, 
the three legal systems as almost all other do recognise copyright in 
derivative works i.e.. translations, collective works etc. There is cop\-
right in the adaptation of a literary work such as a play adopted from a 
novel or a film script adopted from a play. In the realm of musical works, 
adaptations are usually called arrangement, e.g., an orchestral work 
arranged for piano, or conversely a song written with piano accompa-
niment orchestrated for voice and orchestra. In popular music there are 
many arrangements of original songs made to suit a particular performer 
or a particular language version of the text. Each such adaptation or 
arrangement is a work provided there is a sufficient element of intellec-
tual creation. The intellectual input of the adapter or arranger may be 
quite modest to be suff' lent. In addition to originality, in all common 
law jurisdictions fixations are crucial. The work has to be fixed in 
writing or in some other material form to qualify for a copyright. 
Fixation thus is a condition precedent to the existence of copyright. As 
noted in this study, this is not so in most civil law jurisdictions, 
particularly in France and Germany. In these countries a lecture given 
without a script or a musical performance of a work without a score is 
protected. In view of this the Berne Convention dcesn't take sides and 
provides that it is a matter for legislation in the countries of the Lnion 
to require fixation in some material form. This gives each country the 
possibility to demand fixation either generally or for one or moio 
CHAPTER - 12 •  508 
categories of works. 
The third important thing in relation to subject-matter of copy-
right is the issue of publication. Whereas in the law of libel publication 
as a term of art has a veiy narrow meaning, i.e. showing or communi-
cating the writing containing the libel to any person other than the 
person defamed, in copyright the meaning is wider and closer to the 
general meaning of the word, i.e. making public. The definition of 
publication has varied considerably both from countiy to country and 
from time to time. In the history of copyright, publication meant 
originally the making public of copies (i.e. reproductions) of works. 
When films and phonograms were invented, the old definitions as 
detailed in chapter on Neighbouring Rights began to present new 
difficulties, which were dealt with in separate ways in different countries. 
As to the categories of works which are to be given copyright 
protection, the study has revealed that some national legislations (U.K., 
U.S.A., India) contain a definition of the works protected, others do not 
(e.g. Italy). Broadly speaking, there are two categories of works. The 
first is the one which includes works named in the Berne Convention, 
'literary and artistic works' which includes dramatic, musical and 
dramatico-musical works. The second is a category of recent types of 
works cinematograph films, sound recordings, broadcasts. The first 
category works are protected as copyright in the common law jurisdic-
tions while the term used for the second category in the civil law 
jurisdictions is neighbouring rights. 
The chapter on Subject Matter of Copyright and Authors 
Rights also leads us to conclude that the major rights under copyright 
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law include both economic rights and moral rights. While copyright is 
an idealistic concept, starry-eyed idealism should be discouraged. 
Copyright is largely about money. But then that does not mean that 
independent of money, copyright is nothing. The importance of moral 
rights of the author is clearly, demonstrated in the definition of the c/fo/f 
moral in French law : 'The author shall enjoy the right to respect for his 
name, his authorship, and his work. This right shall be attached to his 
person. It shall be perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible'. Its main 
objective is to safeguard the author's reputation, what Shakespeare, 
called that immortal part of myself. 
The enumeration of the author's economic rights as discussed in 
the chapter on this subject also makes it clear that the economic rights 
under the International Copyright Conventions and in the national 
legislations are not uniform though there is substantive similarity in 
them as far as U.K., U.S.A. and India are concerned. These rights differ 
in the terminology. Several rights do overlap and the precise scope of 
each right varies from one country to another. Nevertheless, the repro-
duction right, the adaptation right, the distribution right, the public 
performance right, the broadcasting right and cablecasting right are 
found in nearly every national copyright law. 
The issue of applicability of International law in relation to 
copyright was investigated in the chapter on this subject. Since works 
of knowledge do not know national boundaries, protection to foreign 
authors is a crucial issue. Once it was conceded that the creators of now 
works of many kinds should be protected, such protection becon-js at 
best only partially effective and at worst totally ineffective if it is 
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confined to national frontiers. The idea that copyright arises from the 
act of creation of the work and not from any administrative act leads 
naturally to the idea that once the right exists, it should be valid 
anywhere. There is no good reason why a creator should be entitled both 
to moral recognition and to the pecuniary rewards of his works only in 
his own country and not abroad. As most countries including the three 
which form subject matter of this study are parties to one of the 
International Conventions, a forgiven author gets copyright protection 
under the Convention. If this is not the case, the national law gives him 
protection. 
The treatment of foreigners, apart from conventional protection, 
varies considerably. In the United Kingdom works are protected if the 
author at the time of publication is a qualified person (qualified persons 
are British and Irish nationals or persons domiciled or resident in the 
U.K.) or if they are first published in the U.K. or an associated territory. 
The United States having won independence from Britain and wanting 
to create their own culture became protectionalist. Copyright thus was 
granted only to American citizens and residents in the U.S. Even a 
century later when copyright was gradually granted to some foreign 
authors (country by country) copies of foreign works had to be printed 
in the U.S. (under the so called 'manufacturing clause'). The Indian law 
protects foreign authors in the same manner as its own nations subject 
to condition of reciprocity and International Conventions. 
As to the copyright in literary, dramatic and musical works, the 
study has found substantial similarity in the laws of the three counii. ; 
studied here. A large variety of works such as compilations, selections. 
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abridgments, headnotes of law reports, advertisements, examination 
papers etc. and protected as 'literary works'. The ambit of dramatic 
works has also been enlarged though actors ga^^s are still not covered. 
On the issue of musical works, the study found that U.S. law is far less 
ambigous as compared to U.K. and India as it extends copyright 
protection to 'accompanying words' as well. The protection to musical 
works in films is still not adequate and the response of Indian judiciary 
in this regard is indeed unfortunate. 
On the issue of'copyright in software', the study has found that 
the legislative activity on copyrightability of software has been quite 
recent one and the countries studied here are bringing quick amend-
ments in quest of keeping pace with the fast changing computer 
technology. 
The 1994 Amendment brings Indian law in conformity with the 
Uruguary Round Agreement on Trade - related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) which requires countries to provide authors and their 
successors in title the right to authorise or to prohibit the commercial 
rental of originals or copies of their copyright works. However, it is to 
be noted that the TRIPs agreement is less stringent than the amended 
Indian law in that it allows a purchaser of a copyrighted work to sell his 
copy and adds the coveat that, in respect of computer programs, this 
obligation does not apply to rentals where the program itself is not the 
essential object of the rental. 
A traditional exclusion from infringement allows use of a coi, -
righted work for research criticism or private use, known as "fair 
dealing". The 1994 Amendment eliminated the "fair dealing" exclu-
CHAPTER-12 :512 
sion with respect to computer programs. This is an unusual step as "fair 
dealing'' has been a long standing exclusion which is part of well settled 
copyright law. 
At the same time, a new exclusion from copyright infringement 
of computer programs has been added. A lawful possessor of a copy of 
a computer program may make back up copies purely as a temporary 
protection against loss, destruction or damage in order to use the 
computer program for the purposes for which it was suplied. Such acts 
will not constitute either copyright infringement or violation of moral 
rights of author. 
As to the question of copyright protection to architectural de-
signs', the study has found that the protection granted to architects 
under the United States law prior to 1976 was highly insufficient as 
compared to the protection enjoyed by their counterparts in U.K. and 
India. The protection to architects in India has been further widened by 
the 1994 Amendment which replaced by the term architectural work of 
art by \vork of architecture. 
As to the vital question of 'performers rights', the study has 
revealed that despite recent legislative activity in U.K. and India and 
despite specific inclusion of performers rights in the latest amend-
ments, the plight of cine actors performing in films still continues due 
to conferrment of copyright only on the film produceis. But these 
amendments do otherwise give sufficient protection to other 
neighbouring right owners such as Producers of Phongrams and Bro.i'l-
casting Organisations. 
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As to the infringement of copyright and types of infringement 
such as primary and secondary, the study found remarkable similarity 
in the copyright laws of the countries studied. As to the infringement in 
respect of computer programs, the study has revealed that Indian 
copyright law is infect better than its counter part in the United States. 
Finally, the study reveals substantial similarity as far as remedies 
for copyright violations are concerned. The British remedy of Anton 
Pillor Order is quite effective and should be expressly recognised in 
Indian Copyright Act. On the question of Criminal remedies, certainly 
the American law is much more shingent as compared to U.K. and India. 
(B) FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT LAW ; 
On the basis of above conclusions, when considering the future 
of international copyright law, following three things must therefore be 
always remembered. 
First, the concept of copyright is of fairly recent origin. There 
have been periods of great flowing of western civilization like the Greek 
City States, the Roman Empire, the European Renaissance, without it, 
and there are still many countries where that part of the law doesn't 
exist or does not effectively operate. 
Secondly, copyright deals with the prevention of theft of intellec-
tual property, which is a concept much more difficult to grasp than 
ordinary theft and far less deeply rooted in the public consciousness of 
what is right and what is wrong. The process of convincing the general 
public that copyright infringement is theft is a long and arduous one 
which has scarcely began. 
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Thirdly, the enforcement of international law, even when laid 
down in international conventions has not proved easy even in such 
vital spheres of public International law as Health Regulations or Sea 
or Air law and the Copyright Conventions have been critically 
described as having no teeth because they lack machineiy for enforcement. 
After a century of successful development there are now three 
major forms of challenges to the concept of copyright: 
(i) Challenges to International Copyright law; 
(ii) Challenges to National Copyright law, and 
(iii) Challenges to the effectiveness of Copyright law arising from the 
speed of technological development. 
This study as seen in the preceding chapters mainly examined 
the issues relating to the impact of technology on the copyright law and 
therefore the conclusions on such issues and future of copyright as to 
them will have to be taken together. 
(i) Challenges to International Law : 
(a) Philosophical Challenges : 
In the 1940s and 1950s it was feared that a challenge to Interna-
tional copyright would come from countries with communist or totali-
tarian philosophy which might negate the whole concept of intellectual 
property on the grounds that all creative people should find their reward 
and fulfillment in dedicating their works to the community, represented 
by the state, and the state in return should look after their materiil 
needs, and that, therefore, individual rights are unnecessary and may 
even be positively harmful. As countries inclined to those philosophies 
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became more common it was feared that this view might spread to many 
of the new countries which were still uncommitted on the subject of 
Intellectual Property Rights, that the whole concept of copyright as a 
private and individual right be endangered and that as a consequence the 
general level of international protection might be seriously reduced. 
This challenge as seen in this study didn't materialise. The COMECON 
countries of Eastern Europe which had fairly sophisticated and success-
ful copyright systems before the second world war maintained their 
allegiance to copyright. The erstwhile Soviet Union which, like France 
and the United States before her, had created a Copyright law immedi-
ately after the Revolution, developed it within the framework of its 
social and economic system, revised it in 1973 and eventually ratified 
the Universal Copyright Convention in 1974. Recent developments in 
the people's Republic of China suggest that they are not averse to 
recognising the concept of copyright in new legislation and, a first step 
did enter into bilateral agreements^ though U.S. is still unhappy about 
its copyright regime and has imposed trade sanctions recently (June 
1996) against her. 
Socialist legal theory was restated in terms which completely 
corresponded to the basic principles of International Copyright 
law-\ With the end of socialist block, this challenge has almost come to an end. 
(b) Needs of Developing Countries : 
Numerically, the importance of the developing countries can 
hardly be exaggerated. Most countries of the world are developing 
countries. Many of them are not members of any convention and some 
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of them do not have a copyright law, or if they have one it is inadequate 
or inadequately applied in practice/ In the 1960s it was feared that the 
developing countries would challenge the concept of international 
copyright. This challenge was not based so much on ideological grounds 
as on the practical proposition that the developing countries needed and 
welcomed the intellectual property of the developed world, but that 
they were too poor and certainly too short of hard currency, to pay for 
it in the same way 's developed countries did, nor did they have any 
copyright material which could readily be offered in exchange. The 
situation has not changed much on this count even today. The implied 
challenge, therefore, was that if they could not be accommodated they 
might opt out of the International Copyright System, at least for the time 
being, and still take what they needed without payment, pleading that 
that was, after all, what the U.S. had done to some extent in the not too 
distant past. An attempt to meet this challenge was made at the 
Stockholm Conference in 1967 and the Paris Revision of Berne conven-
tion in 1971. 
In 1979 a Joint Consultative Committee was formed by VVIPO 
and UNESCO with the stated objective of facilitating access by devel-
oping countries to works protected by copyright. The major task was, 
and is, to create awareness of copyright generally and of the less 
obvious but all important fact that a copyright system is of importance 
to the economic and cultural development of all countries, including 
developing ones. The Convention establishing WIPO (Stockholm 196"^ ^ 
provides that VVIPO 'shall offer its co-operation to states requesting 
legal - technical assistance in the field of intellectual property and in the 
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intervening period WIPO has discharged this obligation by sustained 
efforts. Thus developing countries can now easily exercise the transla-
tion right and reproduction right without incurring liability for copy-
right infringement or paying royalty in hard currencies. 
(ii) Challenges to National Law : 
In the last 30 year as has been observed in this study, there has 
been a positive response by governments and Parliaments of most 
leading countries to the need of Copyright law reform to adjust the law 
to advance technology. New Copyright Acts or major amendments in 
the United Kingdom in 1956 and 1988, France in 1957 and 1985. India 
in 1957, 1983 and 1994 and United States in 1976 and 1988 are evidence 
of this trend. 
There are, however, three tendencies which constitute challenges 
to the development of copyright on the national level : First, consum-
erism Secondly, the tendency to replace what should be copyright or 
neighbouring rights by levies which are form of taxation or siii generis 
legislation. Thirdly, difficulties of enforcement. 
More accurately described as consumer politics applied to 
copyright or neighbouring rights, 'consumerism' means that the con-
sumer should have the widest possible access to all copyright material 
at the lowest possible cost and in many cases have free access. Almost 
everybody in modern society is a consumer of copyright in several 
respects ; as a reader of books, newspapers or other printed copyright 
material, as a listener to music, as a viewer of television or as parent of 
a child at school who needs textbooks, to name only the most common 
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uses. Thus, put in electoral terms, on most copyright issues the over-
whelming majority of voters are on one side and a comparatively very 
small number of voters, who are copyright owners, are on the other side 
of the argument. No politician in a democracy can totally ignore the fact 
that there are no votes in copyright when taking a position on a 
copyright issue. The counter argument - that without an effective 
copyright system creative effort would be undermined and the public 
interest would suffer - is less obvious and will, therefore, have to be 
reiterated often and in many different forms. 
In view of this political situation, it can be concluded that the 
timing of legislation dealing with new technological phenomenon is 
essential. The Director General of WIPO has observed that if uncon-
trolled use of copyright material by means of new technology is allowed 
to go on for many years, the users will then do everything possible to 
interpret the alleged 'silence' of the law to mean that the author's 
exclusive right doesn't exist to this 'new' use and, therefore, their hands 
are completely free.' By the time the discussion reaches legislative 
bodies or the courts, the users can claim that their free use of works is 
to be regarded as lawful, that they have acquired the right freely to use 
the works since their practice has not been sufficiently questioned or 
challenged. 
One of the trends of the last decade as noted in this study has 
been a certain rapprochement between copyrights and neighbouring 
rights. Viewed from the common law countries such as U.K., U.S.A. & 
India to which present study relates, the rights of phonograms producers 
have for a long time appeared as copyright but with a narrower scope. 
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Only two or three out of the large bundle of rights of authors are 
necessary to Neighbouring Rights owners. The phonograms producer as 
observed in the Neighbouring Rights chapter needs a reproduction 
right, a distribution right, and a public performance right. The broad-
caster needs a reproduction right and possibly a public performance 
right, the performer similarly needs a recording right, a broadcasting 
and public performance right and some moral rights. In all cases a 
shorter term is needed, usually 50 years from publication or broadcast-
ing or fixation instead of 50 years after the death of the author. 
Another vital conclusion of the present study is that the fact that 
the right owner is usually a corporate not a physical person has been no 
impediment in common law countries which were studied here, whereas 
to many civil law countries it seemed insuperable. The French legisla-
tion of 1985 appears to have been the turning point giving record 
producers as well as performers extensive neighbouring rights ap-
proaching those they have under some common law legislations. In the 
case of performers who are natural persons the civil law legislations 
have had fewer difficulties and the courts of the leading civil law 
countries have long since regarded them as derivative right owners. The 
legislations of the common law countries on this count have been 
patchy. However, in some of them, e.g. the United Kingdom, civil rights 
have been added to the right to bring criminal prosecutions which 
performers have had for half a century and in U.S.A. the courts have 
built up a substantial body of case law as discussed in the preceding 
chapters to protect them in general respects. Nonetheless, particularly 
in countries where their Trade Unions are strong (e.g. U.S.A. & U.K.), 
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they have often relied more on Union bargaining power than either 
copyright or neighbouring rights. Broadcasting organizations with the 
development of television have become very important copyright own-
ers of both films and phonograms in the common law countries as well 
as the largest single copyright users in most developed countries. 
However, this study found that wherei-s performers rely on trade union 
strength when they are doubtful about copyright protection, broadcast-
ing organizations tend to rely on public law and regulations for their 
protection. 
When a new right is introduced such as a Public lending ri^ht\ 
or an old right has to be resorted such as the reproduction right in the 
case of 'reprography' or 'hometaping', the study in hand found that 
there is a great temptation for governments to take the new right out of 
the copyright system. In the case of a public lending right this may be 
done because a limited fund is created from taxpayer's money as 
governments do not want borrowers from public libraries to have to pay 
a royalty and the government wants only nationals to benefit from this 
fund, which would otherwise be depleted. If a public landing right is 
introduced as a copyright the International Conventions would apply 
and give all Convention nationals the right to claim against the fund.** 
In case of 'home taping' a levy on recording equipment or on blank 
tapes can be treated as a royalty to be divided among copyright owners 
as in Germany. However it can also be treated largely as a tax, as in 
Sweden where 90 per cent goes to public funds and only 10 percent »o 
the right owners (authors, performance and phonograms producers). 
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has to be concluded here that such solutions are inconsistent with a free 
market economy. It amounts to an expropriation of the rights of the 
copyright owner, as his most fundamental right, the reproduction right, 
is seriously eroded and the equitable remuneration which is due to bini 
for the copying of his work is taken away from him by the state. Another 
problem is that many copyright and neighbouring rights, particularly 
reproduction rights, are becoming increasingly difficult. -Reprogra-
phy' and 'home taping', 'down loading' are outstanding examples. It 
would, however, be wrong to conclude from this that these rights should 
be abandoned and replaced by what would amount to free use excep-
tions. When public performance rights in music were first introduced at 
the beginning of the 20th century, it was argued that because of the 
multiplicity of rights and a very large number of locations where music 
is performed in public, the right would be unerforceable. These fears 
have proved groundless and the performance right has become of very 
great value to copyright owners without in any way harming the public. 
Thus different forms of enforcement by collecting societies, blanket 
licencing and cleaning house systems and only in last resort equitable 
remuneration and compulsory licence would appear to be correct 
answers to the problem. 
Henry Maine rightly observed that 'social necessities and social 
opinion are always more or less in advance of the law. We may come 
indefinitely near to closing the gap between them, but it has a perpetual 
tendency to reopen. The greater or lesser happiness of a people depends 
on the degree of promptitude with which the gap is narrowed.'" The gap 
can often be narrowed by the courts. The classic example as repeatedly 
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noted in this study is the development of the droit d' anteur in France. 
Two brief copyright laws (1791 and 1793) passed in the wake of the 
French Revolution were shaped in the course of century and half into 
one of the most highly developed copyright systems of the world solely 
by the courts, until the law was eventually codified in 1957. Similarly, 
it can be concluded that in the United Kingdom, when piracy of 
phonograms threatened to erode both the recording rights of authors and 
the reproduction right of producers of phonograms and the ordinary 
processes were found to be too slow to cope with the new phenomenon, 
it were British judges who timely intervened and created a procedural 
remedy which was discussed in the chapter on Remedies for cop\ right 
violations i.e. the. Anion Filler Order. The remedy indeed proved to be 
quite swift and effective and did enable copyright to resort itself in good 
time. The Indian courts so far have not shown such an activism with 
regard to copyright laws. 
As copyright is in essence an individual property right which 
benefits a small minority (the creators of copyright material) against a 
large majority (the users of copyright material), the judges who are 
irremovable under democratic Constitutions may be in a better position 
to hold the balance between private and public interest, fairly than 
members of Parliament who, however enlightened, have to keep an eye-
on the next election. 
(Hi) Technological Challenges ; 
As indicated in the introduction of this study, the study v is 
mainly designed due to technological challenges which continue u< 
pose new problems for the copyright law. 
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New technology as can be concluded from present study poses 
two quite distinct challenges to the copyright law. 
In the first place, the rapid pace of technological change has led 
to the evolution of new forms of creative expression, such as computer 
programs. The challenge here is whether National laws and Interna-
tional Conventions can show sufficient flexibility to accommodate 
these new technologies within the existing copyright regime. As seen in 
the chapter on software protection, the copyright system now appears 
to have surmounted the challenge of assimilating computer programs 
within the existing framework of national laws (including the ones 
which were studied here i.e. U.K., U.S.A. & India) and International 
Conventions, and computer programs are almost universally recognised 
as literaiy works for copyright purposes. 
The second challenge to copyright posed by technological devel-
opment is the proliferation of new uses of existing works. The rapid 
development of technology has given a considerable impulse to copy-
right law because of the large number of uses to which a work can be put. 
thus increasing, the potential rewards for its creators. 'Copyright is the 
Cinderella of the law. Her rich older sisters. Franchises and P itents, 
long crowded her into the chimney corner. Suddenly the Fairy God-
mother, Invention, endowed her with mechanical and electrical devices 
as magical as the pumpkin coach and the mice footmen. Now she whirls 
through the mad mazes of a glamorous ball'. These 'mechanical and 
electrical devices' are many ; recording and andio and video tape 
recording, broadcasting and broadcasting by cable and satellite, pho' 
copying, computerised storage and retrieval systems and misuse u. 
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Internet. The challenge to the copyright lies in the ease with which one 
or many copies can be made, and in the fact that such copies are being 
made in private homes or in offices and other non-public places where 
any control over the reproduction of copyright material is either impos-
sible (at home) or very difficult (in offices etc.). Future researchers on 
the subject of copyright have to concentrate on this emerging challenge 
and have to find a viable answer. The solutions of various countries such 
as royalty on the recording equipment in Germany or royalty on the 
blank tapes in Austria have not made any major dent. 
At present, few computers in which copyright material is stored 
are interconnected (at least in a developing country like ours), and 
access to networked computers is limited for the most part to business 
users. However, with the dramatic growth in the use of personal 
computers in the home, accompanied by the rapid spread of computer 
networks not only between businesses but also among indviduals, the 
copyright problems posed by computer use are likely to increase 
exceptionally. Infact the latest use of Internet has already posed greatest 
ever challenge to copyright law. The globe-girdling Internet links 3.2 
million computers in over 150 countries.'^ This network is virtual. That 
is it doesn't exist in physical form. Highly sophisticated computer 
software makes computer-to-computer connectivity possible. Appar-
ently seamless, and silently creating a global library is the World Wide 
Web. In this library are located many many Web sites (or bookshelves 
of the electronic type on computer). And these bookshelves are crani' i 
with books. Internet jargon calls them Home I'agcs. Each page com-
bines texts, graphics and pictures. Basically, information in the multi-
CHAPTER - 12 : 525 : 
media format. An Internet user who visits a Web site has freedom for 
random access. Web users are thus able to see, select, read and copy 
what may be a copyrighted material. Thus the problem of the nature of 
'home-taping' has emerged in a highly dangerous manner and the law as 
it exists today is unable to cope with it. The U.S. Government has 
constituted a Committee in March 1996 to examine the issue and 
recommcd amendments in the copyright law to meet the worst challenge 
posedby technology to it. The Internet's development has indeed totally 
changed the dissemination of information even to the extent of replac-
ing printed works completely. The day has come when a large number 
of houses and offices throughout the globe are linked to a computer 
centre via viwer/printer consoles'. The result is that the supply of one 
copy of a new work to a central point would make it or selections from 
it, available to all offices and houses which are linked to the central 
point. Bearing in mind as discussed in this study that the whole concept 
of copyright in modern times arose from the invention of the printing 
press, even its partial replacement by computers amounts to a revolu-
tionary change, i. is suggested that in this changed scenario the«copy-
right owners have to exercise their copyright at the input stage and look 
to the computer disseminator for the royalties in the same way that they 
have looked towards their publishers in the past. As copyright owner 
has always been recognised both under International law and under 
most national laws (including U.K., U.S.A. and India) entitled to his 
reproduction right, there seems no good reason why he should not be 
entitled to control copyright through Internet and payment of royalties 
before his work is put on Internet Web. 
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Another challenge to copyright law is posed by cable diffusion. 
The chapter on Neighbouring rights examined this issue at length and 
it is concluded that because of great number of works involved or the 
practical difficulties of locating copyright owners, national laws should 
provide for 'institutionalised collective administration' of the rights. 
Similarly the national laws should provide for payment of an equitable 
remuneration for performers and producers of phonograms whose 
performances or phonograms are used in cable transmission. The 
necessity for 'institutionalised collective administration' applies to 
these rights as well. Broadcasting organisations, it is suggested, on the 
other hand should be ^iven an absolute right to authorise the distribu-
tion by cable. This is the equivalent to a reproduction right for broad-
casting organisation and must therefore include the right to forbid the 
distribution by cable. The recent use of 'Direct Broadcasti.ig Satellite 
where signals are more high powered and receivable by members of the 
public in their homes ofter an adaptation of their receiving sets have 
also raised new challenges to the copyright law. Here when using these 
satellites the originating broadcasting organisation emits a signal which 
is directly receivable by the public in their private homes. These 'direct 
broadcasting satellites' combined with cable transmission have radi-
cally changed the pattern of broadcasting and do significantly influence 
the use of copyright works and make it very difficult Tor copyright 
owners to control this new use of their works. The solution, it is 
suggested, to meet this challenge, is to be found in the contr.irts 
Keeping in view facts such as the size of the territory covered by the 
broadcast and that of size of the audience, royalties payable by the 
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emitting broadcasting organisations be determined. The recent example 
of litigation on the question of televising of Wills World Cup 1996 by 
the World Tel is a case in point where negotitation alone could pave the 
way of reasonable settlement of the dispute. The contract law therefore 
is going to be extensively used. 
Thus there is little doubt that the number of consumers of 
copvrieht will continue to crow in the field of information and educa-
tion as well as in the field of entertainment. Both scholastic and 
vocational education are constantly being extended and as people 
become better educated they become more eager for more widely 
accessible information in all fields. As technology in broadcasting 
develops, more and more programme hours will have to be filled and 
much of the longer broadcast day and increasing number of broadcast 
channels will consist of copyright material. The age span of each 
consumer of copyright is growing as people earn earlier and live longer. 
Working hours continue to get shorter thus increasing leisure hours (i.e. 
five day week scheme) which tends to increase copyright consumption. 
Copyright owners will thus create works for ever-increasing markets 
which should add to their economic return from such works. The 
problem of future, therefore, is whether they will be able to control 
these new markets. 
In this situation control of copyright works by individual copy-
right owners is impossible, but it is suggested that control by collecting 
societies on behalf of all copyright owners is still possible. Performinc 
rights & music are outstanding examples. Infact the choice is between 
control by these societies or no control at all and once control of a right 
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is lost it is very difficult to regain and in the long run the right will 
atrophy. Now that recording equipment is sufficiently to be owned by 
individual members of the public and be used in their homes, any 
control at the stage of making copies becomes impossible and copyright 
protection can only remain effective ifexercisedatamuch earlier stage 
This can to some extent solve the challenge of Internet as well. Thus tlie 
purpose of copyright, which is to assure to the owners of copyright 
material an equitable remuneration for each use of the copyright 
material they have created, can only be achieved by a reinterpretation 
of the concept of copyright in the light of these new circumstances. That 
widened concept must include the restoration of the original and most 
basic copyright - the reproduction right. It doesn't matter 'whether the 
rights are directed against a communicator making the work available 
to the public or against an enterprise producing the equipment making 
reproduction by the public possible or even against the members of the 
public themselves. Nothing short of this will assure the effectiveness of 
copyright protection in the electronic communications of 21st century. 
But if the collective administration doesn't work as discussed above 
then the choice remains between a 'statutory licence' and a 'compul-
sory licence'. The former is a licence under which protected works 
could be freely used on condition that the user paid a fee, fixed by the 
law or by a competent authority. The latter is a licence requiring the 
copyright owner to grant the necessary permission without however 
depriving him of the right to negotiate the terms of authorisation. Th'is 
authors right to claim an equitable reward for the use of his work is to 
be protected and limitation imposed in the public interest does not lead 
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to the unjustified advancement of commercial interests of users. This 
expresses the basic principle that the remuneration in order to be 
equitable should be freely negotiated. These negotiations for the equi-
table remuneration should take place in the form of collective bargain-
ing which in many cases will be between two near monopolies, repre-
senting right owners and right users, the law should provide for a 
special tribunal to adjudicate if agreement can't be reached between 
these parties. Such copyright royalty tribunals already exist in U.K. 
Germany etc. 
If large areas of the use of copyright material remain uncontrolled 
and therefore not remunerated and copyright owners can not stop this 
mass of large scale infringement, the whole currency of copyright risks 
devolution from indifference and common contempt'". What is, there-
fore, needed today is what Professor Cornish Calls 'techniques for 
converting paper rights into revenue gen lating realities'. These tech-
niques, it is suggested could be of three kinds : 
i) maintaining a complete copyright and exercising it by a blanket 
licensing system administered through d collecting society mak-
ing collective agreements with large single users or categories of 
smaller users; 
ii) reducing the absolute right to authorise or forbid the use of the 
protected material to a right of equitable remuneration which will 
still in most cases be exercised in the same way as those under (i) 
abo'c. 
The precedents for the collective exercise of copyrights, whethc. 
they are absolute rights or rights to equitable remuneration, are the 
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collecting societies set up by the owners of performing rights, most of 
which in the field of musical copyright have more than half a century of 
experience of blanket licensing. These licences are granted in advance 
of the use to organisation which regularly perform copyright material. 
Such a society relating to music was established in India in 1995 under 
the leadership of famous musician Naushad Ali and in a year's time 
royalty worth 60 lakh rupees was collected and distributed amongst the 
musicians. 
(ill) Putting a royalty on equipment which is used by the public for the 
reproduction of copyright material. 
Whatever solution is adopted to solve these problems, there \% ill 
still remain, as suggested above, a need for a certain amount of 
supervision of the collecting societies. 
Before this study is closed, few specific words as to the Indian 
experience of copyright law and justice are necessary. How does this 
study evaluate the Indian experiment ? The question is important and 
adequate knowledge has to be developed to respond to it. First, we need 
close empirical examination of copyright problems in India. The present 
work is not the end but only a humble beginning. Many more 
researches are to be conducted to arive at plausible conclusions and 
solutions. Secondly, we need to know more fully the ratio, and the 
rationale, of copyright litigation settled out-of court as co ipared with 
those fully litigated. The future researches should move in this direction 
as well. Thirdly, we need some assessment of probable copyrii-' • 
infringements which go unredressed at law for a whole variety o. 
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reasons - ignorance of rights, difficulties of access to courts, the slow 
growth of copyright law, associational weaknesses among producers of 
different genres of protected works and bureaucratic styles of adminis-
tration of copyright legislation. 
Pending such knowledge bases, all one has is the Copyright Act. 
statutory amendments in the Act to keep pace with the technological 
revolution and slender corpus of decisional law. 
On this basis, all one could say in that Indian law as on the statute 
book does not sound all that immature yet it has not so far been put to 
any real use. What, therefore, is needed is to increase copyright 
conciousness as an aspect of the Indian social and cultural development 
and justice. Clearly, as a priority task, the obstacles imposed by the 
crises of the Indian adjudicatory system, especially enormous delays, 
staggering costs and wavering decisional law. have to be redressed and 
access to adjudication improved. The present structural disincentives to 
the use of protective provisions of copyright legislation have to be 
removed. And this can, perhaps, be best done through a network of 
easily accessible copyright tribunals throughout the country. Further 
the improved working of Copyright Board in this regard is also must 
and will go a long way to make copyright protection in India a reality. 
The Board should not remain as described painfully by the learned 
scholar, Prof. D.C. Pandey'", a forum which is infertile" to provide 
measures and relief to helpless authors against infringers of copyright.. 
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